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MISCELLANEOUS

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE Va. 20THE WASHINGTON POST
30 October 1980**JACK ANDERSON**

Trying to Plug a U.S. 'Radar Hole'

The Carter administration's recent decision to dispatch four of the Air Force's Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes to Saudi Arabia might lead the average citizen to believe there are plenty of the high-technology aircraft to go around.

But the painful fact is that the United States needs every AWACS plane it has—and more—to protect the continental United States from a sneak attack.

A top-secret Pentagon assessment of our interlocking early warning systems has turned up a frightening flaw: a "radar hole" big enough for the Soviets to drive an armada of low-flying nuclear bombers through.

The report puts the message in one succinct, hair-raising paragraph: "Present U.S. surveillance systems can provide warning of aircraft attacking at high or medium altitudes through the polar region, but they have virtually no capability to provide warning or attack characterization from any other threat axis."

In other words, if the Russians—or the Chinese, for that matter—don't oblige us by sending their bombers in from just the right direction and at just the right altitude, the United States might not know they were coming until the bombs started falling.

Present U.S. early warning systems are aimed primarily at incoming in-

tercontinental ballistic missiles, which undoubtedly would approach from the north. Satellites and tracking stations provide good coverage.

But for early warning on aircraft, Pentagon sources told my associate Dale Van Atta, the United States depends on the outdated Semi-Automatic Ground Environment System and its intended replacement, the Joint Surveillance System, which say is not much better.

"Both of these systems are range-limited, both leave significant gaps in low-altitude radar coverage," the secret report warns. In addition, even the Joint Surveillance System lacks what the Pentagon calls "counter-countermeasures capability"—meaning electronic equipment that could overcome jamming and other enemy techniques that can neutralize our radar defenses.

This is where the AWACS planes come in—or could, if we had enough of them. AWACS aircraft, the report notes, "can provide low-altitude coverage, but they are too few in numbers and . . . would be prohibitively expensive to maintain as a strategic warning fence while remaining available for other assigned missions."

The United States has exactly 20 of these \$100 million-per-copy super-sophisticated surveillance planes. Two more have been funded for each of the next three fiscal years, with an eventual goal of 34 AWACS aircraft.

Even that would be inadequate for proper protection of the continental United States, particularly when, as now, up to 20 percent of the AWACS force is deployed on "other assigned missions" elsewhere in the world.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon is trying to plug the radar hole without having to depend solely on AWACS planes, which it would prefer to keep for their designed role in offensive operations rather than as a defensive stopgap.

"An Enhanced Distant Early Warning line of minimally attended radars could improve coverage in the northern approaches to North America and significantly reduce operating costs," the secret report states. "Over-the-Horizon Backscatter radars will provide long-range surveillance of the coastal approaches."

The Pentagon also wants a modernized interceptor aircraft force—as well as more AWACS aircraft.

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ON PAGE 5-16

THE WASHINGTON POST
29 October 1980

JACK ANDERSON

'The Most Dangerous Game' in Mideast

A deadly two-man game has been going on for years in the Middle East—and both players are men who should know better. The participants, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi, have been trying, by one means or another, to remove the other from the playing field "with extreme prejudice"—by assassination or violent overthrow.

This updated version of "The Most Dangerous Game" has been followed with some nervousness by the American intelligence community. U.S. hopes for peace and stability in the region would blow sky-high if either Sadat or Qaddafi succeeded in rubbing out his rival.

The seesaw struggle between the two leaders is chronicled in U.S. intelligence files. The falling-out began nearly a decade ago. Qaddafi, a young pan-Arab zealot, was an admirer of Sadat's revolutionary colleague and predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the charismatic military man who masterminded the ouster of Egypt's playboy King Farouk in the 1950s. Nasser at one point tried to unite Egypt and Libya as a first step in creating one great Arab nation.

Qaddafi—who even lived for a time in Sadat's home—came to believe that Sadat had betrayed the Nasser dream and the pan-Arab cause. Even before Sadat solidified this suspicion by making peace with Israel, the two

Arab rivals indulged in what State Department analysts described in their reports as "bizarre adventures" aimed at each other's throat.

In actual numbers, Qaddafi has probably planned more violence against Sadat than the other way around. But Sadat has done his share.

In public, Sadat has called his desert neighbor crazy, childish and suffering from a Napoleonic complex. In private, he has planned Qaddafi's assassination.

"President Sadat," says one of several top-secret CIA reports, "has ordered the Egyptian intelligence service to draw up plans to overthrow Libyan President Qaddafi . . . Sadat reportedly stipulated that the coup should appear to originate within Libya, and that care be taken to conceal Egypt's hand . . . Sadat is apparently going about the planning with some caution."

One of many Qaddafi plots against Sadat is described in a top-secret State Department report. It tells of a meeting between the Libyan dictator and George Habash, a member of one of the Palestinian terrorist groups Qaddafi has bankrolled to the tune of some \$70 million a year.

Habash was promised all the money he needed to engineer Sadat's overthrow, according to the report. The plot was to involve leftist Egyptian army officers, Palestinians and communists, and was to include "a plan to assassinate the Egyptian leader, using

non-Arab terrorists to avoid damaging the Palestinian position in the Arab world."

One Qaddafi plot against Sadat was discovered by Israeli intelligence and the Egyptian president was tipped off. Sadat angrily ordered a border attack on Libya. Alarmed by this open clash, the United States quietly stepped in.

But the plots keep coming "every three to six months," including one by Qaddafi to blow up Sadat's plane on his way home from Washington last April. Our intelligence agents learned of the plot and Sadat was routed through England instead.

ON PAGE **7**

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
29 October 1980

E. Berliner arrested as spy in W. Germany

Karlsruhe, West Germany (UPI)—West German authorities have arrested an East German suspected of spying, the eighth alleged Communist spy caught in the last two weeks, the federal prosecutor said today.

Rainer Koenig, 40, a lecturer at an East Berlin university, is suspected of having spied for the East German State Security Ministry, police said. Koenig, at the time of his arrest, had a false West Berlin identity card, intelligence paraphernalia and a large sum of money, police said.

Intelligence officials estimated that 16,000 Communist agents are in West Germany, 70% of them East Germans.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
28 October 1980

The Federal Diary By Mike Causey

Guerrilla Warfare Rages Over Parking

Steps will be taken to eliminate free parking for government employees in order to reduce the waste of energy, particularly gasoline, in commuting to and from work.

— From President Carter's televised address to the nation on the energy crisis, April 5, 1979.

Ever since the president uttered that line, in his button-up-your-overcoat pep talk to Americans, the U.S. government has been involved in a guerrilla war with its employees, one of every seven of whom now has to pay for a parking spot he used to get free.

Unhappiness with pay parking is not limited to any one class of U.S. workers. The protests came from lowly clerks from admirals and generals, and even from the head of the CIA. He said his folks in the Langley, Va., woods shouldn't have to pay to park because bus service to the agency is lousy. But six months after Carter said that, the government was going to set up its own pay lots, more than 350,000 employees have gone into pay parking. Others have joined car pools or are parking someplace far from the office where they don't have to pay.

Six months after the parking fees went into effect, a federal judge here ruled that Uncle Sam may have acted improperly in implementing pay parking on the basis of something the president said on television. Commenting on a lawsuit brought by the American Federation of Government Employees, U.S. District Judge Harold H. Greene quashed a government motion to dismiss the case. He said, in effect, that government workers don't have "property rights" to parking spaces at the office, but that the AFGE union might have a case on grounds that Carter didn't implement the parking order properly, as part of his energy conservation program or via an executive order.

The judge's decision, which was cheered by much of bureaucratic Washington, left many people with the impression that pay parking was about to end. And many hoped that they would be able to get back their portion of the \$1.5 million that federal agencies collect here each month. The word is, don't hold your breath. And don't count on any parking-fee rebate to do your Christmas shopping.

Uncle Sam is sure to fight the case all the way to the Supreme Court if necessary. Some legal eagles believe Carter could carry the day if he would issue an executive order implementing the pay parking system anew. But they speculate that he will not do that before the election anyhow.

Currently, federal workers in metro Washington pay between \$25 and \$30 a month for a space at the office. Some rather large bureaucracies have grown in a number of federal agencies to administer the collection of funds, assignment of spaces and distribution of parking signs or stickers. Next year, if the pay-parking edict sticks, those fees will double for many parkers to bring fees up to commercial rates.

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ON PAGE **B12**

THE WASHINGTON POST
28 October 1980

JACK ANDERSON

U.S. Heads Off Shipment to Soviets

Jimmy Carter reacted to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by announcing a tough embargo on the sale of militarily useful hardware to Russia by American manufacturers.

Not long after, the president's new hardline policy got its first real work-out, and for sheer melodrama it surpassed anything in the staid, button-down Commerce Department's recent history. It almost took a last-minute charge by the U.S. cavalry to rescue a high-technology shipment from the devious, double-dealing Kremlin agents, who had arranged for a freighter to pick up the goods.

The sensitive material consisted of spray guns, drying ovens and other items needed to coat jet engines with a protective ceramic layer. The process prolongs the life of the treated jets, and is essential for long-range aircraft.

The manufacturer, Sermetal Inc. of Limerick, Pa., a subsidiary of Teleflex Inc., had struck a deal with the Soviet Union to provide the technology, the assembly line components and quality-control training that would enable the Russians to set up their own high-speed engine treatment complex. The contract was worth \$6 million to \$8 million for the American company.

Sermetal got the necessary licenses from the Commerce Department in June 1978, despite Defense Department objections and a CIA recommendation against the sale. By the

time the Afghanistan eye-opener changed the picture early this year, Sermetal had already delivered 56 volumes of technical data to the Soviets.

But the assembly line components were still in this country, and in early February the Pentagon asked the Commerce Department to revoke Sermetal's export license. Commerce sent two field agents to inform Sermetal its license was being reevaluated.

At the time, the company was scheduled to turn the assembly line material over to Amtorg, the Soviet government trade organization, in New York by June. But after the Commerce Department visit, Sermetal executives, presumably fearing the loss of their lucrative contract, moved the delivery date up to April.

Meanwhile, unbeknownst to Sermetal, a top-level interagency group in Washington decided late in February that the export license should be revoked. For some reason, Commerce never acted on the decision.

On March 24—a Monday—Defense Secretary Harold Brown sent a hand-delivered message to Commerce Secretary Philip Klutznick, ordering him to stop the shipment. Klutznick ignored the message.

Four days later—on Friday, March 28—the FBI notified the Pentagon that the Russians were diverting a freighter to pick up the shipment. Brig. Gen. William Odom, military

aide to national security affairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, telephoned top Commerce officials. He ordered them to stop the shipment and threatened to go to the president if action weren't taken immediately.

Thus inspired, Commerce finally acted. At 5:15 p.m. that Friday, Sermetal got a phone call from Commerce enforcement agents wanting to know where the material was located. Company officials said the government agents were in "complete panic," but that Sermetal assured them the goods were safe in a Newark, N.J., warehouse. Pentagon officials, however, told my reporters Lonnie Rosenwald and Vicki Warren that Sermetal disclosed the location only after a Commerce official threatened economic sanctions against the company.

At any rate, Commerce ordered Customs Service officers to impound the shipment, only to be told that it was too late on a Friday evening to carry out the order. So Commerce had to send its own field agents to stick on the labels that officially impounded the material.

Sermetal has appealed the revocation of its export license. Commerce is conducting an internal investigation of the delay in effecting the revocation. And a group of Republican senators led by Utah's Jake Garn is trying to set up a special strategic trade office to take over export controls from the reluctant Commerce Department.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 42THE NEW REPUBLIC
1 November 1980

Washington Diarist

Many reporters I know are frustrated novelists, but I'd never thought Daniel Schorr one of them, certainly not on the evidence of his dogged and matter-of-fact writing. But then in *TNR* of October 4 I read "The Trigon Caper," a story he'd brought in on a day I was in New York. It began, "The Brotherhood is a fraternity of the political right and outcasts from the intelligence-defense establishment. . . ." I hadn't known this cabal actually had a name. Obviously I'd heard about these strange American paranoids, who actually think the Soviets spy on us, for years at dinner parties on New York's Upper West Side. But Schorr's suggestion that senators Pat Moynihan, Jesse Helms, Malcolm Wallop, and Gordon Humphrey, plus a few US and British security intellectu-

als, actually composed something remotely like a network is sheer invention. In some rough sense, I suppose, these men have something in common—about what Robert Taft and the Communist party had in common when they both supported public housing in the 1950s. Schorr rightly faults the *New York Times* for identifying Brzezinski aide David Aaron as the official apparently suspected by some of having compromised an American agent in Moscow. But then Schorr complains that neither Moynihan nor Wallop, whose Senate subcommittee was trying to find out who might have been responsible for the security breach, "nor their staffers would say whom they had in mind." Did Schorr really want them, but not the *Times*, to finger Aaron? Since I believe Aaron is guilty of nothing, I'm glad they didn't and sorry the *Times* did. But if anyone is guilty of anything in this messy affair, I'm also glad that a Senate committee is investigating despite the CIA assurances that there's nothing to investigate. When does Schorr trust the CIA? When it suits him. The Russians think this committee is so important that they have tried to place an agent on its staff.

M.P.

ARTICLE ABSTRACTED
ON PAGE 20

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
3 November 1980

Washington Whispers ®

U.S. intelligence experts were convinced in late October that virtually all 52 American hostages in Iran had been brought back to Teheran, most of them to the American Embassy, to protect them from possible uprisings in other parts of the country.

★ ★ ★

The view is nearly universal in America's intelligence community that the Soviet Union, within a year, will be forced to send troops into Poland to prevent that nation's Communist Party from losing control of the country to independent labor unions.

★ ★ ★

ARTICLE APPEARED
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26 October 1980

VIP

The McLean Bar Where Spooks Hang Out

By Maxine Cheshire

IT IS A scene out of a John le Carré novel and it has been one of the CIA's best kept secrets. There are those in the "Mission Impossible" world of espionage who claim to use it as one of the most efficient mail drops in any world capital.

Write a name on an envelope, they say, forget about postage, and leave it behind the bar, right under the autographed picture of former CIA director George Bush and a sign that says: "Tipping Is Not a City in China."

Somehow, magically, the letter disappears and to no one's surprise, finds its way to its destination, without any assistance from the postal authorities.

To the spies and spooks and secret agents who hang out there, the place is called O'Toole's. But don't try looking up the address in the phone book. It isn't listed under that, or any other name.

There is a sign erected on the parking lot which reads Bill's Place. But that isn't listed in the phone book either.

Neither is McLean Inn Restaurant, another name which the owner, John Francis (Jack) O'Toole, uses in referring to his establishment.

O'Toole's is located at 6671 Old Dominion Drive in McLean, just minutes from CIA headquarters in Langley.

It looks like a blue-collar pub, except that there are few blue-collar men among the regulars around the bar.

On one wall hangs a souvenir of the Soviet Union T-shirt emblazoned in the Cyrillic alphabet with the KGB emblem that is mistaken sometimes by newcomers for a Kappa Rho Gamma fraternity memento.

Next to it is an old Foreign Legion recruitment poster left behind by some soldier of fortune. And next to that is a new CIA version of Monopoly which, according to regulars, has been recently patented and is expected to go into mass marketing.

Alongside thumb-tacked color Polaroid shots of bar girls in Vietnam before the fall, and a Dec. 7, 1941, special Pearl Harbor edition of the Honolulu Star Bulletin, someone has stuck up a poignant appeal for financial assistance for a veteran CIA employee mustered out six months short of retirement.

Jack O'Toole isn't anxious to have his place identified to the public as the CIA's favorite hangout. "That's a no-no," he told a reporter who was introduced last week by agency-connected sources. "I keep a low profile. . . . I have customers who are doctors, lawyers, Indian chiefs. . . . we don't advertise, we're a word-of-mouth business."

Once, during Watergate, when a food critic thought it would be great fun to find out where CIA types such as E. Howard Hunt hung out, he went prowling around Langley looking for the place known as O'Toole's.

He never found it. Someone deliberately steered him to the wrong place and he wrote an entire column on a different bar.

If anyone doubts that O'Toole's is "THE" hangout, there at the bar almost every night sits Lucien ("Black Luigi") Conein, the former CIA agent who was described by David Halberstam in "The Best and the Brightest" as someone sprung to life from a pulp adventure.

O'Toole's was also a place frequented by Frank Terpil, the former CIA agent who is now a fugitive who fled the U.S. to avoid prosecution on charges of training terrorists and exporting high-powered explosives.

His house, seized by the IRS which claims he owns \$2.8 million in unpaid taxes, is only a few miles from the bar and is the source of a lot of discussion currently at O'Toole's. Abandoned, with dirty water threatening to freeze and burst the blue-tiled swimming pool, the Terpil house is a monument to misspent lives in the intelligence service.

Vepco has disconnected the electrical service and tacked a \$351.31 bill on the front door.

UPI

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AM-JFK 10-25

ASSASSINATION PROBER SAYS OSWALD-CIA LINK IGNORED
BY IRA R. ALLEN

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- TWO CAPITOL HILL COMMITTEES THAT PROBED THE JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION FAILED TO PURSUE POSSIBLE LINKS BETWEEN THE CIA AND LEE HARVEY OSWALD, A FORMER CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATOR CHARGED SATURDAY.

GAETON FONZI, WRITING IN WASHINGTONIAN MAGAZINE, SAID THE PANELS IGNORED EVIDENCE TYING OSWALD TO A MAN PURPORTED TO BE THE CIA OVERSEER IN CHARGE OF WORKING AGAINST CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO.

FONZI WORKED FOR THE SPECIAL HOUSE ASSASSINATIONS COMMITTEE IN 1977 AND 1978 AND ALSO LOOKED INTO THE KENNEDY KILLING FOR A SUBCOMMITTEE HEADED BY SEN. RICHARD SCHWEIKER, R-PA., DURING THE 1975 SENATE INVESTIGATION OF CIA ABUSES.

IT WAS SCHWEIKER WHO RECOGNIZED A COMPOSITE DRAWING OF THE SUPPOSED CIA LATIN AMERICA SPYMASTER AS CIA AGENT DAVID PHILLIPS. THE DRAWING WAS BASED ON THE RECOLLECTION OF A CUBAN EXILE WHO WORKED FOR 13 YEARS AS AN ANTI-CASTRO TERRORIST UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF AN AMERICAN WHO SAID HE WAS MAURICE BISHOP.

SCHWEIKER LINKED THE DRAWING OF BISHOP WITH A PHOTOGRAPH OF PHILLIPS, WHOM THE SENATOR KNEW FROM PREVIOUS TESTIMONY. PHILLIPS, UNDER OATH, DENIED HE IS BISHOP.

THE CUBAN EXILE, ANTONIO VECIANA, TOLD FONZI THAT WHILE WAITING TO MEET BISHOP IN DALLAS SEPTEMBER 1963 -- TWO MONTHS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT WAS SHOT -- HE SAW BISHOP TALKING WITH A MAN HE LATER IDENTIFIED AS OSWALD.

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UPI

"THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND," FONZI SAID. "WHEN I ASKED HIM IF THE MAN COULD HAVE BEEN SOMEONE WHO RESEMBLED OSWALD, VECIANA SAID: 'WELL, YOU KNOW, BISHOP HIMSELF TAUGHT ME HOW TO REMEMBER FACES ... I AM SURE IT WAS OSWALD. IF IT WASN'T OSWALD, IT WAS SOMEONE WHO LOOKED EXACTLY LIKE HIM.'"

BUT VECIANA SAID THE COMPOSITE DRAWING OF BISHOP DID NOT MATCH A PHOTOGRAPH OF PHILLIPS, ALTHOUGH HE SAID THE RESEMBLANCE WAS "CLOSE."

IN AN INTERVIEW WITH UPI, FONZI SAID HE DOES NOT BELIEVE VECIANA ON THAT SCORE AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE, UNLIKE THE SENATE CIA PANEL, DID NOT BELIEVE PHILLIPS' DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED ALIAS.

"I BELIEVE PHILLIPS IS MAURICE BISHOP, IN THE SAME WAY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE DID NOT BELIEVE PHILLIPS WHEN HE SAID HE WAS NOT BISHOP," FONZI SAID.

THE SCHWEIKER SUBCOMMITTEE SUGGESTED CASTRO MAY HAVE ORDERED KENNEDY KILLED IN RETALIATION FOR AMERICAN PLOTS AGAINST HIM, BUT "THE VECIANA LEAD RAN COUNTER TO THE CASTRO-RETALIATION THEORY," FONZI SAID. "RATHER, IT LINKED OSWALD TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE."

"IT WAS NOT HARD EVIDENCE (BUT IT) SCREAMED FOR THE (HOUSE) COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION," FONZI WROTE.

"IT NEVER GOT THAT ATTENTION ... AND SO, BECAUSE IT DID NOT HONOR ITS MANDATE TO CONDUCT 'A FULL AND COMPLETE' INVESTIGATION IN THIS IMPORTANT AREA, THE COMMITTEE HAD TO DISTORT THE FACTS IN ITS FINAL REPORT IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY ITS CONCLUSION."

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CENTRAL AMERICA

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 October 1980

ARRIVAL AIRPORT
ON PAGE 1

Jamaica politics — and gunrunners

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Montego Bay, Jamaica

The eastern end of the runway at Sangster International Airport here was dark — clouds blocking out the bright moonlight that bathed the western end of the runway and the terminal building.

Soon after 11 p.m., a twin-engine Cessna on a flight from Opa Locka, Fla., landed along the darkened portion of the runway, hesitated as a cache of arms and ammunition in metal containers was dropped off, and then taxied normally to the airport terminal.

Another shipment of arms to this troubled island had arrived. And all would have gone well for the gunrunners if a Trans-Jamaica aircraft on a delayed flight from Kingston, the capital, had not landed almost immediately afterward. The pilot of the commercial craft spotted the containers at the far end of the runway and notified the control tower.

That brought immigration, customs, and police officials scurrying to the darkened end of the runway where they found the containers and their small arsenal: 10 automatic rifles, 10 silencers with their serial numbers erased, 12,000 rounds of 5.56 cartridges in 12 boxes, and 17 magazines for the rifles. Soon a full investigation was under way. Senior police officials were summoned.

The two pilots of the Cessna were quickly picked up and the plane, of Jamaican registry, was impounded. For the police, the discovery was one of the first in which so much weaponry was located at one time.

The incident took place Oct. 27 — less than 60 hours before Jamaicans were to go to the polls Oct. 30 in a critical parliamentary election.

Although seizure of the weapons got plenty of publicity, it is unlikely that the police will come up with any findings in time to have any impact on the vote. The incident, nevertheless, focuses attention on the mounting violence that has become such a part of Jamaican life in recent years. Close to 600 persons have died since Jan. 1 in the current election-year escalation of the trouble.

Guns are commonplace. It was not always so. In simpler, earlier times, they were seldom a part of a household. But a police spokesman in Kingston this week said, "Now they are almost as common in the home as a bed."

That may overstretch the point for most parts of this lovely Caribbean island. But the police official was speaking specifically of the ghetto area of West Kingston, where much of this weaponry eventually ends up — and where most of the killing and violence take place.

Another source estimates there are 25,000 illegal guns on the island — rifles, pistols, and even submachine guns. He says there are ammunition caches all around the island that police have not discovered.

This violence has come up as a major issue of the current political campaign — with Prime Minister Michael Manley and his opponent Edward Seaga trading verbal blows and blaming each other's political parties.

Both admit, however, that the bully boys of Mr. Manley's People's National Party (PNP) and Mr. Seaga's Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), are not above reproach. There are parts of Kingston that are labeled PNP or JLP territory, and supporters of the other party enter at their own risk. Barricades set up by advocates of one party or the other block off whole streets. Gunshots can be heard, especially at night, and the morning newspapers are full of reports of killing and related incidents of the day before.

Mr. Manley and his PNP blame the JLP for much of the killing. Some PNP activists suggest it was the JLP that began the round of violence a decade ago when it began illegally importing weapons for use by its bully boys. The JLP predictably counters that all the blame should be placed in the lap of the PNP.

Mr. Seaga suggests that much of the weaponry in the hands of the PNP comes from Cuba, with which Prime Minister Manley has had increasingly friendly relations over the past five years. Mr. Manley, on other hand, charges the JLP has support from the US CIA and from the US government in general — implying that the JLP gets weapons from this source.

The impounding of the weapons at the airport might suggest a shipment for the JLP, if one were to believe the PNP, since the weapons came apparently from the US. But things are not that simple.

Over the years, PNP activists have been caught by police with weapons bearing US markings, and JLP activists have been found to have weapons with Czech markings, presumably coming from Cuba.

A more logical explanation seems to be that the weapons arrive from many sources and are then sold to the highest bidder in a clandestine market about which the police have only limited knowledge.

"We simply do not know where the weapons come from and how they get here, and how they are then sold or distributed across the island," said a police spokesman. "That is why the Montego Bay incident is so intriguing. We may be able to find out who the traffickers are."

For most Jamaicans, there seems to be a growing hope that somehow the violence spawned by all the tremendous firepower on the island will decline in the days ahead. A JLP candidate in Mandeville said this week, "It does not matter who started the violence and who is now responsible, for what most Jamaicans want is an end to it all so that we can go on and live decently."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-8NEW YORK TIMES
29 OCTOBER 1980

Six Months After Exodus, Life's a Little Easier in Cuba

By JO THOMAS
Special to The New York Times

HAVANA, Oct. 27 — Havana appears far less tense today than it was in the frantic days last spring when 10,800 people rushed onto the grounds of the Peruvian Embassy, complaining about everything from a lack of freedom to a lack of shoes, and Cubans sailed by the thousands for Florida, jeered and sometimes beaten by those they left behind.

Gone are the signs saying "Good Riddance!" and the bright red anti-American posters showing machine guns and warning Yankees to "Remember Girón," the Cuban name for the Bay of Pigs.

But more important are the small notices that have begun to appear in the supplement to the monthly newspaper Opina. "Fix your gas stove," says one, adding that the service is "fast and dependable."

Other classified ads offer foreign-language instruction or repairs to televisions, washing machines or marble. Some offer photographic services, car rentals, magic shows and clowns.

The advertisements are evidence of a development that American diplomats here see as significant: the beginning of a private-service sector in the economy. For the first time, two people can contract for services without going through the state.

Surplus Sold in Farmers' Markets

The diplomats see the development as part of a trend that began last year to liberalize the economy by providing more incentives, flexibility and efficiency and trying to ease consumer demand for goods and services. Earlier this year, farmers who met their production quotas were allowed to sell their surplus in farmers' markets.

In addition, employers can now contract independently for workers without having to go to the state's central labor pool, as long as the worker is registered with the state. An advertisement in the latest issue of Opina solicits five economic directors, five accountants and six work organizers for the paint department of the Special Auto Service Business. The requirements include a "moral outlook in accord with the principles of our society."

American observers see the increased liberalization as the continuation of a trend that seemed, during the refugee crisis in April and May, to be in danger of stopping but now seems stronger than ever. They also see it as an effort to ease discontent and tension among consumers.

Although 125,262 Cubans left the country between April 21 and Sept. 26, when President Fidel Castro closed the port of Mariel, Cuban officials estimate there are still about 375,000 who would like to get out.

No Plans for Most Emigrants

Cuban and American officials have agreed that 600 refugees stranded at Mariel when the boatlift to Florida was cut short will be allowed to leave the country, but there are no special arrangements for the others.

Ever since last spring's exodus began, Cuban officials have conceded privately that they knew their society would have to absorb those left behind. They expressed optimism that they could do it without severe problems. In recent weeks, in an apparent effort to make life more enjoyable for those who stayed, the prices of many consumer goods have been cut, sometimes by 50 percent.

A Cuban housewife said she saw "a wonderful flowered blouse" that used to cost 100 pesos, or \$143, that now cost 50 pesos. She added: "It's still expensive, but possible. What I'd really like and can't get are comfortable shoes."

In the storage room of the United States Interests Section in the Swiss Embassy there is a growing pile of bags filled with mail from Cubans who want to leave the country.

Stopped Counting at 6,000

American officials stopped counting the letters when the number reached 6,000, and that was many mailbags ago. There is only a small consular staff to read the visa reports, and the handwritten letters that have been opened lie stacked in boxes waiting for someone to consider them.

"Mariel suggests to both countries," said an American diplomat, "that two countries so close together should normalize their relations and respect one another's immigration laws." The release this week of 33 American prisoners serving sentences for offenses ranging from hijacking and drug smuggling to illegal entry was seen by both Cubans and Americans here as one in a series of efforts by Cuba to improve its relationship with the United States.

Some of those who were in custody in Cuba had been arrested after being chased into Cuban waters by the United States Coast Guard. The Coast Guard and the Cuban border guard cooperate informally against suspected drug traffickers.

Gestures to Prisoners' Families

The release of the American prisoners was described by the Cuban Government as a good-will gesture in response to requests from relatives, members of Congress and private organizations.

There have been other subtle signs that Cuba is trying to ease tension in the region. Direct flights to Jamaica have reportedly been canceled until after the elections to be held there on Thursday. The Cubans have repeatedly been accused of interfering in those elections, a charge they deny.

And although some Cuban officials say privately that they are worried about what they see as the growing militance of anti-Castro exiles and what they think is an increase in the number of Central Intelligence Agency officials in Miami, they are not making a public issue of this.

No one here expects any dramatic or immediate improvement in Cuban-American relations. But diplomatic observers in Havana have suggested the possibility of a small but significant good-will gesture by the United States, such as the dropping of the embargo on medicine, cultural exchanges, or even scheduled air service between Miami and Havana.

PHILADELPHIA BULLETIN
20 October 1980

DONALD LAMBRO

Political manipulation of CIA

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency has confirmed in secret testimony what President Carter will not publicly acknowledge to Congress: that Nicaragua is exporting its revolution to neighboring countries in Central America.



This was the blunt, but still classified, message that the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency delivered jointly to a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee. The CIA and DIA have closely monitored the Sandinista-led government's terrorist activities against El Salvador and elsewhere in Latin America.

Members present at the closed-door hearing of the House Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee — including Chairman Gus Yatron (D-Pa) — were described as "stunned" by the details of Nicaraguan skullduggery, considering the President's unqualified pledge to the contrary.

"Members were sitting there with their mouths open," related one observer. "They (CIA and DIA) confirmed exactly what Carter had told them was not happening."

Last May the President signed a foreign assistance bill which included a \$75 million loan for Nicaragua. Under the bill, Carter was ordered to certify in writing that the Sandinista government "has not cooperated with or harbors any international terrorist organization or is aiding, abetting, or supporting acts of violence or terrorism in other countries."

The White House stalled for more than three months while the State Department tried to find ways to transfer aid from other foreign aid funds. This would have avoided the need for certification that, said one State Department source, "would be impossible for the President to honestly comply with."

Finally, on Sept. 12, Carter sent Congress a flat denial, stating that Nicaragua was not engaged in any foreign adventures, although his own intelligence reports revealed these in convincing detail.

The secret intelligence testimony given before Yatron's panel on Sept. 30 essentially confirmed the

public testimony of Rep. C.W. Bill Young (R-Fla), which detailed a laundry list of accusations against the Sandinistas.

They included the confession of a captured Salvadoran terrorist who said he was involved in shipping arms from Nicaragua to rebel forces in El Salvador — with some arms being supplied by the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Further intelligence testimony confirmed the existence of rebel training camps in Nicaragua from which raids into El Salvador are being staged.

As to Carter's denial of any Nicaraguan support for terrorist organizations: The subcommittee was told of numerous connections between the Palestinian Liberation Organization, including PLO supervision of Nicaraguan military training camps.

Last June the official Managua Radio Sandino reported that leftist revolutionaries in El Salvador had united with the Sandinistas: "A single army will emerge from their force, their heroism, their revolutionary awareness, their responsibility toward the peoples of the world and their unity," the broadcast said.

Young, whose testimony was based on his own CIA sources, stressed that "there is essentially no disagreement within the intelligence community on the evidence."

Yet, he said, "While the intelligence community is reporting one thing about what is occurring in Nicaragua," the President "chooses to disregard that evidence and certify otherwise."

But beyond Carter's apparent ignorance or dishonesty in the matter lies a broader and potentially more explosive issue: the political manipulation of the CIA by the White House.

When House Intelligence Committee aides sought a briefing with CIA analysts about Nicaragua last August, they were told that such a meeting was not possible because of "a presidential embargo" on all future discussions about the Central American country. The embargo was suddenly lifted on Sept. 10, two days before Carter issued his certification that Nicaragua was not assisting revolutionaries in other countries.

Donald Lambro is a syndicated columnist.

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CIA UNCLASSIFIED STUDIES

Approved For Release 2009/06/15 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501430001-1

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A15THE WASHINGTON POST
27 October 1980*Igor Birman*

The Way to Slow the Arms Race

The question of whether the United States should challenge the Soviet Union to an intensified "arms race" is now at the center of American political debate, and I would like to answer it from the standpoint of one who worked as an economist in the Soviet Union for many years before emigrating to this country in 1974.

My answer begins here: the American intelligence agencies have made major errors in their estimates of the Soviet economy. They say that Soviet GNP was about 60 percent of American GNP in 1978, that the Soviets spend 11 percent to 13 percent of this GNP on the military and that the Soviets will not reduce their military spending but likely will increase it—because a reduction would not benefit them economically.

The 60 percent GNP estimate is critical. Note that the CIA estimate is even higher than the Soviets' own, which would mean that the Soviets underestimate their own achievement. This is impossible to believe, but rather than demonstrating so with numbers and economic jargon, let me make the case with a few observations.

That GNP estimate would mean that, accounting for population difference, the standard living and labor productivity in the Soviet Union are roughly one-half that of this country. Let us look first at the Soviet standard of living.

Soviets eat much worse than we do. They consume very small quantities of fruits and vegetables and less meat. Only consumption of bread, potatoes and liquor is higher. At that, Americans spend 17 percent of their income on food, Soviets about half. In housing, many millions share apartments, and a family of three to four has at most two rooms. Two bathrooms are unheard of, and no house in the countryside has running water. Similarly with clothing: walk-in closets do not exist because people don't need them. Color TV sets are rare, household appliances few or nonexistent, air conditioning hardly known. There are less than 10 million private cars.

In services, only education is even comparable. Medical care is "free" but poor in quality. Telephone services, air travel, recreation facilities and hotels represent tiny fractions. Retail trade is atrocious. Many services simply do not exist. There are at most 3,000 swimming pools.

In short, my estimate is that the Soviet standard of living is only a fourth or even a fifth the American level.

As for labor productivity, even by Soviet statistics, which cannot be trusted here, it is about half that of the United States in industry and one-fifth in agriculture. An American worker uses several times more electricity and much better instruments and tools, so he produces much more. Why else are the Soviets so eager to buy Western technologies?

Various practical and theoretical considerations might be cited to explain the inaccuracy of

CIA estimates, but let me simply say that, in my opinion and expertise, the Soviet economy produces at most one-third of American GNP per capita and more likely one-fourth. This, of course, changes the whole picture fundamentally.

Let us move to the CIA estimate that 11 percent to 13 percent of Soviet national product goes to the military. I think the military share is higher—not less than 15 percent, and very likely about 20 percent. This follows from the consideration that Soviet GNP is not so large as the agencies think. It follows from my certain knowledge that Soviet military industries get the best brains, skills, facilities and other advantages. It follows from certain faults in the methodology of Western analysts.

Finally, there is the CIA statement that the Soviets will not cut military spending because there is no particular economic purpose in doing so, and the Soviets can even increase the military share of GNP.

This claim rests once again on a presumption that the Soviet economy performs much better than it actually does, and on a gross underestimation of the military burden. The elementary fact that all Soviet resources are in shortage necessarily means that any diversion of resources

from the military will produce useful results. We witnessed something of the sort in the early 1970s, when events in Poland and the onset of détente produced a decision in favor of more consumer goods. These were produced precisely by military enterprises, some of whose resources of labor, materials and energy can be easily and efficiently shifted for civilian production.

I am not predicting here that Soviet military outlays will be reduced. I am simply saying that the Soviet rulers again face a most difficult choice of allocating scarce resources. There are many reasons the Soviet economy is now in a shambles—systemic inefficiency, demographic problems, oil shortages, the permanent failure of agriculture, inefficient investment and the like—but a fundamental one is backbreaking military expenditures. Contrary to what the intelligence agencies claim, a radical reduction in military outlays could be a real remedy. That is why, when we economists discussed the situation in Moscow, we agreed that détente was badly needed to save the economy from collapse.

That leads me to a final enigma: why in the 1970s, in spite of the troubles of the economy and in spite of the possibilities of détente, did the Soviets put so much into a military buildup?

Obviously they made various miscalculations, but the main factor, I believe, arose from the United States' post-Vietnam deceleration of its military effort. When an arms race was under way on both sides, the Soviets could not hope for military parity, let alone advantage; but then the rulers saw an opportunity to overtake the United States, and they could not resist it.

The standard of living has remained shamefully low, there is an acute financial crisis, the tempo of economic growth is at historic lows, scanty investment has created problems in oil and other raw materials, etc. But they did reach military parity, with superiority perhaps on the horizon.

We cannot allow the Soviet leaders to hope to gain military superiority. Since their economy is much weaker and smaller and their military burden extremely heavy, our best hope is to demonstrate by our own military spending that the Soviet Union cannot catch up to us. If we do not spend more on our military, the Soviets may well validate the CIA estimate and increase the military share of GNP. But if we increase our share and reestablish superiority, they will on second thought divert at least some resources for the good of their people. Then, and only then, will the arms race in both countries slow down.

The writer, a Soviet emigré, is an economist in Washington.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 64-65U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
3 November 1980

Under the Oil Gun—Once More


The Iraq-Iran war has underscored again the vulnerability of industrialized nations to interruptions in their supplies of imported oil.

Virtually every major nation in the world—the Soviet Union, China and Mexico are exceptions—now depends to some extent on crude oil from abroad.



The United States is relatively well off—less than half its oil is imported. Other nations—such as Japan, West Germany, France, Spain and Sweden—rely totally or almost totally on outside petroleum sources.

The U.S. buys no oil from Iran, and less than 1 percent of its imports come from Iraq. But Portugal obtained 62 percent of its oil from the combatants; Austria 36 percent; France 31 percent; Spain 26 percent; Italy 20 percent and Japan 12 percent.




If importing nations start scrambling for oil to replace losses from Iran and Iraq, today's oil glut could turn into yet another worldwide shortage. That would raise the specter of a sharp upward ratcheting of prices, as always occurs when supplies get tight.



PHUCK OTHER—WOODPH CAMP & ASSOCIATES
P. 3000 FOR UNION



CONTINUED



Where 7 Big Nations Get Their Imports

Barrels of Crude Oil Per Day Percentage of Total Imports

United States

Saudi Arabia	1,292,000	23.3%
Nigeria	691,000	12.4%
Libya	668,000	12.0%
Mexico	542,000	9.8%
Algeria	533,000	9.6%
Indonesia	328,000	5.9%
Canada	222,000	4.0%
Other nations	1,279,000	23.0%

Canada

Venezuela	211,000	32.6%
Saudi Arabia	186,000	28.7%
Iran	80,000	12.3%
Other nations	171,000	26.4%

Japan

Saudi Arabia	1,351,000	30.9%
Indonesia	736,000	16.8%
United Arab Emirates	643,000	14.7%
Iraq	496,000	11.3%
Other nations	1,149,000	26.3%

Great Britain

Saudi Arabia	360,000	48.7%
Abu Dhabi	80,000	10.8%
Kuwait	69,000	9.3%
Iraq	44,000	6.0%
Other nations	186,000	25.2%

West Germany

Saudi Arabia	447,000	23.4%
Libya	274,000	14.3%
Nigeria	246,000	12.9%
Great Britain	220,000	11.5%
United Arab Emirates	170,000	8.9%
Algeria	118,000	6.2%
Iraq	103,000	5.4%
Other nations	336,000	17.4%

Italy

Saudi Arabia	761,000	33.9%
Iraq	392,000	17.5%
Libya	272,000	12.1%
Kuwait	173,000	7.7%
United Arab Emirates	108,000	4.8%
Other nations	536,000	24.0%

France

Saudi Arabia	689,000	34.1%
Iraq	604,000	29.9%
Nigeria	170,000	8.4%
Abu Dhabi	129,000	6.4%
Other nations	429,000	21.2%

Note: Figures are as of mid-1980, except late 1979 for Canada and Italy.

USAWR charts—Basic data: Central Intelligence Agency, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, U.S. Dept. of Energy, British Petroleum

ON PAGE 1 (SECT. 1)

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
26 October 1980

New Soviet food shortages could spark unrest

By Jim Gallagher

Moscow correspondent

Chicago Tribune Press Service

MOSCOW—In the wake of its second small harvest in a row, the Soviet Union seems destined for a season of deep discontent in which meat, milk, and vegetable shortages could cause strikes and other disturbances, some Western observers here believe.

"Soviet leaders have a very serious problem on their hands," one Western diplomat here said. "They're heading into very dangerous days."

Last spring, assembly line workers at two of the country's top automobile plants staged brief strikes to protest low meat and milk supplies. Reports have been reaching Moscow all year of disturbances and unhappiness in other poorly supplied industrial areas.

Even with the poor grain crop, bread shortages appear to be highly unlikely because the Soviets now grow enough wheat in their worst years to meet these needs. But the full impact will be felt by the livestock breeders, who use the bulk of the grain crop as feed.

"AFTER THIS dismal harvest," another diplomat said, "the food situation will be worse in 1981. That must be making Soviet leaders very nervous, especially in light of labor unrest in Poland, which was also sparked by shortages of food."

A measure of how serious Kremlin concern has become was provided last week by Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, who publicly acknowledged that Soviet agriculture has still not fulfilled the goal of putting a wider variety of foodstuffs on the average dinner table.

"We still encounter difficulties in supplying the cities and industrial centers with such foodstuffs as milk and meat," Brezhnev complained to the Communist Party Central Committee. Western observers believe this startlingly frank admission of food shortages was intended to reassure increasingly restless Soviet workers.

"He wants everyone out there in the cities to know that the leadership considers this a priority problem," a third diplomat explained. "With worker unrest a real problem in Poland, he doesn't want that sort of thing happening here. Whether people are reassured remains to be seen."

OTHER ANALYSTS here are skeptical about public disruptions because the Russians, who will be most affected by the food problems, historically have remained passive in the face of fierce oppression and a traditionally difficult style of life. However, this view does not take into account the rising expectations of a more comfortable existence that have been carefully inculcated during the Brezhnev era.

Despite huge investments during the present five-year plan, Soviet meat production has been stagnant for the last three years and this year has declined by 3 percent so far, partially as a result of the U.S. grain embargo, which was in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The average Soviet is actually eating less meat now than in 1975, despite oft-

repeated promises by Brezhnev and other leaders that his bland, starchy diet would soon be varied and enriched. According to Soviet statistics, people here eat less than two-thirds of the amount of meat annually that government nutritionists consider the bare minimum. A similar situation prevails for fruits and vegetables.

MILK PRODUCTION has been declining by about 3 percent per year for the last three years, and such staples as cheese, yogurt, and sour cream are becoming increasingly difficult to find.

This year's poor harvest will only make matters worse. The grain crop is an estimated 181 million metric tons,

more than 50 million metric tons less than what the state plan called for. In addition, other crops have been considerably diminished, including potatoes, a prime component of the Soviet diet.

This year's grim grain harvest comes on the heels of an equally sharp shortfall last autumn. The Soviets will have a difficult time coping because they are still beset by the ill effects of last year's setback. The grain harvest then totaled 179 million tons.

U.S. Department of Agriculture experts expect that about 15 percent of the present crop will be wasted due to mildew, rot, and other factors, which means the true, usable crop is only 154 million tons.

"A STAGGERING BLOW" is the way one Western agronomist assessed the significance of the back-to-back bad harvests. He said the Soviet meat industry would be adversely affected for several years.

Other analysts said that the 1980 grain harvest will make the U.S. embargo an even bigger burden for the Soviets, who were heavily hurt earlier in terms of both the quantity and quality of animal feed they could find in other markets.

With shortfalls reported for Australia, Canada, and Argentina this autumn, those problems should be even more pressing next year, the sources said.

Last year the Soviets produced 15.5 million tons of meat, but they will not achieve that level again this year. Some observers believe Russia won't reach last year's level for three years or more, and only if next fall's harvest is a bumper one.

ONE SHORT-TERM Soviet solution to meat shortages would be a massive distress slaughtering of herd animals this winter. This would enable the Soviets to stock their markets with more meat than usual for a short period, but in the long run the industry would be severely affected because the livestock levels would be so low.

Still, some Western analysts say the Soviets may have no option, and that distress slaughtering will have to be undertaken because the Soviets will be unable to buy enough foreign-grown grain.

CONTINUED

to keep their herds anywhere near present levels. "That will have a very demoralizing effect," one agronomist said, "because they've done a damn good job keeping their livestock levels up after last fall's lousy harvest. They were hoping to get some help from Mother Nature this time around, but now they're at the end of their rope."

The bad news about the harvest came amid a flurry of equally distressing statistics from other areas of the economy. Most ominous is that oil production appears to be peaking, as the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency predicted it would.

THE CIA CONTENTS that, in the next few years, Soviet oil output will decline very sharply. The Soviets assert they have vast untouched reserves available, and that new fields soon to come on line will give production badly needed momentum.

In addition, the Soviets say increased use of other energy sources will help

them overcome their energy crunch. But coal production has been stagnant for three years, atomic power development is way behind schedule, and gas output is growing slower than required.

On Thursday, the Soviets named a new prime minister to replace Alexei Kosygin, 76, who resigned due to ill health. The new man is Nikolai Tikhonov, 75, only a year younger and in questionable health.

"Everything's old and frail here," one Western diplomat said. "The leaders, the industrial plant, the economic philos-

ophy, the agricultural program. Year after year we hear politicians complain about it, but nobody seems to be able to reverse the downward trend. In every other socialist economy in Eastern Europe, innovations are being tried, solutions are being sought. But not here."

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FBI CASE

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ON PAGE A1-11

THE WASHINGTON POST
30 October 1980

Nixon Supports FBI On Break-In Authority

By Laura A. Kiernan
Washington Post Staff Writer

Former president Richard M. Nixon took the witness stand in federal court here yesterday in an extraordinary display of courtroom drama and testified that he believes the director of the FBI had direct authority from the president to authorize break-ins in the interest of national security.

His testimony climaxed the trial of two former FBI officials charged with violating the civil rights of friends and relatives of the radical Weather Underground while Nixon was in the White House in the early 1970s.

Moments after the former president began his testimony in U.S. District Court, a woman seated in the crowd of spectators cried out, "War criminal!" Others followed with shouts of "genocide" and "He's a liar."

Secret Service officers rushed to Nixon's side, but the former president seemed undisturbed by the outburst, looking once toward Chief Judge William B. Bryant and raising his eyebrows.

As the shouts continued, deputy U.S. marshals quickly removed from the courtroom three demonstrators who have claimed they were victims of illegal FBI activity.

Much of Nixon's testimony focused on his efforts to bring an end to the Vietnam war while his administration was confronted with violent antiwar activists such as the Weathermen.

"It was quite different than what it is today," Nixon testified at one point, his eyes lowered.

The two FBI officials, W. Mark Felt, once the bureau's No. 2 man, and Edward S. Miller, formerly head of the domestic intelligence division, are charged with illegally authorizing warrantless searches of private homes in a desperate search for clues to the whereabouts of fugitive Weathermen.

The defense has repeatedly argued throughout the seven-week trial that authority to conduct those break-ins rested with then acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray III and that Felt and Miller had Gray's approval to conduct them. Yesterday, Nixon, called as a prosecution witness, testified that he, too, believed that the authority to approve those entries was passed on from the office of the president directly to the head of the FBI in national security cases.

"In matters of foreign intelligence, the line went directly from the president" to J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI director until his death in 1972, Nixon testified. When Gray succeeded Hoover as director the authority remained in the bureau, Nixon testified.

"It was the office not the man" that had the authority, Nixon testified during cross-examination by defense lawyer Brian P. Gettings.

Nixon, at times pounding his finger on the witness stand to emphasize a point, testified that in the early 1970s there was "hard evidence" that the Weathermen had connections to foreign powers, and he cited what he called that group's stated intention to "overthrow the government." Under questioning by Miller's lawyer, Thomas A. Kennelly, Nixon testified that he deemed it "essential" that the government strengthen its efforts to seek out persons responsible for bombings and other terrorist activities during the war years.

The former president, appearing as a court witness for the first time since he left office in August 1974, repeatedly emphasized that those years were a "war time" and that those violent disturbances "directly affected the president and those who advised him from bringing an end to a very difficult war."

"I can assure you as one who went through it" that concerns about terrorism were "greatly magnified... we were at war," Nixon testified at another point. He then said he hoped that neither President Carter nor Ronald Reagan, "if he becomes president," would have to "write letters to people whose sons had been killed" — as he and other wartime presidents had to.

Realizing he had digressed for a moment from his testimony about terrorism, Nixon apologized, and added, "When you have it [terrorism] in war time... realize what's happening may create attitudes in this country that may delay the end of the war, the end of the killing, it makes it much worse."

During questioning by special government prosecutor John W. Nields Jr., Nixon testified that in 1970 he authorized a widespread domestic intelligence program — known as the Huston plan — involving illegal break-ins and electronic surveillance aimed almost exclusively at the Black Panther Party and the Weathermen. Nixon told Nields that he believed that his approval, as president, of those activities in appropriate circumstances "would remove the illegality as I understood it."

Nixon said that four days after he approved the plan, however, he withdrew his authorization following objections from Hoover as conveyed to him by then attorney general John N. Mitchell.

Nixon testified, however, that in withdrawing his approval he did not think that he was prohibiting Hoover from using those techniques.

It appeared that the prosecution intended Nixon's testimony to show that the Huston plan was the only occasion when Nixon authorized the FBI to conduct warrantless searches directed at the Weathermen, and that he revoked that authority almost immediately.

Nixon, who now lives in New York, appeared voluntarily although the government had issued a subpoena for his testimony as a formality. Nixon has all along made it clear that he would testify in court for either side in the case, although the defense declined to call him and completed the presentation of its evidence Monday.

The case is expected to go to the jury within the next several days.

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NEW YORK TIMES
29 OCTOBER 1980

3 Ex-Attorneys General Testify on F.B.I. Searches

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 28 — Three former Attorneys General, Ramsey Clark, John N. Mitchell and Richard G. Kleindienst, testified today that they had never authorized agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to enter and search homes without search warrants, even in national security cases.

Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Kleindienst said that they might have approved requests to conduct such "surreptitious entries," also known as "black bag jobs," if they had believed that they were necessary to collect intelligence information about Americans collaborating with hostile foreign governments. Mr. Clark said that he would have considered authorizing searches without warrants only in "extreme circumstances" involving, for example, terrorist threats to explode a nuclear bomb.

Mr. Clark, Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Kleindienst testified in Federal District Court here at the trial of two former officials of the F.B.I., W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller, who are accused of conspiring to violate the constitutional rights of citizens by authorizing a series of break-ins in 1972 and 1973.

The purpose of the break-ins was to obtain information about fugitive members of the Weather Underground, an antiwar group that had taken responsibility for bombings at the United States Capitol, the Pentagon and other public buildings.

Testimony by Mitchell

Mr. Mitchell, who was Attorney General in the first three years of the Nixon Administration, from January 1969 to March 1972, said that he was never asked to approve warrantless searches because J. Edgar Hoover, former Director of the bureau, had ordered an end to use of the technique in 1966.

After consulting F.B.I. documents while he was on the witness stand, Mr. Mitchell said that Mr. Hoover's objections to "black bag jobs" had been based on the "operational hazards involved" rather than on doubts about the legality of the technique.

Mr. Mitchell said that he believed that he was making his first appearance in Federal court since his conviction in 1975 on criminal charges arising from a conspiracy to cover up the Watergate scandal. Mr. Mitchell served 19 months in prison.

The three Attorneys General were called by the Government as rebuttal witnesses. William B. Bryant, chief judge of the Federal District Court here, is expected to send the case to the jury later this week.

Mr. Mitchell, in response to questions from one of the defense attorneys, said that he would have been likely to approve "black bag jobs" in the Weather Underground investigation if he had known that members of the group had ties to Communists in Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam. The knowledge of such ties, he said, "would be a very strong factor in my approval, all other factors being proper."

Mr. Mitchell said that the break-ins conducted by the F.B.I. before 1966 were done "without the approval of the Attorney General, without submission of the question to the Attorney General." Prosecutors maintain that Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller were required to seek explicit approval from the Attorney General for each break-in, just as the bureau sought case-by-case approval for the installation

of electronic eavesdropping devices in national security cases.

Mr. Kleindienst, who was Attorney General from June 1972 to May 1973, said that if he had known about the break-ins, he would have required the bureau to obtain his authorization in each case. Mr. Kleindienst, a lawyer now in private practice in Arizona, pleaded guilty in 1974 to a misdemeanor charge of misleading a Senate committee that was investigating the Justice Department's handling of an antitrust case against the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.

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NEW YORK TIMES
28 OCTOBER 1980

Defense Rests at Trial Of Ex-Officials of F.B.I.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 (AP)— The defense rested today in the trial of two former officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who have been charged with civil-rights violations by approving break-ins to gather information about members of the Weather Underground.

Attorneys for W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller closed their case in Federal District Court after presenting witnesses and documents designed to show the legality of the entries at the homes of friends and relatives and members of the radical group in 1972 and 1973. The defense attorneys argued that the break-ins had been authorized by the President, the Attorney General and the Director of the F.B.I.

Mr. Felt was the bureau's No. 2 man and Mr. Miller headed its intelligence division.

Prosecutors contended that the break-ins without warrants were illegal in the Weather Underground cases and violated individual civil rights. The defense argued that the entries were legal because the Weather Underground fugitives had connections with foreign powers.

Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller have admitted authorizing the break-ins and have said they were authorized to do so by their boss at the time, L. Patrick Gray III, acting director of the bureau.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE E2NEW YORK TIMES
26 OCTOBER 1980**F.B.I. Defendant
Puts It on the Chief**

Two former officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who once directed the activities of the G-Men in New York charged last week that higher-ups in the chain of command had authorized illegal breaking and entering of private homes in the metropolitan area almost a decade ago. The two former officials, J. Wallace LaPrade, dismissed two years ago as head of the bureau's New York office, and W. Mark Felt, once second in command of the bureau, pointed accusing fingers at L. Patrick Gray 3d, at that time was acting director.

The two were testifying at the trial in Washington of Mr. Felt and a colleague, Edward S. Miller, former head of the bureau's intelligence division, on charges that they had conspired to violate the civil rights of several dozen individuals by authorizing break-ins and searches. The defense is seeking to show that Mr. Miller ordered underlings to undertake the actions, which were aimed at gathering information about would-be terrorists, on orders of Mr. Felt, who had been acting under orders of Mr. Gray.

The witnesses said Mr. Gray not only knew of the pattern of break-ins but also condoned at least some of them — although apparently not in writing. Mr. Felt's defense contends in addition that he was free from fault because of general, as opposed to specific, authorizations for break-ins, as well as long-standing bureau precedent. The law in such cases is unclear and much will depend on how the judge charges the jury, possibly this week.

A few rebuttal witnesses remained to be called, but neither Mr. Gray, nor the Attorney General at the time, John N. Mitchell, nor the President, Richard M. Nixon, have been called to testify. The defense feels that the latter two would be distractions. Mr. Gray faces some of the same charges and is to be tried separately.

ASSOCIATED PRESS

FPM-FBI TRIAL: 410

FBI WILL SEEK COURT APPROVAL FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SEARCHESBY LARRY MARGASAKASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

WASHINGTON (AP) - THE FBI WILL SEEK COURT APPROVAL BEFORE CONDUCTING SEARCHES IN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE CASES BECAUSE THE BUREAU WANTS TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF THOSE WHO ARE SEARCHED; AN FBI MEMORANDUM SAYS.

THE OCT. 14 MEMORANDUM, INTRODUCED FRIDAY AT THE FEDERAL COURT TRIAL OF TWO FORMER FBI OFFICIALS, SAYS THE BUREAU ISN'T OBLIGATED TO SEEK THE COURT WARRANTS.

BUT THE DOCUMENT STATED THE DECISION "REFLECTS A DESIRE TO MORE FULLY PROTECT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUALS AFFECTED BY PARTICULAR SEARCHES."

ACCORDING TO THE FBI POLICY STATEMENT, SOME REQUESTS FOR SEARCH WARRANTS ALREADY HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO A NEW COURT THAT WAS ORIGINALLY FORMED TO RULE ON REQUESTS FOR WARRANTS TO INSTALL WIRETAPS AND MICROPHONES.

THE DOCUMENT WAS WRITTEN BY KENNETH C. BASS III, FBI COUNSEL FOR INTELLIGENCE POLICY. IT WAS INTRODUCED AS EVIDENCE BY LAWYERS FOR W. MARK FELT AND EDWARD S. MILLER, THE FORMER BUREAU OFFICIALS ON TRIAL FOR APPROVING FBI BREAK-INS THAT PROSECUTORS NOW SAY WERE ILLEGAL.

THOSE BREAK-INS, CONDUCTED WITHOUT WARRANTS IN NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY IN 1972-73, TOOK PLACE AT FIVE RESIDENCES OF FRIENDS AND RELATIVES OF FUGITIVES WHO BELONGED TO THE RADICAL WEATHER UNDERGROUND.

FELT, THE FBI'S FORMER NO. 2 MAN, AND MILLER, THE EX-CHIEF OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, ARE CHARGED WITH A SINGLE COUNT OF VIOLATING INDIVIDUAL CIVIL RIGHTS. BOTH MEN ADMIT APPROVING WARRANTLESS BREAK-INS, BUT DENY THEIR ACTIONS WERE AGAINST THE LAW.

THE DEFENSE INTRODUCED THE FBI MEMORANDUM BECAUSE IT MAKES CLEAR THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S BELIEF THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS HISTORICALLY POSSESSED THE AUTHORITY TO APPROVE WARRANTLESS SEARCHES IN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE CASES.

FELT AND MILLER FURTHER CONTEND THAT SINCE THE FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION, PRESIDENTS HAVE DELEGATED THIS AUTHORITY TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI. THE DEFENDANTS HAVE SAID THE INVESTIGATION OF THE LEFT-WING WEATHER UNDERGROUND FALLS INTO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

1 of 2

ASSOCIATED PRESS

FBI —————

FIELD BECAUSE FUGITIVES FROM THE GROUP HAD CONNECTIONS WITH COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS AND FOREIGN COMMUNIST MOVEMENTS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE BREAK-INS.

THE FBI MEMO SAID THAT SOME REQUESTS FOR SEARCH WARRANTS ALREADY HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE RECENTLY FORMED FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE BOARD, WHICH UNTIL NOW HAS BEEN RULING ON REQUESTS FOR WIRETAPS. THE MEMORANDUM SAID THE FBI BELIEVES THE COURT ALSO HAS AUTHORITY TO RULE ON WARRANTS FOR SEARCHES.

AP-NY-10-25 0336EDT

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FORMER EMPLOYEES AS AUTHORS

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 11NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW
26 OCTOBER 1980

The Young Man Who Grew Old

FACING REALITY

From World Federalism to the CIA.

By Cord Meyer.

433 pp. New York:

Harper & Row. \$15.95.

By THOMAS POWERS

IN "Facing Reality," Cord Meyer's memoirs of a long life spent mostly in the C.I.A., there is a fine description of his experience as a young Marine officer on Guam in 1944. It is night, he has seen many men die during the day, and he is both angry and sick at heart. He imagines rising from his foxhole and addressing the men on both sides: "There are differences between us, I know, but none of them worth the death of one man . . . Surely we have far more in common than that which temporarily separates us . . . The only certain fruit of this insanity will be the rotting bodies upon which the sun will impartially shine tomorrow. Let us throw down these guns that we hate. With the morning, we shall go on together and in charity and hope build a new life and a new world."

He thinks of one of his men, lying dead in the rain, and wishes that all those who made the war—"countrymen and enemy alike"—could be made to trade places with the dead young soldier. Mr. Meyer had learned to hate not just the war against Japan, but war itself, war in general, war as the great curse of human history: "He saw war clearly as the finished product of universal ignorance, avarice and brutality."

Mr. Meyer describes himself at 24 quite convincingly as a man all but immune to cant, jingoism, fear-mongering, windy patriotism. Whatever the Big Picture described back in Washington (or Berlin, or Tokyo), however urgent the strategic reasons for battle given by the old men in their clubs, mumbling geopolitics over lunch, the young Cord Meyer will have none of it. His heart is cold to the fate of empires; he sees only the young men dead on the fields and beaches. It is not victory he cares about, but peace.

Mr. Meyer's self-portrait appears in a short story that he wrote not long after he had been severely wounded on Guam. He lost an eye and was so close to death that the Marines mistakenly cabled his parents that he had been killed. But he recovered from his wounds and six weeks later made a vow in his journal that was only implicit in the short story: "The general notion of what I have to do is clear. I owe to those who fell beside me, and to those many others who will die before it's done, the assurance that I will do all that is in my small power to make the future for which they died an improvement on the past. The question is how?" Mr. Meyer's answer, after a discouraging couple of years with the United World Federalists, was to join the C.I.A.

This is a fact that could use a bit of explaining. Mr. Meyer was a very public young man. In the years immediately after World War II, he was, in fact, a figure of almost romantic

appeal. His short stories had been published in the Atlantic and were highly praised and often reprinted. His years in the United World Federalists and other organizations gave him a national reputation as a passionate idealist. In addition, he was handsome, an able speaker and socially well-connected. Before deciding to join the C.I.A., for example, he asked the advice of Walter Lippman, who gave his cautious assent. Fate seemed to have chosen Mr. Meyer for a distinguished public career, which made his decision to bury himself in the C.I.A. all the more astonishing to his friends.

If there is one thing the C.I.A. believes in, it is that the United States, like every other nation, is ultimately alone and must depend solely on itself for survival. As a nation, we may murmur support for notions of collective security, disarmament, international cooperation and the like, but this is not allowed to interfere with the primary business of defense—which is taken to be a matter of arms and vigilance. If the other side should beat its swords into plowshares, the C.I.A. (after a great deal of argument about whether it was really so) would report a cautious, muted, thoroughly hedged version of the fact to the National Security Council. But it wouldn't really believe it. As an institution, the C.I.A. is deeply conservative and pessimistic. It offers no solution to the problem of war. It makes only fitful attempts to see further than the "near term." It believes that if we are alert, if we are prudent, and if we are seen to be strong, then, God willing, we may find our way through the dangers immediately ahead.

There is a great deal to be said for this view of matters, beginning with its antiquity. The Greeks wrote about the horrors of war, but they prepared for them too, and so has everybody else since. But it must also be said that this approach has had the disadvantage of routinely resulting in war. What the young Cord Meyer objected to was the fact of war, not its purpose but its reality, the dead men on the fields and beaches. Hiroshima made him yet more fearful of wars to come. Why then, one might ask, did Mr. Meyer abandon his hope for some fundamental change in the international system and embrace the one institution most deeply committed to the ancient belief that only by preparing for war can we hope to avoid war, at least in the near term?

The young Cord Meyer rebelled against the answer. The old Cord Meyer has been at it so long he can't even see any longer the point of the question. This makes "Facing Reality" one of the saddest books I've read in some time. Mr. Meyer's short story is far and away the best thing in it. The rest is fitfully interesting, but it is also argumentative, confused, disingenuous, self-important and often boring. The problem seems to be that he is trying to do too many things at once—alert us to the Communist menace, say something nice

CONTINUED

about all those kind people he's met over the years, put an ice pick into the ribs of C.I.A. defectors who have spilled secrets "for financial and ideological reasons," put into "context" (which means explain away) everything the C.I.A. has been criticized for doing in recent years. On one page, Mr. Meyer's book sounds like a tract from the John Birch Society, and on the next like a long-overdue bread-and-butter letter. This is disconcerting. He warns us at the beginning there will be no secrets in his book. Fair enough. But there are no non-secrets either. He is trying to explain what he did without telling us what he did, and the result is a tone of plaintive self-justification.

A characteristic section deals with the C.I.A.'s attempts to prevent Salvador Allende from coming to power in Chile, a troubling episode, already much described, to which Mr. Meyer adds nothing but claims of a secret Russian role and a purely conjectural charge that Allende planned to impose a regime of Stalinist rigor on Chile, which would then serve as a base for the armed subversion of neighbors. Mr. Meyer's account begs two large questions. The first is that his description of the Russian role — a matter of secret funds, arms and influence — closely parallels the C.I.A.'s. This view is something the young Cord Meyer would have spotted immediately as the old, old story, the sort of thing that ends, down the road, in young men dead on the fields and beaches.

The second question begged is what happened — the disparity between Allende's alleged plans and what his successors actually did. Chile's fate has not been happy. The Pinochet regime cannot fairly be blamed on the C.I.A., but surely the Chilean experience ought to have cautioned Mr. Meyer about our ability to help faraway peoples by meddling in their politics. It did nothing of the kind. He

is still convinced that our man could have defeated their man in the next election. "If the United States was prepared to offer consistent and adequate covert support." Why? Are the Chileans too poor to finance their own campaigns, or too foolish to direct them? It is sheer presumption to assume, as Mr. Meyer does, that they can't get along without us. Events suggest that our help is a mixed blessing. But Mr. Meyer can only see the long Russian arm, and his only remedy is a long American arm, not just in Chile, but in Angola and every other faraway corner of the globe where he spots a sign of the resolute, ambitious, malevolent Russian bear.

This is where the sadness lies. Something happened to Mr. Meyer after he came home from the Pacific. Somehow he lost his faith, born of suffering, that the world might be run in a better way. Some of his friends in the C.I.A. suggest the real change came after he joined the Agency, when he nearly lost his job while trying to refute vague and loony F.B.I. charges in 1953 that he was a security risk. Mr. Meyer dismisses this interpretation of his history, but it's hard to see what else might explain the harsh and narrow tone of his perpetual alarm.

Mr. Meyer did well in the C.I.A., despite one major disaster when a former National Stu-

dent Association officer revealed that the group had been funded by the C.I.A. Mr. Meyer had arranged the funding of the N.S.A. and dozens of other organizations through a network of dummy foundations, but he neglected to cover his tracks. The N.S.A. flap was enough to unravel the whole network in a matter of weeks. Experienced clandestine operators in the C.I.A. are not polite about Mr. Meyer's handling of this episode. Nevertheless he went on to hold other important jobs in the upper levels of the Agency. He does not have much to say about any of them. There is only one subject on his mind (C.I.A. people say that's all they heard about, too): the Russian ambition to dominate the world.

"What I know now," Mr. Meyer writes, "I didn't know to begin with. I had to learn it the hard way." Hard? He's spent his life in offices in Washington, lunching with friends, attending official meetings, reading cables. The only whiff of danger in his later life came in London, where he served as a station chief, worried about Irish terrorists and was chauffeured to and fro in a bullet-proof car.

On the evidence of his memoirs, Mr. Meyer doesn't really know what happened to his old faith. He woke one morning and it was gone. In its place is a conviction that we have to be strong, we have to be vigilant, we have to meet the enemy wherever he creeps into the daylight. The young Cord Meyer would have recognized him clearly enough — a querulous old man, fussing with the details of the Big Picture, trying to be always ready for war. ■

Thomas Powers, the author of "The Man Who Kept the Secrets," is writing a book about strategic weapons and national security.

WASHINGTON STAR
26 OCTOBER 1980

PUBLISHING

By Hilary Mills

Stamp of Approval From the CIA

Former CIA agent John Stockwell has just signed with Harvey Ginsberg at William Morrow for a first novel. Entitled *Sondali*, the book is a love story set in Burundi, Africa. Africa, of course, is well-known territory to Stockwell, who was part of a CIA task force in Angola and who wrote about the agency's involvement in the Angolan war in his previous book, *In Search of Enemies*.

Enemies was published by Norton back in 1978 without the agency's clearance, and the CIA recently dropped an impending breach of contract suit against Stockwell when he threatened bankruptcy. The agency, however, still has a "constructive trust" on future earnings of that book, and asked Stockwell if there was any way it could impound the proceeds of his new novel.

"No," he said, from his home in Austin, Texas. "They can't sue me because they've already cleared the novel and the other suit is settled. So I touch wood. Nothing can happen unless they come up with some outrageous new law and I don't see how they could."

When did the agency clear the new novel? "Last May. Technically the book would not have had to be submitted. The injunction against me — and I assume it's the same with Frank Snepp and John Marchetti — reads that anything I write about the CIA based on information I gained during my employment or as a result thereof be submitted for their review, or, in other words, censorship."

"This book is not about the CIA and doesn't mention the agency so I told my attorneys, 'Forget the CIA. When one is under government censorship one doesn't lean far over backward to cooperate with them and submit more than you have to. But my attorneys said it might be wise — and various people in the publishing world agreed — to clear the novel so publishers wouldn't be intimidated. It's just a better property to sell if it's totally unencumbered. So I gritted my teeth and submitted it and of course they didn't object to anything in it.'"

Although Stockwell's new book involves a Russian diplomat, oil company executives and an American female chess player who is encouraged to woo the Russian, the author points out that it's a love story rather than a thriller. He adds that he doesn't plan to write any thrillers based on the CIA in the future. "I personally am thoroughly tired of the whole nauseated subject. I also think the nation is. I don't think it's a good medium for fiction."

So at this point he's not very worried about the agency looking over his shoulder? "No, but obviously if you're a public figure and lecturing and interviewing and you have an injunction and a very hostile CIA and Justice Department that's going to lockstep with it, it clearly makes you nervous. I don't want to make a misstep and wind up in jail for contempt of court. On the other hand, I don't intend to shut up altogether either. I don't think that's a very courageous thing to do."

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BOYCE SURFACES

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
26 OCTOBER 1980

Escaped Spy Boyce Called New York Times Reporter

By LAURIE BECKLUND, Times Staff Writer

Convicted spy Christopher Boyce, the object of a 10-month international manhunt, called a New York Times reporter Friday in the first, confirmed trace of the 27-year-old fugitive since his prison escape last January, the newspaper reported Saturday.

The U.S. marshal's office set up an 11-man task force here last week to search for Boyce on the theory that he was hiding in Southern California. There have been reports, none verified, of Boyce being seen as far away as South Africa, Mexico and Alaska.

New York Times reporter Robert Lindsey, who wrote a book about Boyce's sale of classified documents to the Soviet Union, wrote that Boyce told him he had been "all set" but would not disclose where he was calling from.

Boyce said in the telephone call that he escaped from the Federal

Correctional Institution atompoc using a technique he had learned from watching the movie "Escape From Alcatraz" while he was in prison.

Following the true story depicted in the film, Boyce told the newspaper, he devised a papier-mache dummy to lead guards into thinking he was in bed asleep. He then escaped by crawling over two 10-foot-high security fences.

"I did it by myself," he was quoted as saying, and denied that he had had any assistance, Soviet or otherwise, in gaining his freedom. "My knees were shaking. I thought I was going to get a bullet in my head."

He said he hid out in the rolling hills around the prison for nearly three months after his escape, living off help from his friends. Federal agents combed the area time after time in their search for the fugitive.

Boyce told Lindsey, to whom he had spoken before his escape, that he was calling because he wanted his parents to know he was alive and well and loved them. He reportedly called from a telephone booth and indicated in the seven-minute conversation that he was on the way to catch a plane.

Boyce, the son of a former FBI agent and a boyhood friend of his from Palos Verdes, Andrew Daulton Lee, were convicted in 1977 of treason.

Boyce was given a 40-year prison sentence for his role in copying thousands of top-secret documents about a spy satellite program from TRW in Redondo Beach, where he worked as a clerk. Lee, who remains in prison, received a lifetime sentence for selling the documents to Soviet agents in Mexico City for \$70,000.

The information contained in the documents was alleged to be of incalculable value to the Soviet Union.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-2NEW YORK TIMES
25 OCTOBER 1980

Spy Says Prison Escape Was Based on Movie Plot

By ROBERT LINDSEY

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, Oct. 24 — Christopher John Boyce, a convicted spy for the Soviet Union who has been the subject of an international manhunt for 10 months, says he learned the technique he used to escape from a Federal prison last Jan. 21 in a movie shown to inmates only a few weeks earlier.

The movie was "Escape From Alcatraz," which was based on the true story of how a prisoner escaped from the prison at Alcatraz in the 1950's after fashioning a papier-mâché dummy to lead guards into believing that he was asleep in his cell. Mr. Boyce employed the same deception at the Lompoc, Calif. Federal Correctional Institution.

Mr. Boyce discussed the escape and his life since then in a telephone call to this reporter last night. He did not disclose where he was calling from. The call appeared to have been placed from a pay telephone, and he suggested that he was about to catch an airplane but did not indicate where the plane was headed.

Now 27 years old, Boyce, along with a boyhood friend, Andrew Daulton Lee, 28, was convicted in 1977 of selling thousands of documents pertaining to secret Central Intelligence Agency surveillance satellites to Soviet agents in Mexico City and Vienna over the two preceding years.

Mr. Boyce obtained the documents

while working in a C.I.A. code room at a plant operated by the TRW Defense and Space Systems Group that manufactured satellites in Redondo Beach, Calif. Later he asserted that he was a pacifist who had been provoked by his discovery of alleged interference by the C.I.A. in the affairs of Australia and other allies. He said that he originally decided to sell the documents as a whim to protest the C.I.A. activities and then continued to do so out of fear of exposure when his friend insisted on obtaining more money from Soviet agents.

The Justice Department charged that he became a spy to benefit the Soviet Union and for the money. Mr. Boyce and Mr. Lee reportedly received \$77,000 from Soviet agents. Mr. Boyce was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Mr. Lee, a convicted drug dealer, who had asserted that he thought he was part of a C.I.A. plot to sell "disinformation" to the Russians, was sentenced to life in prison.

Justice Department investigators said that last night's telephone call was the first trace of Mr. Boyce they had received since his escape. There have been reports that he had been sighted in South Africa, Mexico and other places, but none of the reports had been verified.

Unhappy with the lack of progress, the Justice Department inaugurated a new effort this week to find Mr. Boyce. The United States Marshal Service, an agency that is responsible for apprehending fugitives from Federal prisons, established here what it called the Christopher Boyce Task Force, consisting of about a dozen investigators.

Has Traveled 'All Over'

Mr. Boyce said he had been "all over" since the escape. The context of the remarks suggested that he had traveled both within this country and overseas.

When he was informed that some California newspapers had speculated that his escape had been organized either by the C.I.A. or the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency, Mr. Boyce laughed and replied, "I did it by myself." As he crawled over two 10-foot high fences at Lompoc, he recalled, "my knees were shaking; I thought I was going to get a bullet in the head."

He said that for about three months after his escape he had hidden out in the rolling hills of near the prison, a mostly rural area of central California that investigators said they had combed repeatedly. Mr. Boyce said that immediately after the escape he was so close to the prison that "I could see the lights at night and the helicopters looking for me."

Mr. Boyce denied that he had obtained any money or other escape help from Soviet intelligence agents. Asked how he had managed to support himself financially, he said that he had had no financial problems and added that friends had helped him.

He said that he had placed the telephone call because he wanted to let his parents know he was in good health and he loved them.

Before ending the conversation, which lasted about seven minutes, he said, "I've never felt better. I love to be free."

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BARNETT CASE

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ON PAGE 1

WALL STREET JOURNAL
30 October 1980

What's News—

Richard Nixon testified that the FBI director had direct White-House authority to conduct warrantless break-ins in foreign intelligence cases affecting national security. The former President appeared as a prosecution witness in the trial of two former FBI officials accused of illegally approving break-ins.

* * * * *

A former CIA agent pleaded guilty in Baltimore federal court to spying for the Soviet Union. Justice Department attorneys said David H. Barnett let Soviets know the U.S. had discovered Moscow's radio guidance frequencies for missiles. Under the plea-bargain, Barnett agreed to undergo testing before being sentenced.

* * * * *

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 October 1980

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92 PAGE 2

**Former CIA agent pleads
guilty to selling secrets**

Baltimore

Former CIA agent David Henry Barnett has pleaded guilty to selling American secrets to the Russians in what is believed to be the deepest known Soviet penetration of the CIA.

Mr. Barnett agreed to plead guilty to the one-count indictment and to cooperate with a federal investigation of US intelligence leaks. The indictment charged that at clandestine exchanges in Vienna and Jakarta four years ago, Mr. Barnett passed the KGB details of a CIA plan to obtain information on Soviet military operations. Law enforcement sources said he allegedly was paid between \$75,000 and \$100,000 for selling the secrets to the Soviets.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
ON PAGE 8.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
30 October 1980

Admits being Soviet spy at CIA

Baltimore (UPI)—Former CIA agent David Henry Barnett pleaded guilty today to selling American secrets to the Russians in what is believed to be the deepest Soviet penetration of the CIA.

Barnett, 47, of Bethesda, Md., agreed to plead guilty to the one-count indictment before U.S. District Judge Frank A. Kaufman. He also agreed to cooperate with a federal investigation of United States intelligence leaks.

Barnett, dressed in a brown suit and accompanied by his attorney, also told Kaufman he would undergo a psychiatric examination.

An indictment issued last Friday charged Barnett

with spying for the Soviet Union by giving the KGB information on a key U.S. intelligence operation. He is believed to be the highest-ranking CIA official ever publicly accused of serving as a Soviet "mole."

The indictment charged that at clandestine exchanges in Vienna and Jakarta, Indonesia, four years ago, Barnett passed to the KGB details of a CIA plan to obtain information on Soviet military operations.

Law enforcement sources have said Barnett allegedly was paid between \$75,000 and \$100,000 for selling the secrets to the Soviets after he ended a 12-year career with the CIA in 1970 and opened a business in Indonesia.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
30 October 1980

Ex-CIA agent pleads guilty to Soviet spying

BALTIMORE [UPI]—Former CIA agent David Henry Barnett pleaded guilty Wednesday to selling American secrets to the Russians in what is believed to be the deepest known Soviet penetration of the CIA.

Barnett, 47, of Bethesda, Md., agreed to plead guilty to the one-count indictment before U.S. District Judge Frank A. Kaufman. He also agreed to cooperate with a federal investigation of U.S. intelligence leaks.

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THE ONE-COUNT indictment charged that at clandestine exchanges in Vienna, Austria, and Jakarta four years ago, Barnett passed to the KGB details of a CIA plan to obtain information on Soviet military operations.

Law enforcement sources have said Barnett allegedly was paid between \$75,000 and \$100,000 for selling the se-

crets to the Soviets after he ended a 12-year career with the CIA in 1970 and opened a business in Indonesia.

The indictment charges that from October, 1976, to February, 1977, Barnett communicated to the Soviets "information relating to the national defense, that is, the nature of and certain details of the HA BRINK operation." That CIA operation had to do with the agency's covert collection of Soviet manuals, weaponry, instruments, and parts, a Justice Department spokesman said.

FEDERAL SOURCES have said the detection of Barnett's activities marked the KGB's deepest confirmed penetration of the CIA.

Sources also said the KGB assigned Barnett to attempt to penetrate committees on Capitol Hill, and spokesmen for both House and Senate Intelligence Committees said Barnett applied for jobs on the panels with access to highly secret information.

Barnett worked as a CIA contract employee—being paid for specific jobs—from 1958 to 1963, and then became a full-time staff member in the covert operations section until 1970. Sources said he did some work for the CIA in later years.

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ON PAGE **15A**

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
30 OCTOBER 1980

Ex-CIA worker pleads guilty to aiding Soviets

By Michael J. Sniffen
Associated Press

BALTIMORE — David H. Barnett, a former operative for the CIA, yesterday pleaded guilty to spying for the Soviet Union. The government has said that the Soviet KGB paid Barnett \$92,600 for secret information.

U.S. District Judge Frank A. Kaufman accepted the guilty plea as part of a plea bargain between Barnett and the government after a two-hour hearing to determine that Barnett's plea was voluntary. During the hearing George Matava, an attorney with the Justice Department's internal security section, read a long statement detailing what Barnett had given the Soviet Union for the money. As part of the plea bargain with the government, the statement included actions which were not a part of the single count of espionage brought against Barnett.

Kaufman set sentencing for Dec. 8 after Barnett, 47, will have been questioned fully by the CIA and FBI about his activities on behalf of the Soviets. The charge carries a maximum term of life in prison.

Also as part of the agreement, Barnett agreed to submit to a lie-detector test after the interviews to determine whether he has cooperated fully. U.S. Attorney Dan Goldstein said the government would make no recommendation on the sentence but would advise the court of Barnett's cooperation.

Released without bail

Barnett was released without bail until his sentencing. He had been indicted by a Baltimore federal grand jury Friday on one count of violating the espionage act.

Matava told the court that among the most sensitive information that Barnett had transmitted to the Soviets was that the United States had discovered the radio frequencies used to guide Soviet SA-2 ground-to-air missiles and the length of time Soviet W-class submarines could remain submerged.

Matava said the SA-2 missile had been highly effective in bringing down U.S. bombers over North Vietnam during the Vietnam War and that gaining knowledge of their guidance frequencies had saved the lives of American bomber pilots during that war.

He said that the W-class diesel submarines were still in use and that the government believed that as a result of Barnett's cooperation with the Soviets, their submarine commanders had been issued new instructions on tactics.

Matava said Barnett, of Bethesda, Md., left the CIA in 1970 in order to try to make more money in private business. He said Barnett's business interests failed and he went heavily into debt and approached the KGB, the Soviet intelligence agency, in 1976 in Jakarta with an offer to sell information for \$70,000.

KGB push

According to Matava, the KGB continually pressed Barnett to find employment inside the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency or the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Matava said that Barnett was afraid to re-apply to the CIA as a permanent employee for fear his dealings with the Soviets would be exposed in a lie-detector examination but that he did try to get jobs with the Senate and House intelligence committees and with the White House's Intelligence Oversight Board, all without success.

Matava told of a long series of meetings between Barnett and KGB officers in Jakarta and Vienna in the late 1970s and the arrangements KGB agents gave him for contacting a KGB control officer in Washington after he moved back here in 1978.

Among these arrangements was a plan under which Barnett would receive telephone calls at 3 p.m. on the last Saturday of each month at a public telephone in the northern Virginia suburbs of Washington.

Matava identified Barnett's KGB control officer in Washington as the former third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Vladimir V. Popov, whom he said Barnett knew as Igor.

More secrets

Among other information that Matava said Barnett passed to the Soviets were the names of seven Soviet consular officers whom the CIA had targeted for recruitment, the identities of 30 covert CIA employees and the name of the agency's central informant in the operation in which the information about the radio frequencies and submarines was obtained. Matava said the informant was alive and might be subject to retribution.

Sources have described that operation, which was run in Indonesia during the 1960s to obtain manuals and parts from Soviet weapons being supplied to that Southeast Asian island nation, as among the most successful CIA operations of its kind.

Judge Kaufman warned Barnett before he accepted the guilty plea that he could not be placed on probation at sentencing. Barnett, wearing a tan suit and blue shirt, showed no emotion during the entire proceeding, facing straight ahead almost throughout.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A1**THE BALTIMORE SUN
30 October 1980

Former CIA operative admits he sold Soviets U.S. intelligence data

By Allegra Bennett

David Henry Barnett, a former Central Intelligence Agency operative, pleaded guilty in federal court here yesterday to selling U.S. intelligence secrets to the Soviet Union in return for \$92,600 in cash.

As part of a plea agreement with the government, worked out over a month of negotiation, Barnett admitted to providing the KGB, the Soviet Union's intelligence agency, with a description of "H A Brink," a covert U.S. operation which procured technical information on Soviet weaponry.

Government attorneys claimed that if the espionage case had gone to trial they also would have proven that Barnett participated, at the request of the Soviets, in other activities detrimental to U.S. undercover operatives.

Barnett's association with the KGB was detailed in a lengthy confession given to the FBI during the course of "12 interviews over an 18-day period last March and April," according to a 25-page statement of facts given to the court that contained portions of that confession.

The statement of facts read yesterday provided a rare glimpse into the workings of the intelligence community generally, known to the public only through spy novels and films.

The espionage scenario outlined in the government's written account contained all the elements of international intrigue—from secret meetings at a Soviet "safe house" in Vienna, to "handlers" or KGB contacts named Igor and Dimitri, and the unmasking of a Soviet spy in the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The details brought low gasps from spectators in the crowded courtroom yesterday.

Barnett's sale of CIA secrets to the KGB represents the most serious breach of government secrecy revealed in recent years.

In the statement of facts read yesterday by George G. Matava, staff attorney with the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department, the disclosures were "the first definite indication to the Soviets" that CIA covert operations have been able to obtain detailed information on military equipment given by the Soviets to their allies.

Mr. Matava told the court yesterday that not only did Barnett disclose the "H A Brink" operation, but he revealed to the Soviets the identities of 30 undercover CIA agents and named 7 Soviet nationals targeted by the CIA as possible recruitments for covert activities.

Asked by the courtroom deputy how he wished to plead to the espionage charge, Barnett, who lives in West Bethesda, answered strongly "Guilty."

The bespectacled Barnett stood with his hands at his sides and looked straight ahead, showing little emotion.

To be certain the plea was voluntary, Judge Frank A. Kaufman asked the former CIA agent whether he was under a doctor's care or taking medication.

Barnett initially responded that he was not under a doctor's care, but after considering his answer for a moment, he altered his response, saying, "I intend to be under the care of a psychiatrist."

Judge Kaufman advised Barnett that, despite his agreement to cooperate with the government in its investigation of the full impact on national security of his espionage activities, he still can be sentenced to life imprisonment. Because of the nature of the offense, he is not eligible for anything less than a prison term, the judge said.

"There can be no probation . . . and no split sentence," Judge Kaufman explained. He set sentencing for December 8.

Under the "H A Brink" operation, Mr. Matava said, detailed information was collected concerning the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile system (known as SAM), the Russian Styx naval cruise missile, and the Soviet W-class submarine. The information regarding the weaponry has never been available from any other source, the federal lawyer said.

According to the document, the importance of the "H A Brink" operation to this country's national security was demonstrated during the Vietnam War.

Having knowledge of the guidance system in the SA-2 missile used by the North Vietnamese to shoot down U.S. aircraft, U.S. intelligence agents were able to learn the signal and jam the frequencies used to guide the missiles to their targets, the document said.

Barnett did not sell the "H A Brink" secrets to the Soviets until 1976, long after the information had been used to save American soldiers' lives in Vietnam.

The information on the sophisticated Soviet weaponry

CONTINUED

was supplied by the Soviets to a foreign nation friendly with them, the document said. That foreign country has since "enjoyed good relations with the United States," according to the document.

Barnett confessed to his activities early last March when confronted by FBI agents, who told him they were aware he attempted to secure reemployment in the U.S. intelligence sector by applying for positions on both the House and Senate intelligence committees.

He was not hired by either committee, and sources said he was not seriously considered for a position.

A resident of West Bethesda since April, 1978, Barnett, 47, first was employed by the CIA in the late 1950s and 1960s as an undercover contract employee and staff officer with a top secret clearance and access to sensitive classified information.

His primary responsibility, according to the court document, "involved the conduct of clandestine intelligence operations overseas, including operations designed to collect information on the Soviet Union."

He left the CIA in 1970 because he was not making enough money, the document read, and went into business on his own. Two years later, he moved his family to Indonesia, and started a number of businesses in private industry there.

The government claims that by 1976, Barnett's "financial situation had become quite precarious."

In the fall of 1976, Barnett went to the home of a Soviet cultural attache in Jakarta, Indonesia, according to the court document.

In a typewritten, unsigned note given to the attache, Barnett revealed his desire to sell U.S. secret information. He subsequently met with another Soviet national, requested \$70,000, and discussed for the first time CIA operations as he knew them while employed by the agency.

Other meetings followed, in Vienna and Brussels, in which Barnett promised that he could get a job again in a U.S. intelligence agency.

The KGB told Barnett that it was primarily interested in the CIA, the Intelligence and Research Bureau at the State Department and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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ON PAGE A1-9

THE WASHINGTON POST
30 October 1980

Ex-CIA Agent Pleads Guilty to Spying

By Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writer

BALTIMORE, Oct. 29 — David Henry Barnett, the first CIA officer in the agency's 33-year history to be indicted on espionage charges, pleaded guilty today to having sold to the Soviet Union details of one of the most successful undercover operations the agency ever conducted against the Russians.

Besides telling the Soviets that many of the weapons they supplied to Indonesia between 1959 and 1969 were re-sold to the CIA, Barnett identified for them the Indonesian agent who arranged the resale and the 29 other Indonesians who helped this agent. And he told them that from these weapons and the technical data that came with them, the United States had been able to devise countermeasures against the Russian-built SA-2 anti-aircraft missile used by the North Vietnamese against American bombers during the war.

A 25-page "statement of fact," to which Barnett did not object, also said that he told the Soviet KGB (secret police) the names of Russian agents the CIA was hoping to recruit as double agents in Indonesia.

In an unemotional voice, Barnett pleaded guilty to a single charge of espionage before U.S. District Court Judge Frank A. Kaufman, who withheld sentencing until Dec. 9 while Barnett undergoes interrogation by the FBI and CIA to determine how much damage he did. Through the Justice Department, the FBI and CIA also told Kaufman they want to find out as much as they can about how the KGB

operates when it buys the services of an American intelligence officer.

"Do you understand that what you are being charged with carries with it a maximum penalty of life imprisonment?" Kaufman asked Barnett.

"Yes, your honor, I do," Barnett replied without emotion, his hands clasped behind his back.

In detail as rich as that supplied by any spy novel, Kaufman was told just what it was Barnett had sold the Russians, how it might damage the United States and how Barnett went about in the two years ending in August 1977 passing what he knew on to the KGB. Kaufman was told that Barnett received a total of \$92,600 from the Russians for what he gave them.

Justice Department Attorney George G. Matava told the court that Barnett

handed over to the KGB the full details of a CIA covert operation code-named HABRINK, which Matava said was "very successful and provided a large volume of Soviet data and a limited amount of Soviet hardware on a large variety of weapons" deployed in Indonesia.

HABRINK gave the CIA enough information about the SAM missile, Matava said, that the United States could determine the radio-frequency used to guide it in flight. Thus U.S. experts were able to devise countermeasures "that saved the lives of many bomber crews engaged in action in Vietnam."

HABRINK also revealed how long "W" class diesel-powered Soviet submarines could stay submerged without

surfacing to recharge their batteries. Matava said this period of time "was longer than the U.S. had previously thought and that information was disseminated, under classification, within the American fleet."

"The information regarding this weaponry," Matava told Kaufman, "has never been available from any other source."

In addition, HABRINK provided details of the Soviet Styx naval surface-to-surface missile, the Komar guided missile patrol boat, the Riga-class destroyer, the Sverdlov-class cruiser, the TU16 (Badger) bomber and the Kennel air-to-surface missile.

Matava said Barnett told the CIA the Soviets shrugged off HABRINK as if it knew the weapons it gave to Indonesia would be compromised.

According to Barnett, Matava said, a KGB agent named Dimitry told Barnett: "The Americans got the information so they are happy, the agents got the money so they are happy and the Soviets got the benefits from supplying the hardware in the first place, so everybody's happy."

Matava said the exact opposite was true. He said the Soviet decision to supply new weapons to Indonesia was the "subject of an intense internal debate within the Soviet Union . . . While debriefing Barnett, the KGB gave short shrift to HABRINK because it did not want to acquaint him with the value of the HABRINK operation or the value to them of learning that such an operation had taken place."

Almost as serious as Barnett's disclosure of HABRINK, Matava told Kaufman, was his revelation of who HABRINK was. Said Matava: "Barnett told the KGB HABRINK's true name. This agent is alive, though no longer active as a source. As a result of Barnett's actions, HABRINK is exposed to retribution if the Soviets found it to their advantage."

It all began in the fall of 1976, Matava told Kaufman, six years after Barnett had left the CIA to seek his fortune in a shrimp factory and a furniture export business in Indonesia. Both were

failing and Barnett had fallen deeply in debt, Matava said.

Barnett went to the home of a Soviet cultural attache in Jakarta and offered to sell his services. Barnett was told to come back a week later, when he met the man who identified himself as Dimitry. By the end of the following week, Barnett had told Dimitry enough to be paid \$25,000 in \$100, \$50 and \$20 bills.

Three months later, Matava said, Barnett met three KGB agents in a KGB safe house outside Vienna. Barnett's trip to Vienna was right out of James Bond. He flew to Brussels, where he took a train to Antwerp for a business meeting with an unidentified associate. He took another train back to Brussels, then a third train to Vienna. He went back the same way, meeting again with his business associate in Antwerp.

What followed was more James Bond. Back in Jakarta in November 1977, Barnett was introduced to a man identified as Igor. Igor, who later turned out to be Vladimir V. Popov, former third secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, wanted Barnett to go back to Washington and get rehired by the CIA or hired by the Defense Intelligence Agency or the Intelligence and Research Bureau at the State Department.

Barnett went back, but failed to get any of the jobs. Along the way, Igor would contact Barnett by calling him at certain times and dates in pay phone booths at an Exxon station in Annan-

dale, the lobby of the Bethesda Medical Building and a public phone at the corner of Wilson Lane and Cordell Avenue in Bethesda. A drop site was arranged near Lock 11 on the C & O canal in Maryland, where Barnett was to place a piece of red tape on the side of a nearby telephone booth to signal the KGB that the drop site had been serviced.

Matava said that neither of the phone booths at the Annandale Exxon station or the drop site on the C & O canal were ever used, but the phone in the lobby of the Bethesda Medical Building rang frequently. Always, it was "Igor" calling Barnett.

Through all the phone calls, Barnett had to tell Igor he'd been spectacularly unsuccessful at finding the kind of job Igor wanted him to get. Barnett was given \$3,000 for another trip to Vienna for a meeting with the KGB at a radio shop at 64 Taberstrasse. By this time, it was April 1980, and though it has never been made clear how U.S. authorities found him out, an FBI legal attache from Bern was across the street from the radio shop verifying that the meeting was taking place.

While Barnett is the first CIA officer to be charged with espionage, he is not the first employee of the agency to be so charged. William Kampiles was arrested on espionage charges two years ago when he sold the Soviets the manual of how the KH11 surveillance satellite works.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES
30 OCTOBER 1980

Ex-Agent of C.I.A. Pleads Guilty To Selling Data to Soviet Union

By PHILIP TAUBMAN
Special to The New York Times

BALTIMORE, Oct. 29 — With tightly clasped hands his only sign of emotion, David H. Barnett, a former American intelligence agent, pleaded guilty today in Federal court here to a charge of selling United States intelligence secrets to the Soviet Union.

In a statement of facts read to the court, the Justice Department said that Mr. Barnett, 47 years old, a former agent with the Central Intelligence Agency, had described "numerous" agency operations to Soviet officials and exposed the identities of 30 covert American agents.

The statement included a chronology of clandestine meetings between Mr. Barnett and Soviet agents that involved "dead drop sites" for the transmission of information, "safehouses" used by Russian agents, and other cloak-and-dagger details usually found only in spy novels.

Plea Bargaining Agreement

The statement, which incorporated information contained in Mr. Barnett's confession to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, appeared to underscore the earlier remarks of officials that Mr. Barnett's activities represented the K.G.B.'s deepest proven penetration of Central Intelligence Agency operations.

After hearing the statement and questioning Mr. Barnett to be certain his plea was voluntary, Federal District Judge Frank A. Kaufman accepted the guilty

plea and set Dec. 8 for sentencing. The espionage charge carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.

The guilty plea was a result of plea bargaining between Mr. Barnett and his lawyer and the Justice Department. Justice Department officials told the court that they had limited the charges against Mr. Barnett to one count in return for his pledge to provide the government with full details of his ties to the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence service.

Officials said they would administer a polygraph, or lie detector, test, to Mr. Barnett to check the credibility of his information. They said they would tell Judge Kaufman the results of the test, but would make no recommendation about the sentence.

The Justice Department generally prefers to settle espionage cases by plea negotiation rather than trial to prevent the disclosure of intelligence information during court proceedings and to avoid the prolonged legal maneuvering that characterizes such trials.

Mr. Barnett worked for the agency for 12 years before resigning in 1970. He returned in January 1979 to conduct training programs for agents until March of this year, including an assignment in Indonesia.

According to the statement of facts presented today, he exposed and compromised a covert operation code-named "H A BRINK," considered one of the agency's high-priority operations in the late 1960's.

"H A BRINK" involved the clandestine collection of information about Soviet weapons supplied to Indonesia. The United States secured information about the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile system, the Styx naval cruise missile, and the W-class submarine. Mr. Barnett, who

worked for the agency in Indonesia in the late 1960's, gave the K.G.B. details of "H A BRINK" in 1976 and 1977. These disclosures by Mr. Barnett formed the basis for the one-count indictment to which he pleaded guilty today.

He also was said to have disclosed to the Russians the identities of 30 covert agency employees and agency attempts to recruit Soviet consular employees.

Justice Department lawyers told the court today that some of these activities would have led to additional counts against Mr. Barnett had his case gone to trial.

According to the 25-page statement of facts, Mr. Barnett, a resident of Bethesda, Md., accepted \$92,000 from the K.G.B. for his services.

Mr. Barnett's spying began in 1976, the statement said. Living in Indonesia and experiencing financial problems, Mr. Barnett approached the Soviet cultural attaché in Jakarta, Indonesia, and offered to become a Soviet spy in exchange for \$70,000. Within a week, he was introduced to someone identified as Dimitri, and after providing details about the agency's covert operations, he received \$25,000 from the K.G.B. agent.

A 'Safehouse' in Vienna

Traveling with \$3,000 in expense money provided by Dimitri, Mr. Barnett arrived in Vienna on Feb. 27, 1977. He was taken to a K.G.B. "safehouse" outside Vienna by a man who identified himself as Pavel, and introduced to two other Soviet agents, identified as Mike and Aleksei. They said their primary targets were the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the Defense Department. At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Barnett was given \$15,000.

In March 1977, Mr. Barnett, back in Indonesia, received an additional \$30,000 from Dimitri. He then made two trips to Washington in an unsuccessful effort to get a job on the White House Intelligence Oversight Board or at the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

In November 1977, in Indonesia, Mr. Barnett was introduced by Dimitri to a Soviet agent who identified himself as Igor. He gave Mr. Barnett the location of two public telephones near a service station in Annandale, Va., outside Washington, and said they were to be used for contact purposes at 3 P.M. on the last Saturday of every month.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A 10THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
30 October 1980

Ex-CIA Agent Admits He Spied for Soviets, Was Paid \$92,600

BALTIMORE, Md. (AP) — David H. Barnett pleaded guilty yesterday to spying for the Soviet Union, and the government described how the debt-ridden former CIA agent coolly peddled his nation's secrets to KGB agents on three continents for \$92,600.

U.S. District Judge Frank A. Kaufman accepted the guilty plea from the red-haired, bespectacled father of three after a two-hour hearing to determine that Barnett's plea was voluntary.

As part of a plea bargain between Barnett and the government, Justice Department attorney George Matava read a 25-page account of what the government said it could prove against the Bethesda, Md., import-export businessman who once had "top secret" clearance in the CIA. The account detailed clandestine meetings between Barnett and KGB men he knew as "Dmitriy," "Igor," and "Pavel" in Jakarta, Indonesia; Vienna, Austria, and Washington, D.C., and pre-arranged calls to pay telephones at suburban Virginia shopping centers.

Under the plea bargain, Barnett admitted guilt to one count of espionage for giving the Soviets details of a CIA secret operation called HA-BRINK, which the government said he worked on overseas. Sources have said the operation was conducted in Indonesia, which is designated "HA" in CIA codenames and which was receiving large amounts of Soviet equipment in the 1960s.

The government described HA-BRINK as very successful until it ended in 1969, just before Barnett quit the CIA. Matava said the United States learned how long Soviet W-Class diesel submarines, still in use in the Soviet navy, could remain submerged. As a result of Barnett's spying, the Soviets have undoubtedly issued new tactical orders to their submarine commanders, Matava said. He added that Barnett told the Soviets how HA-BRINK had obtained the guidance systems for the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile and the Styx naval cruise missile. He said the SA-2 had been used during the Vietnam war to shoot down U.S. planes over North Vietnam, and that HA-BRINK had allowed the United States to determine how to jam the guidance and save pilots' lives.

Barnett faces a possible maximum penalty of life in prison, but he agreed to cooperate fully in telling the CIA and FBI the extent of his work for the Soviets. Judge Kaufman set sentencing for Dec. 8, at which time he will receive a secret report from the government detailing all the damage that Barnett did and what he did not tell the KGB. In addition, Barnett agreed to let the judge see the results of a lie-detector test, which the FBI will administer to determine whether he has held anything back.

The government said Barnett had begun confessing his work for the Soviets when first confronted by FBI men last March while working at a CIA part-time, contract job training agents. The CIA had taken him back in this limited role in January 1979. Nothing said in court indicated whether or not U.S. agents knew then of Barnett's work for the Soviets.



Associated Press

Former CIA Agent Pleads Guilty to Spying

David H. Barnett, a 47-year-old Bethesda businessman who also was a CIA agent, leaves court in Baltimore yesterday after pleading guilty to spying for the Soviet Union. Among other things, Barnett's turnabout ended an extremely successful CIA operation that had netted the U.S. important information about Soviet submarines and naval missiles.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 49NEWSWEEK
3 November 1980

Wheeler, Dealer, Bureaucrat—Spy?

David Barnett was a middle-aged man whose life was going nowhere. After quitting the CIA in 1970, he tried to cash in on his contacts in Surabaya, Indonesia, where he had been stationed for two years. But he failed as a representative of American businessmen looking for investment opportunities, he failed as a dealer in Indonesian antiques and he failed as the manager of a frozen-shrimp plant. Finally, faced with a growing family and growing debts, he allegedly fell back on the one profession he knew something about: espionage. Last week Barnett was charged with passing CIA secrets to the Soviet Union.

A Justice Department official said Barnett was the first former CIA officer to be caught spying for the Russians. Apparently, it was a small catch. Barnett was

a low-level CIA operative for twelve years in a number of places, including the agency's Langley, Va., headquarters. In Indonesia in the early 1960s, he helped with the CIA's Operation HA/BRINK, which involved the collection of secret Soviet manuals and weapons. According to last week's Federal indictment, Barnett met with Soviet agents in Vienna and Jakarta in late 1976 and early 1977 and slipped them details about HA/BRINK. The price: about \$100,000, sources said. HA/BRINK was out of date and hardly worth that much, and that led to speculation that Barnett had told the Soviets more than the CIA was willing to admit in court; with two years' experience in headquarters, Barnett knew about the agency's inner workings.

Supersensitive: The most interesting aspect of the case was not mentioned in the one-sentence indictment. After his contact with the Soviets, Barnett applied for jobs with the supersensitive Senate Intelligence

Committee, the House Intelligence Committee and the Intelligence Oversight Board. He sought help from Democratic Rep. Andrew Maguire of New Jersey, a friend of Barnett's wife. "He indicated that he was interested in staying in Washington and staying in the intelligence field," Maguire said last week, adding that he had done little to help Barnett. All three panels turned Barnett down. He finally found work last year as a non-staff employee of the CIA—apparently so that the agency could keep an eye on him.

Barnett was not arrested last week, but his lawyer said he would be in court soon for arraignment. In court, prosecutors are expected to reveal details that insiders say will sound just like a fictional spy story. But for Barnett, nonfiction was bad enough: if he is found guilty, he could go to prison for life.

JOHN BRECHER with DAVID C. MARTIN
in Washington

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 54TIME MAGAZINE
3 November 1980

World

ESPIONAGE

Living on Burrowed Time*Was onetime CIA Agent David Barnett a KGB mole?*

The news did nothing to improve the already tarnished reputation of the Central Intelligence Agency. In Baltimore last week, a grand jury indicted David Barnett, 47, a former CIA covert agent, on a single count of selling top-secret information to the agency's Soviet counterpart, the KGB. Barnett allegedly fed the Soviets details about a CIA operation code-named HABRINK, set up to collect data on Soviet weaponry systems.

Barnett, who was said to be living with his family in Bethesda, Md., was expected to plead guilty this week. Though he faces a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, he may receive a lighter penalty for confessing. It is the first public case of a CIA official giving secrets to the KGB.

A 1955 graduate of the University of Michigan, Barnett joined the CIA in 1958 and served as an analyst with U.S. Army intelligence units in South Korea and Washington, D.C. From 1965 to 1967, he worked at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., as a staff officer in the directorate of operations, which ran the agency's worldwide covert activities. In 1967 Barnett was assigned to a diplomatic post in Indonesia, where he was responsible for recruit-



ing local Soviet officials to spy for the U.S. He quit the agency in 1970 to run an antiques-exporting firm in Indonesia, but apparently continued to work for the CIA on a contract basis. At some point after his "retirement," with his business on the verge of bankruptcy, Barnett was recruited as a KGB mole.


The most important information Barnett gave the Soviets concerned the CIA's Operation HABRINK in the late '60s. Moscow was then supplying Indonesia's President Sukarno with billions of dollars worth of military equipment. Indonesian naval officers, however, were selling some of the Soviet weapons, parts and manuals to the CIA. Barnett worked on the project under diplomatic cover. He may also have provided details on other covert activities he had known about during his directorate years. And as one former agency official put it, the KGB would surely have debriefed Barnett on CIA minutiae: "the weaknesses of colleagues; who was sleeping with whom; who had a drinking problem; who was unhappy—information that is really useful to them." In any

case, the notoriously stingy KGB did pay Barnett nearly \$100,000, and in 1977 it persuaded him to apply for staff positions on the Senate and House intelligence committees and the White House Intelligence Oversight Board.

Barnett failed, apparently because there were no openings. In January 1979, however, he was rehired by the CIA as a contract agent; 13 months later he abruptly resigned. By that time, both the CIA and the FBI were aware that Barnett was a KGB agent. In fact, TIME has learned that his links with the Soviets were known to some U.S. officials at least two years before the CIA rehired him. That, of course, raises a crucial question: Why was Barnett allowed to return to the agency?

Justice Department officials contend that Barnett was not arrested or exposed earlier because the CIA hoped to turn him into a triple agent. Intelligence experts scoff at this argument on the ground that the KGB would never trust a turncoat agent with any Soviet secrets. Another

theory is that rehiring Barnett was simply an administrative goof. When it was discovered, officials decided that the best strategy was to play for time until it was decided how to handle his case with the least amount of damaging publicity. Whatever the truth, the Justice Department promises to shed at least some light on the shadowy case of David Barnett when he is formally arraigned this week. ■



ARTICLE APPENDED
ON PAGE 8U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
3 November 1980

Capitol Hill—Good Hole for a Mole

A spy in Congress. According to federal officials, that's what the Soviet Union wanted when it recruited a former American intelligence agent indicted on October 24 for espionage.

The indictment accused David Barnett of selling Central Intelligence Agency secrets to Russia. But officials said the information that the Kremlin wanted was not just in the CIA but also on Capitol Hill.

That, prosecutors said, is why Barnett applied for jobs with the intelligence committees of both the House and the Senate. He never was hired, but experts said his attempt emphasizes the sensitivity of secrets entrusted not only to members of Congress but also to scores of its employees.

The two intelligence committees together have 77 staff members, each of whom went through an exhaustive pre-employment investigation by the FBI. In all, 27 of the 38 regular Senate and House committees have employees who hold some form of security clearance for access to sensitive information.

Among those entrusted with the

most vital secrets are the intelligence committees that oversee the CIA, the military committees that watch the Pentagon and the appropriations committees that keep tabs on confidential expenditures by numerous agencies and departments.

It was in the late 1960s that Barnett, now 47, worked as a CIA officer assigned to recruit Russian officials in Indonesia as spies for America. After leaving the CIA in 1970, he experienced money problems, which officials said led to Soviet offers of \$75,000 or more for his delivery of CIA material in 1976 and 1977.

Although the indictment made Barnett the first former covert CIA agent ever publicly accused of spying for Russia, officials insisted that he fell far short of being a high-level "mole" in the U.S. intelligence network.

Congress also claims never to have been infiltrated. Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) suggested in 1975 that spies might have landed jobs on Senate staffs. The FBI investigated and said it found nothing wrong. □

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ON PAGE 3 (SEC. 1)

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
26 October 1980

Thurmond tells KGB methods Spy used clout, got Senate staff job

By James Coates

Chicago Tribune Press Service

WASHINGTON—A Soviet bloc spy obtained a Senate staff job through which the agent passed information using a code book, Sen. Strom Thurmond (R., S.C.) has disclosed.

FBI discovery of the staff infiltration was one of several breakthroughs tracing widespread Communist efforts to place agents in key positions on House and Senate staffs; several sources told The Tribune.

Thurmond, ranking Republican on the Judiciary Committee, emerged from a classified briefing by the FBI and made these disclosures:

- David Barnett, a former Central Intelligence Agency agent who was indicted Friday for acting as an espionage agent for the Soviet KGB, tried to use political clout to obtain staff jobs not only on the House and Senate intelligence committees but also on the White House's Foreign Intelligence Oversight Board, a three-member advisory panel.

- A defecting member of a Soviet bloc intelligence service told the CIA that "Congress was considered a primary target of his service and that the official had easy access to several congressional staff members both on committees and on personal staffs."

A source close to the investigation said the defector came from the Romanian embassy.

- The FBI has unearthed other facts about Soviet infiltration that are "of the gravest concern touching on matters of far greater significance than is publicly recognized at this time."

Numerous interviews with investigators and others close to the situation disclosed that the Soviets used some old-fashioned American political clout in at least one daring scheme to infiltrate the staff responsible for evaluating covert CIA operations for senators on the Intelligence Committee.

Thurmond refused to identify the agent or the staff job successfully infiltrated in the Senate, but one of his aides noted that the Barnett case may have been typical.

Barnett worked for the CIA in Indonesia in the late 1960 and early 1970s and specialized in recruiting Soviet personnel to spy for the United States.

Friday, he was indicted on charges he violated the Espionage Act by passing secrets to the Soviets regarding a CIA project code-named HABRINK, which intelligence sources described as a program to collect Russian spy manuals, weapons, and other secret hardware.

Barnett's defection endangered lives, it was alleged.

BARNETT, THE Tribune learned, obtained a job interview with three top staff members of the Senate Intelligence Committee by having his wife, Sarah, ask for help from a congressman whom she had befriended while attending college in Ohio 20 years ago.

Barnett's wife persuaded Rep. Andrew Maguire (D., N.J.) to use his congressional clout to obtain the interview after Barnett had been told the committee's staff had no openings.

Maguire said in a prepared statement that he knew Barnett was a former CIA agent, but had no knowledge that he was a KGB double agent—called a "mole" in spy jargon—until last April when he was interviewed by the FBI about his role in the case.

A spokesman for the Senate Intelligence Committee said that Barnett was given an interview because of Maguire's recommendation.

Barnett was interviewed by William Miller, the committee's staff director; Benjamin Marshall, the committee security director; and Audrey Hatry, chief clerk of the panel.

After the interview, Miller sent a copy of Barnett's resume to the House Intelligence Committee with a memo attached: "This fellow came in on recommendation of Rep. Maguire for an interview. I suggested he call you for an interview."

THURMOND SAID Friday of Barnett, "I am informed he was also recommended by a senior congressional staff member" for jobs both at the House and the White House.

Thurmond and other Republican senators, including Sen. Malcolm Wallop [Wyo.], said they were upset that the Barnett case was not disclosed long ago.

But an Intelligence Committee source said the fact that Barnett was a KGB agent was told to the Senate just weeks after he applied for work in 1977.

staff job

The CIA had learned, this source said, that Barnett had been recruited by the Soviet spy agency in the early 1970s after quitting the CIA embassy station in Indonesia in the consulate at Surabaya.

Barnett started a business importing rattan furniture into the United States,

and apparently was recruited by the KGB after he ran into financial troubles.

HE REPORTEDLY was paid up to \$100,000 to provide the HABRINK data to the Soviets and would have received more if he had won a congressional or White House post.

One FBI official said that Barnett was not indicted until nearly three years after his spy activities were unearthed because the CIA debated for a long time using him as a "triple agent" to feed false information to the Soviets.

Thurmond charged after his FBI briefing, "I can say the briefing tended to confirm my original assessment that the prosecution of the David Barnett case was delayed inordinately for reasons which may have involved political factors and consideration.

"While I would not characterize the David Barnett case as merely the tip of the iceberg as has been suggested by others, I would state that far more is still to be learned concerning the penetration of the institutions of the American government by Soviet intelligence and the intelligence services of other unfriendly nations.

"In that connection, we have learned recently from the defection of a foreign intelligence officer that Congress was considered the primary target of his service," Thurmond said.

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ON PAGE E-2

NEW YORK TIMES
26 OCTOBER 1980

Ex-C.I.A. Officer Charged as Spy

"This is as close as the K.G.B. has ever gotten to penetrating the C.I.A.'s covert operations," said a law enforcement official in Washington of allegations that David Barnett, who left the Central Intelligence Agency in March, had been paid by Soviet intelligence to get a job (he didn't) on a Senate intelligence committee's staff.

Maybe so. At any rate, the K.G.B. turns out to have had reasons to think its \$100,000 might not be wasted. Friday, Mr. Barnett was indicted on charges of passing secrets to Moscow, in Vienna and in Jakarta, Indonesia, between October 1976 and February 1977. That was when Mr. Barnett was running his own intelligence business. Before that, he had been an officer in the C.I.A. branch responsible for conducting covert operations.

It was not immediately clear whether the operation about which Mr. Barnett passed information, called "H A Brink" and involving American collection of Soviet military information and weapons, was one that he had supervised. What seems clearer is that when the C.I.A. rehired him, in 1979, it was with some thought of turning him to a triple agent. Apparently it didn't.

Michael Wright
and Caroline Rand Herron

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
25 October 1980

Former CIA Agent Indicted on Spy Charges

U.S. Says He Passed Information to Russians; Guilty Plea Expected

By RONALD J. OSTROW, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—David H. Barnett, a former agent in the CIA's clandestine service, was indicted Friday by a federal grand jury in Baltimore on charges of spying for the Soviet Union.

The Justice Department said in announcing the indictment that the alleged espionage took place from Oct. 31, 1976, until about Feb. 27, 1977, in Vienna and Jakarta several years after Barnett left the CIA to conduct "private business."

Barnett, 47, is expected to plead guilty, perhaps as soon as next week, according to government sources who declined to be identified.

The grand jury charged him with delivering defense information to aid a foreign government and with aiding and abetting an offense against the United States. These charges carry a maximum sentence of life in prison.

Barnett was charged with giving Soviet agents classified information on a covert CIA operation code-named HA BRINK. HA BRINK involved collecting Soviet manuals, weaponry, instruments and parts, according to John Russell, a Justice Department spokesman. Thus, information allegedly passed by Barnett could have aided Soviet counterintelligence operations.

Operation Named HA BRINK

The terse indictment and one-page Justice Department summary made no mention of efforts Barnett allegedly made to get a position on the staffs of the Senate and House Intelligence committees and on the White House Intelligence Oversight Board. But a source familiar with the case said the infiltration efforts, all unsuccessful, may figure in future court proceedings.

This source discounted reports that Barnett's anticipated guilty plea was tied to a government promise to recommend leniency in

punishing the former CIA agent. Rather, the source said, the scope and nature of the evidence were such that Barnett became convinced a court fight would be futile.

Barnett and his lawyer could not be reached for comment.

Barnett worked as a contract or part-time employee of the CIA from 1958 to 1960 and from 1961 to 1963. He then joined the agency as a full-time intelligence officer handling covert assignments. In 1970 he resigned to enter private business, the Justice Department said.

From 1965 to 1967, he worked at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., where he assisted and supervised clandestine operations overseas, the department said.

Two years after the alleged espionage, in January, 1979, Barnett again did contract work for the CIA, assignments he continued until last March. An official familiar with the case said Barnett's most recent ties to the CIA came after he was under scrutiny by the FBI. The official said the FBI, with the CIA's assistance, tried to get details from Barnett of what he had provided the Russians as well as information on their espionage apparatus.

Although the indictment charged Barnett with "aiding and abetting," it mentioned no co-conspirators or other persons. A Justice Department spokesman declined to elaborate on the "aiding and abetting" charges.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON STAR
25 OCTOBER 1980

Ex-CIA Agent Is Indicted For Espionage

A federal grand jury yesterday indicted a former CIA employee on charges of passing U.S. national defense secrets to the Soviet Union.

The one-count indictment was returned in Baltimore against David Henry Barnett, 47, of Bethesda, who had worked as a CIA covert operative for 12 years, mostly overseas.

The indictment charged Barnett with violating the Espionage Act by giving Soviet agents classified information involving a secret CIA operation known as HA-BRINK. The Justice Department described it as a CIA effort to obtain Soviet manuals, weaponry, instruments and parts.

The Justice Department said Barnett turned the information over to Soviet agents during the period beginning Oct. 31, 1976, and ending Feb. 27, 1977, in Vienna, Austria, and Jakarta, Indonesia.

If convicted, Barnett could face a maximum penalty of life in prison.

However, law enforcement sources have said that the government has worked out an agreement with Barnett's attorney under which he planned to plead guilty. Normally in such agreements the government recommends less than the maximum possible sentence.

Barnett and his wife and three children have been unreachable since first word of the case leaked to news organizations Wednesday night.

The Justice Department said, however, that Barnett was not in custody and that he and his lawyer had promised that Barnett would be available for all court appearances in the case.

A 1955 graduate of the University

of Michigan, Barnett was a contract employee of the CIA from 1958 to 1960 and from 1961 to 1963. He then served as a regular intelligence officer handling covert assignments from 1963 until 1970, when he voluntarily resigned to enter private business.

The Justice Department said that between 1965 and 1967 he was assigned to CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., where he provided support and supervision of clandestine operations overseas.

The department said that from January 1979 to last March, Barnett was again employed by the CIA as a contract employee.

The State Department's 1969 Biographic Register shows that from August 1967 to 1969 he served as a political officer in the U.S. consulate in Surabaya, Indonesia, with the rank of Fifth Class Foreign Service Reserve Officer.

Reserve officer designations in those days for political officers attached to U.S. embassies abroad were standard cover for CIA operatives.

A fifth class officer is among the lower rankings.

Before then, the Biographic Register said, he also had served in South Korea and Washington, D.C., as a U.S. Army government analyst, a title often used as cover for CIA operatives.

Neither the indictment nor a statement issued by the Justice Department made mention of Barnett's attempts beginning in late 1976 to gain employment with the Senate and House intelligence committees and the White House Intelligence Oversight Board, all of which oversee the operations of U.S. spy agencies and have access to considerable secret material.

Sources have said that those attempts were made at the direction of Barnett's Soviet controllers in return for a substantial sum of money, which has been variously reported to be \$80,000, \$100,000 or \$120,000.

Barnett did not succeed in getting those jobs.

The investigation by the FBI in conjunction with the Internal Security Section of the Justice Department lasted more than a year, law enforcement sources said.

Associated Press

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 5NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
25 October 1980

Indict ex-CIA man as Soviet spy

Former agent accused of selling secrets to KGB

Washington (UPI)—A federal grand jury today indicted former CIA agent David Barnett on charges that he sold top secrets on a key U.S. intelligence operation to the Soviet KGB.

Barnett, if convicted of the single espionage charge, faces a maximum penalty of life in prison. The indictment charges he gave the KGB details of a CIA plan to gather intelligence on Soviet military operations.

Sources say he also allegedly sold other secrets to the Soviets, receiving payments totaling between \$75,000 and \$100,000.

The sources said Barnett has agreed to plead guilty to the charge, apparently convinced the government has enough evidence to prove its case and hoping a federal judge will show some leniency in sentencing in return for his cooperating.

The indictment, returned in Baltimore and announced in Washington, was one paragraph long and tailored to protect national security information.

It charged that from October 1976 to February 1977 Barnett gave the Soviets "information relating to the national defense, that is, the nature of and certain details of the HA BRINK operation."

JOHN RUSSELL, A Justice Department spokesman, said the CIA's HA BRINK operation "has to do with the

covert collection by the CIA of Soviet manuals, weaponry, instruments and parts."

The information allegedly was passed in Vienna, Austria and Jakarta, Indonesia, several years after Barnett ended his 12-year term as a CIA undercover agent.

In an unusual twist for an espionage case, Russell said Barnett would not be promptly arrested. He is expected to be arraigned next week.

Barnett allegedly was assigned by the KGB, the Soviet intelligence agency, to try to get a job at both the Senate and House intelligence committees and the White House's top secret Intelligence Oversight Board. He was unsuccessful.

Officials familiar with the investigation noted that Barnett had served as the highest-ranking CIA "mole" whose existence has been confirmed by intelligence officials.

Barnett, his wife and three children did not answer the telephone at their home in suburban Bethesda, Md., yesterday. Barnett's attorney, Dennis Kolenda of Grand Rapids, Mich., was described by his office as "unreachable."

Barnett is listed in the State Department's 1969 Biographic Register as a Pennsylvania native who earned a B.A. degree from the University of Michigan in 1955 and served overseas with the Army from 1955 to 1958.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
25 October 1980

Ex-Agent Said To Sell Soviets CIA Arms Data

By Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writer

David Henry Barnett, a CIA officer who worked undercover as a U.S. diplomat in the Indonesian seaport of Surabaya in the late 1960s, was indicted yesterday on charges that he sold the Soviet Union details of how the CIA had obtained Russian weapons and instruments from the Indonesians.

The indictment, handed down by a federal grand jury in Baltimore, gave no details of how much money Barnett allegedly received from the Soviets or what he is supposed to have told them. It simply said that Barnett supplied the Soviets with details of a CIA operation code-named HABRINK, which the Justice Department said involved "covert collection by the CIA of Soviet manuals, weapons, instruments and parts."

Sources said the CIA was collecting missiles and radar that had been turned over to the Indonesian Navy by the Soviet Union. While the indictment did not mention it, sources said Barnett was deeply involved in HABRINK from August 1967 until late 1969, while he served in Surabaya.

Under President Sukarno, Indonesia was firmly in the Soviet camp in the 1960s and was given billions of dollars' worth of Soviet military equipment, especially naval equipment. Moscow trusted Indonesia and Sukarno so deeply that it even gave them submarines, surface warships and ship-to-air missiles.

Presumably, the Soviets had no idea their weapons were being resold to the CIA by Indonesian naval officers until Barnett allegedly told them. The indictment said Barnett said that he gave the Russians the HABRINK information between Oct. 31, 1976, and Feb. 27, 1977, in Vienna and Jakarta. Barnett was no longer working for the CIA at the time.

Besides the details of HABRINK,

Barnett was said also to have given the Soviets a "damage report," meaning he told them how much the United States was helped by obtaining the Soviet weapons from the Indonesians.

"This would be an unusually good piece of intelligence for the Russians," one source said. "It would help them to know that the United States had their hands on Russian missiles and radar but it would help them even more to know how much use we were making of those things."

Sources said that HABRINK was one of the most successful undercover CIA operations ever undertaken against the Soviet Union. One source said that the Indonesians furnished samples of almost every piece of Soviet naval hardware except an entire submarine.

"We were getting everything they had," this source said. "We were wheeling the nose cones from heat-seeking missiles down the hall in shopping carts."

While the indictment did not mention it, Barnett is also said to have been paid by the Russians after he left the CIA to try to gain a staff job on either the Senate or House Intelligence committees in hopes that he could become a Soviet mole on Capitol Hill.

Sources on the Senate Intelligence Committee said Barnett came seeking a position in 1977 but was turned down. The House Intelligence Committee also rejected his application, which came with an accompanying introduction from Rep. Andrew Maguire (D-N.J.), who knew Barnett through Barnett's wife.

"I referred him routinely to the appropriate committee staff with the advice that since I knew nothing specific about his intelligence work they should check him out with their intelligence sources," Maguire said yesterday in a prepared statement. "The two Intelligence committees and the FBI are to be commended on their investigation of the whole matter."

The Justice Department gave no details of how it caught on to Barnett's alleged dealings with the Soviets, but one source suggested the CIA might have been tipped off by a Soviet defector.

Capitol Hill sources said that Barnett received from \$80,000 to \$120,000 from the Soviets for the information he supplied. Friends said that Barnett was strapped for money ever since he left the CIA in 1970.

Barnett taught at a private school in Pennsylvania, but left because of disappointment in his career there. He went back to Indonesia, where he managed a shrimp factory before starting an import business dealing in Indonesian furniture. Barnett apparently lost money in the venture, which failed in 1975. Barnett was even more strapped for cash when his wife was stricken with a blood clot of the brain.

The indictment carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment if convicted. Sources said that Barnett, who is 47, plans to plead guilty or no contest as part of a plea-bargaining move.

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NEW YORK TIMES
25 OCTOBER 1980

Ex-C.I.A. Agent Charged With Spying for Kremlin

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24. — A former American intelligence agent, David H. Barnett, was indicted today on a charge of providing the Soviet Union with information about a covert operation conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The one-count indictment accused Mr. Barnett of giving secret information to Soviet intelligence agents in Vienna and in Jakarta, Indonesia, from October 1976 through February 1977.

According to the indictment, the classified information involved a covert C.I.A. operation known as "H A Brink." The operation, according to Government officials, involved the C.I.A.'s collecting of Soviet military manuals, weaponry, instruments and parts.

Supervised Clandestine Operations

From 1965 to 1967, Mr. Barnett worked at C.I.A. headquarters outside Washington, supervising some clandestine operations overseas, the Justice Department said.

It was not immediately clear whether the "H A Brink" operation had been one of those supervised by Mr. Barnett.

The one-count espionage indictment, handed up by a Federal grand jury in Baltimore and announced here by the Justice Department, carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment upon conviction. It apparently represented a compromise between Mr. Barnett and the Justice Department.

By agreeing to plead guilty or no contest to the charge at a later date, and offering to provide the Government with full details about his ties to the Soviet intelligence agency, the K.G.B., Mr. Barnett was indicted on only one count of violating the Espionage Act.

A guilty or no-contest plea by Mr. Barnett would avoid a trial that might force disclosure of sensitive intelligence information. In such cases, the Government generally seeks to settle the case by plea bargaining to preclude a trial.

Justice Department officials have said Mr. Barnett also attempted to aid the Soviet Union by seeking to join the staff of

both the Senate and House Intelligence Committee.

Government investigators said that Mr. Barnett received close to \$100,000 from the Soviet agency in return for his services. His effort to win a job with one of the intelligence committees, which have access to highly sensitive intelligence information, was not mentioned in the indictment.

Law-enforcement officials said that a full account of Mr. Barnett's activities in behalf of the Soviet Union would be disclosed when he appeared in Federal court for arraignment. An arraignment date has not yet been set.

Mr. Barnett worked for the intelligence agency as a contract employee, meaning that he was not on the full-time staff, from 1958 to 1960 and from 1961 to 1963. From 1963 to 1970, he was a full-time employee, serving as an intelligence officer handling covert operations. Part of that time he was based in Indonesia.

He left the intelligence agency in 1970 to enter private business. He returned to the agency in 1979. By then he was under

suspicion as a spy and was apparently given a job in hopes that he would become a triple agent or serve unknowingly as a conduit for "disinformation," or misleading information, to the Soviet Union. He left the agency in March of this year.

The indictment of Mr. Barnett, a 47-year-old resident of Bethesda, Md., brings to 13 the number of defendants who have been charged with espionage by the Government over the last five years. Ten of the 13 were accused of spying in behalf of the Soviet Union. According to the Justice Department, six of the defendants were formerly affiliated with the C.I.A. or one of its contractors, or had access to agency information.

Before 1975, under an internal executive branch agreement reached in 1954, the intelligence agency investigated allegations of espionage by its employees, and cases were not referred to the Justice Department for prosecution. Instead, employees who admitted guilt or were found in violation of agency regulations for handling classified information were stripped of their security clearances, transferred to less sensitive assignments or dismissed. There was no public disclosure of these cases.

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THE BALTIMORE SUN
25 October 1980

Indictment issued here in spy case

Former CIA agent charged with selling secrets to Soviets

By Allegra Bennett

A federal grand jury here yesterday brought a charge of espionage against a former agent for the Central Intelligence Agency who is suspected of delivering U.S. national defense secrets to the Soviet Union.

In a one-count indictment, the grand jury charged that David Henry Barnett, 47, turned over classified information relating to a covert CIA operation known as "H A Brink."

The secret information was furnished between October 31, 1976, and February 27, 1977, while Mr. Barnett worked as a CIA operative in Jakarta, Indonesia, and Vienna, the indictment charged.

Mr. Barnett, who now lives in West Bethesda, outside Washington, has not been arrested, a Justice Department source said, because he and his lawyer, Dennis Kolenda, of Grand Rapids, Mich., have given assurances that they will be available at all times for any required appearances in court.

Mr. Barnett is expected to appear in federal court in Baltimore to plead guilty or no contest to the espionage charge, but no date has been set for an arraignment.

Conviction on a charge of espionage carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.

The "H A Brink" program, according to the Justice Department, involves covert CIA efforts to collect information on secret Soviet manuals, weaponry, instruments and parts. A department spokesman declined to go into further detail about the program.

The Barnett case became public several days ago, when it was reported that Justice Department officials believed an attempt had been made in 1976 or 1977 to infiltrate the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on behalf of the Soviet intelligence service, the KGB.

There was also suspicion that the

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was a target of infiltration. None of these allegations was contained in the indictment.

Both intelligence committees received applications for a staff position from Mr. Barnett.

The former CIA agent was not hired by either panel, however, and a spokesman for each house of Congress said yesterday that Mr. Barnett never got beyond submitting an application and resume and was never seriously considered for a position.

But according to some reports, one law enforcement official disputed that contention, saying Mr. Barnett's application was seriously considered and that important political friends supported his effort to get the job.

Yesterday, Spencer Davis, a spokesman for the Senate Intelligence Committee, explained that Mr. Barnett's application came to the committee through Representative Andrew Maguire (D, N.J.), who is not on either intelligence committee.

Mr. Davis said that Mr. Maguire's wife and Mr. Barnett's wife were acquainted and that both women asked the congressman to see if there was a position available that Mr. Barnett could have on the Senate committee.

"We were not hiring, but the House was," Mr. Davis said, adding that Mr. Barnett's background in intelligence did not automatically make him a good candidate for a staff position on the committee.

He explained that a background in legislation is more useful to the committee than experience in intelligence.

The application was filed in 1977, Mr. Davis said, and was given to William G. Miller, staff director of the Senate committee, who forwarded it to Thomas K. Latimer, staff director of the House intelligence panel, "as a courtesy to Mr. Maguire," the spokesman said.

Without mentioning Mr. Maguire by name, Representative C. W. Bill Young, (R, Fla.), who is a member of the House intelligence committee, said that there was "no reason to believe the member of Congress knew anything about Barnett's background."

According to Justice Department officials, Mr. Barnett allegedly accepted about \$100,000 from the Soviet KGB in return for the stolen secret information.

The former spy worked as a contract employee of the CIA from 1958 to 1960 and from 1961 to 1963 and as an intelligence officer handling covert assignments from 1963 until 1970, when he voluntarily resigned to enter private business.

From 1965 to 1967, he was assigned to

CIA headquarters outside of McLean, Va., in a position in which he provided support and supervision of clandestine operations overseas.

It was reported that he worked again for the CIA from January, 1979, until March, 1980, as a contract employee. But some sources say he was working with the CIA as late as last month.

Since 1976, the government has gotten indictments in 10 espionage cases.

All but 1 of the 12 defendants charged in the cases tried so far have been found guilty. The other defendant was found to be mentally incompetent to stand trial and is confined in a mental hospital.

The average term for those sentenced to imprisonment has been in excess of 25 years. Appeals and motions are still pending in some of the cases, although most of those convicted in the last five years are in prison.

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Approved For Release 2009/06/15 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501430001-1

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ON PAGE **37-38**U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
3 November 1980

Latest Turn in Drama Of American Hostages

War between Iran and Iraq has transformed the situation. Now Teheran must make a choice: Release the captive diplomats or risk disaster.

As 52 American hostages approached the end of a full year in captivity, both Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and President Jimmy Carter appeared under pressure to strike a bargain for their release.

For Khomeini, terminating the crisis with the U.S. offered the best hope for avoiding disaster in a war with Iraq—perhaps even dismemberment of his country.

For Carter, freedom for the imprisoned Americans could have a significant—and possibly decisive—impact on the November 4 election.

In both Washington and Teheran there were developments in late October that encouraged speculation that the two governments might be maneuvering toward an agreement.

A U.S. proposal. Carter signaled Iran: Release of the captive Americans would lead to an immediate unfreezing of 8 billion dollars of Iranian assets and 420 million dollars' worth of military equipment. The supplies—including spare parts for the Air Force—were desperately needed by Teheran to sustain the war against Iraq.

The response from Iran's Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Rajai: It would take more than a lifting of sanctions to secure the freedom of the hostages. But Rajai said after a two-day visit to the United Nations in New York, that he was "confident" the U.S. was ready to meet other conditions laid down by Khomeini.

These included return by the U.S. of the wealth of the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, repudiation of all claims against Iran and a promise not to interfere in that country's internal affairs.

Administration officials in Washington indicated that these terms did not pose insurmountable obstacles as long as they were not stiffened by a parliamentary commission that was scheduled to spell out formally on October 26 Iran's terms for release of the American prisoners.

These officials cautioned, however, against excessive optimism about an early breakthrough—given the lengthy

record of dashed hopes concerning the fate of the captive Americans. They pointed to the Ayatollah's unpredictable behavior in the past and a continuing struggle for power in Teheran that has wrecked previous negotiations.

But these officials stressed that for the first time since the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran on Nov. 4, 1979, Khomeini seemed to have as much of a stake as Carter in ending the crisis.

What transformed the situation, in their view, was Iraq's September 22 attack on Iran. In the face of the invasion, the Islamic revolutionary regime in Teheran found itself almost totally isolated internationally as a result of its refusal to free the hostages.

Condemned by both the United Nations and the World Court for its behavior, Iran was in a weak position to mobilize international support for its charge of aggression against Iraq.

Similarly, Teheran was unable to secure war supplies, except for limited deliveries of light weapons and ammunition from Communist North Korea, Libya and possibly Syria.

An American intelligence official said that Iranian representatives had appealed to numerous governments around the world for military equipment essential to sustain their armed forces, especially the Air Force. "But," he added, "everywhere they are being turned away. As long as they hold the hostages, nobody is willing to jeopardize relations with America by supplying Iran with the spare parts and other equipment it needs so desperately."

Iraq, on the other hand, so far has not been troubled by shortages, with access to the sea through Jordan and backing from a number of countries. "Resupply will be decisive in determining the course of this war," said a military expert, "and as things stand now, Iraq has a decided advantage on that score."

Iranian ground forces, with an extraordinary show of determination, have managed to deny the Iraqis the quick, decisive victory that Baghdad's President Saddam Hussein expected in his bid to alter the border.

However, after four weeks of fight-



"We might be holding the key to your presidential election, too."

ing, the Iranians were being forced to fall back steadily, and the Iraqis claimed to have cut off the oil-producing province of Khuzestan.

Still, Iraq faced the prospect of interminable fighting on the ground and continued attacks on its cities if Iran could break out of its isolation to obtain what was needed to keep its American-trained and equipped Air Force in the fight.

Teheran's best bet for getting the spare parts and other equipment lay in the proposition advanced by President Carter. He offered to deliver an estimated 420 million dollars' worth of military equipment ordered and paid for by the Shah but held in American warehouses since the embassy was taken over last November.

Vital material. In the words of one informed observer: "This is just the kind of stuff the Iranians really need to carry on the war."

"In this situation," said an intelligence analyst, "the realization clearly is growing among Iranian leaders that they could lose the war with Iraq by their continued refusal to release the hostages."

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said that the holding of the hostages was a positive liability for Iran in its war with Iraq. He added: "I expect their release in the relatively near future."

For Carter, a spare-parts-for-hostages deal before Election Day might produce important political dividends,

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but it also would entail risks for his Mideast policy.

Diplomatic observers say that a delicate relationship that is taking shape between the United States and Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states would be jeopardized. The Saudis, alarmed by the threat they feel is posed by Khomeini's Iran, are giving moral support to Iraq and turning to the U.S. for protection.

The magazine's Mideast correspondent, William Hartley, reported that "the U.S. could well lose its newly won advantage in the gulf if sanctions against Iran were lifted to free the hostages before the war with Iraq ends."

He went on: "Washington is on the verge of forging new alliances in the gulf. All this could go down the drain if America began aiding Iran. The Middle East states understand the American dilemma but they would regard the lifting of sanctions during the Iraq-Iran war as a betrayal."

"In the long run, America's only hope of maintaining its position in the gulf and getting the hostages back without paying a prohibitive price would be to lift the sanctions only when the war ends."

Fuad Ajami, director of Mideast studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, warned: "If the hostages are released and arms are sent to Iran, the damage to American credibility in the Mideast would be devastating."

Administration officials disagreed.

Aside from electoral considerations, they argued that a hostage deal was a sensible foreign-policy move and could be sold to rulers of gulf states.

In the first place, they said, the U.S. would not be establishing a new arms relationship with Iran but simply would be allowing Teheran to take possession of equipment that it already owned.

Second—and more important—these officials maintained that Saudi Arabia and other gulf states should be as concerned as the U.S. about the danger of an internal collapse in Iran leading to the country's dismemberment—and possible Soviet intervention. A decisive victory by Iraq, they warned, could produce that result.

With these arguments, the administration hoped to avoid, or at least limit, the adverse effects in Saudi Arabia of a bargain involving the delivery of military equipment bought by Iran before Khomeini came to power.

In any event, some Washington officials asserted, Saudi Arabia and other gulf states are too vulnerable to turn away from the protection offered by the U.S.

What were the prospects of a bargain being struck between Carter and Khomeini that would secure release of the hostages before the November 4 presidential election?

Conceivable, but highly unlikely, in the opinion of most informed officials.

They dismissed as fanciful a suggestion in Teheran that the Americans

could be freed within a day after the expected October 26 presentation to the Iranian parliament of the formal conditions for their release—providing the United States accepted the terms immediately.

The consensus among informed observers: The timing of any Teheran-Washington agreement would be dictated by Iranian internal politics. Rival factions engaged in a power struggle, with the hostages as pawns, would not be influenced by American electoral considerations.

Mustered in the capital. Physically, according to U.S. intelligence sources, there would not be any obstacles to quick release of the prisoners once an agreement was concluded. These officials said available information indicated that all 52 of the remaining hostages were in Teheran.

They may have been dispersed to other cities after the ill-fated April rescue attempt. But since the outbreak of the war with Iran, they are believed to have been returned to Teheran for security reasons. Most reportedly were again in the U.S. Embassy, with a few detained elsewhere in the city to discourage Washington from staging another rescue effort.

Their fate after nearly a year in captivity depended on Khomeini's willingness to face up to a hard choice. That choice as set out by the pragmatists in the Iranian leadership: Release the hostages or accept the prospect of defeat in the war with Iraq. □

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THE WASHINGTON POST
30 October 1980

U.S. Intelligence Uncertain Where All Hostages Are

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. intelligence agencies believe about 90 percent of the American hostages are locked up in the Tehran embassy but are not sure of the whereabouts of the other 10 percent, government officials said yesterday.

This uncertainty frustrates the Joint Chiefs of Staff as they continue to look for ways to rescue the 52 hostages by military force without suffering unacceptably high casualties.

The Pentagon kept studying rescue plans after the April attempt ended in flames on an expanse of sand in the Iranian back country called Desert One. But, Pentagon sources said, lack of precise intelligence on all the hostages' location made trying to find and extract them in a lightning-fast night operation too risky.

Intelligence analysts never believed the hostages were widely scattered throughout Iran after the April raid, as the Iranian government claimed. They still think the hostages are in Tehran, with the 10 percent outside the embassy suspected to be elsewhere in the city.

But nobody pretends to have unimpeachable information about what is going on inside Iran these days, partly because the CIA's network there disintegrated along with the shah's power in 1968. The unsuccessful April raid, code-named Rice Bowl to steer people away from the location if word about it leaked out, tore up what was left of the CIA's once-elaborate network in Iran.

The intelligence gap extends beyond the hostages' location to the war between Iran and Iraq. Estimates about its direction by the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency have proved wrong.

Early in the war, the CIA issued dire secret reports about the possibility that the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf could be closed to oil tankers by one of the combatants. The DIA kept saying the war would sputter out in a matter of days, citing the likelihood that Iran would run out of fuel for its warplanes as one reason for this.

The CIA moderated its warnings when the U.S. Maritime Administration, after checking with companies whose ships were plying the Persian Gulf, reported business as usual except for some challenges from the Iranian navy.

The duration and tempo of the of the Iranian-Iraqi war exceeded DIA's early predictions, Pentagon officials acknowledge. However, they said there has been a slowdown lately in Iran's air operations.

Despite the high risk, the president could always order another attempt to free the hostages by force if it seemed the only way to get at least some of them out alive. But for some time the post-April rescue plans have been consigned to the Pentagon's bottom drawer, sources said.

Columnist Jack Anderson wrote in August that President Carter had given the go-ahead for an invasion of Iran in mid-October, asserting that the Kharg Island oil terminal at the head of the Persian Gulf was an objective. Rescue plans have focused on direct extraction of the hostages, Pentagon sources said, not the occupation of Kharg Island or the oil fields.

Before the April attempt was launched, former CIA director Richard Helms was one of those pushing for a U.S. military occupation of Kharg Island so Iran's oil spigot there could be controlled by the United States, sources said. However, the Kharg Island occupation was not approved then or later.

With military rescue out at least for the moment, the government's intelligence agencies are trying to find out what discussions are going on behind closed doors in Iran's ruling circles concerning the hostages. But here, too, gathering hard information by such standard techniques as electronic eavesdropping is proving difficult.

One reason for this is that the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his top aides do not communicate much beyond their tight circle, keeping Washington and other world capitals pretty much in the dark about their plans.

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ON PAGE 3

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
30 October 1980

Carter aide: Khomeini has cancer

By LARS-ERIK NELSON

Washington (News Bureau)—White House aide Frank Moore was quoted today as saying that Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini "has cancer of the colon" and is "not going to last long," but United States intelligence analysts quickly denied the diagnosis.

Moore, head of the White House congressional liaison staff, made his statement in an interview with editors of the Shreveport (La.) Journal.

But officials in Washington said Moore was basing his remark on an unevaluated intelligence report that came, in part, from a French television crew. Just a week ago, one official said, the Central Intelligence Agency's "ghoul squad"—a group of doctors who diagnose foreign leaders at long

U.S. intelligence denies the report

range—concluded that Khomeini, 80, did not have cancer of any kind.

"You'd be pleasantly surprised at how many things are wrong with him," one official said. "But cancer ain't among them. The analysis ruled out cancer of the colon, of the prostate and of the intestine—which covers all of the rumors we've heard in recent months."

"He could die at 4:30 p.m. tomorrow,

but we have no indication that he will," the official said.


Moore, one official said, disclosed intelligence that he should not have seen and that had not been verified. "He's talking about a raw report that flies in the face of a polished intelligence assessment to the opposite," the official said.

Carter administration officials dread the thought that Khomeini might die soon, believing that his death would produce "unimaginable chaos" in Iran, one official said.

Khomeini is believed to be the only Iranian official who could assure the release of the 52 American hostages, even if the parliament votes to free them.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A1**THE WASHINGTON POST
25 October 1980

Carter Held Hope Even After Shah Had Lost His



First of a series
By Scott Armstrong
Washington Post Staff Writer

During the revolutionary turmoil that pulled down the shah of Iran, President Carter clung to the belief that the shah could be saved, even though the shah himself had lost faith in his own power, a five-month investigation by The Washington Post has found.

Two months before the shah fled to exile, when Iran was aflame with protest, the president's national security adviser personally telephoned the Iranian ruler, urging him to use military force to smother the revolution.

A few weeks later, the president was advised to abandon the shah by an outside foreign policy expert, whom he called in for counsel. Tell the shah to take a long vacation, the president was told, and begin preparing for a new government in Iran. The president said he couldn't do that to an important allied leader and wouldn't.

Indeed, in that same period, State Department sources say they worked to soften the draft of a message from Carter to the shah, urging again the

use of force against the domestic opposition, although the White House insists that no such message was ever sent. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and his top aides feared such a message would lead only to considerable bloodshed and possibly civil war, turmoil that could only worsen America's position in the future of Iran.

The president held to his hope, even when most of his top foreign policy advisers were urging him to ease the shah off his throne and begin the transition to whatever political forces would follow in power. In the final weeks, the U.S. ambassador in Tehran, once one of the shah's staunchest supporters, cabled his exasperation to Washington. The president's attitude, he said, was "short-sighted and did not understand where the U.S. interests lie."

One month later, in any case, the shah was gone, permanently exiled. While the American president was surrounded by conflicting counsel on whether the peacock throne could be saved, one person, ironically, who knew with certainty that the shah was doomed was Mohammed Reza Pahlavi himself.

The shah, notwithstanding his reputation as a bloodthirsty tyrant, disregarded eleventh-hour advice from Washington to get tough with street demonstrators and opposition leaders. He was convinced in his own mind that force could not prevail for long. He knew that he was slowly dying of cancer and was anxious to leave behind a stable nation that his young son could rule. Finally, confused by conflicting signals from the United States and pressured by European leaders to abdicate, the shah in his last month in power moved to accommodate the moderate opposition, to live with some dissent and relinquish some of his vast powers.

These are hidden details from a long and complicated history, the slide of events which led to the fall of the shah and the establishment of a hostile government in what was once America's most reliable ally in the Persian Gulf. Today, perceptions of that tragic event are confused by quick assumptions about precisely what happened. President Carter, for instance, is widely accused of abandoning the shah prematurely. In fact, Carter still hoped to preserve the shah's power, long after intelligence reports and top foreign policy advisers insisted, as a matter of realism, the United States must assist the orderly transition to whatever political forces were going to displace the peacock throne.

This much is certain: The fall of the shah involved a bitter though collegial contest among the president's key advisers, contending for control over foreign policy and veering back and forth in their prognoses for events, stalemating policy with their disagreements.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, the president's national security adviser, appears intransigent in this account, stoutly resisting the "unthinkable" outcome that lay ahead, demanding the toughest policy line and ultimately prevailing over others who saw the future more clearly.

Vance, preoccupied with other matters, arms talks with the Soviet Union or the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks, was strangely inattentive to the alarm bells within his own department until it was too late to make a difference.

And the U.S. intelligence community, once again, seems badly out-of-focus in perceiving the realities of popular discontent within an allied nation.

Some in government did see the picture in Iran clearly, but their perceptions simply did not get through to the president and his policymakers, especially if their distasteful warnings collided with the established official view.

Still, this is not just diplomatic history. The events in Washington and Tehran that presaged the triumph of the Iranian revolution remain with us still as unresolved complications in the hostage crisis and the future of relations with Iran. Until one knows all the things that went wrong then, one may not fully appreciate why the hostility and deep differences continue between the two nations today.

CONTINUE

From the time he took office, Carter gradually became more and more tied to the shah. Pledging as a candidate that under him the United States would no longer be arms merchant to the world, Carter as president had to find loopholes to assure the shah that he would receive more of this country's advanced weaponry than he could practically use.

The president who surprised the world with his human rights pronouncements soon found himself overlooking human rights violations in Iran. And in the end, the president who undertook a monumental effort to achieve peace between Egypt and Israel was standing by an embattled regime that finally fell, not to a foreign army, but to mobs of angry citizens in the streets of Iran.

Early in the hostage crisis, Carter asked for a full compilation of the government documents covering the long history of the U.S. involvement in Iran's internal affairs. But when the study task force asked for specific presidential records, including that personal message drafted one month before the shah's fall, the White House refused to turn over any more papers to the study group and the top-secret project was suspended.

Holding onto the shah was a preoccupation in the autumn and winter of 1978-79, but the story really begins in the first year of the Carter administration. Beginning today, in a series of six articles, The Washington Post will describe the questions and complications that preceded the present impasse with Iran. As in all such inquiries, this account can make no claim to omniscience. This history of the fall of the shah and the U.S. role in it does not presume to be the total record.

The president and his closest foreign policy adviser, Brzezinski, have refused the scores who have assisted — from the White House, the National Security Council, the Defense and State departments, and the CIA — are some who have colored their views with statements clearly designed to serve the interests of their institutions or themselves. Others seem to resent Carter and Brzezinski's treatment of former secretary of state Vance, and still others, able to tell only that part of the history with which they are familiar, appear to be rendering incomplete accounts. In only a few places, however, does one person's view of events conflict sharply with that of another.

Much of this series is based on more than 1,000 pages of documents obtained by The Washington Post. They comprise a small portion of the "Iran papers," collected by the State Department study group, which describe U.S. relations with Iran from 1941 to last November when Iranian militants took hostage the employees of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

A Prediction

More than a year before the shah's collapse, in the fall of 1977, Theodore Moran, a young economist on the State Department's policy planning staff, drafted a secret, internal memorandum suggesting a new strategy for dealing with the massive new arms requests from the shah of Iran. It was based on an analysis of publicly available economic data and press commentaries, and it was totally at variance with the conventional wisdom. It turned out to have accurately predicted the events to come.

Iran, Moran wrote in a memo dated Nov. 2, 1977, "will face rising social and economic tensions unless it reorients government spending." Now putting 25 percent of all public funds into the military, the shah "will have insufficient financial resources to head off mounting political dissatisfaction, including discontent among those groups that have traditionally been the bedrock of support for the monarchy."

"We both have a common interest in moderating and modulating the Iranian military buildup, not because this administration wants to yield to congressmen who do not like the shah, not because the United States is unable to trust Iran with our most sophisticated weapons but because we have a national interest in insuring the stable and robust evolution of a strong and dependable ally."

"We do not want to simply deny the shah particular pieces of military equipment (and have him feel hurt or turn elsewhere). Rather we want him to slow down and stretch out the buildup of his military forces, to give him more time and more resources to build a cohesive, prosperous (and nonrepressive) domestic base for his defense effort."

Moran pointed to the failure of the shah to provide adequate housing, transportation and energy to the people of Iran. The shah envisioned Iran as becoming an industrial power on the level of France by the year 2000, but Moran saw it as an unfinished Third World country, squandering its wealth on weaponry. In addition to direct military spending, the shah was devoting as much as 70 percent of his public housing budget on the armed forces. Oil revenues, which normally would have covered these extraordinary costs, were no longer sufficient to cover Iran's balance of payments.

"The shah and his advisers cannot avoid making the difficult tradeoffs among spending priorities that other developing countries, even richly endowed developing countries, have always had to make," Moran wrote.

While the shah was the object of continuing public controversy, a ruler accused of tyrannical repression, of leading the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to its historic oil-price increases in 1973, he was not in the autumn of 1977 the cause of great worry in the State Department. Other major matters led the agenda at State: the arms negotiations with Russia, the Israeli-Egyptian peace talks, among others. The conventional wisdom on all levels — except for Moran and a few others — was that the shah was a stable ally and the U.S. could count on him in the Middle East.

The president was about to have his first personal meeting with the shah, 10 months after his inaugural. In a secret briefing paper prepared for the meeting in November 1977, the regional specialists in the State Department advised that during the last decade, "the shah gained full political control of his country for the first time in his long rule. Not having to be concerned with an opposition or recalcitrant legislature, he tends to look well into the future and to assess current events against broad historical trends."

Moran passed his memo on to his supervisor, Anthony Lake, the chief of the planning and policy group, which was responsible for evaluating such strategic concerns. Lake signed it and sent it to Vance. The analysis was rejected. It went against all other reports that were in hand.

Moran tried another approach. He had written his doctoral dissertation at Harvard University under the guidance of Samuel Huntington, a friend of Brzezinski's. Huntington and Brzezinski had been coauthors, and Huntington was

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currently a consultant to Brzezinski on U.S.-Soviet relations. Since one of Huntington's areas of expertise was social unrest in Third World nations, Moran believed Huntington would appreciate his own appraisal of the situation in Iran.

The two met and Huntington heard Moran out. But he did not agree to pass the young desk officer's views on to Brzezinski. Huntington said he was too busy on a project of his own — a study on how the United States could capitalize on Soviet economic problems — to get involved.

Moran continued to push his view in the State Department. There were others in the ranks that believed the United States was taking another step down the wrong path, but the upper levels of the department were in agreement that the "shah was very firmly in power," as the secret memorandum for the president put it. Moran, who is now a professor at Georgetown University, got the distinct impression that he was considered "bizarre" by the department hierarchy for even suggesting that the shah's future was insecure.

At that point, the fervent critics of the shah were mainly on Capitol Hill, questioning the regime's repressive policies and especially the continuing abundance of U.S. arms sales. Many at State regarded the congressional critics as merely uninformed, a public relations problem. After Congress required a detailed study on the impact of the arms sales on regional stability, one classified, internal memorandum at State, dated Nov. 2, 1977, summarized options for evasive tactics.

Since Congress would likely criticize the shah's request for an additional 140 F16 fighter planes, Alfred Atherton, assistant secretary for the region, suggested at a meeting that sale of the planes could be secretly approved but the public announcement phrased "so the shah will understand the sale is approved but we will tell Congress that no decision has been made." The Defense Department demurred. It suggested approval of the sale but, instead of deceiving Congress, the sale should not be submitted to Capitol Hill "until timing is propitious."

In fact, Moran's view was supported in one corner of the State Department — an ally who would have surprised Moran had he known about it. Ambassador William H. Sullivan, recognized generally then as an enthusiastic supporter of the shah, disagreed with Moran's bleak prognosis for the regime. But he discreetly recommended to Vance that the way to rein in the shah's more egregious spending habits was to begin more joint U.S.-Iranian

planning. It was the only way to recoup the leverage over the shah that had been lost when his oil revenues made him virtually independent of U.S. influence.

But Sullivan's analysis, like Moran's, was rejected. Either one would require, closer, short-range identification with the shah's regime. It became apparent to Sullivan that no one in the administration wanted to get that much closer to the shah.

Meeting the Shah

It was not until the president and the shah met for the first time, at the White House in November 1977, that Jimmy Carter fully appreciated that he must have a special relationship with the shah of Iran. Until then, Carter seemed ready to maintain cordial terms with Iran but at the same time he was willing to impose, when necessary, sharp reminders of his advocacy of human rights throughout the world and his desire to limit the sale of arms. These policies, originally at least, were meant to apply to the shah's kingdom as much as elsewhere.

The human rights criticism, in fact, had hit home. Ambassador Sullivan reported on July 18, 1977, only six months after Carter took office, that "the United States' policy in human rights has been a central feature of nearly every conversation I've had with senior Iranian officials on whom I've called during my first six weeks in Iran." Sullivan said he had discussed it twice with the shah, once at length with the empress, and with most of the shah's cabinet members.

"The assumption appeared to be that we are opposed to monarchical systems of government and seek to have them replaced by democracies," Sullivan complained. This, he said, he had set straight.

But Sullivan was unhappy with the commentary that was coming out of Washington on Iran. Much of it "seems to focus on the fact that the shah is 'autocratic' or 'undemocratic,'" he reported. "This is interpreted here as an attack upon Iranian institutions and obfuscates the fact that we are concerned about practices rather than personalities or systems of government," Sullivan said.

The Carter administration and the shah were at odds over the question of armaments as well. Carter had promised to keep the worldwide sale of U.S. arms from growing any larger but, as he prepared to meet the shah, the president had on his desk a request from Iran that would put him over the limit

by many billions of dollars each year for the rest of his term.

But Iran was not just any country seeking weapons, and the shah not just any power-hungry leader. The president's briefing paper cited a record of assistance provided by the shah to the United States over the years that was unique. Few nations anywhere had been as loyal as Iran, and few leaders as willing to assist the United States as the shah, the designated peacekeeper in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.

The shah had intervened militarily on behalf of the United States in Oman. He had provided jets on short notice when the United States needed them in Vietnam. He had secretly provided weapons to Somalia for use against Ethiopia when the United States asked him to. He personally persuaded South Africa, which was almost totally reliant on Iranian oil, to stop shipping oil to Rhodesia when the United States supported an embargo of that nation.

The shah had established peace with neighboring Iraq at the request of the United States although such a move was unpopular among many in Iran; he personally brokered the resolution of conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan. He had agreed to consider being the secret conduit to provide arms to Chad when the United States asked him to.

The shah provided U.S. bases along his border with Russia so that the CIA could monitor Soviet missile programs and troop movements; he had helped U.S. counterespionage against Soviet operations in the region. He helped assure an adequate flow of oil to the United States and he alone in the Middle East supplied oil to Israel.

Going into their meeting at the White House, Carter wanted even more assistance from the shah. He asked for and got the shah's pledge to try to freeze oil prices when OPEC met in December.

In addition, the shah answered many of the president's concerns about human rights violations in Iran. According to records obtained by The Washington Post, the shah explained that what appeared to be violations stemmed from an Iranian law outlawing the communist party in Iran. Iran's law, the shah noted, was similar to U.S. statutes prohibiting membership in groups that planned the violent overthrow of the government.

The shah said that he, too, was a human rights advocate. He had personally broken the traditionally rigid male dominance in Iranian society. He had opened the ballot, the classroom and

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the work place to women, who previously had been severely restricted by Islamic custom. If Iranian politics were not totally open, then a little patience was in order, the shah said. The president was inclined to grant it.

From before that first meeting, the shah was regarded by Carter with such trust that, according to the briefing memorandum, the shah was kept informed of secret negotiations and closely held policy decisions that were shared normally with only the closest allies. The shah was told the most intimate details of the SALT talks with the Soviet Union; he was told of U.S. negotiations aimed at keeping France from supplying Pakistan with material to develop a nuclear reprocessing capability — despite U.S. assurances to France that no other government would be told of the sensitive talks.

In return for his friendship, the shah wanted to continue the "special relationship" under which President Nixon in 1972 had ordered that the United States would agree to sell Iran whatever the shah requested from the arsenal of advanced weapons systems.

The president told the shah that he would continue to have the U.S.'s unconditional support but, given the limited resources of each country, that support must be more systematic. Therefore, he asked the shah to prepare a five-year plan for military expenditures, one that would help regularize the purchases. State's bureau of political military affairs had suggested that this "upbeat language" would hold off a full commitment to the shah's shopping list and at the same time "not anger him or spoil his visit."

Washingtonians may remember that day for a different reason. The shah and the president, along with their wives and a small entourage, stood outside the White House for a brief arrival ceremony. Across the street, at Lafayette Park and on the Ellipse to the south, the shah was being denounced by Iranian students wearing masks and cheered by Iranian supporters. The demonstration turned bitter, and police lobbed tear gas canisters into the crowds.

The gas wafted into the eyes of the president and the shah. They wiped their eyes, and the president made a small joke about the incident.

Dissent From the CIA

After that first meeting between the shah and president, the polite argument over arms sales, in effect, continued at the bureaucratic levels. As the various agencies of national security began to meet to prepare the "Military Balance in Iran" report required by Congress, another contingent of dissent emerged from an unexpected quarter — the Central Intelligence Agency.

Junior CIA analysts attending the meetings joined in arguing that the Iranian military could not absorb any additional modern equipment. The Iranians simply did not have the trained manpower to operate or maintain what they had already received. Half their people flunked out of helicopter school, the rest had the equivalent of a sixth-grade education. They barely had the pilots to operate their sophisticated F5 aircraft. In order to operate the even more sophisticated F16s, the shah wanted, those pilots would have to immediately shift to the F16s. And each new advanced-weapon system took the few skilled technicians away from industry.

Virtually the entire Near East bureau of the State Department disagreed. Henry Precht, the director of the regional affairs desk concerned with Iran (and later the head of the Iran desk), was critical of the shah but he believed the current U.S. policy dictated more arms. A tenacious bureaucratic infighter, Precht challenged the CIA presentation.

The CIA analysts held their ground. State promised a bureaucratic battle. The matter would be taken to Vance. The director of the CIA would be called.

A week later, the CIA opposition to the draft folded. The young analysts would say nothing more on the subject.

Only State's human rights office continued to oppose the massive sales, but without any effect. The language of the report on Iran was modified to fit the official view. A public show of support for the shah would be the policy; all sales would be explained to Congress and defended.

Another Chance


Today, Ted Moran's memorandum is part of the huge file that has become the record of this nation's relationship with Iran. Here and there may be found other documents — not many — that had the prescience to say that the United States' policy in Iran was headed toward a fateful turn, that the active elements for disaster were present.

Moran was depressed but not overwhelmed. A colleague in the State Department likened the high-level spurring of his advice to the bureaucracy's handling of the Vietnam war. Factual analysis was put aside when it conflicted with high-level government policy.

Moran agreed. They should both resign in protest, the colleague suggested. No, Moran said, they'd get another chance to change the policy.

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26 October 1980

Failing to Heed the Warnings of Revolution in Iran



Second of a series

By Scott Armstrong
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Carter and the shah of Iran ushered in the new year of 1978 together at a lavish party in the splendid Niavaran palace in Tehran.

Carter danced with the shah's wife, Queen Farah, and the shah's twin sister, Princess Ashraf. Later he conferred with King Hussein of Jordan, whom the shah had thoughtfully invited to discuss the U.S. negotiations for a Middle East peace.

"Iran," the president began his toast, "because of the great leadership of the shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world."

For some reason, Carter put aside the "cool but correct" remarks that had been suggested by Ambassador William Sullivan and delivered a glowing, highly personal toast. He referred to the shah as a man of wisdom who was loved by his people.

"There is no leader with whom I have a deeper sense of personal gratitude and personal friendship," Carter said. Sullivan later described the presidential toast as "far out."


If Carter was more effusive than Sullivan might have wanted, who could blame him? The shah only weeks earlier

had made good a pledge to stall an oil price rise by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and he seemed to be more cooperative on the question of limiting the weaponry the United States would sell to Iran.

The evening was, no doubt, one of great moment for Carter, still in office less than a year. For the shah, he was now dealing with his eighth U.S. president.

It was the second and last time they were to see each other.

Within a week, the shah was enmeshed in a chain of domestic unrest that was eventually to bring him down.



IRAN, From A1

On Jan. 7 in Tehran, an article presumed by the U.S. Embassy to have been prepared secretly by the shah's government appeared in one of the city's two major dailies. It attacked an exiled mullah, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a revered religious leader living in exile in Iraq. The article said that 15 years earlier Khomeini had led, on behalf of landlords and communists, a series of massive, antigovernment protests against land reform and the enfranchisement of women.

But, in fact, the protests were not over reform at all but over government decisions to allow the U.S. military — a growing presence in 1963 — to have immunity rather than be subject to local law. Khomeini said such statutes were illegal under Islamic law and were the shah's "capitulations" to foreign domination.

The 1963 protests led by Khomeini eventually resulted in riots and bloodshed. First, Khomeini was arrested. Unrest continued and later in the year the ayatollah was exiled to Iraq. But, before he was gone, the shah's troops had invaded his theological college in Qom and killed one cleric. As violence continued, the shah finally unleashed the military against the clerics and there were thousands of deaths.

Fifteen years later, the resentments were still strongly felt in the community of Shiite Moslems who followed the exiled Khomeini. So when the anti-Khomeini article appeared on Jan. 7, 1978, there was an immediate reaction. A crowd estimated at 5,000 gathered at a Moslem shrine in Qom to protest both the article and the imprisonment of another ayatollah, Seyed Mahmud Talaghani, who had been jailed the previous summer.

When the crowd emerged from the mosque, the shah's troops fired on it, killing 20 people or more. Whether the decision to fire was the shah's or the act of a rash commander or frightened troops is still open to question. But the shots fired then gave focus to the popular discontents that became in time an unstoppable groundswell of revolution.

Turmoil Begins

The Morning Summary of Intelligence produced by the CIA on Jan. 14 noted "a growing restiveness in Iran over the past several months" and attributed it to the same economic sources of dissatisfaction noted the previous fall by some analysts in the State Department — and rejected by the State Department hierarchy.

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The Morning Summary returned to the same subject 15 days later, reported that the shah's Islamic opponents were in their strongest position since 1963, and described the policy dilemma that the shah faced as he chose between control and liberalization of the society. Like many items touched on once or twice in the Morning Summary and not regularly repeated, it passed virtually unnoticed.

In accord with Moslem tradition, Shiite groups gathered across the country every 40 days to mourn those who died at the mosque in Qom. In February, at the first such mourning, troops again fired into the crowd, this time in Tabriz, in the province of Azerbaijan near the Soviet border. More than 100 people were killed.

From then on, relentlessly and predictably, every 40 days ever larger gatherings of mourners demonstrated in provincial cities, always to be met by military resistance, confrontation that often ended in riots and bloodshed.


In Tabriz, in the first government response to official violence, the shah fired the local chief of SAVAK, his secret police. He gave every impression of being intent on riding out the protests, maintaining that they were led by a small group of religious fanatics with the occasional support of communist opportunists. A coalition of "the red and the black," the shah called it.

As the protests spread, however, the young U.S. consul in Tabriz, Michael Metrisko, who is now a hostage, began to sense that something far more than a religious protest was taking place. Metrisko spoke Farsi, the native tongue, as well as Turkish, and, as the only American official in Iran's fourth largest city, he was in touch with many elements of Iranian society whom U.S. diplomats rarely knew — merchants, students, workers and the clergy.

From February on, Metrisko's reports were in sharp contrast to those of his colleagues in Tehran. Where embassy officials saw the small circle of "red and black" malcontents that the shah spoke of, Metrisko perceived an ingrained hatred of the shah spreading throughout the society.

The mosques, Metrisko wrote, provided the foot soldiers of protest, but the merchants of the bazaar, a bourgeois power group in Iran, were now financing opposition to the shah and working with the mullahs.

These "bazaari," as they were called, were still smarting from an anticorruption campaign initiated against them in 1976 by the shah. Their discontent meant to Metrisko that dislike for the shah was much more resonant than



anyone in Tehran seemed to recognize.

In addition, Metrisko reported that many Iranians with ties to the shah were secretly removing their money and valuables from the country. His detailed findings did not agree with what the embassy in Tehran was reporting. Metrisko's memos were regularly held up when Ambassador Sullivan suggested that he talk to a broader spectrum of Iranians, including supporters of the shah, and prepare a more coherent overview. These longer reports were generally sent as "airgrams," a lower priority message with less likelihood than a cable to be read at the top levels of State. Metrisko, according to former associates, saw this as a gambit to stall and dilute his dissenting views.

Thus began a pattern that was to be repeated through the final four or five months of the shah's reign: One U.S. agency or an arm of it would paint a rosy picture of the shah's future, only to be contradicted by another agency or an arm of the same agency. Occasionally the same analyst would conclude that the shah was done for, and then, a while later, reverse himself and maintain that the shah's future was secure.

At the same time, back in Washington, several American academics were spreading similar reports to intelligence analysts in the State Department. The shah, they said, was in deep trouble. He was losing the support of traditional followers. George Griffin, an intelligence analyst, was disturbed enough to organize a meeting of middle-level staff to review the warnings, but few high-level staff even attended. James Bill, a political scientist from the University of Texas, told them bluntly: "Time is not on the side of the shah of Iran."

"The government can now only respond with more and more coercive force and military control and repression," Bill said. "The large groups of individuals already alienated by the regime will in turn become more demanding and desperate in their response. And they will be joined by others — the only common denominator to their cooperation being opposition to the regime. As this occurs, the shah will have lost the will and capacity to use his traditional tactics of political control. Unless something is done again to break this wildly spinning vicious circle, the future of the current actors in the Iranian political drama can only be a grim one. And the American future in Iran can in no way be considered bright."

Reports on SAVAK

The embassy in Tehran saw no such portents. The shah was entrenched and could brook all rebelliousness. Besides, support for the shah had become a matter of institutional theology after the president's decision the previous fall to continue the close relationship. Sullivan did pass on to Washington new reports of harsh activities by SAVAK.

SAVAK had been responsible for bombing the homes of lawyers and teachers identified with nonviolent political opposition. Well-known dissidents were being beaten by gangs called the "Underground Committee for Vengeance" and the "Resistance Corps," both believed to be arms of SAVAK or the police and operating with the explicit approval of the shah. The government had "exiled" several religious leaders by prohibiting them any contact with their followers and forcing them to live in other parts of the country.

Sullivan, a 30-year veteran of the Foreign Service, with experience at some extremely difficult assignments, felt strongly that it was naive for the State Department to push the shah on human rights violations, and his reporting left little doubt as to the conclusions the embassy had drawn. The shah was attempting to liberalize the society, but he could not afford to lose control over the process. Dissident groups were referred to as "students and other miscreants," freedom of expression was said to be an "aspect" of "permissiveness."

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bles that spoke of the shah as firmly in power, the ambassador realized that his knowledge of the political opposition was sharply limited. Since the 1960s, when the shah expressed irritation at a young political officer at the embassy (William Miller, now staff director of the Senate Intelligence Committee) who helped an opposition group draw up its internal constitution and later at CIA contacts with political dissidents, most U.S. intelligence information in Iran came through SAVAK. Sullivan made various efforts to overcome this handicap, but without much success. The ambassador knew that, despite its reputation for ruthless efficiency, SAVAK, like many secret police organizations, was not considered very effective.

SAVAK, for instance, referred to all "leftist" groups as "communists," particularly if any of their membership had Palestine Liberation Organization or Libyan training; SAVAK constantly confused the two principal terrorist organizations in Iran, "the People's Sacrifice Guerrillas," and "the People's Strugglers" with the Tudeh party, which had not advocated violence against the government as had its Maoist offshoot, but SAVAK seemed unable to distinguish between the two.

Moreover, "for years, SAVAK has maintained that the communists have no centralized structure and that it is led by men of low caliber, but it concedes that the party has as many as 1,000 members active in areas such as Tehran, Tabriz, Azerbaijan, Abadan, Shiraz, and Esfahan," the CIA concluded in a top secret memo. But the CIA was not "confident that SAVAK has the capability to penetrate or determine communist underground. Over the past few years, SAVAK has managed to round up only a very few party members."

Unfortunately, SAVAK's diagnostic difficulties did not end with communists. They also seemed unable to distinguish between the various types of noncommunist opposition groups, frequently confusing them with "communist groups" and always confusing them with each other.

SAVAK could never infiltrate subversive groups, was unsophisticated at analysis and its information gathering was largely limited to what could be obtained through torture.

So Sullivan, acting on his own, instructed his political officers at the embassy in Tehran and CIA station per-

sonnel to pick up direct intelligence from both the religious and more moderate opposition elements in Iran. The embassy staff felt, in any case, that however spotty the information was, it was still much better than the intelligence estimates from Washington, which seemed to them simplistic in the extreme.

On June 1, Sullivan forwarded a report on "the internal scene" in Iran. Drafted by the embassy's political counselor, George Lambrakis, the report was two weeks in the preparation and it rambled over 11 single-spaced pages.

Overall, its thrust was one of optimism for the shah. "The embassy soundings among religious leaders," the report said, "suggest an underlying basis of loyalty to the monarchy and to the independence of Iran as the shah envisions it, but increasing unhappiness with the breakdown of communication from the religious leadership to the shah."

These conservative religious leaders, the report said, "view themselves as the backbone of the opposition to the spread of communism in Iran."

Despite that conclusion, the paper focused on what had become a growing uncertainty among the populace, and expressed concern for the future.

The shah had gradually ordered "considerable relaxation of press censorship, a tolerance of political criticism and of minor manifestations of dissent, and a more genteel system of police controls."

"The shah has staked his prestige on a degree of permissiveness and civil rights and freedom of expression which has drawn oppositionists into the open, but he has displayed a measure of uncertainty in indicating how he intends to deal with them."

"It is obvious," the report went on, that the shah is "having trouble keeping Pandora's box partly open. His original experience in encouraging freedom of expression led to vitriolic attacks on the government and built expectations of more serious reform than what he perhaps had in mind when he started."

Sullivan's cable confirmed the reports of extensive violence against dissidents and blamed the shah's government for setting off "a brush fire of religious opposition" that "rehabilitated Khomeini in the eyes of religious leaders."

For the first time, the embassy in Iran reported that economic problems were causing chaos — a view that the State Department had rejected in 1977.

Affluence resulting from the 1973-74 quadrupling of the price of oil had led to double-digit inflation, caused mass migration from the countryside to the cities, served to break up the traditional Islamic family and cultural patterns of the society, and had raised expectations throughout the populace. Furthermore, widespread corruption in high places was universally recognized and despised. While such corruption "unfortunately permeates the traditional Iranian social system," it nevertheless made many in the society "cynical," according to the report.

In a piece of analysis that reflected the shah's views, Sullivan noted that by providing broad access to education in an attempt to build a "prosperous middle class" that would support him and his dynasty, the shah instead had created a growing cadre of critics without any political voice in the society.

The shah had failed, the report said, "to provide clear operational guidelines for his administrators and security people in dealing with dissenters. . . The shah's new directives to his security forces, such as instructions to desist from torture. . . are disorienting."

"Those in charge of security are being told that they will be held responsible for any major new outbreaks, but are also being prevented from using the time-honored methods of arrest, long imprisonment and manhandling — if not worse — to get at the threat."

"The [recent] rioting. . . which elicited the government's announcement of a crackdown of street demonstrations was the first of a possible series of steps backing away from liberalization. . ."

"The Chinese experience of letting a thousand flowers bloom and then chopping them down, would be pertinent," the memo noted.

The violent and the nonviolent, Khomeini extremists and small groups of terrorist guerrillas, all represent diverse interests which would not combine against the government if the government were clever in keeping them divided." The shah had succeeded in wiping out "left-wing elements" in the past with the support of conservative segments of the society.

The shah was at a crossroads, the report said. Sullivan assumed that the shah would not give up real power. He "will not permit events to escalate to the point where national security, as he sees it, will be threatened."

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What was needed, in Sullivan's view, was for the shah to perform adroitly, to keep the opposition divided, "to open better channels to the religious leadership and...to act on some of their complaints. If done deftly, this should go a long way to assuage them and lead to a breakdown of opposition unity."

But Sullivan added a disclaimer. It is, he wrote Washington, "too early...to be definitive on the direction the shah will take."

Divided Views

It was not long before the shah earlier report suggesting the shah was in deep trouble, now had a new idea — a zero-based analysis of the U.S.-Iranian relationship. They would accept the shah as a fact of life but proposed to start from scratch and analyze every aspect of the relationship. For example, instead of giving the shah additional planes to protect his air force from being wiped out in an attack, why not give him reinforced, attack-proof hangars? Moran's boss, Anthony Lake, head of policy planning, approved the project. Before the two could get very far, they were told by Lake to stop.

The same split in views that prevails now, three months after the shah's death, prevailed then. For many American leaders, the shah was a longstanding ally of the United States; if not a puppet, then at least a willing and most helpful partner in maintaining crucial American interests. On the other hand, he was seen by many others as a corrupt tyrant, an oppressor of his people, a megalomaniac who saw weapons as toys.

The internal debate, was not over whether the shah could survive, but whether the United States, now led by a president who had promised to take the United States out of the arms business, should be supplying him weapons that, in some instances, were difficult for the American military to operate.

On July 5, 1978, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance chaired a policy review meeting on Iran at the White House. In attendance were Brzezinski, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, CIA Director Stansfield Turner and Newsom. The specific subject for what seemed like the 100th time was arms sales, but the underlying issue, as Sullivan had complained, was whether the United

States should continue such close ties with the shah.

It was not a discussion the participants wanted to hold, and they rapidly learned that Sullivan's staff was in contact with the opposition. He took it up with Sullivan, asking whether such meetings were a sign of waning support for him by the United States.

The shah explained to Sullivan that he had recently been assured in a telephone call from Nelson Rockefeller that the United States was behind him and to expect a call from the White House confirming that. Shortly afterward, the shah said, the president's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, telephoned.

What was American policy, the shah asked Sullivan. The ambassador assured him that he still had U.S. support. But the message from the shah was clear — any American contact with opposition groups would be interpreted as a shift in loyalty.

In July, Sullivan, back in Washington on home leave, took up the matter with David Newsom, the undersecretary of state for political affairs, the day-to-day chief of all ambassadors for crisis situations. Newsom is said to have agreed with Sullivan that the contacts were valuable and should be continued, regardless of the shah's objections.

By midsummer, the seeds of concern about the shah's future were flourishing at the State Department, but had hardly been noticed, if at all, by the chief policymakers. Instead, the discussions about Iran had to do almost exclusively with arms sales to the shah.

Two young analysts who were more skeptical, human rights deputy assistant secretary Stephen B. Cohen and Theodore Moran, who had written and came to a decision that cut it short. Arms sales to Iran ought to continue, they agreed, because they contributed to the national security of the United States and the only question was how much.

They were, however, faced with a serious dilemma. The shah had requested \$15 billion in equipment over the next five years. But, following a campaign promise, the president had limited U.S. arms sales early in his administration. Effectively, he had said that total arms sales could never exceed what they had been the previous year.

With a \$3 billion per year average, the shah's request would cut deeply into the overall allocations of arms sales. In order to keep the grand total under the previous year's total they would have to cut back the arms to be sold to Israel, Taiwan, Korea, Saudi Arabia and possibly Pakistan, Vance's briefing

memo for the meeting said. In effect, they would be jeopardizing other highly regarded security commitments.

The administration would find a way to get around the president's ceiling on arms sales, in all probability by persuading the shah to spread out his purchases over a longer period.

That left only one issue that the meeting failed to resolve — the shah's desire to obtain the F4G, a highly sophisticated aircraft known as the Wild Weasel. The president would have to decide that one himself.

Four days later, Newsom arrived in Tehran to meet with the shah and talk with U.S. Embassy officials. The undersecretary told the shah that the United States appreciated his difficult but successful efforts to "achieve a more open domestic political debate while maintaining public order."

The shah responded with what had become his standard theme. "I want to turn over to my heirs a kingdom that is politically modern as well as technologically modern. I am going to try to undertake such political reforms but I know there is risk in doing so."

Newsom informed the shah of the presidential decision — no Wild Weasels for Iran, at least for the present.

Afterward, Newsom met with most of the embassy staff at the home of Charles Naas, deputy chief of the mission. The consensus was that the shah's position was secure. Tehran was alive with a different story, a rumor that the shah was dying of cancer.

Recognizing the importance of being in touch with popular sentiment in Iran, the State Department during the summer of 1978 put out a personnel notice seeking to recruit people who spoke Farsi. No one signed up.

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White House Objects to Report

Following publication of the first of The Washington Post's series of articles on U.S.-Iranian relations, the White House issued this statement:

The Washington Post's report on relations with Iran in 1978 and 1979 contains serious errors of fact and of interpretation. In misstating the facts, the report also misrepresents U.S. policy, the deliberations involved in its making, and its implementation. The sources for the report appear to have been individuals with only peripheral access to, or involvement in, the actual


process. Reliance on them makes the report largely a compendium of guesswork and gossip.

Because of the sensitive nature of our relations with Iran, however, the White House has not commented on similar reports in the past. It does not intend to alter that policy to respond to The Washington Post report in detail. At an appropriate time, and in an appropriate setting, following the return of the hostages, it will be possible to discuss our relations with Iran, both authoritatively and completely.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
27 October 1980

U.S. Urged 'Crackdown' on Opposition



Third of a series

By Scott Armstrong
Washington Post Staff Writer

On Aug. 19, 1978, one of the most tragic theater fires of the 20th century took place in Abadan, a city in the heart of the rich oil-producing region of western Iran, now the object of attack and counterattack in the war with Iraq.

With the doors locked from the outside and firefighting equipment slow to arrive, nearly 500 people were killed, burned to death, suffocated or trampled.


The Iranian government charged that the fire was caused by arson, set by Islamic fanatics who were opposed to liberalized rules that allowed theaters to stay open longer than in the past.

But the opposition claimed that while the film was being shown, several anti-shah activists had run inside seeking to elude agents of SAVAK, the Iranian secret police. They charged that the agents, after securing the shah's personal permission, had locked the doors and burned the movie house down.

In 1978, opponents of the shah did not need proof to hold him responsible for the most terrible of deeds. Soon after the fire, his regime's culpability for it was taken almost for granted. The terrible disaster further united the many disparate groups in Iran who wanted the shah out of power.

At about the same time, the important in-baskets in Washington had yet another draft of the CIA's National Intelligence Estimate on Iran. Entitled "Iran: Prospect Through 1985," the report declared "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even 'pre-revolutionary' situation."

At the State Department, an intelligence analyst on Iran, George Griffin,



IRAN, From A1
wrote a dissenting footnote to the draft. While the CIA estimate agreed with the conclusions drawn by Ambassador William Sullivan, the embassy staff in Tehran and the State Department leadership, to Griffin it seemed simplistic and wrong. Not only had press reports been painting a different picture of life in Iran, but embassy cables and intelligence reports since June had cited a growing alliance between the Islamic traditionalists and the other, growing dissident segments of Iranian society.

Griffin consulted an old hand on Iran, Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA agent who had coordinated the U.S. participation in the 1953 "coup" that kept the Pahlavi dynasty in power. Roosevelt told Griffin that the shah was, in fact, a weak man, a "defective personality," who would fold under pressure in a "failure of will."

Faced with disagreement, the CIA analyst in charge of the draft withdrew it from circulation. The issues would be reexamined again later.

The Opposition

What most of these opposition groups in Iran shared were two goals: the removal of the shah from power and an end to what they perceived as foreign domination of Iran. It was perhaps the failure of American analysts to recognize the extent of the second of those goals that led to so great a misunderstanding of what Iran would be like after the shah was toppled.

Chief among the shah's opponents, of course, was the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Sent into exile in 1963, Khomeini was living in Iraq, in the city of Najaf, the home of the most sacred Shiite Moslem shrine. Khomeini is now regarded by many in the West as leading Iran back into a religious dark age, but in 1978 he used the most modern of technological devices — the tape cassette — to smuggle his message of revolution back into Iran.

Constantly railing against the shah and urging Iranians to rid themselves of foreign influence, Khomeini's taped diatribes in the closing months of the year could be heard in nearly every mosque in the country. By the time of the Rex Cinema fire, Khomeini was the recognized symbol of resistance.

The theater fire in Abadan seemed not only to unite dissident groups in Iran but to have a deep, unnerving effect on the shah as well. Sullivan had just returned from Washington where he had lobbied on behalf of the shah's pared-down "wish list" of \$10. billion in U.S. military hardware. To Sullivan, the shah suddenly seemed filled with self-doubt, a man who believed that nothing could work, who was no longer able to analyze events. The shah, according to Sullivan's reports to the State Department in Washington, was becoming unhinged.

According to one report, the shah told Sullivan that he had tried to suppress dissent with repression and that hadn't worked; he had tried to put in place a civilian government and that hadn't worked either.

Bitterly, the shah asked whether he should appoint a corrupt civilian government that would turn the populace against it and make it clamor for a more authoritarian military government with himself back in full command. "I have to demonstrate the bankruptcy of the moderate option," the shah told Sullivan, "so people will see that a government is necessary to prevent chaos."

Sullivan what the United States government wanted him to do, and Sullivan passed the question on to Washington.


On Sept. 4, the largest demonstrations yet broke out across Iran. Three days later, the shah declared martial law in Tehran and 11 other cities.

On Sept. 8, Black Friday as it came to be called, the shah's troops fired into a crowd of demonstrators at Jaleh Square in Tehran. By the government's account, 86 people were killed; the opposition put the toll at more than a thousand. The demonstrators had not learned of the newly imposed curfew.

Jimmy Carter got news of the Jaleh Square massacre at Camp David, where he, Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin had begun meeting to negotiate a peace between Egypt and Israel.

Carter was briefed on the incident by Harold Saunders, assistant secretary of state for the region. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, according to a number of department sources, knew few of the details because he was nearly totally absorbed in the Egyptian-Israeli discussions and in nuclear arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

According to accounts of Saunders' briefing for Carter, the shah was still firmly in control of Iran. The skepticism that was beginning to spread among low-level State Department aides had not worked its way up. When Saunders finished, the president's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, joined the briefing and declared that the shah needed a strong statement of U.S. support — it would boost his morale and that of allies in the region. Sadat had already called the shah to pledge his support and suggested that Carter do likewise. The president agreed.



shah's willingness to use force as a good sign. Sullivan noted that the declaration of martial law was an indication of renewed self-confidence on the part of the shah, and predicted that, despite reports of morale problems in the army, the shah and his military could handle the situation.

The Pentagon agreed, with its Defense Intelligence Agency issuing a report at the time that said the shah is "expected to remain actively in power over the next 10 years."

Unrest mounted in Iran during the rest of September and into early October. Faced with the new violence in Tehran, the CIA's National Intelligence Estimate was quietly laid aside. Viewpoints would have to be reconsidered. The State Department would redraft it.

The shah appointed a new, more moderate prime minister and decided to take action against Khomeini by formally asking the government of Iraq to expel him, to move him further from Iran. Agreement came quickly; Khomeini had been stirring up Shiite Moslems in Iraq as well.

Immediately, however, the shah took back his request. As dangerous as Khomeini was in Iraq, he might prove to be more dangerous in a European capital where he could get world press attention and maintain even better communication with Iran through more modern, long-distance telephone connections.

In early October the aging ayatollah, denied admission to Kuwait and Syria, went to France, taking up residence in a suburb of Paris.

The shah renewed his attempts to defuse turmoil and divide the moderate opposition from the radical Shiites through reform, promising amnesty for 1,500 prisoners. But on Oct. 24, virtually every city in the nation was hit by massive outpourings of protest, calling for the ouster of the shah or the return of Khomeini.

Sullivan, only recently so optimistic about the shah, once again feared that events were getting beyond control. In October, a small Pentagon group, led by Deputy Secretary Charles W. Duncan Jr. (now secretary of energy), met in Tehran with the shah and his military leaders and was informed that Iran was now willing to scale down its arms request — "postpone," not "cancel" — because it would be unable to pay for it all. Sullivan told Duncan that the shah was in dire straits but still might act decisively to resolve his problems.

The Pentagon group had just left Saudi Arabia where the royal family was deeply concerned about what it perceived as a failure by the United States to support its allies in the Persian Gulf.

believed that the Soviet Union was sure to capitalize on chaos in the region unless the United States would make a show of strength. What the Saudis wanted, it was clear, was U.S. military intervention on behalf of the shah.

The Saudis' concern seemed exaggerated and their requests — for U.S. assistance with covert subversion in South Yemen — reckless. But as an absolutely vital ally, the Saudi perception of U.S. assistance was as important as the reality of it.

The shah's problems were internal, however — and did not fit the Carter administration's criteria for direct intervention, since there was no real threat from outside.

Iranian generals began talk of taking matters into their own hands on behalf of the shah. Some wanted to "round up 10 mullahs and shoot them," one of Sullivan's aides said at a staff meeting, and 300 army officers had petitioned their leaders for permission to crack down on demonstrators.

Gen. Manuchehr Khosrowdad, the commander of Iran's air force, wanted to clear the streets once and for all. If intimidation didn't work, then mass arrests and bloodshed would.


When Sullivan and British Ambassador Anthony Parsons went to call on the shah, they found the shah unnerved once again, incapable of action, unwilling to make decisions, ravaged by the deaths in the streets.

Less the arrogant emperor and more like a befuddled bureaucrat, the shah pleaded for advice. Who should he appoint to what positions? Should he install a military government? Should he allow the military to use force, should he crack down? More and more "crack down" came into play in conversation.

The shah told Sullivan and Parsons that his ambassador to the United States, Ardeshir Zahedi, was urging him to take a hard line, to crack down as the troops had done the month before at Jaleh Square. According to the shah, Zahedi had come to Tehran with the word of Brzezinski that the Carter administration would support every action necessary to preserve order in Iran. But where was the direct U.S. support that was due him, the shah wanted to know.

The shah told Sullivan to ignore Zahedi. He was, the shah said, trying to relive the dreams of his father, a key figure in keeping the shah on the throne in 1953. The shah was uncertain about what to do, but he had come to a decision about what he would not do. There would be no "crackdown." If he

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killed thousands of his countrymen, he would have to rule by force for the rest of life and would be unable to pass the throne on to his son.

According to some accounts, it was at this point that Sullivan and the United States first learned that the shah had cancer. By then, Sullivan already knew that the shah believed he had no more than a few years to live.

Violence continued to grow. In Amol, near the Caspian Sea, dissident student groups took control of the city. For the first time, the shah's families and friends spoke of a revolution in progress.

In Tehran, 10,000 students at the university marched in protest; in the south 30,000 oil field workers walked off their jobs.

The shah continued to offer concessions. He dismissed 34 senior SAVAK

officials who had been accused of torture and other abuses. At what was said to be Sullivan's suggestion, he agreed to grant amnesty to the political prisoners on his birthday, Oct. 26. He said there would be no future political arrests.

"Feeding the crocodiles," Sullivan called it, unconvinced that the shah's reform gestures, which transferred no real power, were sufficient to quiet the opposition. Sullivan concluded that the shah's new prime minister, Sharif-Emani, was doomed and once more the shah would turn to him for advice.

The shah was under pressure from home to get tougher, to appoint a military government and turn it loose on the opposition. Gen. Hossein Rabii, who feared most of all the threat of communist subversion, complained to an embassy official: "His majesty is simply not being himself. He has got to assert himself or we'll make him assert himself."

By the end of October, the news coming out of Iran had begun to divide the Carter administration. One viewpoint, shared by desk officers throughout the government familiar with daily events in Iran, maintained that the shah could not survive. The other camp, most forcefully represented by Brzezinski at the White House, believed the shah could stay in power and that the United States must make every attempt to keep him in power.

But Sullivan was concluding that the shah could no longer guide events as the all-powerful ruler. Leaving the Iranian military to its own instincts, he feared, would mean chaos—either bloody repression or mutinous troops. When Sullivan cabled the State Department asking for advice, he made two suggestions: Urge the shah to begin to truly accommodate his moderate opposition by allowing the creation of a real parliament and prime minister, retaining for himself only foreign policy and the military. And suggest that the shah leave the country for at least long enough to allow the new administration to restore order.

Sullivan's request for instructions were urgent. He talked directly with David Newsom, undersecretary for political affairs and the No. 3 man at State, who was typically passive. Newsom told Sullivan of the difficulties of getting instructions cleared through the White House and Brzezinski.

But Vance and some of his aides were struck by the picture Sullivan had painted. Sullivan was on the scene; his views should be considered.

On Oct. 27, when Iranian experts from all departments met at State for an all-day session, the consensus of Farsi-speaking analysts was that neither more liberalization, which Persians would perceive as weakness, nor repression, would save the shah. Someone suggested a straw poll. Of 30 or 40 people there, only four believed that the shah would be on his throne a year later.

Aides to Vance met with Brzezinski's Iran specialist, Navy Capt. Gary Sick, to respond to Sullivan's request for advice. Sick said that Brzezinski wanted stronger language making it clear that the shah should not capitulate in any way to his opposition. Nevertheless, Brzezinski, through Sick, agreed on sending Sullivan a cable suggesting that the shah should be encouraged to relinquish some of his domestic authority and leave on vacation.

It seemed, for the moment, to be a major shift in U.S. policy, albeit a secret one. But it lasted only for a moment.

The Pressure

On the day that cable was sent, the president received the shah's son, Crown Prince Reza Shah, at the White House. The young Iranian was a student at the U.S. Air Force Academy, and it was his 18th birthday. He was accompanied by Zahedi, now back in Washington.

"Our friendship and our alliance with Iran is one of our important bases on which our entire foreign policy depends," the president said in a public statement during the meeting.

Zahedi, who had learned that new secret instructions were on their way to the U.S. ambassador in Iran, was already busy trying to regain lost ground for the shah with a new expression of support from Carter. He got in touch with Brzezinski to complain. He warned other powerful American friends of the shah as well, including David Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger and John J. McCloy.

Rockefeller and Kissinger began calling contacts in the press and on Capitol Hill to bring pressure on the administration, warning that an Iran without the shah would rapidly turn communist.

McCloy went further than that. The former high commissioner to Germany after World War II, former president of the World Bank and chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, McCloy, at 83 years of age, was a partner in the law firm that represented the shah, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, one of the most prestigious law firms in the United States.

In letters and phone calls, McCloy urged Vance to support the most hard-line aid for the shah, and to make it known that such support was coming. According to one State Department source, McCloy made it clear to Vance that he had also been in touch with the president.

According to one source with access to intelligence information, Zahedi opened another line of pressure, less subtle, to force a stronger endorsement from the president. Zahedi arranged for someone to contact Barbara Walters of ABC News and reveal Sullivan's new doubts about the shah and that U.S. support seemed to be declining. When Walters called Zahedi on the story, he at first seemed reluctant to talk

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— then depicted the shah as debilitated by his lack of U.S. support. Sullivan was portrayed as taking a "go easy" line, meeting behind the shah's back with the opposition. The report warned of a communist takeover, in which oil supplies might be lost, U.S. arms might fall into the "wrong hands."

"Without the belief that Jimmy Carter will support him, the shah sits and waits," Walters reported on the evening of Nov. 2, which, it turns out, was one of the most accurate news accounts during this period.

The White House issued a denial: The president was not abandoning the shah. This is part of what Zahedi wanted to happen. The other part was a private communication from the White House, guaranteeing that Washington would not get cold feet if the shah embarked on military action to take over the oil fields and break up demonstrations. Zahedi wanted the shah to know, with certainty, that the United States would not shrink away if the TV news began showing American-made tanks rolling against Iranian citizens.

In fact, the president had not yet made up his mind about how far to go in supporting the shah or deserting him. He was not sure whether Sullivan's analysis made sense. And Brzezinski was offering an alternative view of the revolution in Iran, one which ultimately persuaded Carter to stand by the shah — to the very end.

With a background as a lifelong academic before joining the Carter administration, Brzezinski mustered serious intellectual arguments in behalf of his position. Revolutions are not won by the will or might of revolutionaries, Brzezinski maintained. Instead, they succeed because of the absence of an effective authority in control.

Brzezinski had copied and gave to Carter a few pages by historian Crane Brinton, who argues that successful revolutions are marked commonly by the ineptitude of the government's use of force rather than the skillful use of force by the opposition. While a majority of the populace may be unhappy and wish the existing government overthrown, only a minority takes part in the actual clash of forces. The government that is overthrown is one which does not exercise tight control over its troops, which has military commanders of little intelligence, which loses its troops to the opposition.

Brinton went even further: People are generally so conservative, routine-loving and obedient that virtually no government is likely to be overthrown from within until it loses its ability to use its police and military powers against the small cadres who make revolution.

In addition to this argument, Brzezinski added the weight of reports on Iran coming in from elsewhere in the government. Some in the State Department now wanted to ease the shah out of power, Brzezinski noted, but for months, even as the crisis in Iran grew, the department's own analysts said the shah could make it through the unrest.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, concerned about Saudi Arabia's uneasiness, had become a partial ally of Brzezinski's. Brown said he favored letting the shah solve his own problems — but if it took military action against demonstrators to solve them, then so be it. Brown advised the president to make it clear to the shah that the United States would stand behind him no matter what he did.

According to one National Security Council staff member, Brzezinski felt that Brown's opinion would weigh heavily with the president. Carter, the source said, considered Brown and Vance to be equally cautious in outlook. With Vance hardly involved in Iranian problems at all, Brown's views, the source said, were even more important than they would ordinarily have been.

By early November, Brzezinski told Carter that the question in Iran was no longer how the shah could move to compromise with his opponents but rather how he could restore his collapsing authority. The only way to keep the United States out of Iran in the long run, Brzezinski reportedly said, was for the shah to act decisively by turning his troops loose to quash dissent.

Shortly after the Walters broadcast, Brzezinski reported that Zahedi had called, upset over the television report, according to a White House source. The president had been publicly challenged to say whether he stood by the shah.

The Advice

Carter told Brzezinski to call the shah and relay his support.

Brzezinski interpreted his instructions broadly. Since the beginning of the administration, his staff had repeatedly dissuaded him from recommendations for military involvement or covert action in Africa and Latin America. At this moment, Iran was the place to take a stand.

Brzezinski called that evening. According to a U.S. official who said he was familiar with the conversation, Brzezinski told the shah that Carter supported "whatever steps the shah deemed necessary to keep the peace." Brzezinski urged the shah to "crack

down" on demonstrators, according to several sources familiar with the conversation. He told the shah that Carter understood that force would have to be used; and that human rights considerations were no longer of the highest priority. Brzezinski, according to one State Department source, pressed the shah to turn his government over to the military to conduct the crackdown.

Then Brzezinski called Sullivan in Tehran and informed him of his conversation with the shah.

Sullivan, feeling undercut and embarrassed, sent an angry cable to Washington, where aides to Vance were as dismayed as the ambassador was. They could not understand why Brzezinski would approve a policy of accommodation as recommended by Sullivan and then personally countermand it in a conversation with the shah. Several phone calls to Sick, Brzezinski's aide, however, confirmed that the call had been made and that Brzezinski had urged a crackdown.

Vance was also unhappy when he learned of Brzezinski's call. From almost the outset of the Carter administration, the secretary of state, according to aides, had largely ignored news reports of a constant battle for control of foreign policy between himself and Brzezinski. From his point of view, those aides said, no such battle existed. He had reprimanded his staff when they complained of power grabs by Brzezinski. This time, the aides said, Vance was truly upset. Word spread quickly through the State Department that Iran policy was now being run from the White House.

On Saturday, Nov. 4, Sullivan and British Ambassador Parsons went again to see the shah.

And the shah seemed puzzled: What was the U.S. policy? What did Carter want him to do, the shah asked Sullivan. Was it Brzezinski's advice to go ahead and unleash the Iranian military against the demonstrators? Or did the president wish something more moderate? As the shah described Brzezinski's call, he said he was not inclined to follow the advice from the White House adviser. The shah doubted that force would be effective, and again noted his conviction that his son could not rule in the future if thousands of Iranians were to be killed.

At the embassy in Tehran, however, some support for the Brzezinski position was emerging. Sullivan's deputy, Charles Naas, told a visiting team from Washington that those demonstrating against the shah were just students and religious fanatics with a large smattering of communists among them. In Naas' view, there was a "silent majority" in Iran which abhorred the demonstrations and would support a "crackdown."

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of the type the shah's father had employed — when he had 25 mullahs hanged. "Human rights are no longer a problem," Naas said.

Gen. Philip Gast, the head of the U.S. military assistance group in Tehran, had a similar appraisal. All that was necessary was to concentrate on the infrastructure and management problems within the Iranian military. A member of the State Department team visiting at the time was surprised by Gast's "can-do" talk. It seemed to conflict with the fact that Gast's office in the Iranian military headquarters had been without heat and electricity for a week.

On Nov. 5, the shah's attempts to bring members of the moderate opposition into his cabinet became stalled when Karim Sanjabi, a leader of the National Front, demanded along with Khomeini that the shah step down.

On that day, the worst wave of violence to date broke out. Demonstrators burned buildings and automobiles and attacked the British embassy. Tehran was aflame. Beginning to see conspiracies everywhere, some aides in the American embassy blamed the attack on the Iranian military. Sullivan thought the U.S. Embassy had been left alone because army leaders knew of the American call for repression.

That night, the shah met once more with Sullivan and Parsons. Despite his own best judgment, the shah said, he would have to let the military take command because even the moderate opposition, in the form of the National Front, had refused to deal with him.

The shah, Sullivan said, appeared composed and resolute for the first time in a long while. The shah said he had got a phone call the previous evening from Nelson Rockefeller, who told him to be tough, and that Kissinger, through Zahedi, had suggested that it was time to round up and rearrest all the political prisoners who had been released.


The shah said he would urge his military government, under the command of Gholam Reza Azhari, to rule with restraint. Some opposition leaders would be rearrested but not those of the National Front. The press would be closed for a few days because "soviets" of reporters had taken control from publishers and editors. The city would be quieted by flooding streets with troops and tanks. In contrast, some of his generals were talking about "hanging 10 mullahs or burning 10 mosques."

The shah said he was making a further attempt to split the moderate clergy, represented by the Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, away from Khomeini.

And finally, the shah told the two ambassadors, he was sure of one thing: If a military government failed to restore order, he was finished.

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28 October 1980

Vance Deflects a Call for Toughness



Fourth of a series

By Scott Armstrong

Washington Post Staff Writer

On Nov. 9, 1978, U.S. Ambassador to Iran William Sullivan sent an eyes-only cable to the secretary of state in Washington urging a major policy change toward the embattled shah. The revolution in Iran was growing, the shah seemed doomed, and the dominant figure emerging was the 78-year-old Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whose character and outlook were virtually unknown to American policy-makers.

Sullivan, once an enthusiastic booster of the shah, was now a convert to dire forecasts. He titled his cable: "Thinking the Unthinkable."

Others in the State Department who had persuaded themselves that the shah's new military government had prospects for success were jarred by Sullivan's pessimistic message. In it he postulated that if the new military government of Gen. Gholam Reza Azhari failed to subdue quickly the growing turmoil, the shah would probably not survive. With that in mind, the United States should begin contingency planning. Because U.S. interests were fundamentally to preserve the independence of Iran as an ally and because

Iran was surrounded by a constellation of potentially hostile nations, a strong, effective, pro-American military was fundamental.


Therefore, plans should be made for putting the armed forces in touch with whatever new government was likely to emerge. Because any new government would not likely survive for long without Khomeini's approval, Sullivan urged Washington to prepare to meet secretly with opposition representatives most closely associated with the ayatollah to find out what he would accept to keep Iran's armed forces intact.

Sullivan believed that the first person to approach would be Mehdi Bazargan, an engineer who enjoyed Khomeini's blessing and was well regarded by all factions of the opposition — the clergy, the bazaaris, the National Front and the workers. Unlike most of the other members of the National Front, he was untainted by old jealousies and internecine rivalries. One of Sullivan's political officers had met with him the week before. His views on social reform and civil rights were suited to Sullivan's notion of an appropriate head of state.

Because such an approach would be tantamount to a desertion of the shah, the substance of discussions with Bazargan would have to be totally secret. If the shah learned of it, it could be precisely the signal that would cause him to give up all hope. That, in turn, could leave a disastrous vacuum.

President Carter's reaction to Sullivan's cable was severe. He met with national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and canceled the rest of his appointments for the day.

Why had he not been told that events in Iran were to the point where the U.S. ambassador was ready to abandon the shah? What was going on in the State Department, in the CIA, in



IRAN, From A1

the National Security Agency, in the Defense Intelligence Agency? Aside from a few references about the unhappiness of religious groups and radical opposition members with the shah, no one had warned him that things were this serious.

The president scrawled out a note to Brzezinski for each of his advisers — Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance,

Defense Secretary Harold Brown, CIA Director Stansfield Turner and the head of the National Security Agency, Adm. Bobby Inman. Why had intelligence on Iran been so inaccurate? Or was Sullivan simply wrong?

On the afternoon of Nov. 13, Carter met with Brzezinski, his White House chief of staff, Hamilton Jordan, and Turner.

Turner offered an explanation. CIA resources had been cut so badly that they could not cover both the Soviet threat in the region and domestic politics. In addition, he mentioned the decision in the 1960s to rely on SAVAK, the shah's secret police, for information about the domestic political opposition in Iran. But mainly Turner blamed the mysterious aloofness of the Shiite clergy. The embassy political staff had been largely handling those contacts, he explained, and they had totally misinterpreted events. In short, the failure of intelligence was principally Sullivan's fault.

CONTINUE

Mixed Reports

Through November and into December of 1978, American intelligence reports and appraisals of the situation in Iran continued to be marked by what had become a steady pattern: the outlook for the shah was stable one day, his collapse imminent on the next. Brzezinski remained constant on the need to stand by the shah; advisers in the State Department were split.

Despite Sullivan's strongly worded cable, many members of his own staff in Tehran were unaware that their boss had lost confidence in the shah's chances of survival. They continued to send in reports that conflicted with Sullivan's own appraisals and, anxious not to create panic by broadcasting his own drastic shift in position, Sullivan did not stop them.

On Nov. 15, for instance, embassy political officer George Lambrakis and a visiting intelligence analyst from the State Department filed an encouraging report on their visit with the head of the 400,000-member teachers' union. They told Washington that this moderate opposition leader "would dearly love to follow conciliatory course which would permit shah to remain and reign, not rule, but government has closed down all efforts he and his group have made to publish or be politically active." The cable warned of a "crypto-communist" organization, a rival for teachers' loyalties.

This was the sort of evidence that Brzezinski regularly called to the president's attention — a dispatch suggesting that the shah was not in as much trouble as the State Department was claiming and that communist influence was a major threat.


The shah had his own supporters chiming in on the Washington debate. King Hassan II of Morocco, a strong ally of the shah who was himself locked in conflict with Soviet-backed guerrillas, arrived in Washington and urged the president to give the shah his complete support, including military intervention on his behalf if necessary. How else could other allies be assured of U.S. support, Hassan asked.

The president took Hassan to be intimating that if the shah did not receive full U.S. support, Hassan and others could be expected to work against the administration's Arab-Israeli peace initiative. Carter sidestepped Hassan's suggestion, but assured him that all allies could count on the United States in time of crisis.

The same day, the president asked Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) to stop in Iran on a trip he was making to the Middle East and North Africa at the end of the month. Byrd's son-in-law was Iranian and the president could count on Byrd for a candid appraisal of the shah's position.

Later that day, the president also asked Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal to stop in Iran and make his own appraisal.

Sullivan had still not received a response to his "Thinking the Unthinkable" cable. He continued the contacts



with the opposition on his own authority. Each week he authorized contacts with opposition members that were closer to the clerics and harsher on the shah. But his reporting still drew no response from Washington.

Lambrakis filed another hopeful report on the possibility for a moderate solution to the crisis:

"There are a variety of elements in the population who would dearly like to see some sort of compromise solution which would keep the shah and avoid a total victory for the Khomeini forces. Many of these people are convinced communists will eventually manage to take over any successor government despite their relatively low posture in the opposition. Others want to avoid what they see as religious fanaticism."

The cable, signed as a matter of protocol by Sullivan, closed with an observation: "All recognize [the] key role to be played by the armed forces whatever the outcome of the present situation might be."

When Blumenthal lunched with the shah Nov. 21, he was a bit taken aback. The State Department briefing papers had told him the shah "remains in firm control and has stated categorically that he will not step down." But Blumenthal found the Iranian leader sullen and listless. As the cabinet officer tried to reassure the shah about American attitudes, the shah seemed not to hear.

When Blumenthal's gloomy report reached Washington, Undersecretary of State David Newsom decided to try again at the White House. He assembled three analysts who had recently briefed him on their tour of Iran and sent them to enlighten Brzezinski's staff on how bad things really were. The group, accompanied by Iranian desk officer Henry Precht, met with Brzezinski's deputy, David Aaron, and the NSC specialist on Iran, Navy Capt. Gary Sick, in the situation room of the White House.

The group from State explained that the question was not who was opposed to the shah, but who was for him, because that list was much shorter. But Aaron seemed unconvinced. He wanted to know who was organizing the trouble. It was clearly a small group that could be mollified or eradicated.

After the State Department group had spent an hour describing the total deterioration of support for the shah, Aaron interrupted Precht to ask a question.

"Tell me, Henry, exactly who is the opposition?" Aaron asked.

"The people, David, the people," Precht responded tartly.

The State Department team left totally discouraged. They felt the White House was losing touch with reality in Iran.

Sullivan's cables from Tehran, meanwhile, took on a sarcastic quality that did not increase his influence at the White House, as he noted the comings and goings of Ardeshir Zahedi and the out-of-channel communications by Brzezinski. Who is the American ambassador, he wondered at one point.

From the White House viewpoint, Sullivan's ego undercut his effectiveness as an advocate for U.S. policy. One White House staffer said the president was tired of Sullivan's "smart-ass attitude and smart-ass cables."


But Byrd's personal report did not brighten the picture either. He informed the White House that he found the shah impotent to alter the course of his slide.

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11th-Hour Efforts

While the president absorbed these reports, tremendous international pressure was being applied for a last-ditch effort to keep the shah in power.

The principal allies of the United States had an enormous stake in ensuring that Iran remained stable. Japan, Israel, South Africa and several of the Western European nations were heavily dependent on Iran for their oil. Khomeini had announced that after the revolution Israel would get no oil from Iran and that all contracts with foreign firms would be canceled. That created a special scare in Japan, which was building a huge petrochemical complex in Iran. French firms had even larger contracts for construction of nuclear power plants. (Strikingly, the shah planned to make Iran independent of oil and develop a nationwide network of nuclear power plants by the turn of the century.) In all, the western European nations were said to have begun



work on contracts calling for \$12 billion in development at the time of the fall of the shah.

Because of their need for oil and their investments, some in the State Department felt, the Western powers believed the most likely method of maintaining stability was to keep the shah propped up.

In the same period, Energy Secretary James Schlesinger was worrying, not only that crippling strikes in the Iranian oil fields might interrupt the flow of oil, but would create another, more serious problem for the shah. Without oil revenues he could not pay for the recently promised wage increases. Without the wage increase, there would be more strikes. And intelligence reports warned that oil workers were now planning strikes over political demands, not wages and benefits. In short, economic collapse could bring down the shah.

Decision Time

From all the competing voices, the president had to choose. What was the reality in Iran? And what could the United States do at this point to gain control over events?

When Blumenthal returned at the end of November with his personal report, he also had a business-like suggestion for resolving the internal debate: get an outside opinion.

Blumenthal told the president he had been shocked by the shah's demoralized appearance. He said Sullivan had told him to expect the shah to be downcast, but, at the same time, State briefing papers were declaring that the shah could regain control of events. Blumenthal questioned whether the latter opinion was sound. He advised the president to seek an outside appraisal, and recommended that Carter appoint George Ball, a former undersecretary of state and now a partner in a New York investment house, to conduct it.

Blumenthal's advice was seconded by Brzezinski, who told colleagues he was sure Ball would see things the same way he did. Ball arrived in Washington immediately and Brzezinski installed him in the Executive Office Building where he began sifting through all the intelligence reports he could find.

Ball, then 68 years old, had known many among the Iranian elite for 30 or 40 years and had traveled frequently

to Iran. Years earlier, he had heard firsthand of the frustration with corruption under the shah and had thought the shah's penchant for advanced weaponry to be irrational.


Whatever new evidence Ball needed to reinforce his suspicion that the shah's days were numbered, he got from a series of confidential briefings from analysts at the State Department and elsewhere. The portion of Sullivan's cable traffic that Ball was allowed to see yielded a similar view. Iran analysts from State passed on other cable traffic and memoranda that they knew Ball had not yet seen. Even Brzezinski's own aide, Sick, agreed that the shah was done.

From the reports he read and conversations with administration aides, Ball rapidly came to the conclusion that the shah could not be saved. He seized on the possibility of installing the National Front in power, despite the CIA reports citing the weakness of the Front.

On Nov. 30, the CIA issued a top secret intelligence report on the shah's opposition, dealing mainly with the National Front, which it referred to as "a wide range of parties from moderates to radical leftists but not communists." The Front was described as too divided, probably to provide Iran with effective administration.

Correctly, the CIA noted that "it is Khomeini who has the largest backing among the demonstrators and rioters who have plunged Iran into chaos," and that "most leaders of the Front have moved closer to the 'hardline views' of Khomeini. 'It is the religious leadership that can bring out the demonstrators and mobs, not the National Front.' But the CIA added that the Iranian military would 'play the pivotal role in future political developments in Iran.'"

Ball chose to ignore the CIA warning that "ideological and personal feuds,



some decades old, weaken its cohesion and have damaged its ability to negotiate during the current disorder. The National Front has not put forward a formal program other than calling for the return of the 1906 constitution [which would make the shah a constitutional monarch with limited powers], a top secret intelligence memorandum said.

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But if the Front seemed ineffectual, it was also the safest alternative. For Ball, the National Front consisted largely of constitutionalists, human rights advocates, committed to self-determination over Iran's oil assets, and nonaligned in their foreign policy. No doubt the rhetoric of anti-Americanism would outstrip any statements of support for U.S. values. But Ball reasoned that American support for their independence would swing them back into the U.S. camp.

The Iranian specialists at State were pleased that Ball also concluded that the shah could not continue in full authority; they were disturbed at Ball's recommendation that the shah retain his throne and control over the military. The CIA had just reported that Khomeini would never accept that arrangement. Brzezinski was unhappy for other reasons.

Citing recent intelligence predictions that Iran would almost certainly be overwhelmed by violence during the Moharram holidays and the shah probably would be toppled, Brzezinski stressed that such bleak reports could not be trusted. The violence hadn't occurred. The shah hadn't fallen. His point was supported from an unexpected quarter — Sullivan cabled that the shah had survived the worst. "The immediate political crisis has passed," it said, according to sources.

At a presidential news conference Dec. 12, Carter expressed the same outlook. "I expect the shah to maintain power in Iran and for the present difficulties to be resolved," the president said. "The predictions of disaster that came from some sources have not been realized at all. The shah has our support, and he also has our confidence." The president added critical remarks about Khomeini and Soviet ambitions in the region.

When Ball asked for a meeting with the president, Brzezinski was slow to push the request through, apparently hoping to delay the report's arrival on the president's desk until he had had an opportunity to append his own remarks to it. Ball could not turn to Vance, who was in the Middle East desperately pushing for a peace treaty, but, wise to the ways of White House politics, Ball arranged his own appointment.

Finally, on Dec. 13, Ball met with Carter. He told the president that the shah, like Humpty Dumpty, could never be put together again because there had been a "national regurgitation by the Iranian people." Even the professional and middle classes were now against him. What the United States had to do, Ball said, was work out the transfer of power to "responsible hands before Khomeini comes back and messes everything up."

Ball recommended that a "Council of Notables" be established, consisting of prominent citizens from all sections of the opposition except the Marxist left. The council, not the shah, would pick the leaders of a new government. Ball offered a list of 40 to 50 "notables," mostly elderly, moderate leaders from the early 1950s, when the National Front was at its most powerful.

Ball warned that Brzezinski's hard-line "crackdown" approach could not succeed. Army troops might refuse to fire at demonstrators, he said, leading to the disintegration of the military. If the military did hold together, then there would be massive, bloody confrontations leading to prolonged civil war.

One way or the other, Ball told Carter, the shah should be told he ought to leave the country for awhile and begin to share power with others. It was the only way he could avoid letting the country fall into the hands of communists and religious extremists. Ball did, however, recommend that the shah could continue as regent and as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

"I can't tell another head of state what to do," Carter responded.

"You can tell a friend what you think," Ball retorted. "One of the obligations of friendship is to give advice, particularly to a man who is cut off from the normal sources, who is surrounded by syncophants and out of touch with his people."

Carter wouldn't budge. Ball departed for a Florida vacation.

A Proposal

Afterward, Brzezinski, unhappy with Ball's recommendations, once again made his case for standing by the shah. The shah had made it through the most dangerous holiday period; he could ride out the protests. The "Council of Notables" made no sense, Brzezinski said, because the National Front leaders were weak, had no popular support and no respect from the military leadership. The result, Brzezinski said, would be a crumbling at the first push from Iranian communists or an aggressive move by the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, Brzezinski said, only the military could meet a threat from Khomeini, and, from all appearances and intelligence reports, the military was still intensely loyal to the shah. What the shah needed from the president was a clear signal that the United States would back him to the end. That would serve a double purpose: It would let the allies know that the United States kept its commitments, and it might prod the shah to seize the opportunity to crush the opposition.

According to sources in the State Department, Brzezinski then drafted a letter for the president to send the shah, which unambiguously urged him to use force to put down the demonstrations. The letter, three sources said, spoke of issues of greater importance than liberalization of Iranian society.

A draft of the letter was sent to Vance for State Department comments; key aides to Vance were shocked by it. The result of the letter, one aide feared, might have been "1,000 deaths." Others thought in terms of tens of thousands of deaths.

Vance spoke to the president immediately, according to these sources, and said he wanted to be sure that Carter understood that language of the draft would likely be interpreted by the shah as an invitation for massive violence against his people. According to State Department sources, Vance told Carter that the idea was dangerous on several counts. If the shah accepted the advice, a confrontation with civilians could turn into a lengthy civil war or lead to a breakdown of the Iranian military, if troops balked. Vance feared these possibilities could only play into the hands of Iranian communists and perhaps the Soviet Union as well.

And if the shah did not accept the advice, but abdicated, the letter could create a disaster for U.S. interests should it fall into the wrong hands.

Carter, according to State Department sources, told the secretary of state that he was willing to take the responsibility. He felt it was important for the shah to know that the United States was unambiguously behind him. According to these sources, the president believed that the shah had a new lease on life and should take advantage of it immediately.

Vance suggested changes in the draft to make it slightly more ambiguous, which were accepted. The White House now says the message was never sent.

At one point in early 1980 during the hostage crisis, Carter asked for the compilation of a documentary history of U.S.-Iran relations, in preparation for Iranian demands for an accounting on the U.S. role in the Persian Gulf nation. But when the study task force asked for presidential documents, the White House refused certain documents, including the draft letter. The gathering and analysis of the "Iran papers" was shifted to Brzezinski's office and suspended. Vance's copy of the revisions is now missing from his office files at the State Department.

In any case, advice from Washington had no impact on the shah's decisions. He did not order any crackdown.

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A Retort

In Tehran, Sullivan was not consulted about the draft letter, but he was infuriated by Zahedi's representations of U.S. policy, by the president's refusal to approve contacts with the opposition, by Brzezinski's persistence in backing the shah.

Having pushed for overtures to be made to Khomeini's representatives and for Washington to ease the shah out of power, Sullivan fired off a cable home saying that the president's policy was "shortsighted and did not understand where the U.S. interests lie," according to a State Department source.

For months, State Department officials had warned Sullivan that he was on thin ice with the White House, that Brzezinski and to a lesser extent the president felt that his cables were impudent and improperly critical of the National Security Council and Carter. The new cable got Carter's attention.

"Pull him out," the president ordered

Vance, according to State Department sources.

Vance objected. Firing Sullivan would make it appear that the United States was deserting the shah.

Carter was adamant; he said he wanted Sullivan's "ass."


Vance suggested that, instead, undersecretary Newsom be sent to

Tehran to give Sullivan an official but private reprimand. Finally, the president relented.

As it turned out, Newsom was too busy to make the trip. Sullivan stayed on the job, unaware that the president wanted him fired, as events in Iran headed toward the climax.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
29 October 1980



Iran Crisis Finally Forces Itself on Vance

Fifth of a series
By Scott Armstrong
Washington Post Staff Writer

Cyrus R. Vance became secretary of state for Jimmy Carter believing that his single greatest objective would be to work for a nuclear arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. By December 1978, as the reign of the shah of Iran was coming to an end, Vance was still essentially preoccupied with the complex negotiations with Russia.

A disciplined workaholic, Vance was often in his office past 11 p.m., munching on a Roy Rogers cheeseburger, formulating tactics to use on the Soviets — and sometimes even on colleagues in the Carter administration — to keep the SALT talks on course.


Vance's style was to put all other matters out of sight and concentrate on his main goals. He ran the State Department with that in mind, setting in place people in whom he had great confidence and relying on them to look after their regional interests.

The system was good for State Department morale and functioned smoothly in most instances. But it had

specific shortcomings. Often aides from State were outranked at meetings with the hierarchy of other agencies of government. Assistant secretaries and their deputies, trying to put forth the State Department position, were no match for national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski or Defense Secretary Harold Brown in matters over which there was disagreement. And on Iran, there had been growing disagreement.

During the fall of 1978, low- and mid-level State Department aides tried repeatedly to get Vance's ear on Iran, failing that, they urged his ranking assistants, Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher and Undersecretary for Political Affairs David Newsom, to impress upon Vance the urgency of the situation.

Vance, however, had added a second, high priority which preoccupied him — the peace talks between Egypt and Israel. After the Camp David meeting among Carter, Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin had ended in preliminary accord in October, Vance was working on the important follow-through negotiations between the two nations.



Christopher, or "Chris" as virtually everyone at State called him, was regarded as extremely intelligent, precisely in tune with Vance's reasoning, a subtle persuader, though something of a procrastinator. In major areas apart from SALT and the Middle East treaty, Christopher was, de facto, the secretary of state.

Newsom was the most sophisticated of career diplomats, soft-spoken, meticulous, wary, accustomed to staying within the limits of established policy and practice. Newsom was the chief operating officer of the Foreign Service, who oversaw the flow of diplomatic events that rose to major importance. When assistant secretaries for the various regions of the world saw a situation developing beyond the limits of established policy, they usually took it to Newsom. Both men, Christopher and Newsom, had Vance's complete confidence. But neither man was the president's secretary of state.

Between SALT and his Middle East duties, the secretary of state was often out of the country. Aides said Vance preferred things that way, finding the capital a city where he could get little done. Away on a long trip with only a few assistants, he had no staff meetings to worry about, no White House meetings and few social or protocol functions.

Beneath Christopher and Vance, the structure of analysts who were expert on Iran had been sounding alarms over the shah's future for many months, with varying degrees of intensity. In the fall of 1978, for instance, Harold Saunders, assistant secretary for the region, had reviewed for a staff meeting all of the different groups aligned against the shah, from the semi-feudal landholders to the rural peasants, from the democratic opposition to oil field workers, from the merchants to the Shiite clergy.

The departmental press secretary, Hodding Carter III, asked a question. "Hal, you've just listed every group in the society. Who's for him?"

"The military," Saunders replied tersely.

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By early December, Henry Precht, the desk officer in charge of Iranian affairs, was particularly frustrated. Convinced for months that the shah's regime was in a state of collapse, Precht saw the United States gliding along with the same policy, unaware of the implications for the future when the shah was displaced by a new government.

Precht complained to his boss, Saunders. He said the measures being taken by the shah — discussions with moderate opposition leaders about participating in the government — were too little and too late. Even the latest recommendation by Ambassador William Sullivan, calling for the shah to relinquish control of domestic authority and temporarily leave the country, was not enough, Precht said.

He urged that the shah be told to abdicate and begin transferring control to an opposition coalition acceptable to the United States and to the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who would no doubt take charge in a new regime. To do otherwise would leave the United States without any voice in the ultimate outcome.

Saunders listened politely but disagreed. The shah might be in difficulty but time was on his side. In the face of presidential decisions to support the shah, Saunders could not recommend an abrupt shift.

Precht then took his argument to the seventh floor, the corridor of power in the State Department, where the offices of the secretary of state, the deputy secretary and the undersecretary for political affairs are located.


He spoke to W. Anthony Lake, the head of the policy planning group, and Arnold Raphael, a young Foreign Service officer who had served in Iran and was Vance's senior executive assistant. Both were said to be sympathetic but told Precht that the tone of his memos were too demonstrative. They cautioned him to present his case more objectively. They said the secretary — "Mr. Vance," as the entire staff referred to him — was not receptive to emotional appeals.

But whether the appeals were emotional or calm, Vance, according to a number of his aides, showed no inclination to get deeply involved in discussions about Iran. Lake had tried personally at a recent meeting of assistant secretaries to propose a full-scale re-

evaluation but Vance had interrupted. There would be no reevaluation, Vance said curtly. The president had made up his mind: the U.S. policy was to support the shah.

Piling up on Vance's desk were pleas from Precht, from Sullivan in Tehran and from Lake and Raphael as well, generally asking that the secretary try to budge the president from his support of the shah. Precht's arguments, bolstered by a task force that had just returned from Iran, finally persuaded Newsom and Christopher. But the secretary was the only one with enough stature to convince the White House.

While Vance was in the Middle East negotiating, the news "leaked" from the White House that SALT negotiations were proceeding so well that an agreement would be finished by year's end and President Leonid Brezhnev might come to Washington for a summit in January. Vance and a handful of others knew better — the president had sum-



moned him home for the announcement of normalization with communist China, an event that was sure to upset the Soviets and postpone the SALT agreement.

Vance favored normalization, but not at the expense of a SALT treaty. Brzezinski's accelerated schedule for normalization was undercutting Vance's efforts. There were other disagreements on U.S.-Soviet relations. Vance was beginning to feel crowded by Brzezinski.

Warnings of Urgency

On Dec. 15, when Vance flew back to Washington from Cairo, he encountered the issue of Iran and finally heard warnings of urgency, some from outside the administration, which moved Vance to take Iran onto his list of most important issues. One came from Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) whose office had been approached by an unhappy aide at State, asking for help in arousing Vance on the Iranian crisis.

Two days after Vance's return, Kennedy met with him, ostensibly for a briefing on Iran. According to sources familiar with the meeting, Kennedy listened politely to Vance but thought the secretary had little idea of how strongly the people of Iran had turned against the shah. The senator recommended that Vance look carefully at the recommendations that George Ball had just made to President Carter a few days earlier, urging Carter to back away from the shah and help form a transitional government of Iranian moderates.

Later that day, Vance read Ball's report and called the investment banker at his vacation home in Florida. To Ball, Vance seemed ignorant of what had transpired in his absence, not focusing on Iran sufficiently. To Vance, the presence of elder statesman Ball certified Iran as a crisis worthy of his attention.

Ball warned the secretary of state that the situation in Iran was critical, that the shah could not last, and that Carter and Brzezinski were being unrealistic in their hopes for maintaining the status quo.

The president, Ball said, was listening only to Brzezinski and perhaps to Brown, whose views on Iran seemed uncharacteristically hawkish. Ball urged Vance to become personally involved. He backed Sullivan's proposals for immediate communications with the opposition, so long as the contact was made in a way that allowed the government to deny it. He said the shah should be encouraged to relinquish real power.

When Vance finally turned his attention to Iran, the situation was relatively tranquil. The president and Brzezinski seemed to think that since the shah had gotten through the religious holiday that the CIA had predicted would be his most crucial test, the worst was past.

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At the State Department, those who felt the shah was doomed — with the exception of Precht and Sullivan, who both continued to hammer away for more drastic concessions from the shah — were content to sit back and wait. It was just a matter of time until the shah fell.

Soon the opposition began to escalate its activity with massive national strikes.

Vance was ready to move, but it was not his style to go directly and ask the president to undo a previous decision. Once Vance lost an argument and the president decided, he respected it. His aides thought this was an unfair

disadvantage because Brzezinski never seemed to give up on his positions.

And Vance had another potential adversary on the subject now. Energy Secretary James Schlesinger, former CIA director, former secretary of defense, had weighed in with his own proposal — send a high-level envoy such as Brzezinski or Brown to meet with the shah, bolster his resolve and perhaps show him how to take control over the domestic unrest. Schlesinger had studied CIA profiles that described the shah as weak, frozen in fear. Brzezinski liked the idea but suggested that Schlesinger himself be the envoy.


CIA Director Stansfield Turner suggested, meanwhile, a program of covert action — a campaign of "black propaganda" that would confuse and divide the shah's opponents by portraying Khomeini as an unwitting pawn of the left, espousing anti-Islamic goals. Members of Khomeini's entourage in Paris would then be exposed as the sources of these accusations — "SAVAK agents" secretly working for the shah. Although the plan was discussed at one cabinet-level meeting and met no objections, it was apparently put off.

Contacting the Ayatollah

On Dec. 20, the general heading the shah's military government suffered a mild heart attack and told Sullivan he could not continue. The shah was too indecisive to last much longer.

Sullivan, convinced the military would splinter unless arrangements were worked out with the opposition, cabled Washington with an urgent suggestion. A high-level envoy should be sent to meet directly with Khomeini in Paris.

With complicating developments in the Middle East, China and SALT, Vance had still had little time to discuss Iran with the president, but he now argued against Schlesinger's proposal for a high-level envoy and instead for the



State Department position that the United States must establish direct contact with Khomeini. Recent reports from Tehran, Vance said, described support for Khomeini, not only in the Islamic clergy, but in the mercantile centers and general population. He was the symbol of emerging national independence and the United States must begin dealing with him.

The president agreed, at least partly. He would postpone the idea of a high-level envoy to see the shah. Instead, they would urge the shah to accommodate the opposition, but retain control of the military. But Carter was less sure of Sullivan's plan to begin contact with Khomeini. Everyone, even Ball, had noted the virulent anti-American rhetoric from Khomeini. The president was concerned that the shah might see any U.S. approach to the ayatollah as desertion. Other allies in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, would have the same reaction.

Vance pointed out that it could be done discreetly, probably with the shah's knowledge and support.

Carter was not ready for such a bold step.

On Dec. 22, Vance was in Geneva negotiating with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, when he received a telephone call from Brzezinski. Brzezinski said that he and Turner had convinced the president to reject one of the items Vance had already negotiated with Gromyko. Vance objected that the change was not worth jeopardizing the entire SALT agreement; he wanted to discuss it directly with the president. Carter was on his way to Plains, Ga., for Christmas and was unavailable, Brzezinski said.

Vance returned empty-handed to Washington on Christmas Eve — for the first time wary of Brzezinski.

While the secretary of state had been gone, the State Department had established contact, almost accidentally, with Khomeini's people. Precht, earlier in the month, had gone to a television taping of the MacNeil/Lehrer Report and met Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, who served, roughly speaking, as a chief of staff for the swirl of mullahs and technocrats surrounding the ayatollah. They dined afterwards with their host, but Precht was reluctant to discuss anything substantive because U.S. policy at that point prohibited any contact with Khomeini's representatives. He proposed Yazdi as a contact point, if the president approved.

Later in the month, the top political officer in the Paris embassy, Warren Zimmerman, was authorized to meet with Yazdi, a 47-year-old Moslem who was educated in America and worked for years as a cancer researcher at Baylor University, while coordinating the radical Islamic Students Association in the United States. Yazdi was regarded as a moderating influence in the Khomeini entourage.

From other sources, the United States learned that the revolutionary group had laid more groundwork for a takeover of Iran than intelligence reports had suspected. Khomeini's agents had successfully infiltrated SAVAK, the shah's secret police.

The CIA, in contrast, had been unable to establish whether Iran's generals were moving toward accommodation with the shah's opposition. One secret report said the senior officers held National Front leaders in contempt as "coffee-house politicians susceptible to communist penetrations and influences but the junior officers may be more susceptible to the Front's appeal." The CIA knew little about the potential for a relationship between the generals and the ayatollah.

Zimmerman asked Yazdi about the ayatollah's potential relationship with the Iranian military, a crucial question for American policy makers who saw the Iranian generals as the enduring center of pro-U.S. influence. Yazdi was unable to enlighten him. In many areas, the ayatollah was an enigma, but especially on questions of hypothetical situations that did not yet exist. Only contact with Khomeini himself could help.

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Demands by Military

In Tehran, the shah's position continued to deteriorate. The demonstrations were becoming more frequent.

The shah had attempted to entice two opposition leaders into some form of coalition government. He released them from jail and proposed that he retain only his title of monarch and control over foreign policy and the military. They turned him down.


On Christmas Day, the U.S. Embassy was attacked.

The message was clear to Sullivan, the shah was losing control.

The shah's military leaders began clamoring for action. They demanded that he appoint one of their own, Gen. Gholam Ali Oveissi, to head the government. Oveissi was perhaps the toughest of the generals; since October he had been urging the shah to put down the demonstrations with force. Oveissi was also the choice of Iranian Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi who, at Brzezinski's suggestion, had returned to Tehran to bolster the shah's resolve.

The shah, as he had done so often in crisis, turned to the United States for advice, calling in Sullivan. What should he do? Should he appoint a civilian government with opposition participation? Should he finally agree to crack down?

Communicating on a special secure



telephone line, Sullivan relayed the question to State, where aides thought the ambassador sounded "frantic." As he had several times before, Sullivan urged direct communications be made with Khomeini himself.

Advice for Carter

On the afternoon of Dec. 28, Vance, now immersed in the Iranian situation, went to see Carter at Camp David, where the president was spending a few days in retreat.

Vance found that even as the shah's strength was declining, Carter's support for him was increasing. Brzezinski had continued to present a compelling case.

Even if the shah was going to fall, Brzezinski argued, it was important to show the world that the United States stood by its friends in deep crises. Only by maintaining unwavering support for the shah, Vance was told, could the United States assure the Saudi Arabian leaders that it would not desert them if a crisis arose. Already feeling threatened by the Soviet Union and perhaps by internal unrest as well, the Saudis had privately hinted that they were rethinking their position toward the United States. Intelligence reports indicated that Moscow was about to portray the Camp David accords as anti-Arab, hoping thereby to entice the Saudis into a better relationship.

Indeed, the reasoning went, if the United States was perceived as having sold out the shah, the continuing Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations might be undermined as well. How could

Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin take pledges of support from Carter at face value if the United States dropped the shah?


Brzezinski had a new line of argument as well. Bolstered by a study by Schlesinger, he maintained that the potential loss of Iranian oil under a hostile regime would have dramatic impact on Europe, Japan and Israel. Under the Camp David agreement, Israel was being asked to give up the oil fields in the Sinai, so the Iranian source (50 percent of Israel's oil) was even more significant. It could scuttle a Middle East peace accord. Schlesinger also had urged that the shah be told to unleash his military.

Vance reiterated the arguments he had mastered in the last month. Unless America acts quickly, he told the president, it would have no voice in the future of Iran, for it was not the shah but Khomeini who was now the dominant force. Iranian oil production had been cut substantially because of earlier labor unrest, and new strikes were looming. Israel was already looking for new sources of oil and could sign a supply contract with Mexico.

The shah, Vance said, must be encouraged to abdicate. If he refused, he should be told to leave the country and let things quiet down. It could be called a vacation, Vance said.

Carter told Vance, as he had told Ball less than two weeks earlier, that he did not want to tell another world leader to abdicate. Vance said the shah seemed to be begging for advice, and that the British were about to tell him to take a vacation. At a minimum, the United States should not block that effort.

Carter finally agreed. The shah would be encouraged to bring moderate opposition leaders into his government and give them real power over domestic affairs. If the shah asked again, he should be told that the United States had "no objection" to his leaving Iran. Carter was not yet ready to approve direct contact with Khomeini, however. The president said he wanted to know that the shah agreed too.



Sharing Power

In Tehran, after Sullivan received these new instructions, he cabled back almost immediately, saying that the shah was considering the appointment of a moderate opposition member, Shahpour Bakhtiar, as prime minister, and that the shah agreed that the United States should probably establish contact with Khomeini.

Bakhtiar's selection reassured the White House. He was described as a slightly right-of-center opposition lead-

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er. A junior officer in the Mossadegh administration 25 years before, Bakhtiar was portrayed in the CIA's intelligence memorandum as "another advocate of an activist policy... something of a loner... close ties to the workers and the students... a rough and blunt man with considerable political shrewdness and ambition."

Bakhtiar, "although an avowed socialist, is usually associated with the right wing of the National Front," the CIA reported. This faction would "probably favor a compromise settlement and might participate in elections."

The White House optimism overlooked the CIA's month-old estimate that the National Front, because of divisions and quarrels, would probably "be unable to produce an effective administration and a realistic government program."

On the other hand, the CIA had missed some calls, too. It incorrectly predicted that Bakhtiar would be one of those least likely to settle with the shah.

At the embassy in Tehran and in the State Department, there was much less enthusiasm for Bakhtiar because those analysts assumed he would fail, only postponing a U.S. reckoning with Khomeini. Sullivan and Precht thought the shah should be negotiating with Mehdi Bazargan, leader of the "Freedom Movement in Iran," whom the CIA dismissed as "a narrow-minded religious fanatic with a flare for demagogic rabble-rousing." Sullivan thought that Bazargan would probably be Khomeini's first prime minister once he took power (a prediction that proved accurate). Of those closest to Khomeini, Bazargan was the most likely to preserve a relationship with the United States.

Sullivan relayed Washington's official reaction to the shah and inquired about the proposed U.S. approach to Khomeini. The shah agreed that it was probably a good idea, particularly if the military was to be held together. The generals would need assurances about the future.

Vance, still at Camp David, took the question back to the president. Brzezinski was still opposing the idea, but Vance prevailed. Carter approved the mission to Khomeini.

Who should go to see the ayatollah? Vance's staff, thinking of Khomeini's background as a teacher of philosophy, wanted someone with stature as a scholar and preferably a strong Christian background. Ball's name was considered, but ultimately Vance chose a retired diplomat, Theodore Eliot, who had served in Iran, spoke fluent Farsi and understood the nuances of Shiite beliefs, and was an intellectual and a moralist.

Eliot came back to Washington for briefings on the mission. For a brief time, at the close of 1978, it seemed that the secretary of state had regained control over foreign policy toward Iran.


In Tehran, British Foreign Secretary Lord George Brown, a friend from the early days of the shah's reign, arrived secretly and told the shah he had to relinquish control of his country. He should leave for a two-month vacation, Brown said, to do otherwise would be to risk chaos. He had to give a new government time to succeed. Brown was warm but direct with his old friend. The shah, for the first time, agreed that he must leave Iran.

Later that day, the shah formally asked Bakhtiar to take over as prime minister and form a new civilian government.

Explaining to Sullivan that he had decided to leave the country, the shah, who had once given himself the title of "King of Kings," stopped at one point and asked: "Where will I go?"

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30 October 1980

U.S. Rejects Coup Options



Last of a series


By Scott Armstrong
Washington Post Staff Writer

On New Year's Eve 1978, Iranian Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi threw a party for the western reporters gathered in Tehran to cover events as they approached their climax in 1979. Zahedi toasted the prospects for the shah's new government formed by Shahpour Bakhtiar and said it was "ready to roll," stocked with such well-qualified people that the opposition forces would accept the new regime.

One year before, Jimmy Carter had raised a New Year's toast to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as an "island of stability." Now the shah was yielding authority to Bakhtiar and would leave the country for a while, in the hope that things would settle down and the revolutionary forces would be satisfied.

Zahedi was, nonetheless, already undermining the Bakhtiar regime by emphasizing the continuity of the shah's regime. Bakhtiar begged Ambassador William Sullivan not to weaken his chances further by a public U.S. endorsement. Sullivan forwarded the request to Washington but it was ignored. The next day, Bakhtiar received a public blessing from the White House.

For the American government, the new administration in Tehran offered fragile hopes and, once again, for President Carter, it brought a swirl of con-



flicting advice and increasingly limited choices.

Originally, Carter was told by his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, to stand by the shah to the bitter end. Brzezinski had been supported by the secretary of defense, the secretary of energy and a number of influential American friends of the shah.

But Carter's secretary of state, others in the State Department and some whose private counsel he had sought had argued that the United States must begin to establish relations with the political forces displacing the Peacock Throne, including even the aged ayatollah, Ruhollah Khomeini. According to Americans who had called on the ayatollah exiled in France, Khomeini might be willing to work out a peaceful transition.

The shah remained only as an important symbol. The underlying question, the one crucial goal left for American policy makers, was to make certain that the Iranian military remained intact and powerful, able to insure that the Iran of the future would continue with a pro-American outlook.

What was the best strategy for accomplishing that? To stand back and hope the Bakhtiar regime succeeded, without obvious help from America? Or should the United States put all of its hopes on Iranian generals who, after all, led forces equipped with the very best in American military hardware? With proper encouragement from Washington, could the generals still seize control of the troubled nation and enforce order, perhaps even restore the shah to power? Or should the generals be urged to begin negotiations with Khomeini on a peaceful solution?

The argument continued, in one form or another, through the first two fateful months of 1979. The entire world now knows the outcome. What is less well known is official Washington's lingering hopes for a different climate in which a friendly, cooperative government remained in power.

Nearly everyone in the foreign policy apparatus agreed that the 400,000-man military was the central element in guaranteeing a U.S. future in Iran, but even the military, once thought to be fiercely loyal to the shah, was becoming a question mark. Some leaders wanted Khomeini's blood, but others were thought to be making overtures to him.

As arrangements were being made for the shah to leave Iran and for Bakhtiar to take the reins of a new government, one general, air force chief Manuchehr Khosrowdad, asserted that once the shah left, the communists were sure to take over. He said that no figure from the old National Front, such as Bakhtiar, was acceptable as a leader. Khosrowdad spoke openly of plans for a "coup" to keep the shah in power.

Bakhtiar moved to make himself acceptable to the military, but was unable to persuade Gen. Fereydoun Jam to return from exile as defense minister. Talk of coups continued. Khosrowdad and Gen. Gholam Ali Oveissi wanted a push that would destroy all opposition to the shah. Gen. Hossein Rabii and some of the younger generals were prepared to let the shah go but they wanted to wipe out his opposition and leave Bakhtiar fully in charge. Some wanted the military to take full charge, and keep the shah as a figurehead.

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
Each scenario by the generals required U.S. support, and, one by one, the military high commanders turned to the United States for assurances. Meanwhile, throughout Iran troops were being restrained less and less in dealing with demonstrators.

Back in late December, Brzezinski had proposed that the USS Constellation with its 80 aircraft and 5,000 sailors and aviators be brought into the area to demonstrate a U.S. presence and commitment. The national security adviser was articulating his "arc of crisis" thesis on Islamic unrest which reversed an interagency analysis originated by the State Department. Even if the State Department argument was correct that the Soviets were not the cause of the domestic ferment in Islamic countries, the United States must still act to insure that Russia would not capitalize on it.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance argued that bringing forward the Constellation would simply reinforce the Soviet radio broadcasts to Iran that were predicting U.S. military intervention on behalf of the shah. Defense Secretary Harold Brown came down in the middle — the carrier would be useful for evacuating Americans from Iran if that was needed but he too appreciated the provocative nature of the gesture. In the end, Carter sent the Constellation to the western Pacific and held it near Singapore.

President Carter had other problems on his agenda, including political problems. Press Secretary Jody Powell prepared a memo noting that January was supposed to have been a month of triumphs, but complications with SALT negotiations and the new Israel-Egypt treaty and the shah's troubles were beginning to mar the image of progress. The commitment to the shah was being widely questioned, the course of events in Iran being read as weakness. Powell had no remedies to propose, but sent a copy to Brzezinski.

At the State Department, Vance and his deputies generally tried to block the more provocative suggestions coming from Brzezinski and the National Security Council, but usually they regarded Defense Secretary Brown as an ally in caution. Vance was surprised, therefore, when Brown took the initiative and proposed an entirely new approach of his own.



The United States needed to know more about the shah's military high command, Brown noted. So he recommended sending a general of our own to Tehran, one with sufficient rank to impress the Iranian top brass. Brown's specialist, Robert J. Murray, who is now undersecretary of the Navy, picked Gen. Robert (Dutch) Huyser, deputy commander to Gen. Alexander Haig in charge of U.S. forces in Europe. Huyser had been in Iran to coordinate joint NATO and Iranian defense plans. He knew the members of the Iranian military hierarchy personally, and Brown thought he could act as a consultant to the generals.

Haig objected strongly, saying that Huyser was not qualified for a political mission and threatening to resign if Huyser was sent. At the White House, Haig's objections were ignored. Haig was to retire shortly anyway, and his frequent criticism of the Carter administration was finding its way into the press regularly.

Brown told the president that he should put aside an earlier idea of sending a Cabinet-level envoy to bolster the shah; if anyone went, it should be Huyser. Carter approved the choice.

After instructions were brokered back and forth among departments, the general was told to assess the situation in Iran and make two requests of the shah's high command: Above all else, it should hang together; and, if at all possible, it should avoid a "military solution" and negotiate with the shah's opposition.

Huyser arrived in Tehran on Jan. 3. Almost immediately, he found that seven Iranian generals were set to take over the government as soon as the shah left. He met with all seven individually and then as a group. They expressed fear that Bakhtiar would not be strong enough to protect their interests and, in the face of more violent opposition, their lives. They planned to restore order.

Huyser argued that the only way the military could remain intact was to support Bakhtiar. The United States would stand by the generals, he said, only if they stood by Bakhtiar. They had no choice.

Several of the generals — Oveissi, Khosrowdad and Rabii — were difficult to dissuade. They had no faith in Bakhtiar; he would accommodate the opposition at their expense. They felt that only the military could block an eventual communist takeover. The military, they said, was prepared to wipe out the opposition leadership and, if necessary, to kill 100,000 Iranians.

They would not need Bakhtiar, they could put the shah back in power, if they chose, or run the country themselves. What they needed, they told Huyser, was the support of the United States.


Huyser was convinced the Iranian generals were afraid that a new regime would initiate investigations into corruption. Like many officials close to the shah, they had prospered handsomely under him. Huyser told them they would be allowed to leave the country if they chose, but that the United States was not ready to support military action. He warned that if they did act, they would be on their own. To avoid the turmoil that could lead to the dreaded communist takeover, they must support Bakhtiar.

Huyser stayed at Sullivan's embassy residence while in Iran. Unhappy with his assignment and receiving death threats almost every day, the general remained cloistered with Sullivan most evenings, arguing about the strength of the Iranian military.

Huyser was persuaded that the generals were powerful and could be kept together in charge of a unified force. But Sullivan was skeptical. He said that the military was on the verge of collapse, and that ordinary Iranian troops would probably not respond to commands to shoot their countrymen.

Each evening, after dining with Sullivan, Huyser called Washington, where it was still afternoon, and spoke to Defense Secretary Brown or the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David Jones. He reported that the shah's command structure was intact, that it could reasonably rely on 80 percent of the troops for support, and that if the generals were unleashed they could crush the opposition.

INT-INT



Since no one knew how Khomeini viewed the Iranian military, Vance authorized Paris embassy officer Warren Zimmerman to renew his secret contact with Khomeini's de facto chief of staff, Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi. So volatile was the struggle for influence around Khomeini that Yazdi insisted Zimmerman meet him secretly at an inn away from Khomeini headquarters. Each time Zimmerman contacted Yazdi, he used a pre-arranged signal, identifying himself as a reporter named Shoemaker (his mother's maiden name).

In a series of seven conversations, Zimmerman posed questions to Yazdi, who relayed what he said was Khomeini's answer in their next meeting: Khomeini would sell oil to any buyer at the "just" price, Yazdi reported. He would allow U.S. investment, although he would be antagonistic toward the United States. But he would be even more antagonistic to the "atheistic" and "anti-religious" Soviets.

Yazdi had unsettling news. While Khomeini knew little about the Iranian military leadership, he was extremely hostile toward it.

The Shah Departs

On Jan. 16, 1979, the shah left Iran. There were massive demonstrations

and dancing in the streets of Iranian cities. Originally planning to go to the United States, where he was to reside at the estate of Walter Annenberg in Palm Springs, Calif., the shah's flight was re-routed to Aswan, Egypt, where President Anwar Sadat had invited him for a stopover.

Faced with continuing chaos in Iran, Vance and Brzezinski finally agreed on something — the United States should maneuver to keep the shah in Egypt. Vance felt that the shah's presence in the United States would intensify anti-American feeling in Iran and serve to further damage the Bakhtiar government.

Brzezinski, however, felt the shah was still the key to rallying the Iranian military and that it was best for him to be nearby when the time came.

Indeed, Vance and Brzezinski were still offering the president fundamentally different ideas about what the future looked like in Iran. Brzezinski emphasized, as he had in the past, the threat of a communist takeover if Khomeini's religious fanatics should attain power. Vance, in contrast, argued that despite increasing concern over leftist radicals in neighborhood and worker organizations, Khomeini himself was staunchly anti-communist. The ayatollah might provide the best bulwark against a communist regime, even the possibility of cooperation with Washington.


Even after the shah's departure, Brzezinski's staff continued to discuss the possibilities for military action to keep the Khomeini forces from taking power. They had been in touch with Iranian generals who only awaited a favorable signal in order to launch a takeover of the government.

On Jan. 17, the day after the shah left Tehran, Capt. Gary Sick, Brzezinski's specialist on Iran, summoned State Department and CIA aides who had recently returned from Iran to the White House to see whether any of the various ideas for coups had any chance of success.

Brzezinski's aides were not prepared for the response they got. Support for the shah did not exist in Iran, they were told. In all probability, it would never exist. The key to weakening Khomeini's grip on the country was to let him take power. The populace would then learn that Iran's problems were not so easily solved. In the meantime, it made no sense to install or support a provisional government — no one who might be able to lead Iran would seriously attempt to take power without backing from Khomeini. The country was his.

The United States, these analysts believed, should concentrate now on cultivating moderate Islamic clergy, such as Ayatollah-Sayed Kazem Shariatmadri, and other middle-of-the-road elements in Iran, looking toward a coalition of military, social democrats, moderate clergy, and supporters of the shah that would counter the more extreme groups surrounding Khomeini. This would take time, they added, because reliable links with these groups had been lost in the years that the CIA had depended on the shah's SAVAK for intelligence on Iranian dissent.

When Khomeini ran into trouble, this coalition of moderates could form the nucleus for a future government friendly to America. In addition, once the shah was gone, there was the potential for considerable internal strife from the various ethnic and regional groups, with whom the United States



had lost contact during its years of close identity with the shah.

Meanwhile, Harold Brown at the Pentagon had a new idea to offer his personal representative, Gen. Huyser, who was pleading for permission to leave the country because of the death threats against him. Brown thought that restoring order in the southwestern oil fields was a priority and he proposed that Huyser organize a military takeover of the oil fields. With strikes in every sector of the economy from the civil service to the oil fields, Bakhtiar was presiding over a frozen society, his credibility rapidly evaporating. If the generals could get things running again, it would strengthen confidence in the regime.

Huyser tried to persuade the generals to proceed with Brown's mission, even if it meant putting troops at work on oil wells, but he couldn't get agreement. As soon as Huyser convinced one general, another would back off and insist on an alternative project.

Philip Gast, head of the U.S. military assistance group in Tehran, arranged a meeting with Medhi Bazargan, a member of the National Front who was close to Khomeini, and asked him for help in ending the strikes. Bazargan was unsympathetic.

Meanwhile, Gen. Haig continued to advise the Joint Chiefs at the Pentagon that the military should be pushed into action, with or without Bakhtiar. If the military did not move soon, before Khomeini's return, it would be too late. Secretary Brown again queried his man in the field: was now the time for a military takeover?

But Huyser was beginning to change his mind about the Iranian generals, having failed to get effective help on the oil fields. The military, he reported, had the power to take over the country — but not the governmental expertise to run it. It would be better to back Bakhtiar. He was propping up the generals more than the other way around.

Khomeini Acclaimed

On Jan. 31, Ayatollah Khomeini arrived triumphantly in Tehran, greeted by tumultuous demonstrations.

After a final effort to insure the military's loyalty to the shaky government, Huyser finally got permission to return home.

Events began escalating out of control. Sullivan cabled that the fall of Bakhtiar was imminent.

At State, they worried what to say publicly. Bakhtiar was no longer viable, but to say so would precipitate his immediate fall. Huyser was briefing President Carter, Brown and Vance, insisting the military command was still intact and ready to put down demonstrations if Bakhtiar gave the orders. But elsewhere in government, sources were telling reporters that the regime was doomed.

When that story appeared on the evening news, Jody Powell promptly denied it. The president does not believe the Bakhtiar government will fall, Powell told CBS.

From the White House viewpoint, it was another instance of leaks making policy. Once the word was out to the press, the administration had to live with the results, whether the president liked it or not.

Carter told his appointments secretary to get a list from Brzezinski of the top State Department people and have them at the White House the next morning. Sixteen top-level officials appeared in the Cabinet Room the next day.

After praising Vance, Carter turned to his real concern. Leaks. He could no longer let those who had lost the policy arguments carry on their battles in the press, the president told them.

"This leaking has got to stop and what I am going to do is this," Carter said. "If there are any leaks out of your area, whatever the area may be, I am going to fire you. Whether or not that's fair, and I can see where some of you might not think it fair, this has just got to stop. So, Leaks from your area, regardless who's at fault, and you're fired."

Leader Appointed


Later that same day, in Tehran, Ayatollah Khomeini appointed a prime minister for his provisional revolutionary government. It was Bazargan (as Sullivan had earlier predicted). Gen. Rabii, reminding everyone that the military did not wish to be left out of the final arrangement of power, had helicopters and aircraft flying over Tehran.

Bazargan recognized that he must establish authority over the military and he began meeting with some of the generals. Gen. Jam, whom Bakhtiar had failed to entice into his government, was offered a cabinet post. Gen. Gharabaghi talked with the revolutionary prime minister, then went to see the failing one, Bakhtiar. The general said the military's only hope of acting cohesively was to shift allegiance to Bazargan.

Bakhtiar now turned to Sullivan for advice. So the ambassador cabled Washington for instructions, proposing that he tell the fading prime minister to begin the peaceful transition to the new regime.

But the word came back: stay with Bakhtiar, tell Gharabaghi to withdraw his resignation, the United States still supports the shah's prime minister.

Three days later, a group of air force officers and enlisted men mutinied, took control of some tanks and attacked the headquarters of Bakhtiar's armed forces. Nineteen American military advisers were trapped inside. They were freed at 5 a.m. the next morning, only after Bazargan and Yazdi personally arrived to rescue them.



Gen. Rabii was preparing to launch a coup and take control of the government in the name of the military. Sullivan got a call from Washington that night, relaying a message from Brzezinski. Would a military coup succeed? Could they hold power against the revolution?

The ambassador responded with an unprintable expletive and asked: do you want me to translate that into Polish?

With no clear lines of authority, no reliable estimate of whose troops were loyal and whose had joined the revolution, Rabii and the others quickly declared their neutrality after only mild resistance. Most were arrested. The revolution had won.

Two days later, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was overrun by supporters of Khomeini. Again only personal intervention by Yazdi freed the Americans.

On Feb. 27, Sullivan sent a cable to Washington saying that the embassy could no longer be protected, that anti-American sentiment was at a fever pitch. At least four of the most experienced Foreign Service officers stationed in Iran wrote memos saying that, considering the risk of attack, there were too many people stationed at the embassy. One suggested that the staff be reduced to six officers and a vicious dog.

The embassy staff was reduced to 40 or so, though it later grew again in size. On Nov. 4, 1979, revolutionaries, heeding a plea from Khomeini to rid the country of U.S. influence, overran the embassy and took hostage all of the Americans inside. Fifty-two of them are still there.

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POLITICS - 1980

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
29 October 1980

OPINION AND COMMENTARY

From the media

Why they endorse REAGAN

President Carter came to Washington as an outsider finding fault with everyone and everything, tilting against the established insiders, and asking: Why Not the Best?

Why not, indeed? But what, in fact did we get?

Only Carter's palace guard of zealous Georgians remains unchanged and unfazed by four years of failures and fiascos.

For some, the indiscretions have been such that even close friendship with Carter could not save them.

Bert Lance, Carter's choice for the key Office of Management and Budget, was an early victim of his own irregular banking practices.

Dr. Peter Bourne, Carter's White House doctor, quit before a special prosecutor could probe why, and for whom, he was writing phony drug prescriptions.

Hamilton Jordan, after unacceptable social conduct at diplomatic dinners and in a Washington bar, survived a special investigation of alleged drug use. But Tim Kraft a key political adviser, was forced to quit the current campaign and is now being investigated because of similar allegations.

On the great issues — defense, foreign policy and the economy — Reagan would be a better President because he has better advisers.

The real point is that Reagan would run a real Cabinet. The Secretary of State would be exactly that: the National Security Council chief would not try to trump him regularly as Zbigniew Brzezinski now trumps Secretary of State Muskie, and before him Vance. The CIA and our other intelligence agencies would be given back their true role in intelligence so that we are no longer constantly surprised by events.

— New York Post

EXCERPTED

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 12-13

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
28 October 1980

THE CANDIDATES ON THE ISSUES :

#3 DEFENSE

Intelligence
agencies

CARTER

Jimmy Carter in 1976 promised reforms in the intelligence agencies. As President, he did reorganize the agencies and placed curbs on covert activities, electronic counterespionage, and surveillance of American citizens and resident aliens.

Among positions taken by either the President or his director of Central Intelligence, Adm. Stansfield Turner, regarding still-pending legislation for an intelligence "charter" are: that the charter should give the intelligence community greater leeway, rather than less, to conduct its operations; that congressional oversight continue to be restricted to two committees; that "prior notification" to Congress on covert activities is "excessive intrusion" into a president's conduct of foreign affairs; that the president not be required to approve all covert operations personally; that the CIA be exempted from most requirements of the Freedom of Information Act; that the CIA not be barred from using the news media, the clergy, or academic institutions as "cover" for intelligence operations; and that anyone — not just present or former government employees — be subject to criminal penalties for disclosing the names of purported "covert agents."

REAGAN

The Republican platform states: "A Republican administration will seek to improve US intelligence capabilities for technical and clandestine collection, cogent analysis, coordinated counterintelligence, and covert action. . . . re-establish the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, abolished by the Carter administration, as a permanent nonpartisan body of distinguished Americans to perform a constant audit of national intelligence research and performance. . . . undertake an urgent effort to rebuild the intelligence agencies. . . . support legislation to invoke criminal sanctions against anyone who discloses the identities of US intelligence officers abroad or who makes unauthorized disclosures of US intelligence sources and methods. . . . provide our government with the capability to help influence international events vital to our national security interests. . . ." and "seek adequate safeguards to ensure that past abuses will not recur," while seeking "the repeal of ill-considered restrictions sponsored by Democrats, which have debilitated US intelligence capabilities while easing the intelligence collection and subversion efforts of our adversaries."

CONTINUED

ANDERSON

"The work of the intelligence agencies is a significant and necessary part of America's efforts to live securely and peacefully in the world," the Anderson platform says.

Anderson "strongly supports" congressional oversight, but would reduce the number of committees to which agencies must report. "Congress should receive prior notification of all significant covert intelligence operations, and the principle of congressional access to intelligence agency information and material must be firmly established.

"Covert operations should be undertaken only for compelling reasons, and we will support legislation that prohibits assassination in peacetime and other practices that are repugnant to our democratic traditions."

Anderson also would ban covert use of American journalists, academicians, clergy, and Peace Corps volunteers. And he would "consider" seeking legislation providing criminal penalties against those who, "using secrets learned while employed in an intelligence agency, endanger lives by revealing an agent's identity." However, punishing writers who have not been intelligence agency employees would violate the First Amendment, he says.

ARTICLE 15
ON PAGE 15U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
3 November 1980

Tomorrow.

A LOOK AHEAD FROM THE NATION'S CAPITAL

Newsgram

2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Jockeying for top slots in a Reagan administration is heating up--assuming that Republicans will pull off a victory in the seesaw presidential campaign. Inside the GOP camp, this is the way the cabinet talk is going . . .

State--George Shultz, former Treasury Secretary who has gained wide international experience as president of the Bechtel Group. An outside possibility, Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), would take some persuading.

Henry Kissinger? More likely to be on call for special assignments.

Defense--Gen. Alexander Haig, former Allied commander in Europe, now president of United Technologies Corporation. Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), if Reagan needs a bipartisan touch. Jackson has turned down the job twice.

Treasury--Charles Walker, former deputy secretary. William Simon, Ford's Treasury Secretary, wants something different, like Defense. Alan Greenspan, ex-chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, could end up Treasury chief.

Justice--William French Smith, Reagan's attorney, or Caspar Weinberger, veteran of GOP cabinets. Long shots: California Justice William Clark, or Ed Meese, if he does not move into the White House as chief of staff.

Commerce--Bill Brock, Republican national chairman, or Anne Armstrong, if she does not go to the United Nations as Ambassador.

Labor--Thomas Sowell, U.C.L.A. economist. Betty Murphy, former chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, also is being pushed for the spot.

Housing and Urban Development--Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.) or Representative Thomas Evans (R-Del.).

Health and Human Services--Robert Carleson, who ran California's welfare program, or Schweiker. Search is on for a black to add to the list.

Transportation--Drew Lewis of Philadelphia, a key campaign aide, or Evans.

Interior--Senator Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.) or almost anyone he pushes.

Agriculture--Governor Robert Ray of Iowa, if he would take it.

Energy--Representative Dave Stockman (R-Mich.), to keep agency in check.

Education--No candidate yet for another department Reagan wants abolished.

Top White House jobs will go to campaign aides: Richard V. Allen, national-security adviser; Martin Anderson, domestic-affairs adviser. William Casey, the campaign chairman, is slated to head Central Intelligence Agency.

CONTINUED

Note that most of those on the tentative Reagan list have had years of experience in government. That's important to a President who plans to delegate authority, make cabinet officers real centers of policymaking power.

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Presidential Candidate Briefings

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NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
7 October 1980

Andy finds nothing new in briefing on Mideast

Chicago (AP)—Independent presidential candidate John B. Anderson, after a CIA briefing on the fighting between Iran and Iraq, said he had heard nothing to alter his criticism of President Carter's foreign policies.

Anderson also said, on his arrival for a campaign visit today, that he learned nothing that could not be found reading the newspapers.

The independent candidate focused his attention today on a black-owned publishing company and other minority-oriented business firms.

Anderson and his running mate, Patrick J. Lucey, got the two-hour intelligence briefing yesterday from CIA Director Stansfield Turner.

The CIA briefing put Anderson on equal footing with Republican candidate Ronald Reagan, who consulted with Turner on the Iran-Iraq situation

Saturday along with Republican vice presidential nominee George Bush.

Anderson would not say what he had learned during his meeting with Turner and senior CIA officials, except that he and Lucey "felt it was appropriate that we get the latest information we could on these matters because from time to time, we are required to comment."

Anderson said the briefing covered general developments in the Middle East, the fighting between Iran and Iraq, and the continued presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

The candidates' trip to Chicago and Boston opens a full week of campaigning that also will take him to Connecticut and New York. In New York City, he'll attend a dinner given by the state's Liberal Party, which has endorsed him for President.

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NEW YORK TIMES
6 OCTOBER 1980

Anderson Says Briefing Has Not Changed Criticism

LANGLEY, Va., Oct. 5 (UPI) — John B. Anderson was briefed today by the Central Intelligence Agency on the Iran-Iraq war and other Middle East matters. Later, the independent Presidential candidate said that the information had not changed his criticisms of President Carter's foreign policy.

Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, briefed Mr. Anderson and his running mate, Patrick J. Lucey, at the agency's headquarters.

The meeting came a day after Ronald Reagan and his running mate on the Republican ticket, George Bush, received a similar briefing.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A6THE WASHINGTON POST
5 October 1980

CIA Briefs Reagan, Bush

MIDDLEBURG, Va., Oct. 4 (UPI) — Ronald Reagan and his running mate, George Bush, got their first CIA briefing today, which focused on the Iran-Iraq war. Bush said he would not use the information to criticize President Carter.

Reagan did not comment on the session, which was lead by CIA Director Stansfield Turner.

But Bush, who was head of the CIA under President Ford, spoke with reporters afterward.

"There's plenty of room for criticism on foreign policy and I will continue to be a strong critic," he said. "But please, this was not the purpose of this meeting just to get information so we could go charging out to launch an attack."

He said policy matters were not discussed.

"We simply received from them, in the best tradition of the intelligence service, thorough intelligence briefings," he said. "So it's been a good morning and I feel much better informed about the world. I can't tell you I feel more optimistic about it."

Bush said the meeting emphasized Iran, including its war with Iraq, and touched on Afghanistan as well.

He said he did not expect to reap

any political benefits from the session and vowed that no security leaks would come from the GOP team.

"I will not be guilty of that," he said. "I know Governor Reagan will not be guilty of that."

Reagan announced last week that he would accept an intelligence briefing on the war. Before that, he had declined all such offers because, as his press secretary, Lyn Nofziger, put it: "We don't want to get mouse-trapped by the administration."

Nofziger said Reagan might find himself forced into silence about something discussed in a briefing when he could have gotten the information elsewhere and used it.

But Reagan said he decided he needed briefings on the Iran-Iraq war "because of the current delicate world situation and the threat to worldwide peace and stability the conflict poses."

He said he was "determined to do and say nothing to exacerbate the situation or hurt in any way our effort to bring about a satisfactory ending to the fighting."

Earlier today, Reagan met with former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger, former NATO chief Alexander M. Haig and retired Adm. Thomas Moorer, plus his own foreign policy advisers.

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BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE
5 October 1980

Administration intelligence officers brief Reagan, Bush on Iran-Iraq war

Associated Press

MIDDLEBURG, Va. — Carter Administration intelligence officials gave Republican presidential nominee Ronald Reagan and running mate George Bush a briefing yesterday on recent developments in the war between Iran and Iraq.

Bush called the discussion "pure intelligence" and said that neither he nor Reagan intended to use the information "as ammunition to criticize President Carter."

CIA director Stansfield Turner and other top intelligence officials spent more than two hours with the candidates at Reagan's rented estate in northern Virginia.

Bush, who headed the CIA during the Administration of former President Gerald R. Ford, said that he was impressed with the information, but that it did not change his general view of the situation in the Mideast nor would it cause him to stop criticizing President Jimmy Carter's general handling of foreign policy.

"I feel better informed about the world. I can't tell you I feel more optimistic about it," said Bush, who spoke to reporters waiting outside.

Bush said that he and Reagan asked several questions about the US hostages in Iran but that there was little discussion on this subject.

Reagan declined to discuss the briefing with reporters, although as he walked Bush to a helicopter. Reagan characterized the session as "most interesting."

"We're just getting information we didn't have before," Reagan said.

Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, who occasionally advises Reagan on foreign policy, questioned the importance of the briefing.

Kissinger did not attend the briefing, but conferred with Reagan and Bush earlier in the day in a session that also included retired Gen. Alexander Haig, former commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Adm. Thomas Moorer, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
5 October 1980

CIA Briefs Reagan on Middle East Crisis

By RICHARD BERGHOLZ

Times Political Writer

MIDDLEBURG, Va.—Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan got his first briefing from the Central Intelligence Agency Saturday—but only on the Middle East crisis.

Until now, the former California governor has steadfastly refused to accept President Carter's offer of a CIA briefing, contending that his own sources of information are adequate for campaign purposes.

But after the Iran-Iraq war broke out, Reagan decided to accept the offer, insisting that the briefing be limited to the Middle East, because he did not want to be inhibited in his future attacks on Carter by any unnecessary access to classified information.

Session 'Most Interesting'

When the two-hour session ended at his leased estate near here, Reagan called it "most interesting."

For more than an hour before the briefing began, Reagan was closeted with some of his defense and foreign policy advisers—former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, former White House chief of staff and NATO commander Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., and the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer.

Reagan then was accompanied into the briefing—conducted by the CIA director, Adm. Stansfield

Turner, and his aides—by his running mate, George Bush, CIA director four years ago, gave Carter his briefing as the then-Democratic presidential nominee.

Bush told reporters that Reagan's briefing covered the Iran-Iraq fighting and touched briefly on conditions in Afghanistan and on the U.S. hostages held in Iran.

Feel Better Informed

"It was a professional, non-policy briefing," Bush said, "and we do feel better informed."

Reagan has been sharply critical of Carter's handling of foreign policy matters, particularly in the Middle East. The Republican candidate was a strong admirer of the late Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and has attacked Carter for not using U.S. force or influence to assist the shah's regime against the revolution in Iran. He has charged that the fighting between Iran and Iraq would not have started if the shah had been in power.

But Bush, whose background as CIA director has not been emphasized much in the Reagan-Bush campaign, told reporters after the briefing that "it was not our purpose to get information with which to attack President Carter."

"We are not going to sally forth from here to launch an attack on the President. Our purpose was to understand force levels in the area, what some of the best minds in the

intelligence community feel is happening in the war."

Bush said he was impressed with the professionalism of the briefing officers and said "we feel uninhibited" by the briefing.

Under usual CIA briefing procedures, each recipient is required to "sign off" or acknowledge receipt of the individual facts given them. These acknowledgements go into intelligence files so authorities have a record of what was and wasn't given to those briefed.

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RW

ANDERSON

WASHINGTON (AP) - INDEPENDENT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE JOHN B. ANDERSON AND HIS RUNNING-MATE, PATRICK J. LUCEY, GOT A TWO-HOUR INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING SUNDAY ON THE FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ FROM CIA DIRECTOR STANSFIELD TURNER.

THE CLASSIFIED BRIEFING, IF NOTHING ELSE, GAVE THE APPEARANCE, IF NOT THE REALITY, OF EQUAL STANDING WITH MAJOR PARTY RIVALS RONALD REAGN AND PRESIDENT CARTER.

REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE REAGN AND HIS VICE PRESIDENTIAL CHOICE, GEORGE BUSH, RECEIVED A SIMILAR BRIEFING SATURDAY FROM TURNER.

ANDERSON DECLINED TO SAY WHAT HE LEARNED DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH TURNER AND SENIOR CIA OFFICIALS, EXCEPT TO SAY THAT HE AND LUCEY "FELT IT WAS APPROPRIATE THAT WE GET THE LATEST INFORMATION WE COULD ON THESE MATTERS BECAUSE FROM TIME TO TIME, WE ARE REQUIRED TO COMMENT."

ANDERSON SAID THE BRIEFING COVERED THE GENERAL U.S. ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE FIGHTING IN IRAN AND IRAQ, PLUS INFORMATION ON THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN.

DURING HIS INDEPENDENT PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, ANDERSON HAS BEEN SHARPLY CRITICAL OF CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICIES. ASKED IF HE LEARNED ANYTHING DURING THE BRIEFING TO EASE THE LEVEL OF THAT CRITICISM, ANDERSON SAID NO.

ON MONDAY, ANDERSON BEGINS A FULL WEEK OF CAMPAIGNING THROUGH ILLINOIS, MASSACHUSETTS, CONNECTICUT AND NEW YORK, ENDING WITH A LIBERAL PARTY DINNER IN NEW YORK CITY.

THE LIBERAL PARTY IN NEW YORK HAS ENDORSED ANDERSON FOR PRESIDENT, COMPLICATING CARTER'S RE-ELECTION CHANCES THERE AND GIVING A CURRENT LEAD IN PUBLIC OPINION POLLS IN THE STATE.

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CIA OPERATIONS CENTER

NEWS SERVICE

Date: 4 October 1981

Item No. 3

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DISTRIBUTION II

7AM-REAGAN:500

7REAGAN AND BUSH BRIEFED ON MIDEAST

7BY TOM RAUN

7ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

MIDDLEBURG, Va. (AP) - CARTER ADMINISTRATION INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS GAVE REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE RONALD REAGAN AND RUNNING MATE GEORGE BUSH A BRIEFING SATURDAY ON THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.

BUSH CALLED THE DISCUSSION "PURE INTELLIGENCE" AND SAID THAT NEITHER HE NOR REAGAN INTENDED TO USE THE INFORMATION "AS AMMUNITION TO CRITICIZE PRESIDENT CARTER."

CIA DIRECTOR STANFELD TURNER AND OTHER TOP INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS SPENT MORE THAN TWO HOURS WITH THE GOP CANDIDATES AT REAGAN'S RENTED ESTATE IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

BUSH, WHO HEADED THE CIA HIMSELF DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF FORMER PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD, SAID HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE INFORMATION THAT WAS RECEIVED AT THE PRIVATE BRIEFING. BUT BUSH ALSO SAID IT DID NOT CHANGE HIS GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST NOR WOULD IT CAUSE HIM TO STOP CRITICIZING CARTER'S GENERAL HANDLING OF FOREIGN POLICY OVER THE LAST 3 1/2 YEARS.

"I FEEL BETTER INFORMED ABOUT THE WORLD. I CAN'T TELL YOU I FEEL MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT IT," SAID BUSH, WHO SPOKE TO REPORTERS WAITING OUTSIDE.

THE VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SAID HE AND REAGAN ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE U.S. HOSTAGES IN IRAN BUT THERE WAS LITTLE DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT.

REAGAN DECLINED TO DISCUSS THE BRIEFING WITH REPORTERS, ALTHOUGH AS HE WALKED BUSH TO A HELICOPTER, REAGAN CHARACTERIZED THE SESSION AS "MOST INTERESTING."

"WE'RE JUST GETTING INFORMATION WE DIDN'T HAVE BEFORE," HE SAID. WHILE BUSH GENERALLY PRAISED THE QUALITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER, AN OCCASIONAL REAGAN FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER, QUESTIONED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BRIEFING IN LIGHT OF WHAT HE SUGGESTED WAS THE POOR STATE OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE.

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"THE VALUE OF THE BRIEFING CAN OBVIOUSLY BE NO BETTER THAN OUR OVERALL INTELLIGENCE," KISSINGER SAID. "BUT SINCE THAT'S THE BEST INFORMATION THAT'S AVAILABLE TO OUR SENIOR OFFICIALS; THAT'S THE BEST WE CAN DO."

KISSINGER DID NOT ATTEND THE CIA BRIEFING; BUT CONFERRED WITH REAGAN AND BUSH EARLIER IN THE DAY IN A SESSION THAT ALSO INCLUDED RETIRED GEN. ALEXANDER HAIG; FORMER COMMANDER OF NATO; AND ADM. THOMAS MOORER; FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

SAYING "WE OBVIOUSLY HAVE AN INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM," KISSINGER SUGGESTED THE CIA DID NOT EVEN KNOW IN ADVANCE THAT AN IRAQI ATTACK ON IRAN WAS IMMINENT.

REAGAN HAS SUGGESTED IN THE PAST THE WAR WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED HAD THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION DONE MORE TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE LATE SHAH MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI; WHO WAS OVERTHROWN IN THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION OF EARLY 1979.

KISSINGER SAID THE BRIEFING WOULD BE USEFUL IN HELPING REAGAN "TO KNOW WHICH AREAS OF SENSITIVITY HE SHOULD AVOID IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND IT WILL KEEP HIM FROM MAKING AN INADVERTENT MISTAKE."

FOR BUSH; THE SESSION MAY HAVE BROUGHT BACK RECOLLECTIONS OF A SIMILAR BRIEFING FOUR YEARS AGO. IT WAS THE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING THAT BUSH; THEN THE CIA DIRECTOR; GAVE DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE JIMMY CARTER.

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Middle East

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ARTICLE APPEARED
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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
13 October 1980

Washington Whispers

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The Central Intelligence Agency is under fire again—this time for its shortcomings in the Iraq-Iran war. The CIA, with its stress on high-technology spying, is said to have been caught short of people on the ground able to fathom Iraq's real intentions.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-1**NEW YORK TIMES
9 OCTOBER 1980

Iran Is Said to Be Receiving Arms And Medicines From North Korea

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 8— Iran, isolated internationally because of the crisis over the Americans held hostage there, has been able to buy military and medical supplies from North Korea in recent days to help in the conflict with Iraq, Secretary of the Treasury G. William Miller said today.

In a meeting with a few reporters, Mr. Miller said that Iran was using military cargo versions of the Boeing 747 to ferry ammunition, medical supplies and other equipment that it purchased from the North Korean Government.

Intelligence sources said that as of yesterday, three such 747 missions had been carried out. Iran's army has substantial amounts of Soviet and Chinese equipment, even though its primary supplier during the rule of the Shah was the United States.

Gulf States to Raise Oil Output

On another matter, Mr. Miller, who as Treasury Secretary is concerned with international shipping and commerce, said that in addition to Saudi Arabia, other Persian Gulf oil producers, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain, had agreed to increase production to make up for losses from Iran and Iraq.

He said that the increase would amount to about three million barrels a day, about the amount lost to the world market by the halt in Iranian and Iraqi exports. Kuwait, another producer, which borders on Iraq, has emptied oil from its storage facilities into waiting tankers and has not refilled them. The move was taken as a protective measure in case the war should spread to Kuwait's borders.

Kuwait was one of the Gulf states that

the United States said yesterday would be a candidate for American defensive help, such as benefiting from the Awacs radar-surveillance planes now based in Saudi Arabia. Kuwait today called on Iran and Iraq to end the fighting.

Meanwhile, both Egypt and Israel have informed the United States of their concern over the situation caused in the region by the Iraqi-Iranian fighting. Both Egypt and Israel have independently urged the United States to take a more active military role to insure that the Soviet Union does not take advantage of the situation, American officials said.

To underscore Israel's anxiety, Ephraim Evron, Israel's Ambassador to Washington, met successively today with Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser. Mr. Evron, according to Israeli diplomats, said that Israel was concerned that Iraq was escaping world condemnation for its "aggression" against Iran.

Iraq is regarded by Israel as one of its major enemies in the Arab world and Mr. Evron noted his country's apprehension over Jordan's support for Iraq in the conflict. He said Israel's concern was that a close alliance between Iraq and Jordan might evolve, putting additional pressure on Israel's security along its eastern borders.

As a result of the Iranian-Iraqi conflict, neither Egyptian nor Israeli diplomats in Washington have predicted progress when the negotiations on Palestinian self-rule resume here next Tuesday with Sol

M. Linowitz, President Carter's Middle East adviser, acting as an intermediary.

Muskie Said to Voice Concern

Israeli diplomats reported that Mr. Muskie said the United States had already expressed its concern to King Hussein of Jordan about his allowing his nation to become involved in the conflict.

The autonomy talks, which have been in a state of virtual suspension since July, have now been relegated to a secondary place in all sides' consideration, officials from the United States, Egypt and Israel said.

Israel, in particular, has little interest in concluding the talks because of the unsettled state of its security in the West Bank of the Jordan. As part of the projected agreement, Israel was supposed to reduce its military presence in the West Bank area that it seized from Jordan in 1967. But with the possibility that Iraq and Jordan might forge an alliance, Israel now sees the West Bank as an even more strategically crucial area, Israeli diplomats said.

From the start of the Iranian-Iraqi conflict, American officials have wondered how Iran was going to resupply its forces, since its regular supplies from the United States and Western Europe have been suspended as a result of the embargo imposed following the seizure of the American hostages last November.

Now, according to Mr. Miller, the Iranians have worked out a business deal with North Korea that may meet some, but not all, of Teheran's requirements. The North Koreans are not thought to be able to supply spare parts for Iran's American-built air force, but they could probably help out with a range of other equipment, intelligence officials said.

North Korea, a Communist country with a relatively independent foreign policy, has in recent years become active in the group of nations that profess to be nonaligned. American officials said that there seemed to be no particular ideological reason for North Korea to aid Iran. Rather, they said, the Pyongyang regime probably wants hard currency that Iran could supply.

Iran's President, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, said in an interview yesterday that a crash program had been started to scour the world to buy needed military supplies from sources not complying with the embargo imposed by the United States and its allies. He did not state where Iraq bought its supplies but said that it had to pay premium prices for them.

Mr. Bani-Sadr has said that Iran was hurt by being isolated internationally, but he has repeatedly accused the United States of being in collusion with Iraq. Mr. Miller said he hoped that Iran would finally decide to free the hostages to enable it to resume normal economic relations with the West.

ARTICLE APPEARED
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N. Korea, Syria Are Helping Iran, U.S. Sources Say

China Is Said to Let Iran Use Airspace; Jordan Troops Aren't Detected

By WALTER S. MOSSBERG
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON—Iran has been getting help in its war with Iraq from North Korea and Syria, according to U.S. intelligence sources.

In addition, these sources say, China has been aiding Iran indirectly by allowing Iranian planes to fly over Chinese airspace on their way to and from North Korea.

However, U.S. officials don't believe that Jordan is yet providing any troops or other military aid to Iraq, despite King Hussein's public promise to do so.

American intelligence has detected at least three flights of Iranian Boeing 747 jumbo jets to and from North Korea. The planes are believed to be bringing Iran medical supplies and ammunition for some Soviet-built artillery that Iran uses. Iran's arsenal is overwhelmingly of American manufacture, but some of its weapons are Soviet-made, and North Korea produces ammunition for that type of artillery.

The aid for Iran from Syria is believed to have taken two forms: medical care for wounded Iranian soldiers at Syrian hospitals and unspecified war supplies. According to U.S. officials, Iran used American-built C130 transport planes to deliver the casualties to Syria and then return with supplies.

Syrian Aid Cut Off

However, the aid from Syria was abruptly cut off Monday, officials say, when Turkey denied both Iran and Iraq the use of its airspace. Unless Iran's planes can fly over Turkey, they can't reach Syria without traversing hostile Arab airspace.

For North Korea, the aid to Iran is believed to offer the opportunity to earn badly needed hard currency. For Syria, which maintains a bitter feud with Iraq, aiding Iran is a way of striking at Iraq and shoring up Syrian President Assad's standing with fundamentalist Moslems, who revere Iran's clerical leader, Ayatollah Khomeini.

For China, helping Iran is aimed at preventing major Iraqi victories and a possible fragmentation of Iran that could lead to an expanded Soviet role in the region. Chinese assistance, even if indirect, also helps China's ally, Pakistan, which must count on help from a strong Iran to counter any move against its territory from Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

Pakistan itself was giving Iran military aid before the war, U.S. officials said, but has done little or nothing since the fighting began. Israeli and U.S. officials deny rumors that Israel, which considers Iraq a major enemy, has been helping Iran in any way.

On the Iraqi side, U.S. officials say neighboring Arab lands are continuing to offer aid, publicly and privately, but most help is indirect. Iraqi planes currently are believed to be using bases in Kuwait, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and, especially, North Yemen, as safe havens. But Saudi Arabia and Oman, which had harbored Iraq's planes initially, continue to bar them under U.S. pressure.

Supplies for Iraq

U.S. officials say supplies for Iraq do appear to be moving across the Jordanian border, and ships laden with Iraq-bound goods are unloading at Jordan's port of Aqaba, as Iraq's Persian Gulf ports have been closed by the war. The U.S. hasn't detected any troops or military equipment among the supplies entering Iraq from Jordan, but Israeli officials say Jordan is transshipping military supplies from Eastern European ships to Iraq.

The U.S. beefed up its military aid to Saudi Arabia, the Pentagon says, by sending the chief of American air defenses, Major Gen. John Piotrowski, to the oil kingdom. Gen. Piotrowski is said to be helping the Saudis integrate their own air defenses with the U.S. Airborne Warning and Command System planes and U.S. ground radar that President Carter sent to Iran earlier.

The general, who was the first Air Force officer to command AWACS planes in the U.S., also will consider what further aid for Saudi defenses may be necessary to protect Saudi oil fields from Iranian attack.

By sending its top air defense officer to aid the Saudis, the U.S. hopes to emphasize further its ability and readiness to defend moderate Arab oil states that are willing to heed American urgings to stay out of the war.

In Boston Tuesday, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher publicly said the U.S. is willing to provide such aid to nonbelligerents. But Pentagon officials said none of the countries in the area has asked for anything specific.

In the war itself, U.S. officials said Iraq appears to be massing armor for assault in a few days on the Iranian refinery city of Abadan, already badly hurt by Iraqi air and artillery attacks. The two countries continue to trade air strikes, with Iraq growing more active in recent days by using Soviet-built Tupolev bombers that had been stored in other Arab countries.

Although U.S. analysts say Iran continues to put up valiant air resistance, they continue to predict that a shortage of U.S.-made parts and fuel will, sooner or later, curtail Iran's air operations.

ARTICLE APPEARED
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9 OCTOBER 1980

U.S. JETS NEAR GULF IMPROVE WAR DATA

They Monitor Iran's Oil Area From
Over Saudi Arabia — Ground
Radar Station Is Opened

By **RICHARD HALLORAN**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 8 — United States radar planes flying above Saudi Arabia have enhanced American surveillance of large parts of the Iraq-Iran battlefield, including the besieged cities of Khurramshahr and Abadan, military analysts said today.

At the same time, officials here said that a United States ground radar station that was sent to improve Saudi air defenses went into operation today, completing the first phase of American military assistance to Saudi Arabia since the conflict between its neighbors began. A communications unit is also in operation, they said.

In addition, the top American specialist in air defense, Maj. Gen. John L. Piotrowski of the Air Force, started today to examine Saudi air defenses and to coordinate the operation of the American units with Saudi radar, communications and air defense units.

Officials here said that General Piotrowski was also studying what other American help the Saudis might need, including more aircraft, if they come under attack from Iran.

Deployments to Egypt Planned

In related developments, officials disclosed that 8 to 12 Air Force A-7 attack planes would accompany a 1,400-member Army Rapid Deployment Force to the Egyptian base at Ras Benas, across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia, next month.

The United States also plans to send a squadron of F-4 Phantoms or F-16 fighters to the Egyptian base at Cairo West this month in a training exercise similar to one just completed there by a squadron of Phantoms.

The first of the four Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft operating over Saudi Arabia arrived there on Oct. 1 and went into operation almost immediately. Three more of the planes, which are military versions of the Boeing 707 packed with electronic sensors and communications equipment, have since arrived at a Saudi base near Riyadh.

The planes, known as Awacs, fly an elliptical course close to the border with Kuwait in 10-hour shifts, providing 24-hour coverage. They communicate with an Air Force ground station in a Saudi operations center.

What Planes Can 'See'

The Awacs planes can "see" about 250 miles at low altitudes and up to 350 miles at high altitudes. They can spot aircraft flying low to elude ground radar as well as high-flying intruders. The Awacs planes can also track tanks, trucks and other vehicles and can monitor ships in the Persian Gulf.

Analysts here said that the operations of the Awacs had shown that they could monitor Iraqi and Iranian battle movements in an arc extending almost as far north as the Iranian city of Dizful and including the Iranian oilfields along the gulf coast and the oil terminal on Kharg Island.

An Awacs aloft transmits information to the Saudi operations center, where Saudi officers could use it to guide their fighters on air-defense missions. Officials here said that there had been several training missions with Saudi fighters but that there had been no hostile intrusions.

The officials said that care was being taken to insure that information from the Awacs planes did not fall into Iraqi hands because President Carter has asserted that the United States will remain neutral in the conflict.

Two Other Units in Operation

They said that the United States had received assurances from the Saudi Government that the information would not be given to the Iraqis. In addition, the officials said, the information was being screened and the Saudis were receiving only what was considered necessary for their defense.

Officials said that the Carter Administration plans to keep the planes on station as long as the conflict continues. They also said that the United States would offer similar help to other nonbelligerents in the region, but they emphasized that weapons would not be offered.

The ground radar station that went into operation today can spot aircraft about 200 miles away and determine their altitude and distance, officials said. It is placed so that its radar cone complements a similar Saudi unit, they said.

The officials said that the Air Force communications unit sent to Saudi Arabia enables all American units there to talk to each other, to talk to the fleet centered on two aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea and to communicate with American military headquarters in Europe.

With General Piotrowski's 20-member team, the number of American military people in Saudi Arabia rose to over 800, the officials said. About 400 were there before the conflict as advisers, engineers on projects and administrative people handling military sales. Since then, another 400 in flight crews, technicians, communications specialists and other support roles have arrived.

ARTICLE APPEARED
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9 OCTOBER 1980

Greater outside war role

New moves by U.S., N. Korea

From Inquirer Wire Services

Outside involvement in the Persian Gulf war increased yesterday with disclosures that the United States will supply surveillance information to friendly gulf nations and in 1983 will send Jordan tanks it has had on order and that North Korea is providing ammunition and medical supplies to Iran.

The State Department announced the offer of surveillance data in what it said was an effort to lessen the threat of air attacks resulting from the Iraq-Iran war.

The department said the data were being gathered by four airborne radar command planes sent to Saudi Arabia last week to protect that nation's oil fields and other installations from any surprise attack.

Treasury Secretary G. William Miller disclosed the North Korean help for Iran at a luncheon meeting with reporters. Miller said that Iran had made several flights of large 747 cargo planes to North Korea to pick up the supplies, but that he did not know how much assistance would be provided in the long run.

"How long it will last, how many flights, we don't know," Miller said.

Other U.S. officials familiar with the situation indicated puzzlement at North Korea's move to aid the Iranians in the continuing war.

One official, who asked not to be identified, said North Korea needs the money it can make from supplying the Iranians, but also wants the friendship of Iraq and other Arab countries. North Korea has hopes of playing a leading role among non-aligned nations, a group in which Iraq is prominent.

North Korea gets most of its arms from the Soviet Union and China, although it also manufactures some ammunition of its own, U.S. officials said.

Despite North Korean aid, Miller said spare parts and other essential equipment for the Iranian military are unavailable on the world market.

Iran's military strength is largely its air force, which consists of F-4, F-5 and F-14 jets obtained from the United States when Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was in power. The United States has not provided spare parts to the Iranians since the seizure of American hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran nearly a year ago. Parts for U.S.-built military equipment are extremely difficult to buy elsewhere on the world arms market, Miller said.

The U.S. planes in Saudi Arabia that are gathering the intelligence data have a surveillance range of 250 to 350 miles and can monitor much of the Persian Gulf region from Saudi Arabian or international airspace.

Their principal function, as described by U.S. officials, is to spot flights of attack planes heading for neutral countries in the region before they reach their targets.

In announcing the U.S. offer to share surveillance information with other countries not involved in the war, State Department spokesman John H. Trattner said the purpose was to help meet "legitimate defense needs" of friendly countries.

It was learned that the countries involved in the offer are Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Both Kuwait and the emirates are major oil producers. Oman is strategically situated — directly across the Strait of Hormuz from Iran.

Behind the decision to deploy the surveillance planes and support crews to Saudi Arabia was a concern within the Carter administration that Iran might launch a desperation attack against gulf oilfields if Iraq appeared at the point of victory.

Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher, in a speech Tuesday in Boston, said the administration is ready to supply aid to friendly governments that feel threatened by the war.

However, officials at the Pentagon and State Department said yesterday that no request for ground equipment has been received from any country in the region.

Meanwhile, the Carter administration is going through with plans to supply Jordan with 100 tanks with sophisticated targeting equipment, despite an apparent setback in U.S. efforts to encourage that country to maintain its neutrality in the Iraq-Iran war.

The State Department said delivery of the tanks, equipped with special thermal night-sighting devices, would begin in July 1983 and be completed within four months.

The disclosure came as Jordan continued to move toward closer identification with Iraq in the war now raging in the Persian Gulf area.

On Tuesday, the State Department made an appeal to Jordan to remain neutral, while emphasizing that there is no evidence Jordan is funneling arms to Iraq.

However, U.S. officials reported that a flotilla of merchant ships were being sent to the Jordanian southern port of Aqaba, with food, cement, radio batteries and possibly military gear. It was not clear, however, whether the shipments were bound for Jordanian markets or for Iraq. Nor has it been stated who sent the cargoes, though the registry of the ships is known to be eastern European, Indian and Lebanese.

In addition to the 100 tanks promised for 1983 delivery, the White House also is considering a request for 100 more M-60s.

Iraq has friendly relations with the Soviet Union, although that nation has proclaimed neutrality in the gulf war, and Hussein is due to visit Moscow in a few days.

WASH. POST
PAGE E-13

WASHINGTON POST
8 October 1980

JACK ANDERSON

U.S. Ill-Prepared for Gulf Showdown

The United States is woefully unprepared for a military showdown in the Persian Gulf region, where turbulence and instability threaten the free world's oil supply.

Locked in secret Pentagon files is dismaying evidence that the U.S. show-of-strength in the region is more show than strength. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have warned President Carter tersely that the Soviets possess "substantial advantages" in both strategic and conventional forces in the Middle East-Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area.

The Joint Chiefs called this the trouble spot of "greatest vulnerability" for the United States. In an urgent, top-secret report submitted shortly before the Iraqi-Iranian outbreak, they warned that Soviet forces "could intervene in regional political conflicts" and could threaten "U.S. and allied access to oil supplies."

The U.S. warships arrayed in battle formation in those troubled waters may look awesome from a distance. But viewed up close, all too many of the individual ships are unfit for service and manned by ill-trained crews.

For example, President Carter greeted the return of the aircraft carrier Nimitz from the Persian Gulf with fanfare and flourish. He flew to Norfolk, Va., earlier this year to welcome the great carrier home. Against a backdrop of martial music and fluttering flags, he intoned:

"Your presence in the Indian Ocean and in the Arabian Sea ... constantly ready, constantly in training ... (left)

no doubt about American strength." He pledged "to maintain our military forces at the highest level of readiness, at the highest level of strength."

But there was something Carter did not tell the cheering throng: The Nimitz had not been "constantly ready" at all. Its skipper, Capt. John R. Batzler, had sent a grim warning from the Persian Gulf that the carrier was in "C-3 condition" — far short of "the highest level of readiness."

Navy sources told my associate, Ron McRae, that a combat ship should be in C-1 shape before it is sent into a danger zone. They described "C-3 condition" as unfit for combat, although technically it takes a C-4 rating to keep a ship out of action. The poor condition of the Nimitz, sources said, contributed to the failure last April of the hostage rescue attempt.

The Navy has had to scrounge to keep its other aircraft carriers combat-worthy, too. This past summer, the Midway had to be overhauled in the Philippines before it could be dispatched to the Persian Gulf. Frantic admirals virtually scoured the Navy for 50 "volunteers" to man key positions aboard the Kennedy before it sailed for the Mediterranean in August.

And the Independence was plagued with problems — screws that dragged, inoperative catapults, malfunctioning blowers — during a month-long shakedown cruise. In one work area,

the temperature hit 140 degrees, and crew members had to be rotated every 20 minutes.

Warned the Joint Chiefs in their top-secret report: "The United States has several deficiencies in its ability to project power. First, adequate sea and air transport is lacking ...

"Second, faced with severe budgetary constraints, many operational and maintenance programs, which support day-to-day combat-readiness, have been cut back over the years. Inflation compounds the problem, as already tight budgets cannot be stretched to cover all that was programmed when the budget was put together ..."

In stark language, it continues: "Shortages of ordnance and fuel are also degrading readiness. Certain types of ammunition are in short supply and storage capacity is limited ..."

"Fuel and funding constraints have reduced opportunities for training at sea, with an adverse impact on the overall readiness of ships. Flying hours dedicated to training have also been reduced, cutting the number of training sorties flown in forward deployment areas and reducing training opportunities for nondeployed aircraft to less than 70 percent of the hours required to attain primary mission readiness."

Footnote: A Navy spokesman refused to comment on the readiness of carriers, except to argue that a C-3 ship is "considered to be combat ready."

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8 October 1980

U.S. Finds No Sign of Jordanian Military Aid to Iraq Despite King Hussein's Pledge

By NORMAN KEMPSTER
and OSWALD JOHNSTON

Times Staff Writers

WASHINGTON—Despite King Hussein's pledge of support for Iraq in its war with Iran, there is no evidence so far that Jordan has sent troops or weapons to Baghdad's aid, U.S. officials said Tuesday.

"There is no information that Jordan has provided any military equipment," State Department spokesman John Tratner said.

Tratner said the United States has made clear to Jordan that it opposes any enlargement of the war beyond Iran and Iraq. Nevertheless, U.S. influence on the Jordanian ruler has ebbed in recent years, even though the Amman government obtains most of its major military equipment from U.S. suppliers.

King Hussein announced Monday that Jordan supports Iraq, an Arab nation, against non-Arab Iran. He ordered mobilization of Jordanian trucks and other transport vehicles to carry food and supplies to Iraq.

But U.S. officials said they saw no indication that the king would back his commitment by sending elements of Jordan's British-trained army into battle.

U.S. officials scoffed at a report in a Kuwait newspaper that Jordan had massed a mechanized force of 40,000 troops on its border with Iraq. One official said such a force would include almost all of Jordan's effective military units.

The Jordanians cannot transfer American military equipment (to any other country) without agreement of the United States, Trotter said.

Other officials said Jordan is permitting supplies bound for Iraq to be unloaded at its southern port of Aqaba, but that no heavy military equipment had been landed. Iraq's

only outlet to the sea, the Shatt al Arab waterway at the head of the Persian Gulf, has been blocked by the fighting.

"There is no sign of heavy shipping going into Aqaba," a State Department official said. "But there is more traffic than usual going into the port on its way to Iraq."

In Washington, the Associated Press quoted U.S. sources as saying that ships with supplies apparently intended for the Shatt al Arab had been diverted toward Aqaba. The sources said the ships came from India, Lebanon and some East European countries, but pointed out that they could be engaged in normal commerce.)

Intelligence information available in Washington indicated that the supplies being unloaded at Aqaba are mostly food and other essentially non-military items, although the shipments may include small arms and ammunition.

The Jordanian port is about 800 miles from the Iraqi border and the roads are not good. Therefore, it is unlikely that any shipments would reach Iraq for several days after arriving at Aqaba.

The port city is just across the narrow Gulf of Aqaba from the Israeli port of Eilat, and Israeli intelligence can monitor the situation there closely.

Jordan seems to be relatively isolated within the Arab world in providing backing for Iraq.

Hazem Nuseibeh, the Jordanian ambassador to the United Nations, said he is prepared to defend his government's position before the Security Council. Ten days ago, the Security Council appealed to both sides to stop fighting but has taken no formal action since.

"We are the closest to Iraq of all the Arab countries," Nuseibeh said in an interview. "In 1958, we had a political federation with Iraq."

Saudi Arabia, while indicating its preference for the Arab nation, has

recently gone out of its way to assure Tehran that it does not consider Muslim Iran to be an enemy. And Syria, a bitter rival of Iraq, has launched a propaganda barrage against the Baghdad regime.

Al Baath, the newspaper of Syria's ruling party, Tuesday accused Iraqi President Saddam Hussein of being an "imperialist agent out to play the role of the shah" in representing U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region, the Associated Press reported from Damascus.

Al Baath accused the United States of pushing Iraq to invade Iran to "divert attention away from the Arabs' main struggle against Israel and provide the United States and Israel with an excuse to intervene in the gulf."

Syria Due in Moscow

Syrian President Hafez Assad has scheduled a trip to Moscow today. The war is certain to be a topic of discussion.

Two Soviet cargo ships that entered the Persian Gulf last weekend but turned back before reaching Iraq are currently at anchor off the South Yemeni port of Aden, a Pentagon official said. The official said it was possible that some goods were loaded into smaller ships at Aden for shipment to Aqaba.

Other U.S. officials said the Soviet Union seems to be playing a cautious game, perhaps hoping to get through the conflict without alienating either Iran or Iraq. In Persian-language broadcasts aimed at Iran, Moscow has attempted to reinforce Tehran's anti-American sentiments.

"Soviet media have claimed, without the slightest foundation in fact, that the United States has taken a part in the conflict," Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher said in a speech Tuesday in Boston. "Such fabrications can only inflame a situation that holds dangers for East and West alike. They do not reflect the degree of responsibility that is due from a great power."

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 October 1980

Experts' early assessments tumble as Iran, Iraq brace for longer struggle

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Both the Iraqis and Iranians are defying Western — and possibly Soviet — logic as they fight on.

Early theories, assumptions, and conventional wisdom held by Western officials and analysts about how this Middle East war might end and about who might come out on top have been crumbling.

The original hope, in the West at least, was that both sides would quickly run out of fuel and ammunition and that this would end the conflict. But both sides are clearly bracing to fight a long war of attrition if necessary.

The level of combat and the pace of the fighting are both lower and slower than some Western experts had expected them to be. At the same time, the Iranians are putting up more of a fight than many Western analysts thought their state of disorganization would allow.

One widespread theory held by American officials and other experts in the early stages of the now 16-day-old war was that the Soviet Union would be an automatic winner in this war, no matter what the outcome. That theory has not been dropped by any means. For one thing, the Soviets still seem to hold more options than the West. One of them would be to resupply Iraq with arms and ammunition.

"At State, we feel that the longer the conflict endures, the more opportunities there are for Soviet meddling," said a State Department official. "The Soviets have

a lot more chips to play."

But there is a growing body of expert opinion that sees a possibility of no winners emerging from the war. The Soviets' ability to manipulate the situation to their advantage may turn out to be less impressive than it was at first thought to be.

At the same time, the United States has derived a short-term gain from the war that is not talked about publicly in Washington but is talked about privately. An early theory was that better-prepared Iraqis might trounce the Iranians and thereby draw Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states into their orbit. For a few days, there was, indeed, a "bandwagon" effect in favor of Iraq.

But as the Iranians fought the Iraqis to a stalemate, the initial Arab euphoria faded. Saudi Arabia, the key oil nation, looked to the United States for support and protection. The US responded to Saudi requests by sending to Saudi Arabia four giant early-warning radar planes known as AWACs.

"This whole thing has given us an opportunity to improve our relationship with the Saudis," said one American analyst. "When they asked for the AWACs, we just leapt at it. Our only mistake was being so public about it."

The US and Britain were also able to exert influence when it came to the possibility of other Gulf states joining the Iraqis in action against Iran. The West's nightmare is that the fighting will spread, cutting off oil supplies. When the Iraqis were seen to be dispersing fighter aircraft — and, according to one report, a troop transport plane — to other Arab states, Western diplomats warned of the consequences of a wider conflict. So did the Iranians.

The Sultanate of Oman, overlooking the strategic Strait of Hormuz, seemed to be in the process of offering the Iraqis a base from which they could seize three Iranian-held islands. That could still happen. But with the Iraqis looking less like winners and the Iranians looking more like fighters, the likelihood has apparently diminished.

CONTINUED

By Oct. 6, Iraq had consolidated its hold on at least the port area of the Iranian city of Khorramshahr. And Jordan has offered its assistance to the Iraqis. But Western analysts doubt that the Jordanians will go so far as to enter the fighting at this stage.

The widespread early assumption that Iraq might be well on its way to becoming the dominant power in the Gulf is giving way to a realization that this war may leave that Arab state exhausted, without the reserves of energy, manpower, and other resources to play such a role.

In a war of attrition, Iran, with a population estimated at about 40 million, might prevail over Iraq, with a population estimated at 13 million.

The Iraqis thus may be tempted to "escalate" the fighting. Reports of Iraqi air strikes on Tehran Oct. 6 may be one sign of this. But as one American analyst put it, an escalation might simply cause Iraq to get stuck deeper in the Iranian quagmire.

Unfortunately for the peoples of both nations, there is much in the way of potential for destruction that has yet to be deployed. Neither side has so far committed tanks, for instance, to major battle.

In the early stages, American intelligence indicated that the Iraqi Air Force would probably dominate the skies, but the reverse appears to be the case so far. Iraq's Soviet-supplied air defenses have proved inadequate to halt pinprick attacks by the Iranians. These could prove politically, if not militarily, significant if allowed to continue.

The Iraqis appear to be avoiding air-to-air combat with apparently superior Iranian pilots. The American-trained and supplied Iranian Air Force, which was thought by some US specialists to be virtually inoperative, has shown an ability to move spare parts and keep planes in the air that was unexpected.

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Brown Discloses U.S. Sends Saudis Ground Radar and 100 Personnel

By PHILIP SHABECOFF

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 5 — The Defense Department said today that the United States was sending additional radar and communications equipment and military personnel to Saudi Arabia to supplement and eventually replace the electronic surveillance planes sent after the outbreak of the war between Iran and Iraq.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said American air and naval forces in the Persian Gulf area would defend the United States surveillance planes, called Awacs, if they were attacked.

Replying to questions on ABC television's "Issues and Answers," Mr. Brown said that the United States had no plans to deploy additional equipment to Saudi Arabia beyond what was needed to make the Awacs planes operate effectively. He said the additional equipment consisted of ground radar and communications facilities.

According to the Pentagon, a total of 460 American military personnel have been stationed in Saudi Arabia in recent

months, almost all of them advisers or members of teams specializing in training the Saudis how to operate and maintain new military equipment.

Thomas Ross, a spokesman for the Pentagon, said later that about 100 more United States support personnel would accompany the equipment, joining 300 already there to operate and service the Awacs planes.

Ground Radar to Supplant Awacs

Mr. Ross also said that the ground equipment, when fully operational, would replace the electronic surveillance aircraft. At that point, the planes and the 300 airmen who serve them will be withdrawn, he said.

The ground equipment, like the planes, will be controlled entirely by Americans and the information gathered by the equipment will be provided to the Saudis for their air-protection system, the Pentagon spokesman said.

The additional equipment is being sent from Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico. "Several" C-141's and one C-5 plane are ferrying the equipment to the Middle East, Mr. Ross said, adding that the new radar and communications should be in operation by Wednesday.

Mr. Brown added that the surveillance aircraft sent to Saudi Arabia operated well away from the Iraqi-Iranian battle lines and so were unlikely to be attacked.

But he added: "I can assure you that we have the capability, if our forces are attacked, to defend them."

Iran-Iraq Impasse: Ground War Stalls, Yet Neither Side Exploits Air Power

By DREW MIDDLETON

After two weeks of fighting, the war between Iran and Iraq appears to be settling into an impasse on the ground with neither side able to register significant gains without heavy reinforcement. The rival air forces, which could supply the firepower to break a deadlock, concentrate on flying punitive missions that have little immediate effect on the war on the ground.

Military Analysis — The situation as the war enters its third week includes these basic elements, western intelligence officials say:

Q Iraqi forces have partly occupied four urban objectives: Dizful to the north, and Ahwaz, Khurramshahr and Abadan to the south. No continuous battle line has been established, and Dizful is isolated from the rest of the front.

Q None of these objectives have fallen to Iraqi ground forces, and the Iranians have made a major effort to reinforce Khurramshahr and Dizful. The Iraqis will need substantial reinforcements of tanks and infantry if they wish to complete the conquest of the cities.

Q Air operations on both sides continue to raise the toll in lives and property and sharply reduce oil production in both countries without seriously affecting the main military situation.

Some Local Iraqi Successes

The Iraqi offensive that began two weeks ago with attacks in the Shatt al Arab and the bombing of Teheran achieved some successes today, but fell short of its main military and political goals. The Shatt al Arab, the waterway that leads from Iranian and Iraqi oil ports to the Persian Gulf, is now dominated by Iraqi artillery.

The invasion of Iran's oil province of Khuzistan beyond the waterway did not result in an uprising by its Arab inhabitants, which Baghdad expected; the majority apparently fled into the desert to wait for the end of the fighting.

Iraqi attacks on Ahwaz, Abadan and Khurramshahr severed those cities' ties to the Iranian economy. But the invaders failed to take the cities, and that failure is beginning to result in serious casualties in men and heavy losses of equipment. The equipment losses are so serious that some analysts do not believe Iraq can contemplate resuming the offensive without heavy resupply from the Soviet Union.

Casualties are mounting on the Iranian side; Khurramshahr has been shelled by 130-millimeter and 175-millimeter guns and heavy mortars for six days. On the other hand, at the outset of the siege, the Iranian forces were numerically weak; now they have been reinforced, in at least one instance by helicopter airlift.

Analysts believe that the failure of the Iraqis to mount a major attack to take Dizful may prove to be Baghdad's most serious command error. The city is astride one of the main roads into Iran; reinforcement would enable the Iraqis to take the city and develop the threat of a push beyond it. In that event Iran would have to mount a major effort to expel the invaders. At the moment there is no objective evidence that the Iraqi forces intend to do more than move leisurely toward the capture of Dizful while peppering it with artillery.

The war's second week was notable for a perceptible strengthening of Iranian resistance on the ground and in the air. The stiffening on the ground appears to result from two factors: First, the Iranian infantry, a mixture of regulars and revolutionary guards, and tank forces appear to be fighting more effectively, with lieutenants and sergeants stepping forward to take the initiative in the absence of a coherent central command.

The second is that the Iranians are now deploying their best weapons to halt the Iraqi invasion. Chieftain tanks were reported on the front yesterday and today; the British-built Chieftains are described by Western analysts as the best tanks on the battlefield if well-maintained.

Neither side is likely to win a decisive victory, analysts said, unless air power is coordinated with ground attacks.

The failure of both sides to use their air forces in support of ground advances is inexplicable to Western military sources. Occasional air strikes have been directed at hostile tanks and infantry, but these have not been coordinated with ground operations. When ground attacks are begun, they invariably take place without fighter-bomber support directed at the opposition forces.

The reason for the absence of coordi-

nated air-ground attacks may lie in the rival forces' inability to carry out one of the most complicated operations of modern war. As one analyst pointed out, air-ground operations cannot be improvised but require months of training and quick execution.

Analysts agreed that Iraq has lost the initiative, and that it can be regained and the offensive resumed only by a wholesale reinforcement by fresh armored and infantry units rather than the piecemeal insertion of reservists. But unless the Iranian Air Force turns its attention from Baghdad, the Iraqi artillery will slowly pound the besieged cities into rubble.

Iranian Resilience Underestimated

The Iraqi Government and some Western intelligence agencies appear to have underestimated the resilience of the Iranian forces. Their present fighting quality is higher than anticipated and their supply position, while still precarious, is improving.

The Iranians must use their resources sparingly, according to American sources familiar with the supply situation. They say that though Iran under the Shah built up significant stockpiles of spare parts, replacements and ammunition, these are not believed sufficient to fight a defensive battle, which Iran is now doing, and simultaneously mount the counteroffensive necessary to drive out the invaders.

U.S. Said to Act to Prevent Attack by Iraq From Oman

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 — Alarmed by intelligence reports that Iraq was planning to launch air and helicopter strikes against Iran from nearby Oman last weekend, the United States and Britain exerted considerable diplomatic pressure to prevent the widening of the conflict, diplomatic sources said today.

They said information was received on Saturday from Oman that Iraq had sent troop-carrying helicopters and planes to that small Persian Gulf nation and was considering asking the Omanis for permission to attack three Iranian-held islands in the Gulf and Iranian installations near the Strait of Hormuz.

Such attacks might have resulted in Iranian retaliation against Oman and such oil-producing Gulf states as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and in the closing of the strait to oil shipping. But the attacks did not take place.

This was disclosed to reporters here and in London as President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan arrived in Washington for a meeting with President Carter this morning to discuss Pakistan's economic problems and General Zia's frustrated efforts on behalf of the Islamic Conference to end the Iran-Iraq war.

An Answer to Iranian Charge

Politically, it is being suggested that the strong stand taken by the Carter Administration against the use of Oman's territory may have averted a dangerous spread of the fighting. But it is also acknowledged that there is no certainty about what might have happened.

High-ranking officials here hint at another aspect of the situation. Iran, from the start of the war with Iraq, has accused the United States of collusion with the Iraqis. In effect, the Americans are saying in response that not only are such charges false but that in fact the United States is working to protect Iran's integrity.

At a news conference in New York yesterday Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie said: "There is absolutely no substance to any accusation that we were involved in collusion with Iraq in connection with this current fighting. There never has been any basis for it; and as a matter of fact, there is a lot of basis for the opposite conclusion."

The Oman crisis, as it is being described here, occurred as the Carter Administration was occupied with an urgent request from Saudi Arabia for air-defense assistance.

Early in the Iran-Iraq conflict, Saudi Arabia and some other Arab states agreed to permit some Iraqi planes to land on their territory. The Saudis feared that Iran might retaliate by attacking its eastern oilfields.

Neutrality Was Prime Concern

The overriding American concern in deciding whether to provide the four electronic-surveillance planes, known as Awacs, for Airborne Warning and Control Systems, was that the move not be seen as undermining American neutrality in the conflict.

It is presumed here that Saudi Arabia

asked Iraq to remove the planes that had landed on its territory so that it would be easier for the United States to go ahead with the Awacs decision. President Carter provisionally approved sending one of the four planes on Sunday, reporters were told, and the final decision was made Monday after Saudi Arabia agreed to issue a statement that it had asked for the planes and after members of Congress could be briefed.

By coincidence, Lord Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary, was in Washington over the weekend after attending the United Nations General Assembly session in New York. According to diplomatic officials, he was struck by the high degree of tension in the Administration.

Today President Carter told General Zia that the United States would stand by its 1959 commitment to help Pakistan if it was attacked by the Soviet Union, whose troops are in neighboring Afghanistan. General Zia did not ask for military aid but stressed the need for more economic assistance for refugees.

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4 OCTOBER 1980

CORD MEYER

Twilight Of the Mullahs

The disorganized theocracy that presides over mounting chaos in Iran is proving, in spite of the bravery of individual Iranian soldiers, that it is no more capable of waging a modern war than it is of managing a complex economy.

With his fanatical religious zeal and passion for martyrdom, Ayatollah Khomeini is seen by an apprehensive Carter administration as almost congenitally unable to agree to any compromise with Iraq on the disputed border issues.

Therefore the threats emanating from Tehran of wider bombing of Arab oil installations are being taken seriously in Washington. Rather than concede tactical defeat with its implicit admission of the loss of Allah's favor, Khomeini is viewed as capable of trying to bring down the whole shaky edifice of Western oil supplies in a final act of retribution against greater and lesser Satans, endangering the lives of the hostages in the process.

Even if the waning power of the Iranian air force places this Götterdämmerung beyond the ayatollah's febrile reach, Carter officials see few advantages and many dangers in any likely outcome of the fighting.

Incredible as it may appear, Iranian leaders are genuinely convinced of the truth of their propaganda line that American collusion with the Iraqis lay behind the attack. A rational decision by the Khomeini regime to improve relations with the U.S. in the face of Iraqi hostility is therefore deemed remote.

The War's Origins

Although the proximate cause of the war was the abrogation of the 1975 treaty by Iraqi strongman, Saddam Hussein, Khomeini must bear a large share of the responsibility. With his incendiary propaganda aimed at stirring the Shiite majority in Iraq into open revolt, Khomeini recklessly provoked Saddam and gave him an excuse to assert the Iraqi military superiority, which Khomeini had himself created by undermining the discipline and leadership of the Iranian army.

Having helped trigger the war, the Khomeini regime proved unable to prevent Iraqi forces from advancing into oil rich Khuzistan where the majority of the population is Arab and resents Persian rule imposed from Tehran.

Although the Iraqis disclaim any intention to annex Khuzistan, their propaganda boldly incites the Arabs to assert their independence, and part of the local population is supporting the invading army. An autonomous Arab Khuzistan aligned with Iraq would deprive a truncated Iran of most of its oil.

In less than two tumultuous years, Khomeini has alienated the U.S. by the seizure of American hostages and antagonized every Arab neighbor by his shrill propagation of Shiite fundamentalism, while the reckless intervention of his mullahs has ruined the economy and the army.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that influential voices like those of Anwar Sadat and columnist Joseph Kraft are urging an American-sponsored coup to overthrow the ayatollah and replace him with a pro-Western government.

Rejecting a Coup

But Carter's more realistic advisers reject this advice on two grounds. First, quite aside from the CIA's current vulnerability to leaks, the intelligence agency is described as having virtually no influential agents within Iran in a position to mount such an operation. Secondly, in spite of all the disasters, Khomeini still retains such a hold over the Tehran masses that no internal faction yet dares move against him.

But it will be a long, cold winter in Tehran. With the destruction of the Abadan refinery and other oil installations, Iran has lost not only its revenues from exported oil but also the capacity to refine the kerosene that most Iranians depend on for both heat and cooking. A shivering and hungry populace will have time for second thoughts about the wisdom of its leadership. Carter analysts expect that as the chill of winter deepens there will be spontaneous efforts by the disparate opponents of Khomeini to replace him.

The outcome of such indigenous revolt is entirely unpredictable, which may explain why the Soviets have been so careful to treat Khomeini with kid gloves. On the Marxist left, the Fedayeen and the Tudeh Party are the best disciplined groups and enjoy covert Russian financing but they so far lack sufficient popular support to succeed on their own.

On the right the army officers, the liberal nationalists and the middle classes with support of the moderate clergy may have a better chance of taking over from Khomeini but they would face a bitter fight from the Marxist left and from the Islamic radicals.

In the ensuing anarchic struggle for power, the fate of Iran is likely to be decided. If the Soviets intervene to support their allies, one of the least enviable responsibilities of the next American president will be to decide how and whether to react.

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Agee and Passport

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NEW YORK TIMES
7 OCTOBER 1980

Supreme Court Roundup

Justices Will Rule on Authority to Revoke Passport

By LINDA GREENHOUSE
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 6 — The Supreme Court today agreed to decide whether the President had the authority to revoke the passport of an American citizen on the ground that the citizen's international travel was a threat to national security.

Opening its 1980-81 term, the Court agreed to hear the Carter Administration's appeal from a ruling that it lacked the legal authority to revoke the passport of Philip Agee, a former intelligence agent who has traveled widely exposing Central Intelligence Agency methods and personnel.

The Department of State revoked Mr. Agee's passport last December, informing him by letter that his activities in several foreign countries "have caused serious damage to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."

The department, acting under Presidential authority, cited a Federal regulation under which such a finding can be the basis for revoking a passport. Mr. Agee, who lives in West Germany, brought suit. A month later, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ordered the passport returned on the ground that Congress had never given the executive branch the authority to issue the regulation or to revoke a passport on national security or foreign policy grounds. The Federal appeals court affirmed that ruling in June.

Administration Position

In its request for Supreme Court review, the Administration told the Justices "it is inconceivable that Congress intended to deprive the Executive" of the authority to revoke a passport under such circumstances.

The Administration contended that the appeals court had been mistaken in relying on a 1958 Supreme Court decision, *Kent v. Dulles*, which held that the State Department could not prohibit the issu-

ance of passports to members of the Communist Party.

In the *Kent* case, the Administration said, the denial had been based on the political beliefs of the passport applicants. In today's case, *Muskie v. Agee*, No. 80-83, the revocation was based not on Mr. Agee's political philosophy but on his specific actions.

Mr. Agee is represented by the American Civil Liberties Union. His attorney, Melvin Wulf, urged the Justices not to take the Government's appeal, arguing that the lower court opinion "faithfully follows more than 22 years of right-to-travel jurisprudence."

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WASHINGTON, Oct 6; REUTER - THE SUPREME COURT AGREED TODAY TO REVIEW A LOWER COURT RULING THAT THE GOVERNMENT ACTED ILLEGALLY IN REVOKING THE PASSPORT OF PHILIP AGEE, A FREQUENT CRITIC OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) ACTIVITIES.

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION ARGUED IN SEEKING THE REVIEW THAT MR AGEE, HIMSELF A FORMER CIA OPERATIVE, POSED A THREAT TO FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY BECAUSE OF HIS ACTIVITIES.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTENDED THAT MR AGEE, WHO LIVES IN WEST GERMANY, HAD EMBARKED ON A CAMPAIGN TO RUIN THE CIA.

IT SAID HIS TACTICS WERE TO TRAVEL TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES AND EXPOSE THE NAMES OF LOCAL CIA UNDERCOVER AGENTS.

THE GOVERNMENT SAID MR AGEE'S ACTIVITIES MIGHT HAVE CONTRIBUTED INDIRECTLY TO THE TAKEOVER OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TEHRAN LAST NOVEMBER 4 WHEN THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES WERE SEIZED.

HIS PASSPORT WAS REVOKED IN DECEMBER 1979.

MR AGEE'S LAWYERS HAVE ACCUSED THE GOVERNMENT OF RESORTING TO HEARSAY AND INNUENDO IN PORTRAYING HIM AS AN ENEMY OF THE STATE.

REUTER 1138 NL

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Billygate

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13 OCTOBER 1980

Billy's Woes Rub Off On the President

Senators' criticism of the way the White House handled the Billy Carter affair threatens to feed public doubts about the President just when he needs them least—near the peak of a tough re-election drive.

A 249-page study, issued by a nine-member subcommittee on October 2, said President Carter and his aides violated no laws in their contacts with Billy during his dealings with terrorist Libya.

But among the group's five Democrats, Senator Max Baucus of Montana cited "a series of disturbing judgment calls," and Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont said "the President was ill-served by those around him."

Republicans pointed to the findings as a reason why Carter should be defeated on November 4. Senator Richard G. Lugar of Indiana said the report "will raise doubts about whether the President's relationship with his brother was a tawdry and bizarre business." Senator Charles Mathias of Maryland complained of a "perception of a lack of competence in the administration." Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina said the study indicated "a clear pattern of misconduct."

The nine-week inquiry started after Billy registered as a foreign agent and disclosed that Libya had loaned him \$220,000. The senators said the Justice



Department showed no favoritism to Billy by not prosecuting him. But they also found that—

- Carter should have stated much earlier that Billy "did not represent the U.S. and that the Libyans should not expect to gain any influence ... by cultivating their relations with him."

- The White House was "ill-advised" to use Billy as a contact with Libya during an effort to win release of U.S. hostages in Iran, because that boosted his stature in Libya's eyes.

- National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Central Intelligence

Agency chief Stansfield Turner and Atty. Gen. Benjamin Civiletti mishandled intelligence data about Billy.

- Billy "merits severe criticism" for not telling his brother that he was trying to profit from his Libyan ties.

Carter's aides dismissed the report's impact. Said one: "The Senate found nothing illegal. If they can't come up with anything better than that, the President won't be hurt."

A White House statement pictured Carter as still feeling that he had done nothing wrong. "Even in the light of hindsight," the statement said, "the President respectfully differs with the subcommittee's views."

But a day before the Senate report came out, Carter acknowledged that relatives could cause problems. In a memo to government agencies, he cautioned federal employees against dealing with his family members "in ways that create either the reality or the appearance of impropriety." □

ARTICLE APPEARED
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13 OCTOBER 1980

The Senators Scold Billy and Jimmy

The Senate investigation of Billy Carter's Libyan connection ended last week much the way it had begun: with plenty of criticism for poor judgment—and little else. In a 249-page report, the nine-member subcommittee said Billy's conduct merited "severe criticism." It blamed the President and some of his senior aides both for their "ill-advised" use of Billy to enlist Libyan aid in the Iran hostage crisis and for various sins of "omission" that might have given Libyan officials a false impression of Billy's influence in Washington. But it found no evidence that anyone at the White House had done anything illegal—or even seriously improper—to help the President's younger brother. "When we started out ... I thought we might very well have a bear by the tail," said Sen. Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island. "At the end of eight weeks, I've come to the conclusion that we really had a mouse."

The subcommittee concluded that Libyan officials cultivated Billy's friendship in an attempt to gain influence in Washington; by responding to their overtures, it charged, Billy acted "contrary to the interests of the ... United States." The report conceded that in fact Billy had absolutely no impact on U.S. policy, but it criticized the President for not making that clear. "The President should have either issued a public statement or sent a private message to the Libyan Government ... that Billy Carter did not represent the United States," it argued. If anything, the report said, the White House gave precisely the opposite impression by using Billy last November to arrange a meeting between a Libyan diplomat and national-security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Risk: The subcommittee also had harsh words for the way the Administration reacted after Billy's involvement with the Libyans became apparent. In warning Billy last spring that the government was aware he had made a deal with an oil company to buy Libyan crude, Brzezinski risked

compromising intelligence sources and undermining the Justice Department's investigation of Billy. So did CIA director Stansfield Turner, who kept intelligence on the deal from the FBI, and Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, who withheld from his own investigators information about Billy's \$220,000 "loan" from the Libyans and who also discussed the case briefly with the President. Though there was no evidence of a Watergate-style cover-up, the report said the effect of these actions was "to protect the President from taking personal responsibility" for the problem.

The subcommittee staff may well pursue several loose ends, including a contention by Sen. Bob Dole of Kansas that Billy may have played a role in preventing an Egyptian invasion of Libya—and that a business associate of his had privileged access to the White House. Privately, however, members say the panel has probably met for the last time. Said staff counsel Philip Tone: "I think we have the essentials of the story."

ALLAN J. MAYER with KIM WILLENSON
in Washington

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-10NEW YORK TIMES
4 OCTOBER 1980

Billy Carter Case: A Fizzled Bombshell

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 — After they released their report on the Billy Carter investigation yesterday morning, some of the Senators were almost apologetic. Claiborne Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island, remarked that "in the beginning a

lot of us thought we had a bear by the tail" but in the end "we really had a mouse." Charles McC. Mathias Jr., Republican of Maryland, commented that

the problem had turned out not to be criminality but "folly." Even that most partisan of Republicans, Bob Dole of Kansas, felt compelled to note that there were "no parallels with Watergate."

The investigation began nine weeks ago with enormous fanfare. Some Republicans saw a chance to deliver a mortal blow to President Carter's re-election campaign. Some reporters craved a Watergate-like scandal. Many Democrats were willing to go to almost any length to avoid being charged with a cover-up.

But, like the comet Kohoutek, the sensation that was promised never materialized. There are several reasons.

First, the facts of the case did not prove to be so damaging to the President as some had expected. No evidence of official corruption or clearly unethical conduct was developed. The Senate subcommittee unanimously concluded that the President had exercised poor judgment in the way he had dealt with his brother's relationship with Libya, but the charge seemed commonplace in light of the attacks by Mr. Carter's political opponents on his judgment in handling the economy and foreign policy.

Accustomed to inquiries
Moreover, whatever outrage the American people might have felt at the disclosure that the President's brother was an agent of a regime with a history of terrorism and extreme hostility toward the United States, there has been no indication that they blame the President for it.

Second, the country seems to have become inured to political investigations. Since the Watergate scandals broke in the Nixon Administration, there has hardly been a time when some committee or grand jury was not investigating one politician or another. The Carter Administration had not been in office a year when the investigation of Bert Lance developed. Then there was the question of the President's dismissal of David W. Marston as the United States Attorney in Philadelphia. Then came the peanut warehouse and Hamilton Jordan and Abecam, and by the time the Billy Carter matter came along, they all seemed to blend together.

Finally, President Carter was able to take the sting out of the Senate inquiry with a pre-emptive strike. On Aug. 4, before the Senate investigation had begun, he sent to Congress and made public a long statement recording in copious detail his actions and those of others in his Administration concerning Billy Carter. That night he held an hour-long news conference. He waived claims of executive privilege and ordered his staff to testify before the Senate subcommittee. He even offered to testify himself if the senators saw fit for him to do so.

In the end, the Senators decided not to call the President to testify and not even to send him written questions.

Nonetheless, while the Billy Carter investigation appears to have had little political impact, there are, in the view of many of the senators and lawyers involved, lessons to be learned from it.

The most important one seems to be that the post-Watergate efforts to prevent a President and other officials from abusing their power may have resulted in insulating the President and his top advisers from information they needed to carry out their responsibilities. Senator Mathias, one of the most studious and thoughtful members of Congress, wondered in his statement attached to the subcommittee's report whether "a whole new doctrine of plausible deniability has been constructed."

Consider the following: Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, learned last spring from a highly classified report that Billy Carter was trying to strike a deal with the Libyan Government to obtain an additional allocation of crude oil for an American company.

That was precisely the evidence the Justice Department needed to prove its suspicion that the President's brother was an agent of the Libyan Government. But Admiral Turner did not consult the Attorney General or the head of any other intelligence agency. He testified that he did not know that Billy Carter's relationship with Libya was under investigation. Apparently he was like the others who had become inured to investigations; the fact that Billy Carter was under investigation had been reported in newspapers for more than a year.

Instead, Mr. Turner took the information to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser. Mr. Brzezinski's responsibility is foreign policy, not law enforcement. He took it upon himself to telephone Billy Carter to warn him to break off the deal and then told the President. Mr. Brzezinski also never bothered to check whether the material was important to the Justice Department.

Foreign Policy Implications

About the same time, Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti received similar information from a different intelligence official. Afraid of compromising intelligence sources, Mr. Civiletti testified, he withheld his information not only from his own professional investigators but also from the President and others who might have been able to gauge the foreign policy implications. The Attorney General, whose responsibility is law enforcement, not foreign policy, testified that he had decided unilaterally that the foreign policy aspects were not predominant.

A result of all this was that Billy Carter, the target of an investigation, had secret Government information months before those investigating him had it and that the one person in the Government best placed to weigh the relative importance of foreign policy and law enforcement, the President, never had all the facts.

The lesson could be extremely valuable to some future Administration trying to determine the proper role of the President and his advisers in criminal investigations. By the time such procedures are considered, however, the report of the Billy Carter investigation will most likely be gathering dust somewhere in the stacks of the Library of Congress.

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Soviets in Afghanistan

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9 OCTOBER 1980

Soviet Units in Afghanistan Dig In as if for a Long Stay

By MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN

Special to The New York Times

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Oct. 5 — Nine months after their troops entered Afghanistan, Soviet military planners are making heavy investments that have convinced intelligence officers that the occupation will last for years and will involve still more Soviet soldiers.

The specialists, Asian and Western, say, the scale of the Soviet commitment can be deduced not only from the deployment of troops and material but also from bridge and road projects, construction of fuel storage depots and a petroleum pipeline and, further, a total underwriting by Moscow of Afghan higher education.

The purely military statistics, supplied by the intelligence sources, reveal a major but still unfolding operation. There are 90,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan — nine Soviet divisions. In addition, Moscow has reportedly supplied about 320 combat planes, including 150 helicopters. Of these, there are 72 MI-24 gunships in six squadrons. It is these armor-plated, rocket-firing craft that have done most damage in attacking rebels in the mountain strongholds.

The Soviet command has virtually written off the remnants of the desertion-plagued Afghan Army. More than half the 40,000 Afghans still in service have reportedly been disarmed since some of these forces were found to be both willing and unwilling conduits of arms and ammunition to guerrilla units operating in all 28 provinces.

The intelligence sources here and in India report that the Russians have begun a costly effort to build a new armed force in Afghanistan based on their own model. About 10,000 noncommissioned officers judged to be trustworthy have been sent to the Soviet Union for six-month training courses. A further 500 have been reported undergoing an intensive program of political and military education in Kabul. In addition, 3,000 students, a number equal to the country's peacetime university enrollment, have been sent to the Soviet Union for studies that are said to include paramilitary training.

Similarity of Conflicts

There is a good deal of similarity between Soviet political strategies in Afghanistan and Moscow's experiences in Angola and, more particularly, in Ethiopia. In all three countries very small groups of detribalized, unbanized and largely Western-trained leftists were provided long-term military and economic support in waging war against rural, tribal, sometimes feudally organized and religiously impassioned groups.

In Angola, the struggle has continued inconclusively for five years. In Ethiopia, the Government, aided by Cuba and the Soviet Union, has managed in four years to consolidate its control, although there are still pockets of guerrilla activity.

Some Western diplomats have noted that Afghanistan, because of its common border with the Soviet Union and its position as a bridge between the Persian Gulf and the heart of Asia, is of immeasurably greater importance to Moscow than either Angola or Ethiopia. Therefore, they reason that the Russians will be prepared to make much greater sacrifices for Kabul than they would for their African interests.

In the last two months, the Russians have established seven military commands around the country. The Soviet 201st Motorized Rifle Division is garrisoned in the Qonduz and Fajirabad sector in the northeast. At Mazar-i-Sharif, overlooking the major road link to the Soviet Union, the 16th Motorized Rifle Division has taken up positions. The 275th Motorized Rifle Division has been given responsibility for the east-central sector around Jalalabad. Kabul is guarded by the 105th Airborne Division and the 360th Motorized Rifle Division. The 357th Motorized Rifle Division is at Kandahar, the 54th at Herat and the 68th at Shindand.

In addition, smaller but growing units of specially trained antiguerrilla troops are reported to be posted in all the sectors. Beyond the Soviet border there are large concentrations of forces in the Turkmen, Transcaucasian and Central Asian military districts.

The planes used in Afghanistan are maintained and repaired at Soviet bases. These include 108 MIG-21's, 30 MIG-23's four YAK-28 local reconnaissance craft, 10 longer-range MIG-25 reconnaissance planes, 76 MIG 17's and some twin-jet Ilyushin-28 bombers. The Russians are also using 35 military transports.

There are military airports at Kabul, Bagram, Jalalabad and Herat. Runways have been extended, aircraft revetments built and new housing provided at all air bases for Soviet personnel.

A bridge is being built across the Indus at Termez, on the Soviet border. A major depot for fuel and material is under construction at Pule-i-Khumri, a town in north-central Afghanistan where the two major roads from the Soviet Union merge into the main road to Kabul. An oil pipeline is being laid from the Soviet border to Pule-i-Khumri, with plans to extend it later, according to intelligence sources.

These sources say that the major military objectives that the Soviet Union is seeking to gain with this investment include the following:

¶To establish control of major cities and political centers and to secure main roads and communications.

¶To flush out rebel concentrations in the border provinces through sweeps and to attack and close escape and infiltration links to Pakistan by using mines and cluster bombs.

¶To deny shelter and food to the rebels by bombing villages and burning crops and to win over tribal leaders by bribes and intimidation.

Experts Differ on Outcome

There is divided opinion among the diplomatic and intelligence sources on how likely the Russians are to achieve their goals. One source said that "superior weapons and massive fire power are having an attenuating effect on the future prospects unless the guerrillas are eliminated." Another source said the Soviet Union would not be able to "contain the insurgency at manageable level" unless more troops were sent.

As for the rebels, the sources say they are organized largely on a tribal basis and operate independently of each other. They fight under local malliks, or tribal leaders, and there is almost no central leadership or coordination. The intelligence sources say this situation has some benefits as well as defects.

While the lack of unity imposes "severe logistic limitations" in resupplying or synchronizing raids, it also prevents the Russians from anticipating maneuvers or subverting or conquering any central command. One diplomat remarked that the Afghan rebels had "no leadership that could defeat the Russians" but by the same token "there is no one group that can be defeated."

The sources say that there are resistance groups in all parts of the country and that all major ethnic groups — Pash-toons, Hazaras and Tadjiks — are participating in the fighting. In some places, as in central Bamian Province, the Hazaras, a Mongol people of the Shiite Moslem sect, reportedly established moderately effective control with governing councils that raised and distributed revenues.

Elsewhere, control shifts from valley to valley. In the midst of the overall resistance effort old rivalries and tribal hostilities have flared up, setting guerrilla armies against each other. There have been reports that some units are more brigands than patriots.

CONTINUED

But whether brigands or freedom fighters, theirs is a difficult occupation. All the sources say the groups are very poorly equipped. Photographs showing turbaned partisans rejoicing around a downed Soviet helicopter show them to be armed largely with single-shot rifles and 30-year-old Enfield 303's. A few in the picture had AK-47 assault rifles captured

from the Soviet-supplied Government troops. The Islamic groups are relying almost entirely on captured ammunition.

Rebels Plead for Missiles

Their representatives who cross into Pakistan plead with all visitors for shoulder-fired missiles that they say they would be able to nullify the advantage of the Soviet helicopter gunships. At the moment their tactics mostly involve ambushing patrols and supply convoys. They are also planting mines on the key roads and they have succeeded several times in recent months in halting traffic on the national highway for days. "They are fighting mainly on the strength of

motivation," said one intelligence expert.

Although fighting is taking place all over the country, this does not mean that all Afghanistan is a battlefield. It is a country largely of mountains, crossed by goat tracks and pitted by caves.

Often driven from their valley settlements, the Islamic bands move up the slopes, then come down to ambush and vanish again.

For the Russians, it is a case of search and destroy. For the guerrillas, it is hit and run. Between the engagements there is good deal of waiting. The rebels spent much time foraging. A good deal of activity is reportedly going on but it is not often easy to see.

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ON PAGE **A-11**NEW YORK TIMES
5 OCTOBER 1980

AFGHAN GUERRILLAS TELL OF SOVIET DRIVE

Weary Tribal Leader Says Russian Copters Control River Valley Near the Pakistan Border

By **MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN**

Special to The New York Times

PESHAWAR, Pakistan, Oct. 2 — In contrast to the spokesmen of the established Afghan exile factions here, the two guerrilla leaders who arrived yesterday showed no bravado. The men, gaunt, tired and bullet-scarred, talked, as did the spokesmen, of killing Soviet soldiers. But they also told of being driven into caves, of eating bark and of watching their villages destroyed by rockets.

The men, Abdul Qader Safi and Ghulam Sakhi Kunar, came to seek help and to report a harsh new Soviet offensive in the Kunar Valley, where they have been battling three successive Soviet-supported Afghan regimes since late 1978.

Abdul Qader Safi is the malik, or chieftain, of the Safi tribe living north of Jallalabad. In peacetime he settled disputes, conducted relations with other tribes and collected and distributed tribute and taxes. Now, he said, he commands a guerrilla force whose numbers fluctuate between 6,000 and 8,000 men and boys.

Mr. Safi, who brought 25 followers with him, is visiting the offices here of the seven Afghan political organizations that claim to be leading the guerrilla resistance against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. He is asking them for medicine, blankets, food, money and weapons, but he disputes their self-professed roles.

"Facing Three Misfortunes"

"If they will give us help that is good, but if they ask me to sign that I am one of them, I will not do it," said the 42-year-old fighter. "We are facing three misfortunes — the Russians, the Pakistanis and these political parties. I am not a man of politics, I am a tribal man."

His anger at the Pakistanis actually embraces the entire West, which he feels abandoned his people by not supplying weapons with which they could bring down the helicopter gunships that have once again gained control of the valley for the Soviet Army. "If we had rockets for the helicopters the Russians would be finished," said Mr. Kunar, Mr. Safi's aide, who walked across the high mountain passes despite barely healed bullet wounds in his left thigh.

Both men are very troubled by the most recent Soviet sweep of the valley, which they say is more serious than an offensive conducted there last spring. The valley follows the path of the Kunar River, running parallel to the Pakistani border some 12 miles away. It leads to the door of Nuristan, the remote home of blue-eyed people who claim ancestral ties to the lost legions of Alexander the Great. It was in this region that the rebellion against the urbanized leftist politics of Kabul, the Afghan capital, first erupted.

In the present assault, Mr. Safi said, the Soviet forces last week moved up the valley's dirt road in small scout cars while the MI-24 helicopter gunships fired rockets into those villages that still stand. Now, he says, the Soviet forces have set up posts all along the northern end of the road. "This time I do not know if they will leave as they did before," he said.

Soviet Troops Called Tougher

The guerrillas say that in the sweep only Soviet forces are being used and that these soldiers are different from the ones who came last spring. These new units have younger men who are tougher. The two Afghans called them antiguerrilla commandos.

Their assessment is shared by intelligence sources in Pakistan who say that Soviet soldiers have taken over all of the fighting and that the Afghan Army, depleted by defections, has been virtually disarmed and is regarded by the Soviet authorities as a liability.

The intelligence sources, Western and Asian, believe that the recent Soviet reentry into the Kunar Valley may be intended to seal infiltration routes to and from Pakistan. While some light arms are reportedly being provided by private Islamic supporters of the Afghans, most of the weapons they are using came from captured Afghan armories.

The intelligence sources believe that the Soviet strategists are seeking to cut off the guerrillas' access to food and medical supplies in Pakistan and to deny the Islamic bands a sanctuary where they can rest between engagements.

High Soviet Losses Doubted

Some intelligence experts are highly dubious of assertions by some guerrilla groups that up to 20,000 Soviet soldiers have been killed or wounded in Afghanistan. One expert reported that while it was certain that the Soviet troops were being challenged in all parts of the country their losses were probably slightly less than a thousand men killed or seriously wounded.

Mr. Safi said that most of the Soviet casualties resulted from mine explosions or ambushes. Again and again he came back to the helicopters, which he insisted provided the only real advantage the Russians had in battle. He said his men had found ways to attack tanks and armored cars, but that they remained powerless against the gunships with their twin Gatling-type guns and rockets.

Several other groups with offices here reported that they had succeeded in bringing down the armed helicopters and one faction, called Jamiat Islami, has photographs of its warriors surrounding a downed helicopter. The groups deny that they have missiles and say that through practice their men have learned that the MI-24's are vulnerable if shot from above, from mountain perches, as they hover over valley hamlets.

Mr. Safi may pick up such information while he is here, but his chief objective is to get food or money for food. During the last three months the guerrillas had food as some fields were harvested after the Soviet forces withdrew. Now, once again, fields have been burned and a difficult winter seems unavoidable.

But whatever he gets or does not get, Mr. Safi intends to go back. Unlike many of those at the political offices, he does not talk of the inevitability of victory, just about the continuance of struggle.

His wife is dead. His village is destroyed. His tribe is suffering and endangered.

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FBI Break-in Case

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-19NEW YORK TIMES
8 OCTOBER 1980

Jury Told F.B.I. Break-Ins Were Not Viewed as Illegal

WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 (UPI)—Turned down on his motion for acquittal, a defense attorney told a jury today that he would prove that two former officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation never had reason to believe it was illegal to approve break-ins in a hunt for fugitive radicals.

Thomas Kennelly, an attorney for the Federal Bureau of Investigation's former intelligence chief, Edward S. Miller, delivered an opening statement portraying his client as a man who simply continued 30 years of F.B.I. practice in approving the so-called "black bag jobs."

Mr. Kennelly contended that the nine break-ins at private homes in a search for members of the Weather Underground had been part of a legitimate national security investigation of the type that had been used for years to "combat threats from without and within."

He said that break-ins had previously been conducted "against spies and saboteurs, the Communist Party U.S.A. and the Ku Klux Klan."

Mr. Kennelly opened the defense after Federal District Judge William Bryant refused to issue a directed judgment of acquittal, rejected Mr. Kennelly's argu-

ments that prosecutors had failed in 13 days of testimony to prove their case against Mr. Miller and W. Mark Felt, the bureau's former No. 2 man.

Mr. Felt, 67 years old, and Mr. Miller, 56, are accused of conspiring to violate the civil rights of acquaintances and relatives of fugitive leaders of the Weather Underground, a radical antiwar group. Mr. Felt's lawyer gave his opening statement at the outset of the trial.

Mr. Kennelly told the jury that the defense would prove that L. Patrick Gray, then the Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, had approved the use of break-ins and that Mr. Gray had written in memorandums, "Hunt the Weathermen to exhaustion" and "no holds barred."

Mr. Gray, who faces a separate trial on the same charges, denies approving the break-ins. Judge Bryant has ruled that attorneys for Mr. Miller and Mr. Felt may use as a defense the argument that they were acting on the orders of their chief.

Guidelines Said to Be Unclear

Mr. Kennelly said that guidelines covering break-ins by the bureau were unclear at the time, despite a 1972 Supreme Court ruling requiring court warrants for such searches except when they were approved by the Attorney General in national security cases.

He said that it was not until 1977 that President Carter formally authorized the Attorney General to conduct searches without a warrant in national security cases.

As a street agent and supervisor, Mr. Kennelly noted, Mr. Miller received commendations from the bureau's former Director, J. Edgar Hoover, "for the very conduct for which he now stands accused: conducting surreptitious entries. Not once. Not twice. Ten times."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A11THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
7 October 1980

Prosecution in FBI Break-in Case Ends Questioning

Kleindienst Not Put on Stand But He May Testify Later

Prosecutors yesterday questioned their 23rd witness and rested their case at the three-week-old trial of two former FBI chiefs accused of approving illegal break-ins in a hunt for radicals in 1972-73.

Wrapping up their presentation, prosecutors submitted as evidence 1976 testimony in which former FBI officials W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller told a grand jury they did not recall seeking Attorney General Richard Kleindienst's approval for the break-ins.

In that testimony, Miller said, "I have no idea," when he was asked whether he sought the attorney general's OK for the break-ins and Felt responded with a flat, "No."

Prosecutors contend Felt, the FBI's former No. 2 man, and Miller, its former intelligence chief, acted without Kleindienst's knowledge in approving "black bag jobs."

Chief prosecutor John W. Nields Jr. chose not to call Kleindienst, whose approval was required for the bureau to conduct legal break-ins in a national security probe.

Defense lawyers, contending the government had failed to prove its case, filed a lengthy motion asking Chief U.S. District Judge William Bryant to issue a directed verdict of acquittal for their clients.

The prosecution did not explain why it decided not to call Kleindienst. He may still be asked to testify as a government rebuttal witness or for the defense, since Felt and Miller argue Kleindienst delegated the surveillance authority to the FBI.

Defense lawyers have said that in presenting their side over the next four weeks, they may

call former President Richard Nixon and attorneys general dating as far back as Herbert Brownell, who served in 1954.

Felt, 67, and Miller, 56, are charged in the unprecedented case with conspiring to violate the civil rights of acquaintances and relatives of fugitive leaders of the Weather Underground, an anti-war organization linked to terrorist bombings.

Both Miller and Felt contend they approved the nine break-ins on the OK of then-acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray, and that the "bag jobs" were part of a legitimate national security investigation.

The government's final witness, former Miller aide Thomas J. Smith, testified under pointed questioning from Nields that he knew of no instance where the Weather Underground break-ins were discussed with Kleindienst.

Nields asked Smith if a Supreme Court ruling on June 19, 1972, did not make clear "the decision of whether an American citizen may be subject to a wiretap is the decision of a judge, or on some very limited occasions, the decision of the attorney general."

"That's correct," Smith told the jury.

Smith, however, contended the FBI director had authority to approve the surveillance.

Smith testified that in June 1973, after Felt and Miller had approved the bag jobs, Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox asked the FBI for all internal memoranda regarding approval of break-ins.

He said Miller informed Cox there were no such records — but mentioned generally that break-ins had been conducted in foreign counterintelligence investigations. Miller did not disclose the Weather Underground break-ins, Smith said.

On Friday, Nields contended that testimony about the withholding of evidence from Cox would show Miller's "consciousness of guilt" over approval of the break-ins.

United Press International

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ON PAGE A6

THE WASHINGTON POST
7 October 1980

U.S. Prosecutors Rest Case Against Two Former FBI Aides

United Press International

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2LOS ANGELES TIMES
1 OCTOBER 1980

THE NATION

FBI agents broke into two offices of the Arab Information Center and at least one other site in a search for Palestinian terrorists following violence at the 1972 Munich Olympics, according to testimony at the trial in Washington of two former FBI officials charged with conspiring to approve illegal break-ins. An earlier disclosure mentioned a "black bag job" at the information center's Dallas office Sept. 7, 1972. The latest disclosures said a second break-in occurred at the center's Chicago office on Oct. 6, 1972. Details of the third black bag job were not made public in order to protect U.S. intelligence secrets, which could indicate it took place at an embassy or consulate.

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Miscellaneous

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 4HUMAN EVENTS
11 October 1980

Security Breach Involved?

Mondale Protege On the Spot

It was not a good week for David L. Aaron, the dovish protege of Vice President Walter Mondale who was appointed to a top position on the National Security Council to offset the more hawkish Zbigniew Brzezinski.

First, Aaron refused to appear before a House Armed Services subcommittee investigating the politically motivated leak of secrets involving the Stealth aircraft. Retired Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, former chief of naval operations, has charged that two top White House officials have told him that Aaron played a key role in leaking the Stealth secrets, a move designed to counter Reagan charges that the Administration has let the nation's defenses slip dangerously.

Aaron did supply a sworn statement that he had nothing to do with the Stealth leaking. But presidential counsel Lloyd Cutler informed the subcommittee that President Carter has refused to let Aaron appear on the grounds of executive privilege.

Subcommittee Chairman Sam Stratton (D-N.Y.) was not persuaded, saying Carter could not forbid Aaron's testimony because executive privilege covered only White House advisers and their direct dealings with the chief executive. Stratton said his subcommittee would probably subpoena Aaron for public testimony when the House reconvenes. But that will be after the election—which is, of course, the way Carter wants it.

The other problem for Aaron was the spelling out of his possible role as the loose-talking official who may have compromised a top U.S. spy in the Soviet Union. Rumors of Aaron's involvement have circulated in the capital for months. Both the FBI and CIA have been quoted as saying there is no substance to the allegation.

As columnist Jack Anderson wrote last week, Aaron "may be as innocent as the White House insists he is. But my own investigation indicates otherwise."

Anderson's office talked with four intelligence sources who are not only familiar with the case but who have been scrupulously accurate in the past. They claim that Aaron let slip some ultra-secret information at a party, that an intercepted diplomatic dispatch proved he talked out of turn and that the White House is more anxious to cover up the embarrassment than to uncover the truth.

Aaron's slip allegedly exposed the identity of Anatoly N. Pilatov, a Soviet intelligence officer who worked undercover as an American agent known to the CIA by the code name "Trigon." According to Anderson, Aaron, who has access to the most supersecret "blue line" documents—several levels above those marked "top secret"—mentioned to a Soviet bloc diplomat some facts that had come from Trigon dealing with Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons.

According to Anderson, a Third World diplomat happened to overhear the conversation and reported it back to his government. The cable was intercepted by the National Security Agency, which monitors all overseas communications, and caused immediate repercussions.

"The message was such an embarrassment to the White House that, under an executive order for the protection of private individuals, it was supposed to be destroyed. Yet I understand a copy was kept and might be ferreted out if the FBI looked hard enough. Shortly thereafter, the CIA cancelled all 'blue-line' clearances. This was done, sources say, because Aaron had compromised the documents and had 'rolled up one of our agents.'"

That Trigon was "rolled up" is beyond dispute. The Soviet press has reported that he was executed as an American spy following a secret military trial in 1978. Some CIA officials believe he committed suicide to avoid further torture. His Moscow lawyer claims he is still alive, serving out a 15-year sentence.

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ON PAGE A32

NEW YORK TIMES
9 OCTOBER 1980

Delay Ordered on Ex-Spy's Suit

TRENTON, N.J. Oct. 8 (UPI) — A Federal district judge has postponed until Oct. 20 a hearing on whether to dismiss a \$1 million suit filed by a former spy who charges that she was poorly trained for her work. Judge Dickinson Debevoise granted a request by the Government for time to respond to the complaint by Carmen Mackowski, a Cuban-born American. Mrs. Mackowski was jailed in Cuba for eight years for spying on her former husband, Alfred Ruiz, a top Cuban espionage official.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 46-47THE WASHINGTON POST
9 October 1980

Salvadorans Training At U.S. Sites in Panama

By Christopher Dickey
Washington Post Foreign Service

PANAMA CITY—The United States is in the process of training as many 300 Salvadoran military officers at its Panama Canal area military schools in how to deal with suspected guerrillas in their country while observing human rights.

The decision to begin the instruction, taken last summer without fanfare by the Carter administration and the military-civilian government it backs in El Salvador, is described by U.S. officials here as "extremely sensitive" and "experimental."

The training represents a significant compromise among the disparate elements of the Washington bureaucracy on the extent to which the United States should support the Salvadoran military and reinforce its ability to deal with a growing guerrilla opposition and control its population in an increasingly war-torn environment.

El Salvador for years has been a battleground between rich and poor, right and left. But in the past year, since the Carter administration began taking an intense interest in its fate, it has become a center of confrontation among the State Department, the Pentagon and the intelligence community.

The training by U.S. personnel of Salvadoran lieutenants, captains and commissioned officers in Panama has a heated debate within the administration last winter about plans to send three dozen U.S. military training teams into El Salvador to teach basic discipline and skills to the armed forces.

That proposal, strongly supported by the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, was vehement-

ly opposed by a number of State Department officials, including U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White, who argued that it would be interpreted in San Salvador as a return to U.S. counterinsurgency policy in Central America.

Already, the Panama compromise program is perceived in the region as further evidence of the United States' growing identification with El Salvador's increasingly conservative government, which took over from a rightist military dictatorship under promises of reform one year ago.

The training program has become the focus of an intense propaganda campaign on the part of Central American leftists, and U.S. officials fear it may complicate negotiations with Panama on the fate of U.S. military schools here, now that the transition to Panamanian control of the former Canal Zone has begun.

White, a career diplomat regarded as one of the toughest spokesmen for the administration's human rights and reform policy in Latin America, has been a central figure in the controversy throughout.

"White is the guy that is calling all the shots in El Salvador," said one U.S. military official here. According to both diplomatic and intelligence sources, White has opposed any major CIA or Pentagon interference in the policy the State Department has laid out for the country.

Soon after White arrived in El Salvador last April, he oversaw the replacement of the CIA station chief at the embassy. These sources said that White has since discouraged the CIA's head of Central American operations from visiting the country.

Lt. Gen. Wallace H. Nutting, chief of the U.S. Southern Command based in Panama and responsible for the military security of the region, has asked to visit El Salvador on several occasions and has been told by White not to come because of "bad timing."

White essentially has maintained that the solution to El Salvador's problems will have to be political, social and economic—that the military threat from the guerrillas trying to topple the U.S.-backed government is, over the long run, the least dangerous factor, and that elements within the military itself may threaten the government.

Military and intelligence officials emphasized the need to back up the Salvadoran Army as much as possible.

"This is not purely a political problem," Gen. Nutting said recently. "There's violence, military action. The solution as it appears to me would be a political-military solution."

Nutting denied that he had any serious disagreements with White, said he was aware of the social and economic problems and expressed belief that steps should be taken to improve them.

Nutting did not see any possibility of direct U.S. military intervention in El Salvador. But he added, "Unfortunately a lot of people are unwilling to consider a more active involvement as a result of Vietnam... The problem is how do you manage the situation so they [the Salvadoran soldiers] are left to do it themselves... My own view is that the Salvadoran forces need to improve their proficiency in a technical, professional sense, and if we can do that I think we should."

One way of doing this, planned as long as a year ago, was to send U.S. military training teams into El Salvador, fewer than 50 men altogether, to teach basic discipline and skills to the Salvadoran armed forces.

White vehemently objected to any such move. "I just didn't want them in the country," White said in an interview. "It would involve the United States in an on-the-ground situation in a country in revolution and put us right in the middle." He added, however, that he had no objection to some forms of military aid.

White agreed to a plan to send \$5.7 million worth of nonlethal military aid to the government.

In the months since, basic economic reforms have been put into effect. The Salvadoran left, which was growing ever more unified earlier this year, shows signs of breaking up along the old philosophical lines that kept it divided for most of the 1970s. The once broad-based civilian-military junta has grown increasingly conservative, with power now concentrated in the hands of the most conservative military commanders.

CONTINUED

Since the beginning of the year, more than 6,000 persons have died in the continuing political violence, most of them at the hands of Salvadoran military and paramilitary forces, though an increasing number are being killed by leftist revolutionaries.

A nationwide strike called by the left in August failed to demonstrate widespread popular support, and the insurgents have since been on the political defensive, trying to prove both at home and abroad that they are still, as they have long claimed, the vanguard of the majority of Salvador's people.

Militarily, however, their initiative has not only retained its previous strength, it has grown stronger, and the left is on the offensive.

According to U.S. diplomatic and intelligence sources, as well as representatives of the guerrillas themselves, the revolutionary forces in El Salvador are better trained, better equipped and better able to mount major assaults on the Salvadoran government's troops than ever before.

Meanwhile, as one U.S. diplomat put it, "We haven't given this military a stick or a stone." Of the \$5.7 million available in military aid, about \$2 million has actually been used. Approximately \$350,000 was set aside for training, and in the middle of last summer, the decision was made to use it for the Panama program, and training middle and lower level Salvadoran commanders—the people who actually are in the field being killed and, historically, ordering most of the killing. Since Aug. 11, Salvadoran cadets, noncommissioned and lower ranking officers have been sent to Panama to receive from U.S. forces much the same instruction that the military training teams would have given them in El Salvador.

The three-week course at the U.S. Army School of the Americas at Ft. Gulic in the former Canal Zone is specially designed for Salvadoran soldiers. Although soldiers from all over Latin America have received training there since the mid-40s, Salvadorans had not been received at the school since the Carter administration cut off military aid to the deposed Salvadoran regime of Gen. Carlos Humberto Romero.

The course is titled Human Rights Aspects in Internal Defense and Development. Gen. Nutting described it recently as an effort to teach "how to be nice to people while you force them to do what you want them to do. How to assert force without being brutal."

The curriculum includes situational exercises where the arrest of a possible guerrilla is simulated, proper safeguarding and processing of suspected insurgents with respect for individual human rights, use of the nonlethal tear gas and masks the United States has been sending to El Salvador, care of weapons, psychological operations (described as "civic action and how to be a nice guy," by one official), and histories of various insurgent movements.

So far, 100 Salvadoran officers and noncoms have taken the course, according to U.S. military sources here. By the end of the year about 250 will have completed it. Another 40 are taking technical training, mainly in mechanics and equipment maintenance, at U.S. Navy and Air Force schools in Panama.

The training of Salvadoran troops in Panama is an extremely sensitive issue, according to officials there. The local press has been filled with sensational stories that U.S. troops are actually being readied for or are participating in combat in El Salvador. There are allegations of secret graveyards and all kinds of exotic, brutal skills being taught. There is no substantiation for any of this, but the entire status of the Panama Canal Area Military Schools during the transition from United States to Panamanian control over the canal area has been brought into question.

If the Salvadorans can no longer train in Panama, one official said, "We may have to train them in the United States."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2WASHINGTON WEEKLY
7 October 1980

Big Media Reporters Cover Up Evidence of Letelier as Cuban Agent

Reed Irvine

Just four years ago, in September 1976, Orlando Letelier was assassinated in Washington, D.C. Letelier had been the Chilean ambassador to the United States and later a cabinet officer in the Marxist Allende government of Chile. He had been imprisoned by the military government that overthrew Allende in 1973, but he was later released and allowed to go into exile. Coming to Washington, he was gone to work for the Institute for Policy Studies, a radical think tank. One of his main activities was to work for the overthrow of the military government in Chile. He said that he was working for the restoration of human rights in his native land.

The Letelier assassination shocked the nation, and it brought forth numerous articles in the press and stories on television, first at the time of the murder, and later when three men were arrested and convicted for the crime. It continued to attract widespread attention when the U.S. government sought the extradition of the Chilean intelligence chief, charging that he had ordered the murder of Letelier. The affair has come in for additional publicity this year with the publication of a new book about the case, and most recently when a federal court ordered new trials for three anti-Castro Cubans who had been convicted of participation in Letelier's assassination.

Despite all the thousands of words that have been written and spoken about the Letelier case, almost nothing has been said about the papers found in Letelier's briefcase at the time of his death. These documents showed that Letelier was regularly receiving \$1,000 a month from Cuba and that he hoped to eventually do for Chile what Castro had done for Cuba. The real Letelier was hardly the fighter for human rights and democracy that the public Letelier pretended to be.

Many of these revealing documents were leaked to some members of the press late in 1976. They were discussed by some syndicated columnists, but they were virtually ignored by news reporters. There seemed to be a feeling by many in the media that it was inappropriate to expose to public view the evidence that Orlando Letelier was a Cuban agent. It

was even suggested that those who sought to reveal this information were trying to condone his assassination.

That is ridiculous. The media did not refrain from saying unsavory things about Anastasio Somoza for fear of being accused of condoning his assassination. They have an obligation to the public to tell the truth about Letelier.

FBI Files Released

Accuracy in Media has obtained the Letelier briefcase papers from the FBI, using a freedom of information request. This complete file shows that Letelier was working closely with Cuban intelligence and that he had ties to both the East Germans and the Soviets. He was being paid regularly from Havana, and he was very anxious to keep the Cuban connection secret, knowing that its exposure would impair his effectiveness. In one letter to his paymaster, the Chilean wife of a high ranking Cuban intelligence officer, Letelier boasted of his "apparatus" in the United States. He had persuaded a number of prestigious Americans to serve as a facade. Letelier warned that care should be taken to keep the Cuban connection secret. He feared any hint of that would cause some of his liberal sponsors to resign. "You know how these 'liberals' are," he wrote.

The evidence in the files indicates that Julian Rizo, Castro's top spy in the U.S., was Letelier's "control." Rizo was stationed at the UN in 1975. He is now ambassador to Castro's client state, Grenada. He and Letelier were in frequent contact. Letelier was also in touch with another top Cuban intelligence agent, Teofilo Acosta. His address book contained home and office phone numbers for the Cuban foreign minister and the head of the Cuban Communist Party, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. The address book also shows that Letelier had excellent journalist contacts in the U.S., especially at the *Washington Post*.

The briefcase papers provide a glimpse of the secret activities of an important agent of influence for the Soviet bloc. The failure of the media to tell the story is one more indication of how vulnerable this country has become to manipulation by the agents of influence and disinformation of our enemies.

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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
7 October 1980

Exploring the Soviet's Growing Oil Needs

By ERIC MORGENTHAU

First, let's conjure up a nightmare.

Take everything that's happening today in the Middle East—that most unstable of regions—and add one more ingredient: A Soviet Union almost as hungry for the area's oil as the West is.

It's a haunting prospect. The Soviet Union is the world's biggest oil producer and its second-biggest oil exporter (after Saudi Arabia). Nonetheless, it acknowledges that it's experiencing production problems, and some Westerners worry that the Russians could find themselves in dire need of major oil supplies during this decade—a development that could have enormous political consequences, particularly in the Mideast.

The most celebrated doom-and-gloom forecast was a 1977 study by the Central

Intelligence Agency—which predicted that by the mid-1980s, the Soviets and their East European allies would be net importers of some 3.5 million to 4.5 million barrels of oil daily. The CIA subsequently lowered that estimate, and last year it apparently withdrew it. However, it sticks with its analysis of Soviet problems—the Russians won't have the money to pay for all those imports of oil.

ing in vain for the hard currency to buy some of the more innovative technology imports—to use in trying to boost the country's oil output. "Part of his difficulty was that he lacked the documentation to prove how urgent his needs were," he writes. Enter the CIA.

It cannot be demonstrated conclusively, but there are indications that the 1977 CIA report proved to be a major factor in prodding the Soviet authorities into action, writes Mr. Goldman—who calls the report "a self-defeating prophecy." He notes, for instance, that shortly after the report appeared, the Russians "in rapid order" signed several major contracts with Western suppliers; the contracts had been in the works for years, but the minister hadn't been able to get approval to sign them.

Whatever the reason for the Soviet activity, it is picking up speed (although the Russians really haven't begun to tackle such central—and sensitive—problems as the contradictions in the state's planning and incentive systems). "Unlike some of their rivals in the West the Soviets do have an energy policy," Mr. Goldman observes.

Among other things, it calls for increased use of nuclear power, natural gas and coal—as well as fuel conservation on all fronts. In 1977, energy consumption per unit of gross national product—which had risen 1% a year from 1971 to 1976—leveled off, Mr. Goldman says, and it since has begun to fall.

In their quest for new oil, the Soviets even are inviting capitalists to drill and explore on their land, in some cases offering them a share of any production.

Mr. Goldman also thinks it's in America's interest to assist the Soviets in such efforts. "Anything that can be done anywhere in the world to increase petroleum production would seem to be in our long-range interest," he writes.

The Soviets have tremendous reserves with which to work. The country's oil reserves are estimated to be larger than those of all other countries except Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran. Its gas reserves are the world's largest—some 35% to 40% of the world's total.

At current world prices, the Soviets can afford to push even farther out into the Siberian wastes and waters, and at the same time import the foreign technology needed to enhance output, Mr. Goldman says. "Thus the Soviets probably have the wherewithal to sustain petroleum production and conceivably increase it."

He continues: "Exports will fall at some point, but there is good reason to suspect that it will not be quite as soon as the CIA says, and even if exports do fall, the periodic increases in world prices make it possible for the Soviets to earn the same amount of foreign exchange while exporting less."

Indeed, it's the value of the oil for ex-

port that's behind much of the Soviet push. Mr. Goldman calls the USSR "a one-crop economy, at least in terms of its exports to the hard-currency countries." In 1978, more than half its hard-currency exports were petroleum.

But what if the original CIA predictions of huge imports by the Soviets and their satellites, who rely on the Russians for most of their oil, came true?

The effect on the Soviet economy would be "disastrous," says Mr. Goldman. The effect on the world economy probably wouldn't be much better. Indeed, if the Soviets were importing 3.5 million to 4.5 million barrels a day (and no longer exporting 1.5 million barrels a day, as they have been recently), the strain on the market would be comparable to that caused by the loss of Iranian output during the months surrounding the revolution there.

As for politics, the possibilities are endless. And many of them are possibilities that even the Russians would just as soon avoid. As Mr. Goldman notes, "There is good reason to believe that any change in the existing political makeup of the major OPEC countries is as likely as not to be adverse to Soviet interests."

Mr. Morgenthau, a member of the Journal's London bureau, covers the Soviet Union.

The Bookshelf

"The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum"

By Marshall I. Goldman. Allen & Unwin. 214 pages. Cloth-\$19.95. Paper-\$7.95.

Some European analysts predict that the struggle for scarce resources—chief among them, oil—will be at the center of the East-West conflict for the balance of the century.

This makes Marshall Goldman's new book, *"The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum,"* particularly timely. Mr. Goldman is professor of economics at Wellesley College, associate director of Harvard University's Russian Research Center—and a leading American expert on the Soviet economy.

Mr. Goldman generally takes a more positive view of the Russians than some commentators—often pointing out that despite the ideological and bureaucratic encumbrances of the Soviet system, the Russians can deal with problems when they need to. And that's generally the approach he takes to the question of their oil supplies.

Mr. Goldman says that in recent years the Soviets have come to see their oil problems as urgent—and they're beginning to act, though so far only in limited ways. Ironically, he says, their recognition of the problem was due in no small part to the CIA. Indeed, he calls the 1977 report "the answer to the Minister of Petroleum Industry's prayers."

Since the early 1970s, Mr. Goldman says, the Soviet minister had "been glead-

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
7 October 1980

BILLY NOT ALONE

Agents for Other Lands: a Who's Who

By ROBERT L. JACKSON
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Former CIA director William E. Colby is one. So are former Secretary of State William P. Rogers, former Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford and former Sen. J. William Fulbright. And, of course, Billy Carter.

The capital, in fact, has more than 600 of them—"foreign agents" who have registered with the Justice Department as lobbyists, lawyers and propagandizers for almost every country on earth.

Billy Carter is just the latest and most publicized.

The President's brother was forced to register as a Libyan agent only when threatened with a federal lawsuit. But many agents are quite willing to disclose their activities and fees.

"The law is very clear that our government expects other countries to do this," said Colby, who is helping Japanese interests obtain political intelligence from Washington.

Report Available to Public

Colby—Like Rogers, Clifford, Fulbright and hundreds of others—has filed a brief report with the Justice Department that is available for public viewing. This is required by the Foreign Agents Registration Act, passed by Congress in 1938.

Colby, the nation's top spy from 1973 to 1976, said in his report that he has "collected information and prepared studies" for the Center for Political Public Relations in Tokyo, an institute for political information. He has also "briefed Japanese visitors on American political affairs."

"I help them understand what's happening in Washington," he said in an interview. "I'm not lobbying."

Unlike his years of shadowy work for Uncle Sam, Colby said, "I'm doing all this on top of the table. I

insisted on that with my Japanese colleagues."

Why do foreign countries with large, well staffed embassies in Washington need agents like Colby?

"Well, obviously they're foreigners," he said. "Many of them understand America very well but maybe someone like me understands how the mechanism works a little better. If you go mountain-climbing in Nepal, you'd better hire a local guide."

Japan Has Many Contracts

Japan, in fact, has more local guides than Colby. It has financial contracts with at least 15 Washington-based consultants; public relations specialists and law firms, including the firm where former Sen. Fulbright (D-Ark.) is a partner.

Struggling to keep tabs on this vast array of foreign agents and representatives is an understaffed unit at the Justice Department that has only seven attorneys.

Housed in a shabby office building a block from departmental headquarters, this unit has not prosecuted a big case since 1963, when it went after newspaper columnist Igor Cassini for failing to register as an agent of the Dominican Republic.

Cassini, the brother of fashion designer Oleg Cassini, was close to the Kennedy Administration. But unswayed by his White House links, Justice Department attorneys obtained an indictment charging that he had willfully concealed \$195,000 in agent's fees through a dummy corporation in the Bahamas.

Cassini eventually pleaded "no contest" to the charge, was fined \$10,000 and was placed on probation for six months.

There are obvious parallels to the case of Billy Carter, who tried to hide his receipt of \$220,000 from the Libyan government until pressed by the Justice Department.

But according to Philip B. Heymann, the department's criminal division chief, the difference was that in the Cassini case the government found a written contract stating that Cassini considered himself a foreign agent. Heymann said the department doubted it could prove to a jury that Billy Carter considered himself an agent.

The President's brother registered as a foreign agent last July after department attorneys filed a civil, not a criminal, action against him.

Billy's receipt of \$220,000—although he called it an undocumented loan—is not an excessive sum for agents who are deemed influential. Most large law firms that employ or are owned by former U.S. officials—including Clark Clifford's—can command six-figure contracts as foreign agents.

Clifford's firm was paid \$119,000 by Algeria during a four-month period in 1978 for furnishing legal services and advice on foreign relations, energy and trade matters, public filings show. Algeria's previous foreign agent—former Atty. Gen. Richard G. Kleindienst—was paid \$286,000 over two years.

Rogers, after serving as secretary of state in the Nixon administration, helped represent the government of Indonesia as well as Air France, the official French air line.

His firm, which also includes former Assistant Treasury Secretary Eugene T. Rossides, received \$385,000 from Air France for congressional lobbying and legal work to obtain U.S. landing and takeoff rights for the supersonic Concorde.

'Another Set of Eyes, Ears'

Other successful "foreign agents" are former Sen. George A. Smathers (D-Fla.), former Rep. James W. Symington (D-Mo.) and former commissioner A. Sydney Herlong of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

They are partners in a law firm that has a \$300,000-a-year contract with South Africa to arrange meetings with U.S. officials and to advise on trade and foreign policy issues. Symington says he helps give South Africa "another set of eyes and ears in Washington."

Most registered foreign agents are U.S. citizens but, as Symington says, "I would hardly do anything inimical to our national interests." A liberal with a strong pro-civil rights record when he served in Congress, Symington said he saw no conflict in serving a country that has a tradition of "apartheid" or separation of the races.

"The government over there is trying to make some gestures toward reform in labor unions, in elementary and secondary education and in public accommodations," he said.

CONTINUED

"We're helping to bring South African officials into contact with both black and white leaders in this country. In fact, we wouldn't have taken the assignment if they had a closed mind on the subject."

One of Symington's tasks is to counter pressures by some U.S. churches to have American business withdraw their investments from South Africa. Such moves, if successful, could only reduce jobs for that country's black population, he said.

Aside from performing legal work and lobbying government officials, foreign agents frequently call on members of the press. Deaver & Hannaford, a public relations firm with ties to Ronald Reagan, has listed the names of more than 100 business and editorial page writers it has contacted this year on behalf of Taiwan.

Michael Deaver, one of the firm's partners, is the traveling chief-of-staff for the Reagan presidential campaign. Peter Hannaford is a campaign adviser on a part-time basis.

Their public file at the Justice Department shows that they earned \$30,000 from Taiwan for the first six months of 1980, plus \$10,682 in expenses.

Sydney S. Baron & Co., another registered agent for Taiwan, listed other press accomplishments, including: "Arranged for Cue magazine to go to Taipei to cover the Golden Horse Awards."

Robert L. Keuch, the Justice Department's expert on the foreign agents' registration law, said the typical agent "is going to claim as much credit as he possibly can when things go well for his client."

"Every time Parade magazine or a major newspaper publishes a favorable article, you tell your foreign country. 'Ah, see what I've done,'" Keuch said.

Law Not Prohibitive

He believes, however, that "99% of those who are registered are engaged in perfectly legal activities." Unlike most criminal statutes, the foreign agents' law generally does not prohibit anything, Keuch said. It simply says that if you represent a foreign country you must publicly disclose what you're doing, he explained.

Keuch said he did not know how many foreign agents there may be who have never registered. But when the department finds them, it presses them to file disclosure statements, often under threat of a civil lawsuit, as in the case of Billy Carter.

The government has gone to court only 16 times in the last eight years to force registration, but it has never lost a case, he said.

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WASHINGTON WEEKLY
7 October 1980

SARAH

The Central Intelligence Agency has been having "Nights With The CIA" at its Langley headquarters for Washington area alumni of Ivy League colleges.

When they get there, they are introduced to name-wearing employers of the CIA who also attended those colleges. The pitch is made to recruit new employees from these alumni. The real Chamber-of-Commerce type selling job is done for help in passage of the H.R. 5615, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which was slated to come before the House late in the week of Sept. 22 and probably later before the U.S. Senate.

The bill amends the National Security Act of 1947 to provide criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of information identifying undercover U.S. intelligence officers, agents, informants and sources. This is why the personal contact on a name basis between the employees and their college mates seems unusual.

Even though the alumni get invitations, they still are screened after they accept.

They meet Admiral Stansfield Turner and hear all about the public relations office which the CIA maintains for contacts with the public.

Looking around the expensively appointed building and learning that the CIA has many other officers in downtown Washington and Rosslyn, Va., some of the alumni to think that the CIA must be spending almost as much money as the Department of Defense. The difference is that the DOD expenditures are variable by item as Congress approves each item.

The evening's conclusion is: The CIA needs recruits badly.

by
Sarah McClendon

Heroin Hustle

**How Robert Allen Put
An Oriental Drug Ring
Behind Bars in the U.S.**

**Agent Posed as Mob Figure
For Three Years, Helped
By Charcoal Charlie Wu**

Winnie Chan Lends a Hand

By STANLEY PENN

* * * *

Supplies From Southwest Asia

But despite such efforts, heroin recently has been moving into the U.S. in increasing amounts, according to U.S. narcotics officials. The East Coast cities of New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Boston, Baltimore and Newark, N.J., are particularly hard hit. In Boston, the purity content of heroin sold to addicts has risen 10% in the past six months, an indication of its increased availability, Robert Stutman, in charge of the drug-enforcement agency's Boston office, says.

The growth in the heroin supply is largely the result of a bumper opium crop last year in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. After the substantial local consumption, more than a third of the crop—60 tons of heroin—was available for export to European, U.S. and Canadian markets, according to U.S. intelligence estimates.

Because of the heroin influx, many of New York State's 416 drug-treatment centers are being forced to operate beyond their capacity, a state official says. Deaths from heroin overdoses in New York City alone may exceed 600 this year, against 471 last year and 246 in 1978, it is estimated.

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AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
6 October 1980

Space Reconnaissance Dwindles

Phase-out of high resolution film satellites in early 1980s
could result in 'technical fragility,' Air Force chief says

Phase-out of two U.S. Air Force imaging film reconnaissance satellite programs is raising concern among military analysts over a shortage of high resolution strategic reconnaissance capability in the early 1980s at a time when U.S. dependence on satellite reconnaissance will be growing.

The concern is not universal, however, because replacement of the film spacecraft by a much more flexible satellite has inherent advantages.

Dwindling supply of film-based reconnaissance satellites is one example of a serious situation across the defense space spectrum where increased dependence is being placed upon programs with limited and even shrinking resources.

Air Force Secretary Hans M. Mark characterizes this overall defense situation as one of "technical fragility" because there is little depth in many critical defense space assets. This is occurring at a time when increased isolation of the U.S. has placed added demands on space-based surveillance, early warning, communications and telemetry intercept systems. All U.S. imaging reconnaissance spacecraft are vulnerable to Soviet antisatellite attack.

Pivotal issue in the reconnaissance satellite situation is replacement of the two film return spacecraft programs by the new KH-11 strategic response satellite that transmits its pictures by digital radio link. Film provides higher resolution than transmitted images and many analysts are concerned that phase-out of the film capability will prevent them from seeing important details on Soviet hardware.

Another body of analysts, however, believes the KH-11 can provide the necessary coverage through the early 1980s, when supplemented with the limited number of film spacecraft remaining. The KH-11, although having a lower resolution capability, can provide far more repetitive coverage than the film-based spacecraft, which have a finite film and reentry vehicle supply. The film spacecraft have been operated for 20 years by USAF while the KH-11 is a Central Intelligence Agency project. Institutional conflicts between USAF and CIA on reconnaissance satellite operations is a factor in the concern being aired. Current reconnaissance satellite operations use all three projects. Their operations involve:

■ High resolution film spacecraft—

Only four remain in the USAF inventory and are being held in reserve for serious military emergencies. The vehicles are launched from Vandenberg AFB, Calif., on Martin Marietta Titan 3B-Agena boosters and have at least two reentry vehicles. These return images with resolution up to 6 in.

The spacecraft normally have 50-80 day lifetimes and are typically launched into 125 x 347-km. (77 x 215-mi.) orbits inclined 96.4 deg. Reduction of perigee as low as 69 mi. facilitates extremely high resolution imagery. Film pods are recovered by Lockheed C-130 transport as the pod descends near Hawaii. Last spacecraft of this type was launched May 28, 1979, and ceased orbital operations Aug. 15, 1979. It is the depletion of these highest resolution spacecraft to only four remaining vehicles that has military officials most concerned. Many analysts believe this strategic reconnaissance capability is too thin to support high priority if not dire emergency operations until the space shuttle enables 6-in.-class resolution film cameras to be launched in the mid 1980s.

■ **Broad-coverage film spacecraft—**
Enough of these spacecraft remain to support operations only through 1983 under current planning. They are launched from Vandenberg AFB on USAF Titan 3D boosters and carry four film reentry vehicles. The spacecraft have orbital lifetimes of about 179 days. Built by Lockheed, they have 5-6 month lifetimes and typically fly in 250 x 160-km. (155 x 100-mi.) orbits inclined 96.4 deg. Eighteen have been launched since 1971, the last on June 18, a satellite that is still operational.

■ **KH-11 digital image spacecraft—**
The new spacecraft has high resolution although not as good as the film spacecraft. The KH-11 provides substantially longer missions. Three have been launched since Dec. 19, 1976. The first operated for 25 months. The second, launched June 14, 1978, is moving into its 28th month of service, and the most recent vehicle, launched Feb. 7, is also still operational. These spacecraft normally operate in 440 x 300-km. (273 x 186-mi.) orbits inclined 97 deg. Their images are transmitted and processed in a manner similar to that operated by NASA for the Landsat spacecraft. The ability to have images returned to the ground almost instantly, instead of by widely spaced film pods, greatly enhances the real-time utility of the information.

Higher resolution image transmission systems are under design. A modified version of the current KH-11 with higher resolution will be launched from Vandenberg AFB about 1984 (AW&ST Dec. 10, 1979, p. 66). This spacecraft also will transmit data via digital transmission, but with a resolution closer to what the film spacecraft are providing now. This vehicle can be launched by either the Titan 3D or space shuttle and later models will be retrieved by the space shuttle for refurbishment once their consumables are expended.

Two additional new reconnaissance programs under definition for the late 1980s also would use digital transmissions, but imaging radar instead of cameras so they can look through clouds at Soviet or Warsaw Pact targets.

One spacecraft is being developed specifically to assist reconnaissance over Europe to help pinpoint Warsaw Pact armor while the second program is a Navy ocean surveillance project designed to use radar to monitor Soviet ship movements (AW&ST July 7, p. 13).

Only new film-based system under consideration would involve placement of cameras in the space shuttle payload bay for use over extremely high priority targets where the resolution provided by the image transmission vehicles was inadequate. Use of the space shuttle as a reconnaissance platform would be done only on a limited basis and still needs additional definition.

Space shuttle missions for reconnaissance and other military programs are becoming an issue. Mark told the Electronics & Aerospace Systems Conference in Washington last week: "We are developing the shuttle with an institutional structure which I am very much afraid will make it impossible to use the vehicle to the best advantage for national defense."

Mark said he believes "technical fragility" extends especially to launch vehicles in the 1980s. He defended the space shuttle strongly, but he also noted that if the U.S. does not retain expendable booster capability, "it will turn out that there are instances where you don't want to use the shuttle for a particular launch and then we will be up against a problem." He advocated study of the MX missile as a new expendable space booster.

"It is not all clear whether a complete replacement of expendables by shuttle is such a good idea," Mark said. "Back in 1973 and 1974 we had to make those arguments or we would never have had a space shuttle." He said now it is time to take a more realistic approach to projected launch needs and the U.S. should begin development of new expendable launchers simultaneously with bringing the space shuttle on line. He believes the unique payload capabilities of the shuttle will sustain its own space business, but that the current NASA/Defense Dept. institutional relationship will not facilitate most efficient use of the vehicle for national defense missions as envisioned.

"What we did was decouple the development of the launch vehicle completely from the user," Mark said. "NASA is in fact a minor user and not the driver. That's something the NASA folks don't like to hear, but it is true. We therefore have a situation where we have a new launch vehicle but various user communities are afraid to get on it."

Current shuttle manifest carries about 30% Defense Dept. payloads, with the bulk of the missions commercially sponsored flights. NASA sponsored missions make up a low percentage of shuttle flights.

In order to decouple booster development from NASA and possibly even the Defense Dept., Mark said, a special entity is needed to act as a booster development organization. He did not suggest any specific organizational structure but said it should be specifically geared to facilitate user involvement. New booster development should begin in advance of new expendable booster payload requirements. The secretary opposes continued use of the Atlas/Titan/Delta stable because of their technical obsolescence.

The secretary cited three specific areas that he believes are intensifying Defense Dept. dependence on space systems:

- **U.S. isolation**—"I think it's a political fact of life that the U.S. will become more and more isolated from regions of the world where there is trouble." He cited the Iranian/Iraqi conflict as an example where we have none of the usual diplomatic representation that could provide data on the war. "I think this situation is going to continue and unfortunately get worse. A clear consequence is that it puts a greater burden on the things we do in space to find out what's going on." He singled out satellite communications and surveillance as areas specifically affected.

- **Antiballistic missile defense**—Vulnerability of land-based ICBMs, even with deployment of the MX mobile missile, will increase demand for a U.S. antiballistic missile system, Mark believes. He said use of space early warning systems to accurately characterize an incoming Soviet ICBM raid would be a significant development that could lead to U.S. non-nuclear ABM system. Greatly advanced space-based early warning systems coupled with advanced electronics could place the intercept tracking capability within the ABM itself, allowing so accurate an intercept that a conventional warhead could be used and a massive ground radar system would not be needed for ABM control. Mark was optimistic about the development of a new U.S. ABM system, but noted that the current ABM treaty "could be harmful to what we want to do in the future."

- **Arms limitation verification**—Current and future verification of arms limitation agreements requires high capability strategic space reconnaissance systems and will continue to be a defense space program driver.

Mark said that the fragile operational status of several important defense space programs has occurred because of funding constraints coupled with an attitude in the Defense Dept. to sell the projects on technical performance.

He contrasted this with advocacies keyed more toward a project's importance to the international political and national security environment.

Mark believes promoting the projects on technical performance has allowed gradual cutbacks when the space systems performed at or above specifications and experienced few launch failures. This tended to reduce costs and the number of spacecraft procured. The U.S. is now feeling the effects of a too conservative procurement policy, Mark and other defense space officials believe.

"Several of our important systems are actually at risk in terms of having them stopped at some point and we'll get no data at all," Mark said. "I don't think we have painted the political consequences of our inability to know what's going on in the Persian Gulf [for example] if a few transistors fail, and yet that's where we are now. If I were to list a major failure of my four years in the Pentagon, it is that inability to translate the problems I see into the terms that our political bosses can understand."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 34THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
6 October 1980

The Tragic Jamaican Drama

By GEORGE MELLOAN

KINGSTON, Jamaica—In one of the gutted buildings that face the docks, a few goats pick their way through the rubble, nibbling at what they can find. A shabby, dreadlocked Rastafarian, one of Jamaica's ganja-smoking underclass, sprawls in the ruins, oblivious to the goats and all else. Up a garbage-littered side street, an improvised barricade can be seen, a protection against marauders.

This is a Sunday morning in downtown Kingston, a place that resembles a war zone. In a sense, it is a war zone. The pop of small arms fire can be heard almost any night and in the mornings the bodies are counted. 21 in one recent week, most of them victims of political combat. A former prime minister, Hugh Shearer, was wounded in an ambush in July. Heavy iron grilles, improvised concrete-block walls and barbed wire are a part of attempts to protect homes and businesses against roving gunslingers. Basic foodstuffs such as corn meal and rice have been scarce in the stores, not to mention soap and dozens of other common items. A lively black market exists in U.S. dollars and foreign merchandise, some of it smuggled in from places like Port au Prince and Panama City by professional "shoppers" with oversized suitcases and good friends at the airport customs counters.

Jamaica, a virtually bankrupt country, has not been devastated by an invading army but by its own government, which over the last eight years has piled up the world's most impressive record of official ineptitude. The man responsible, Prime Minister Michael Manley, was all the while being lionized by America's liberals and the Socialist International as one of the world's foremost exponents of the "new economic order" and one of the noblest warriors against imperialism.

The policies and proclamations that have won Mr. Manley such high praise on the liberal cocktail circuit are not winning him admiration today inside Jamaica, particularly among the poor people he has so eloquently claimed to represent. "Manley is a joke!" snorts a hotel maid who pays one-fourth of her \$80-a-week wage in taxes, spends \$2 a day to ride the government's disintegrating buses, can't find basic needs in the stores and can't send her children to school because no one has fixed the school's plumbing and there are no books.

A Jamaican journalist says Mr. Manley is the kind of politician who has no understanding of money or business, who thinks promising something in a speech is equivalent to making it happen, who is, tragically, little more than a charismatic wordsmith.

Concerned About Castro

Mr. Manley will face the voters in late October. He and the other parliamentary candidates of his People's National Party will be opposed by the Jamaica Labor Party, headed by Harvard-educated Edward P.G. Seaga, who has held portfolios in finance, planning, development and welfare in previous governments and has been Jamaica's representative to the IMF and other international financial institutions. Mr. Manley will certainly lose unless he can stage, once again, some new version of what the Jamaican writer calls a "Reichstag fire." In the last previous election, in 1976, this took the form of proclaiming a coup threat, declaring a national emergency, and clapping many of the JLP candidates in jail. But the Jamaican police and security forces, under new leadership and increasingly concerned about the PNP's flirtations with Fidel Castro, have recently taken an independent line, so much so that they have come under political attack from the government itself. They will not likely go along with a repeat of the 1976 exercise.

Mr. Manley may be fortunate if he makes it to the election without suffering a total cutoff of imports or a seizure of some of the country's external assets. His government is beset by creditors on all sides. A red-faced businessman encountered at the baggage carousel at Kingston airport says he is trying to collect \$16 million owed the factoring firm he represents. A U.S. bank syndicate is currently polling its members on what to do about a remarkable government request that not only principal but interest payments on a \$78 million loan be suspended for six months. The government's electric utility is threatened with an oil cutoff if it doesn't pay its overdue bills.

Mr. Seaga has worked out a detailed income-expenditure statement showing that the government will need \$220 million more in foreign exchange than it has any current prospect of obtaining just to keep the country going until the end of the year. There is little doubt that Mr. Manley called an early election—well in advance of the statutory requirement for a vote by 1982—in the hope that he could win a new mandate before Jamaica's lights go out.

The one positive thing about Mr. Manley's record is the lesson it holds for any

other third world leader who might care to heed it: He is the victim of what in British parlance would be called his own bloody-mindedness. To win the hearts of Jamaica's masses and the adulation of American liberals, Mr. Manley began early to wage war against wealth and privilege. His weapons included high taxes, currently 57% on personal income above \$12,000, expropriation of private property and, most damaging, public vituperation aimed at anyone who so much as owned a car or a house.

He thus encouraged the baser elements of Jamaican society to feel justified in inflicting whatever violence they might choose on their "oppressors." Chinese merchants, many of whom had been in Jamaica for generations, were among the first victims of this campaign and most fled for their personal safety. Other people have followed to the point where a local businessman says there is hardly anyone left who could be considered wealthy. One estimate, perhaps high but not unbelievable, holds that Jamaica has lost 40% of its middle class to the U.S., England or elsewhere. The country has suffered five straight years of declining gross national product, a record seldom matched anywhere in the world. Industries that haven't gone out of business entirely have suffered a lack of competent managers, spare parts or foreign exchange. Unemployment is some 30%.

One of the few private entrepreneurial activities still flourishing is the shipment of illegal ganja, or marijuana, to the States. It is widely believed that the ganja trade is controlled by a mysterious organization called "the Coptic Church," whose members, like the Rastafarians, are said to consider Haile Selassie a still-living god and ganja-smoking a vital ingredient of their religion.

CONTINUED

The Copts are getting very rich, buying up real estate, a supermarket, a trucking firm, etc. And the word around Kingston is that if you badly need U.S. dollars to buy, say, a spare part for your factory, you probably won't get them from the government but you can certainly get them, at about a 40% exchange rate premium, by going through a Coptic connection. The ganja trade, estimated at \$200 million a year, is thus the basis for a sizable sub rosa banking operation as well. And, as one Jamaican puts it, "It's the only thing keeping this economy going." In advertisement of this presence, bumper stickers have sprouted in Kingston with the words, "It's Coptic Time" superimposed over a stylized drawing of a marijuana plant.

To get some idea of how the poor fare in this kind of political economy, visit the Maverly neighborhood of West Kingston, with its badly maintained streets and mostly dilapidated little houses. A look inside one two-room dwelling where eight people live reveals that the cooking is done on a smoky charcoal brazier. "We've gone from gas back to kerosene and now back to charcoal," says the head of the household, who makes his living with a small shop. But even though charcoal is cheaper than kerosene or gas, the price of a bag of charcoal, once \$1, now is \$12 as a result of Jamaican inflation.

In addition to food shortages, rising prices, lack of jobs, a closed school and other problems, the people of Maverly live in constant fear for their safety. Murder, rape and political intimidation are endemic to such neighborhoods. The two political parties measure the tide of battle by whose graffiti survives on a neighborhood's wall, a fascinating manifestation of the territorial imperative.

Under Every Bed

Of course, the violence is waged by both sides. Leaders have tried recently to restrain their followers and the murder rate has dropped from the July peak of 131 bodies. But any idea of a clean election is remote. The government-controlled Jamaican Broadcasting has been finding CIA agents under every bed, all intent on overthrowing Michael Manley. U.S.-based CIA balter Louis Wolf was here in July to finger 15 embassy employees as "agents" and succeeded in getting the homes of two embassy families attacked with a bomb and gunfire.

The Daily Gleaner, Jamaica's only non-government news organ of any importance, was recently shut down by a pressmen's strike. Since the PNP-affiliated union is making an exorbitant wage demand well above an arbitrator's proposal, Gleaner management cannot be blamed for speculating that Mr. Manley wants to keep the paper quiet during the pre-election period. The Gleaner's writers, many of whom once supported Mr. Manley, have mostly turned against him as the country has collapsed. He has attempted to retaliate in the past by, among other things, threatening to shut off the paper's newsprint flow.

Then there are the Cubans from Jamaica's big neighbor just to the north. Mr. Manley and the authentic Marxists who have become a part of his government have invited in Fidel Castro's "doctors" and "teachers" and allowed them to fan out around the country to do the thing they do best, political indoctrination. In addition, some 1,500 young Jamaicans have been to Cuba to "learn the construction trade." The fact that they are called "brigadistas" gives some clue to what they were really there to learn.

There are stories of secret camps in the bush, to which young men from the neighborhoods disappear, of mysterious helicopters flying about and of strange khaki-clad men being seen on remote beaches. While this may be partly fiction, an event in April gives reason to wonder. A group of men landed in a boat at the Kingston docks one dark night, set up a heavy machine gun outside a hall where the JLP was holding a dance, called out some JLP members and gunned them down, leaving four dead and 10 wounded. They then disappeared as quietly as they had come.

With such things occurring it is not surprising that people on both sides have predicted civil war if the other side wins this month. More detached observers believe things may quiet down.

But whoever wins will find the job no bargain. Without new infusions of money and talent, once-prosperous Jamaica is heading toward becoming a subsistence economy. And it will be the poor who will suffer, because they will be the only ones left.

This is the first of three articles on Caribbean politics by George Melloan, the Journal Editorial Page's Deputy Editor, who recently toured that area. Subsequent stories will deal with El Salvador and Nicaragua.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-1**WILMINGTON SUNDAY NEWS JOURNAL (DEL.)
5 October 1980

FBI probing ex-spy's role in task force

By **JOE TRENTO**

Staff reporter

WASHINGTON — A former CIA agent, already wanted in a plot to murder a high Libyan official, tried to shake down the director of naval intelligence; the FBI has learned.

The same suspect, who was the civilian head of the highly secret intelligence Task Force 157, is also charged with private illegal arms deals.

Edmund P. Wilson, who has been wanted on a federal fugitive warrant since April, has become a pawn in the rivalry between the two admirals who run the U.S. intelligence community.

One of the two, Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, director of the National Security Agency (NSA), confirmed last week that he had asked for an FBI probe into Wilson's activities.

A spokesman for the other, Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said the CIA would have no comment on the matter.

Turner, a classmate of President Jimmy Carter at the Naval Academy, has failed in his attempt to convince the president to put all American intelligence activities under the CIA's control.

Inman, a little-known intelligence professional who is highly respected by Congress, earned Turner's wrath because the NSA has been given increasing control over the nation's spy satellite program. Inman's agency is responsible for the nation's secret electronic communications, intelligence messages and cryptography.

The Sunday News Journal has learned that in recent weeks Turner and his deputies in the CIA have briefed reporters from major news organizations about Wilson and Task Force 157, which grew from a small naval intelligence operation into a large-scale spy group. Those familiar with the briefings say the CIA has tried to lay the blame for the task force's problems at Inman's feet.

Assistant U.S. Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella Jr., chief prosecutor in the case against Wilson, confirmed that the investigation into Wilson was prompted by a complaint from the CIA that Wilson had been palming himself off as a CIA agent. The CIA told Barcella that Wilson no longer had anything to do with the agency.

What the CIA apparently did not know is that Inman gave extensive testimony to FBI investigators about what he had learned about Wilson and Task Force 157.

Inman, in a rare telephone interview, told the Sunday News Journal that he closed down Task Force 157. "I closed it down because it was out of control and because its continued operation was a drain on Navy resources."

"I fired Wilson because I thought he was a petty grafter, what we call a 5 percent."

The most serious charge in the indictment against Wilson is his alleged involvement in a conspiracy to murder an opponent of Libyan leader Moammar Khadafy in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1977.

The indictment, handed down in Washington last April, also includes several counts of conspiracy to ship rifles to Libya. Then, as now, the United States had a ban on shipping weapons to Libya.

Wilson, 56, whose arms dealings made him a multi-millionaire, remains at large. When Wilson failed to respond to the indictment on April 23, U.S. District Court in Washington issued a warrant for his arrest.

According to Barcella, Wilson is believed to be "moving between his offices in Switzerland and London or at his home in Tripoli [in Libya]. Most likely he is in Tripoli."

Barcella said he has talked with Wilson's attorney, Seymour Glanzer. Glanzer refused to comment on his client.

From sources in the CIA, at the National Security Agency, the FBI and in the Congress, the Sunday News Journal has put together an account of Task Force 157, Wilson's connections to the CIA and Inman's actions.

Task Force 157 was formed in 1968 by Admiral Thomas Moorer, when he was chief of naval operations, to give naval intelligence better communications and human spy capabilities.

When Henry Kissinger began his secret negotiations with China in 1971, he asked for military communications because he distrusted the CIA. Moorer offered him the Task Force and its secret frequencies — called the "SR 1 Channel."

In its investigation, the FBI found out that Wilson and his cronies — who had infiltrated the task force at the behest of the CIA — were actually sending the information to the CIA.

In 1974 Kissinger told a Senate committee that a Navy clerk assigned to his office, who had access to "eyes-only" messages to President Nixon, was also forwarding them to Moorer.

By the time Inman shut down the unit in late 1975, Task Force 157 had grown from a few intelligence operatives to 167 field agents and 200 headquarters officials.

Using a number of phony business fronts, the task force became a free agent, competing with and undermining other intelligence groups and dealing directly with foreign governments, some them hostile to the United States.

It was involved in a wide range of intelligence activities, many paralleling the activities of the CIA, including evaluating Soviet ballistic missile strength and anti-submarine warfare.

Inman told investigators that millions of dollars being spent by the task force could not be accounted for.

The bulk of the staff was drawn from CIA contract spies, not on full-time duty with the agency, or from the military. Exactly how the task force was put together and how it grew is still not clear.

After Wilson was fired by Inman, he resumed his contract work for the CIA by organizing a group of Cuban refugees to conduct terrorist activities in South Africa and Latin America. A number of the task force employees had been CIA-trained. Cuban operatives were hired by Wilson, according to FBI sources.

Although Wilson worked with the Task Force 157 project from 1971 to 1975, he remained on the CIA payroll and reported to Theodore Shackley, who had been former CIA director Richard Helms' right-hand man for clandestine operations.

When Inman fired Wilson, Shackley called the admiral and urged him to keep Wilson on. Shackley, reported not to be with the CIA any more, could not be located for comment.

CONTINUED

Inman, now 49, has served in nearly every top-level military intelligence post. He was director of naval intelligence from 1974 to 1976, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency between 1976 and 1977 and since then head of the NSA.

Inman told the FBI his troubles with Task Force 157 preceded his taking over naval intelligence in 1974.

When he was the naval intelligence officer for the Far East, he had been rebuffed in repeated attempts to learn about Task Force 157. He told the FBI that the task force reported directly to Washington and answered to no one in the field, a procedure considered highly unusual in the Navy's decentralized command system.

His disenchantment with the task force began early in his tenure as head of naval intelligence.

He learned that one task force employee had received kickbacks on contracts given to a company that supplied small boats for intelligence missions. The employee was fired by Inman but no charges were ever placed because a public trial might have compromised defense secrets.

After Inman took over naval intelligence, Sen. John J. McClellan, D-Ark., the powerful chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, invited him to brief committee staff members on the Navy's use of the F-18 jet fighter.

After the briefing, Inman told the FBI, a member of McClellan's staff suggested that they have lunch to discuss how the Office of naval Intelligence could get its budget requests through the Senate smoothly. Inman described the staff member to the FBI as "McClellan's bagman."

Here's what happened then, as Inman related the story to the FBI:

Inman and an aide went to a nearby restaurant, where the McClelland aide introduced him to Edmund Wilson.

During the lunch, Wilson told Inman that his agency would have clearer sailing with McClelland's committee if Wilson's companies were given certain contracts for duplicating and other office services.

In the midst of the conversation, which Inman told the FBI made him a "little sick," Wilson suddenly said, "You know, admiral, I work for you."



Spy chiefs: Bobby Inman of the NSA (left) and CIA's Stansfield Turner.

Wilson told Inman he headed World Maritime, a company set up to channel secret money on behalf of Task Force 157. Wilson also invited Inman and his wife to his 600-acre farm in Upperville, Va. — "an invitation my wife managed to get us out of," the admiral told the FBI.

Inman told FBI agents, and the Sunday News Journal, that Wilson was nothing but a "5 percenter, a small time grafter" who was trying to shake down the chief of naval operations. FBI sources say they are investigating the charge.

Task Force 157 operated out of an Alexandria, Va., office tower not far from the Pentagon, where Wilson created a number of other business fronts to operate the unit. These included World Maritime, Aero-Maritime Corp. and Pearce Morgan Inc.

The Navy has never officially

given any public acknowledgement of the task force.

Its existence surfaced, however, in an appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board by 10 former task force employees who want retirement and federal service credit.

Washington attorney Bernard Fensterwald, who represents them, says that the men are all secretive about what they did for the task force.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 18THE WASHINGTON POST
PARADE MAGAZINE
5 October 1980

PARADE'S SPECIAL

intelligence report

by LLOYD SHEARER

If Reagan Wins

If Ronald Reagan is elected President in the forthcoming election, whom will he appoint to the top Cabinet and agency positions?

The guessing game is in full stride. Mentioned frequently for Secretary of State is George P. Shultz, 59, who served under Richard Nixon as Secretary of Labor, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and Secretary of the Treasury. Currently a vice chairman of Bechtel Inc. in California, a director of J.P. Morgan & Co. and other corporations, Shultz was educated at Princeton as an undergraduate, earned his Ph.D. in industrial economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and was dean of the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago.

Shultz is held in high regard by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France and Helmut Schmidt of West Germany, both of whom reportedly regard Jimmy Carter as appallingly indecisive and Reagan as dangerously inexperienced. Shultz would be welcomed and respected abroad.

Another possibility as Secretary of State is Henry "Scoop" Jackson, Democratic U.S. Senator from Washington. The rumor is that Reagan will offer Jackson the position in an effort to form a truly bipartisan Cabinet, including the best men he can get regardless of party affiliation. Jackson, 68, a Senator since 1952, is a staunch conservative in foreign policy and a veteran anti-Communist.

A third name in the Secretary of State sweepstakes belongs to William J. Casey, 67, manager of Reagan's campaign. Casey served as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission under Richard Nixon and as a chief intelligence agent in the Office of Strategic Services in World War II.

Regardless of whom Reagan selects as his State Department chief if elected, he will surely appoint Richard Allen as his National Security Council adviser. Allen worked for Nixon in National Security until Henry Kissinger allegedly maneuvered him into resigning. Allen is a friend of Seymour Hersh, the former New York Times Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter, and he may have had access to Hersh's unfinished biography of Kissinger—a source which might well prevent Reagan from appointing Kissinger to any vital position or mission.

Reagan has a plethora of competent candidates for Secretary of the Treasury. The two leading lights at this writing are William Simon, 52, who served as Shultz's Deputy Secretary of the Treasury under Nixon and later as Gerald Ford's Secretary of the Treasury; and Caspar Weinberger, 63, HEW Secretary under Nixon and Governor Reagan's Director of Finance in California.

John Connally is another former Secretary of the Treasury who could easily hold down the same job in a Reagan Cabinet. Connally, however, seems slated to become

Secretary of Defense, which is probably why he recently made his first tour of Israel to see personally how perilous the Middle East situation really is.

Gen. Alexander Haig, who helped engineer President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon, has also been mentioned as a possible Secretary of Defense. But Haig is recovering from coronary-bypass surgery, and it is more likely that Reagan will offer him the directorship of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other intelligence establishments.

One of the most important positions in any Presidential Cabinet is the Attorney General, who runs the Justice Department. Reagan's lawyer for the past 17 years has been William French Smith, 63, one of the senior partners of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, a prominent Los Angeles law firm. Smith is a trustee of the Ronald Reagan Trust, a personal family friend and tax adviser, and a shrewd, personable Republican who undoubtedly can have the job if he wants it.

No matter how and with whom he structures his Cabinet, Ronald Reagan will retain as his closest adviser in all matters his wife Nancy. His faith in her judgment of people, her assessment of situations, her advice on which course of action to pursue remains steadfast and inviolate. If Reagan obtains the Presidential mantle, it is she who will help direct his wearing of it.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
ON PAGE A-9

WASHINGTON STAR
5 OCTOBER 1980

The Nation

■ Experts on Terrorism Call U.S. No. 1 Target

The United States and its people are "No. 1 on the hit parade list" for international terrorism, according to three experts who spoke at the sixth annual convention of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers yesterday. Taking part were: Richard Bates, a retired U.S. Navy captain in intelligence and vice president of the group; Ambassador Anthony Quainton, director of the State Department's Office for Combatting Terrorism, and Ray Kline, a former deputy director of the CIA and former head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence.

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ON PAGE A10

THE WASHINGTON POST

5 October 1980

Court Orders Administration to End Suppression of Register of Diplomats

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

For the past year, the Carter administration has been pressing for a law that would make it a crime to disclose the names of CIA operatives abroad, even if the information comes from musty old public documents such as the State Department's Biographic Register.

Now the U. S. Court of Appeals here has ruled that the government has been unlawfully suppressing the Register for the past six years and must make its recent editions public.

The information in the Register, a biographical rundown on more than 12,000 government employees involved in the nation's foreign policy, can be and has been used as an aid to identify U. S. intelligence officers working overseas under diplomatic cover. Since 1974, the government has treated it as though it were stamped "Confidential," but, in fact, it has never been classified.

Instead the State Department has been refusing to make the information public solely on the grounds that its disclosure would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."

A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals held last week that the government's contentions to this effect were nothing more than a smoke-screen.

The lawsuit over the Register began in March 1979 after several diplomatic historians and scholarly organizations had demanded access to it under the Freedom of Information Act.

An annual publication, the Register had been available publicly from 1880 until 1974 when the Privacy Act was passed. The government suspended publication in 1975, then resumed it the next year on a much more limited basis, distributing copies only to selected federal agencies and congressional committees.

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and the other plaintiffs complained that their studies had been impaired, but they were turned down on grounds of the Privacy Act and an exemption in the Freedom of Information Act applicable to "personnel and medical files and similar files" whose disclosure would be a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."

The appellate court pointed out, however, that the great majority of

employees now included in the Register had already been listed in those that were public. In addition, a survey by the American Foreign Service Association indicated that most foreign-service employees favored publication of their personal biographic information.

"When the smoke fades," the court held, "it becomes clear to us that the Register is neither a 'personnel' nor 'similar' to personnel files within the meaning" of the law.

The State Department had also contended that withholding the information was proper "to protect diplomatic personnel overseas from physical harm by terrorists who could use the Register's information to justify their conduct."

The court flatly rejected the argument and scolded the State Department for "attempting to fit a square peg in a round hole." The judges said they understood the risks of violence to foreign service personnel, but they said the personal privacy exemption was simply not designed to deal with that problem.

"The government never invoked a national security claim," said Diane B. Cohn, a Public Citizen Litigation Group lawyer who argued the case in the Court of Appeals. She said government lawyers did file a secret memo claiming some other justification for refusing to make the Register public but it apparently failed to impress the appellate judges.

"The government claimed as evidence in the case that U. S. ambassadors in foreign countries had been attacked," she added. "We argued that you don't need the Biographic Register to know who the ambassador is."

The judges did hold that one traditional item in the Register—listing marital status and name of spouse—could be withheld, but they ordered the release of all other information. The government has indicated that it will appeal the ruling.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE H1THE WASHINGTON POST
5 October 1980

VIP

Spies Taking the Navy to Task

By Marine Cheshire

HE HAD WORKED for the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency and Naval Intelligence.

Finally, for more than four years in the 1970s, he worked for the Navy's super-secret intelligence unit, Task Force 157.

He was a "spy for hire," using commercial and business covers for espionage. He worked in major port cities on the East and West coasts in the United States. Because he speaks four languages, he was assigned by his military supervisors to one of Task Force 157's dozen overseas units.

When the Navy informed him in December 1976 that Task Force 157 was being "terminated," he was given nine months to relocate himself and his family, plus severance and benefits settlements totaling \$40,000.

In addition, he claims the Navy offered to give him and other undercover operatives falsified employment resumes—anything of their choosing—to assist them in getting new, non-governmental jobs.

"If I'd wanted them to say I'd been a real estate tycoon," he said, "they'd have furnished me with all the phony papers I needed to prove I'd been a whiz in the real estate business."

Some 20 of the other intelligence operatives with whom he worked are now relocated with new, mostly big-business employers, nationally and internationally, who have no idea of their real backgrounds as spies.

He himself worked for two weeks for the city government of a large eastern municipality on the basis of faked references and records which showed him to be an experienced "social statistician" and an expert in "urban studies."

"But I had always been in intelligence," he explained. "I wanted to stay in intelligence."

There, the Navy refused to help him. He was denied access to personnel records or any other documentation that would reflect truthfully where he had been working from 1972 to 1976.

Without verification of that missing federal employment, he started over, taking a \$15,000-a-year job in the Treasury Department. His last year with "157" he had earned \$35,000.

Now, he has worked his way back up to a \$25,000 salary, with an agreement from his new superiors that he will be compensated retroactively if his Navy employment is ever acknowledged.

He is one of some 30 former Task Force 157 operatives who have been trying since February 1978, to get the Department of the Navy to recognize them as federal employees, entitled to all the credits that status implies.

This past week, on Wednesday, he showed up at the Merit Systems Protection Board of the Office of Personnel Management.

The procedures have been hopelessly mired down for the past two years because the Navy has "classified" almost every piece of paper pertaining to Task Force 157.

When the Navy judge advocate general concluded that Task Force 157 members were ineligible to receive federal employee credit, the memorandum of that ruling was itself classified. According to a petition for appeal, the "Navy denied appellants access to that memorandum" and "appellants have never been informed as to either the reasoning behind Navy's denial or the nature of the record upon which that decision was based."

Duplicate personnel records which the appellants had in their possession when Task Force 157 was terminated were destroyed by them at the directive of the Navy. Now the Navy is refusing to allow the appellants access to original records on grounds that they are "classified."

The meeting on Wednesday was closed to the press by the administrative law judge who is hearing the case on the grounds that "classified" information is involved. Documents pertaining to the case have been sealed.

In a further Kafka-like twist, the Merit Systems Protection Board's Administrative law judge decided Wednesday that everyone involved in the case must get security clearances, one source said, including the appellants, the lawyers and the judge himself. And those security clearances will be conducted by the Navy, which is now a party in the case along with the Office of Personnel Management.

"The whole thing is sort of crazy. Why is the Navy fighting this?" one person close to the case said last week. "It's a no-win situation for the Navy."

Naval Intelligence Command staff officer Art Wolff said the Navy "wasn't at liberty" to say why the Task Force 157 employees were denied federal employee credit.

The only one of the appellants to show up on Wednesday was asked by the judge, John McCarthy, not to talk about anything that went on in that hearing room, and he did not do so.

The one-time spy doesn't want his name to appear in print if he can help it. He doesn't know why the Navy is taking the stand it is, he said. But he is aware that there are those who think the Navy is trying to put as much distance as possible between the military who ran Task Force 157 and the civilians who worked for them.

Edwin P. Wilson, another Task Force 157 contract worker from 1971 to 1976, was indicted last April in U.S. District Court for allegedly conspiring to ship high-powered explosives to Libya in connection with a terrorist training project. Wilson is a fugitive and is being sought by law enforcement authorities.

In April 1977, The Washington Post reported that Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner personally investigated another case where two CIA employees were accused of providing unauthorized assistance to Wilson, who allegedly was selling explosive devices to Libya.

When the decision was made in May 1977 to abolish Task Force 157, a government source said at the time, "The simple truth is that the spies are too hot to handle... there were too many questionable business deals. They got the job done, but the potential for abuse was too great."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B-2

WASHINGTON STAR
4 OCTOBER 1980

CIA Gag Order on Halperin Modified

By Jane Mayer

Washington Star Staff Writer

U.S. District Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. in Alexandria yesterday modified the protective order he imposed in 1974 attempting to silence former National Security Council Aide Morton H. Halperin.

The gag order, imposed at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency, prevented the publication of sensitive material in a book about the agency entitled "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Victor L. Matchetti and John Marks, published by Alfred Knopf.

Some 168 deletions were ordered by the court in the controversial censorship case, and

Halperin, who acted as an advisor to the authors, was told never to divulge the details of the deletions.

Yesterday Halperin, who now directs the Center for National Security Studies, asked the court's permission to submit two affidavits involving some of the material covered by the order in a new and separate Freedom of Information Act request in the District.

The FOIA request was filed in the U.S. District Court against the CIA by Monica Adres, librarian for the Center for National Security Studies.

Lee Strickland, General Counsel for the CIA, who seemed concerned about classified material involving technological methods for gathering intelligence, argued yesterday that Halperin hoped eventually to testify publicly in Adres' FOIA case — an action prohibited by the protective order.

Bryan granted Halperin's request to modify the protective order, but only slightly.

"I'll modify the order, but will allow Mr. Halperin to submit material to the judge in the District only under seal," said Bryan.

OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS

NEWS SERVICE

Date. 4 October 1980

Item No. 2

Ref. No. _____

DISTRIBUTION II UP014 (SPOOKSPILL, (BY DANIEL F. GILMORE)

R W

FAIRFAX, VA. (UPI) -- DEPUTY CIA DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI SAYS THE
SPY AGENCY IS PREOCCUPIED TRYING TO PROTECT THE IDENTITY OF ITS
AGENTS AND SOURCES, BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES IS BECOMING KNOWN AS A
NATION THAT CAN'T KEEP SECRETS.

"OUR COUNTRY IS BECOMING KNOWN THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AS A COUNTRY THAT CAN'T KEEP SECRETS," CARLUCCI TOLD THE ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. "WE HAVE PICKED UP ENOUGH INFORMATION TO KNOW THAT THIS IS A PROBLEM" AMONG U.S. ALLIES.

THE ASSOCIATION, WHICH NOW NUMBERS 2,500 FORMER MEMBERS OF THE CIA, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, THE FBI AND MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES OF THE ARMED SERVICES, WAS FORMED IN 1975 AT THE HEIGHT OF INVESTIGATIONS AND JOURNALISTIC EXPOSES OF PAST MISDEEDS.

CARLUCCI SAID HIS CHIEF CONCERN NOW IS THE "PROTECTION OF OUR SOURCES AND METHODS."

THE UNITED STATES BEGAN DEVELOPING A REPUTATION AS A NATION THAT COULD NOT KEEP SECRETS IN THE 1970S, BECAUSE OF INFORMATION RELEASED UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THROUGH BOOKS BY FORMER INTELLIGENCE AGENTS, HE SAID.

"THERE ARE NO FRIENDLY BOOKS" ABOUT U.S. INTELLIGENCE, HE SAID. "THE BEST INTENTIONED BOOK RAISES A LOT OF EYEBROWS" AMONG U.S. ALLIES.

CARLUCCI SAID CIA DIRECTOR STANSFIELD TURNER URGED HIM TO TELL THE INTELLIGENCE VETERANS "NOT TO TALK TO JOURNALISTS."

AS HE SPOKE, THE PRESS TABLE INCLUDED THE EDITOR OF COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN, WHICH SPECIALIZES IN PUBLICLY IDENTIFYING U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENTS WORKING ABROAD.

"WE SEE NO REASON WHY A GROUP OF MISGUIDED AMERICANS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO REVEAL IDENTITIES OF OUR PEOPLE OVERSEAS AND DISRUPT THEIR ACTIVITIES," CARLUCCI SAID.

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(SPOOKSALL) _____

AMONG RESOLUTIONS APPROVED FRIDAY NIGHT BY THE ASSOCIATION, WHICH HAS HAD A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVOLVED WITH INTELLIGENCE MATTERS, WERE THOSE URGING CONGRESS TO:

--"ENACT LEGISLATION WHICH WOULD MAKE IT A CRIMINAL OFFENSE FOR ANY PERSON TO MAKE ... DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES."

--INVESTIGATE THE "DEPLORABLE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNDS" THROUGH THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM BECAUSE OF A "HIGHLY INACCURATE AND BIASED AND THREE-PART PROGRAM ON AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. THE RESOLUTION ASKED FOR CHECKS "WHICH WILL PRECLUDE FUTURE USE OF PUBLIC MONIES TO PRESENT MISLEADING MATERIAL DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE THE NATIONAL SECURITY."

--"TO CONSIDER AND PASS LEGISLATION MAKING IT A CRIME FOR ANYONE TO MAKE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE."

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2 of 2

PORTLAND OREGONIAN
25 September 1980

First Amendment demands spy bill repair

A spy bill working its way through Congress needs an overhaul. Sens. Mark Hatfield and Bob Packwood should lobby their colleagues on the Senate Judiciary Committee to modify defective portions of a bill that would make it a crime to publish non-secret information containing the identity of a covert CIA operative working outside the United States.

Protecting the identity of covert operatives and FBI informers is necessary, but their anonymity need not, and should not, be ensured by ravaging the First Amendment with a sweeping prior restraint on publishing.

Among the bill's problems is that it does not define what constitutes an "intentional" identification of an agent, leaving that up to prosecutorial imagination and the courts. Nor does the proposed act set out what it means "to impede and impair" intelligence activities.

The fact that a person could spend three years behind bars and be fined \$15,000 for publishing non-classified material that names a cov-

ert operative is disturbing in the extreme. It rekindles fears that an unscrupulous administration, by threat of prosecution, might exploit the bill's vagueness to muzzle journalists from exposing CIA misdeeds or blunders.

The legislation was prompted by CIA dismay and anger in July after the Washington-based publication, "Covert Action Information Bulletin," alleged that 15 Americans in Jamaica were CIA operatives. Within days, two on the list were the targets of violent attacks.

Indeed, intelligence agents must be shielded from such journalistic ambushes. The Senate bill could be changed to do that while remedying its current, repressive overtones.

And, in addition to curbing their own abuses, the intelligence agencies could make it unlikely that the legislation ever would have to be used if they employed their considerable energy to keep the secret lists of agents and informers in their files just that — secret.

THE GUARDIAN (U.K.)
23 September 1980

Earthquake team deny Russia's CIA claims

By Cella Barnett

THE leader of an international scientific expedition yesterday denied Soviet claims that its work in Pakistan, including a study of earthquakes, was a cover for CIA operations.

Allegations against the 70-man expedition — which contained scientists from Britain, China and Pakistan — were made in the Soviet

Communist Party newspaper Pravda.

Professor Keith Miller of Sheffield University, who returned on Saturday from the three-month trip, said he would ask the Russians for a retraction.

The expedition was arranged by the Royal Geographical Society to explore the Karakoram mountain range of the Himalayas.

It is an area full of miles-long glaciers where two land masses — the Indian and Asiatic plates — collide at the rate of six centimetres a year. Floods and earthquakes are common — the Karakoram fault is bigger than the San Andreas fault in California.

An engineering scientist, Jim Bishop, died when he was climbing precipitous rocks in July. Five members of the team caught hepatitis, a virus infection from dirty

water. Other illnesses contracted included pleurisy, typhoid, pneumonia and dysentery.

But they still achieved major breakthroughs in the study of glaciers and earthquakes, said Professor Miller. Their study of glaciers should enable them to learn more about their water capacity, sources of irrigation and sedimentation.

The results of the expedition's study should be drawn together by next September.

Already Pakistan's government is setting up an international Karakoram research institute in the capital, Islamabad.

Professor Miller added: "We should start laying down the basis of a future expedition and it's already been suggested by various sources that we should combine with the Chinese and do some work in Tibet."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
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THE NATION
20 September 1980

Royal Secrets

The White House has announced a new super classification known as "Royal." The category would supposedly be reserved for ultrasecret stuff, and only the President, a handful of White House officials and a few Congressmen would have access to it. Some may question whether this is a truly new system or a counterploy to reports that an intercepted Libyan cable about Billy Carter was classified Royal and that the term is actually "a compartmental designation to protect the White House from political embarrassment," in the words of *New York Times* columnist William Safire.

The official explanation is that Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner and Zbigniew Brzezinski plumped for the new system. It seems there is so much classified material being turned out these days that intelligence people can't tell the difference between normal and really sensitive information.

Rather than set up a private Presidential security system (with access limited to a Royal "we"—shades of Richard Nixon!), we propose that all classified material—whether Confidential or Top Secret Umbra or so secret that the classification is classified or even Eyes Only Rosalynn—be declassified and deposited in a Spy Library. The Spy Library would be open to all foreign agents, registered or unregistered, who can prove a sincere interest in espionage. It will be an open-stack library with all the documents precisely indexed. The spies will thus be free to snoop around to their hearts' content. The difference is that they will no longer have their work done for them by the Government. Without the various levels of classification clearly stamped on each document, it will be impossible for them to tell what is a "normal" secret and what is a "really sensitive" one. *The Nation* volunteers to serve as a repository for this material if the Carnegie people will come up with a suitable building. Something in travertine marble, please.

—

THE NATION
20 September 1980

THE U.S. AND ANGOLA

The Recognition Factor

CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS

The overused title of "front-line state" could have been coined for Angola. After more than a decade of anticolonial war, followed by a short, sharp civil war and invasion, its Government is still besieged. To the south is Namibia, where South African occupation forces double as the allies of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the anti-Marxist and antiwhite guerrilla group led by Jonas Savimbi. To the east is Zaïre, which still smarts at the reverse it suffered in 1975, and still blames Angola for the social turbulence in its Shaba Province (formerly Katanga). To the west is Ronald Reagan, who would be surprised at how closely the Angolan Government is following his campaign.

The last time that covert action was tried in Angola was in 1975, when Henry Kissinger, seeking a bully little intervention as a tonic for America's post-Vietnam malaise, dispatched Central Intelligence Agency advisers and \$14 million worth of arms to UNITA and Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (F.N.L.A.). As John Stockwell, chief of the C.I.A.'s Angolan Task Forces, shows in his book *In Search of Enemies*, Cuban troops were drawn into the conflict and crushed Roberto's and Savimbi's armies. The C.I.A.'s role was duly exposed, the United States was tainted in Africa by its collusion with South Africa, and the South Africans were angered because they felt the United States had deserted them after they had intervened covertly on the side of the rebels. A zero-sum game all around. The F.N.L.A. was wiped out, and Savimbi's fortunes have waned, as forces of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.) get more of a grip on the southern provinces whence he draws support. But Reagan's expressed desire to aid this champion again has created quite a ripple in Angola's capital, Luanda.

At the height of the South African invasion this past June, when armored columns had penetrated two southern provinces and advanced aircraft were blitzing the positions of the South West Africa People's Organization and Angolan economic targets, I had an interview with Lucio Lara, organizing secretary of the M.P.L.A. and the "number-two man" in the Government. He is white, like many other members of the central committee, and one of the founders of the resistance against the Portuguese. We discussed, among other things, the fact that Britain and America had abstained on the United Nations vote condemning the inva-

sion. Lara was especially interested in the campaign in the United States to repeal the Clark amendment, which bans U.S. assistance to any group in Angola for military purposes.

Under the provisions of a new law governing covert action, if the relevant Congressional committees were informed privately, the President could authorize intervention in the interests of "national security." Lara felt that in the atmosphere following the Afghanistan invasion—which Angola rather guardedly supported—such tactics had a fair chance of being revived. Thus, the credit that Angola had gained by its cooperation in the settlement talks for Namibia and Zimbabwe would be thrown away. The Angolans rather miss Cyrus Vance, who said recently that it makes no sense not to recognize Angola, "a government with which we have cooperated in the search for peace in southern Africa despite fundamental differences on other issues."

The issue that blocks "normalization" at the moment is the presence of Cuban troops in the country. I asked Lara if he would ask for their help in combating the South African invasion. He replied that such assistance had not been requested, but that it would be if the invaders moved much farther north. Angolans are very sensitive to the charge that they are propped up by Cuba, and great efforts are being made to train an army that can replace them. But they are candid: While South Africa occupies Namibia and retains complete command of the air, the Cubans will have to stay. (The South Africans, incidentally, have not claimed any Cuban participation in the recent fighting.)

While American politicians waver about recognizing the M.P.L.A. Government, American businessmen are behaving in a surprisingly bullish way. Luanda's few decent hotels are stuffed with men on leave from Cabinda, where the Gulf Oil Corporation has always enjoyed the best of relations with the M.P.L.A. The U.S. Export-Import Bank is negotiating a \$96 million oil project for the country. The Boeing Company is building an airport and Lockheed is reportedly training pilots. The businessmen I talked to were typically apolitical, but they did volunteer that the M.P.L.A. is shaping up better, and that bureaucracy and inefficiency are steadily diminishing.

Christopher Hitchens is the foreign editor of the New Statesman.

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The campaign against Angola, then, is basically a vindictive rather than a strategic one. The circles who promote it are motivated by a feeling that they wuz robbed, that there was a stab in the back, that they "lost" Angola. It is seen as a fairly cheap way of punishing the Russians for Afghanistan. But even a brief visit to Angola shows that the Cuban forces are not—as is the Red army in Kabul—a force of occupation. Nor, with their black and mixed-race composition, are the Cubans as literally incongruous as the Russians. There would be little popular leverage for a destabilization campaign to work with.

In the South, I did hear bombs go off at night in the provincial capital, and I did see the damage done to the Benguela railway. But I also saw thousands of the local Ovimbundu tribe, who are Savimbi's base of support, returning from the bush and the hills and giving themselves up. The M.P.L.A. is under no illusions about this. It knows that hunger and illness have brought these people in, and that the new arrivals do not trust "the white man's government in the North." But the work of reconciliation is underway, and this has driven Savimbi to rely more and more on direct South African help.

Since the Benguela railway is Angola's lifeline to Zambia, and since it is owned by foreign concessions, and since South Africa tenderly insures that no trains are blown up but only track destroyed, it will take a very hard heart in the White House to decide that Angola has not suffered enough. □

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 237NATION
20 SEPTEMBER 1980**ITEM. ITEM. ITEM.**

■ Almost buried in the landslide of words written about the Billy Carter affair is the charge that he had met with a gunrunner named Frank Terpil to discuss the sale of a quantity of machine guns to Libya. (Billy now denies the meeting took place.) The stories did little more than identify Terpil as a former C.I.A. man, but a fuller picture of his gunrunning enterprises emerged in a Federal grand jury investigation in Washington last year. The hearings resulted in the indictment of Terpil and his associate, Edwin Wilson, also a former C.I.A. man, for illegal arms shipments to Libya, conspiracy to transport explosives, conspiracy to murder and failure to register as agents of a foreign government.

The indictments (reports Murray Waas) charge that Terpil and Wilson provided Libya's Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi with "terrorist training programs" between August 1976 and January 1978. This involved sending seven instructors in the black arts to Libya; Terpil and Wilson also sold Libya "183 pounds of time-control devices" (used to detonate car bombs and the like) and explosive devices disguised as ashtrays, lamps, alarm clocks and vases.

Another of the pair's Libyan projects, the grand jury found, was the assassination of a former member of the Libyan Revolutionary Council, Umar Abdulla Muhayshi, who had broken with Qaddafi in 1975. Terpil and Wilson allegedly offered a hit man \$1 million to do the job but the actual attempt misfired. Since then, nine other Libyan exiles have been assassinated. Whether these murders were class projects of Terpil-Wilson students is not known.

In a conversation tape-recorded by U.S. undercover agents, Terpil boasted that he had successfully carried out an assassination for former Ugandan dictator Idi Amin. There is an even more tantalizing revelation from a New York City D.A.: "By his own admission, Mr. Terpil trained Illyich Ramiriz Sanches, who is known as 'Carlos,' an internationally wanted terrorist, who is believed to have led the raid on the Israeli Olympic team in Munich in 1972."

In Terpil and Wilson's defense it could be said that they only turned their hands to what they knew best—terrorism—rather than engaging in something truly reprehensible like writing an unauthorized book about the Agency.

OMAHA WORLD HERALD
20 September 1980

Lid on FBI, CIA Too Tight

White Hats Need Some Help

An increase in terrorist activities in the United States is feared in the wake of the murder of an aide to the Cuban Mission at the United Nations.

A 41-year-old attache, Feliz Garcia-Rodriguez, was apparently shot by a sniper as he drove his car along a busy street in Queens on a weekday evening.

An anti-Castro terrorist group called Omega 7 claimed responsibility for the killing.

Kenneth B. Walton, the deputy assistant director of the FBI's New York office, said:

"We had indications some months ago that the bombings may stop and other activities may accelerate. The other activities were to start killing people."

In statements sent to news outlets, Omega 7 called itself an anti-Communist organization that wants to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro.

The victim was a lower-level employee, and apparently his death was mainly for the publicity and shock value.

Castro pros and cons aside, the slaying was, as Donald F. McHenry, the chief U.S. delegate to the United Nations said, "a stain on the United States."

The official added:

"We are dealing with a very tight group of fanatics and it is very difficult for the FBI to crack that group because it is so small and such a tight unit."

That description fits a lot of terrorist organizations, both here and abroad.

Iranian, Libyan and other "hit" squads are reportedly roaming the world plotting the assassinations of persons with differing political views.

Control of such activities is difficult. Law enforcement officials need more freedom to tap telephone wires, keep an eye on mail and other communications, and to infiltrate these groups if possible.

The FBI and others need proof that the identity of tipsters is protected. The Freedom of Information Act has been used by organized crime and others to get names of informers. As a result, a lot of information has simply dried up.

In the heat of Watergate, there was overkill in the passage of a lot of regulatory legislation pertaining to the FBI, CIA, intelligence and other enforcement agencies.

In many cases, the controls outweighed the abuses.

With terrorist groups active over the world, a nonpartisan congressional committee should review the restraints imposed on our agencies, and eliminate overly-excessive rules.

Right now, the side wearing the white hats seems to be at a disadvantage.

SAVANNAH NEWS (GA)
19 September 1980

Views on Defense

Whom do you trust on estimates of Soviet defense spending? It's not just a parlor guessing game to decide because crucial decisions about our own defense spending will depend on the estimate we pick.

According to a recent study by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Soviets are spending 50 percent more on troops and armaments than we are. But Sen. William Proxmire believes that the agency's estimate is a "gross exaggeration." He maintains that comparisons are not valid unless one considers the defense commitments of both nations and the relative efficiency of both nations' spending.

MR. PROXMIRE points out that part of the Soviets' lead in spending is offset by their need to deploy considerable forces along the Chinese border. These troops, and those used to keep a lid on dissent in Eastern Europe, he views as no great threat to us.

He further maintains that we spend our defense money more efficiently than the Soviets do and

therefore get more for a dollar — or a ruble — than they do.

THIS WE'RE not so sure about because the Soviets take care to produce and procure the best of military equipment, even if the rest of their economy can't produce a decent ball point pen. On our side, efficiency isn't what it could be when one considers the all-too-frequent examples of cost overruns for military programs and other types of waste.

And by way of further comparison, we should note that the Soviets have a much larger share of funds for the crucial area of research and development of new weapons because they don't have to spend half their military budget, as we do, on personnel. Their conscripted troops receive only a fraction of what we have to pay our volunteers, and we are now increasing that pay.

SENATOR PROXMIRE makes some points worth considering; but considering all points, we incline toward the side of the CIA.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1

THE DAILY CARDINAL
(UNIVERSITY of WISCONSIN)
17 SEPTEMBER 1980

On campus this week

CIA recruiters collar

By Steve Brunsmann
of the Cardinal Staff

Freedom of Information files obtained by the Daily Cardinal reveal that the Central Intelligence Agency, pressured by student protests against on-campus recruitment, has turned to the use of a professional placement service, for the recruiting of University Economics Dept. students.

The CIA, through one of its intelligence arms, the Office of Economic Research, contacts University students who qualify for its Economic Analysis division and arranges interviews. Recruitment conferences through the placement service, American Economic Association are held each fall. Conferences have been conducted in Washington, D.C., Dallas, New York, Atlantic City and Chicago.

Despite evidence of the CIA covertly recruiting potential employees, no University regulations exist governing CIA activities at the University.

Recruitment takes place at two levels, public and covert. Public recruitment encompasses such efforts as the National Security Agency's annual appearance on campus seeking job applicants. The CIA, in fact, holds public screening for job applicants through Career Placement and Advising, situated in Science Hall.

"Usually they call up and ask for a student in some specialty, such as Soviet economic policy."

Economics Prof. Eugene Smolensky

The CIA is tentatively scheduled to be on campus this Thursday and Friday interviewing Computer Science majors for systems analysis work. According to Career Advising and Placement, no one has signed up for this week's interviews yet, in which case the CIA recruiters will not invade Madison.

"They are a legitimate employer, whether you agree with their function or not," said Tom Johnson, director of Career Advising and Placement Service. "Some students, some faculty in fact, are not pleased with their presence. But then some

faculty are not pleased with the EPA, the TVA or the Justice Department interviewing on campus."

Covert recruiting actions involve a faculty member recommending a student to the CIA as a possible employee. The CIA then does a check into the student's past to determine if he or she would be a security risk. This is done without the student's knowledge.

Profs. Ralph Andreano and Eugene Smolensky, current and former chairpersons of the Economics Dept. respectively, said they were ignorant of the connection between the Office of Economic Research and the CIA. Contacted by the Cardinal, both professors said they had never heard of the Office.

"They are a legitimate employer, whether you agree with their function or not."

Tom Johnson, director of Career Advising and Placement Service

Smolensky said, however, that the department placement office keeps files on its graduate students which are open to prospective employers. Government agencies, which might include the CIA, routinely call economics faculty asking for references of graduate students in different areas of expertise, Smolensky added.

"The number of people who call is large," Smolensky said. "I wouldn't remember a specific call."

"Usually they call up and ask for a student in some specialty, such as Soviet economic policy," he said. "Then they are usually referred to the secretary."

Leo W. Sweeney, executive officer for the Office of Economic Research, was indeed interested in students with backgrounds in Soviet economic analysis. But according to Freedom of Information files, Sweeney was interested in lots of students. Agricultural economists. Econometricians. Economists with an engineering background. Economists with research experience on Soviet-East European topics and African topics.

scholars

Sweeney was in charge of the so-called Developing Nations Division of the Office of Economic Research. He retired a few months ago, according to a CIA source.

At a January, 1977, meeting with one University economics student in Atlantic City, Sweeney apparently broached the subject of covert operations with a prospective candidate. "Genuine interest in research and operations (not clandestine)" was how Sweeney described the candidate in a report to his superiors.

CIA covert recruitment on this campus has been proven. Former Dean of Students Leroy Luberg admitted in 1976 to providing the CIA with names of students who could be potential agents. "I turned in

The Church Committee discovered the secret presence of the CIA on more than 100 campuses across the country.

names of those specially talented for the area. I did the same for the State Department," Luberg said. But Luberg stopped recruiting after a time. "I thought it was unwise for a person in my position to

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do this:"


Actions similar to Luberg's were documented in the Senate investigation into the CIA, commonly referred to as the Church Committee. One of the findings of the investigation was the presence of the CIA, secretly, on over 100 campuses. The committee's report was released in April 1976.

Following the Church Committee's findings, several universities adopted specific guidelines regulating the CIA's presence on campus. University guidelines here merely state that it will not accept any grant, contract or agreement which restricts the publication of the research findings. But there are exceptions—government contracts and contracts made during war.

At Harvard University, guidelines written after the Church Committee's hearings, make it illegal for any Harvard faculty to act as a recruiter without reporting the work.

UW System and Madison guidelines make no mention of recruiting activities.

CLASS, I'VE BEEN ASKED
TODAY TO INFORM YOU OF
SOME INTERESTING CAREER
OPPORTUNITIES...



Approved For Release 2009/06/15 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501430001-1

Miscellaneous

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ARTICLE REPRINTED
ON PAGE 25GENESIS
November 1980

PLAY DIRTY

A former Central Intelligence Agency member tells how America can get back on top—by unleashing the agency.

It has not been a good year for the Central Intelligence Agency, or for America. Our first line of defense against the silent enemies who would destroy us has been hounded, exposed, and restricted. The result is an increasingly isolated America, an America in grave political and economic peril. But it is *possible*, and it is *essential*, that we give back to our intelligence services the means and the power to get on with the job of protecting us. And the time has come.

Only a few years ago, the CIA was attacked in Congress as being too aggressive, too secretive, too powerful, too irresponsible. For the first time, legislation intended to limit the activities of the agency and to make it more responsible to Congress was introduced and passed. Now, with an increasingly aggressive and self-confident Soviet Union and a rapidly declining U.S. world position, there is a call from the same voices of Congress that the CIA do something—take a greater role in policy formulation, and mount clandestine operations to help reverse our steady losses. And all of this against a constant background chorus of mistrust. So, despite the mood in Congress to let the leash out a little, it is still insisting that the end of that leash be held firmly in its members' hands.

The mixed emotions floating around the congressional halls is due, in large part, to the CIA's dual nature—it is really a two-headed animal. There is the uncontroversial side, which provides timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence to the president, enabling him to make informed decisions on foreign policy. And there is the other side—the side which has generated a thousand spy thrillers and a

by Jesse James Leaf

CONTINUED

thousand congressional ulcers—the side charged with carrying out covert political action.

Covert action is officially defined as a "clandestine operation designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of United States foreign policy; it may include political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary activities." Covert action, also known as "special activities," is "planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly."

For thirty years, American presidents have looked to the Central Intelligence Agency to carry out secret operations designed to further our foreign policy objectives. Former CIA operative Victor Marchetti correctly states that covert action "can appear to a president as a panacea, as a way of pulling the chestnuts out of the fire without going through all the effort and aggravation of . . . diplomatic negotiations." And there is no question that clandestine activities are a quick fix when things are not going our way.

When Congress held hearings into the abuses and excesses of the CIA, legislators charged that the very concept of covert operations was incompatible with American principles, and that having such a secret organization damaged the nation's ability to exercise moral leadership in the world. Passage of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment required that the president approve every covert action proposed by the CIA, and that his findings on each proposal be reported to the appropriate committees of Congress—eight in all. This means that every special activity our president wants to have undertaken would be known in advance by some two hundred members of Congress and their staffs.

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment was followed by a law that gave two congressional committees oversight of all CIA covert operations—and the committee members admitted that they had little stomach for approving such unethical goings-on.

The freewheeling, no-holds-barred days of covert action are over. Congressional oversight committees are reluctant to approve major covert operations and have, in fact, vetoed many.

This change in attitude has had a devastating effect on the Directorate of Operations, the clandestine side of the agency. Thousands of operatives have left the organization during the last five years. Covert operations have been cut to the bone, and the agency's paramilitary capability is nil.

But this now seems due for a change. The upheaval in Iran, Russian aggression in Afghanistan, instability in the oil-producing Middle East have all moved officials to question the gradual

dismantling of our intelligence system.

On *CBS Reports*, David L. Aaron, who coordinates intelligence activities for the president, has said, "No one feels comfortable in a democracy with secrecy and with clandestine activities. . . . But it's something we have to do to protect our security. . . . We have . . . the Soviet Union using armed force to invade a neighboring country. We know the Soviet Union has its own clandestine service and its own intelligence activities, and these activities are really on the upswing. . . . We had better be concerned about meeting this adequately."

Even Congress, in the midst of passing strict legislation requiring prior notification of all planned covert action, has been having second thoughts. Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., of Delaware, a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence: "It's very easy to sit back and say, 'Why have secrecy? You shouldn't have [the agency] expanded, etcetera.' And then you . . . become privy to the details of occurrences around the world; you realize how close we come, time and time again, to confrontation. You realize the fallout of the confrontation, if it were to occur. And you start to say, 'Wait a minute—let's take another look at this. . . . I now know what I didn't know before.'"

What the Congress didn't know before, and what most congressmen didn't want to know before, was the vast covert-action machine driven by the CIA. Much has already been written about the long list of dirty tricks, so it comes as no surprise that the agency has been involved in planning assassinations of heads of state—Lumumba in the Congo, Cuba's Castro, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Diem in Vietnam, and the successful overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile, replacing a Marxist-oriented administration with a pro-Western dictatorship.

But it is 1980, and the agency's bag of dirty tricks is tied tightly and is nearly empty. Recruiting of agents is still being done, of course; without that, we would have no clandestine service at all—for it is on the agent-in-place that our entire espionage edifice is built.

Despite what you've seen in the movies, CIA agents are *always* foreign nationals (they're called indigenous personnel, or "indigs" for short), recruited and directed by American CIA case officers. Case officers usually work out of American embassies, under cover as political officers, military analysts, or something similar.

In recruiting an agent, the case officer will always have in mind a "target" of some kind. He doesn't just check into a country and look around for agents. A case officer will select (or have selected for him) a target organization whose function suits either the

"Foreign government offices and unions are targets for CIA agent recruitment."

CIA's intelligence needs or its other, separate purpose of stirring up internal dissention and instability. Government offices are always a natural target, as are military installations, trade unions, banks, and certain types of businesses. The CO will get to know the people of his target organization and develop a general idea of how they spend their lives and what they do in their time off. Other peripheral information is gathered and put into an operational-data file. Inside will go telephone directories, membership lists in various organizations, people in debt, people who frequent bars. Not to be excluded are the local brothels, massage parlors, group-sex clubs, drug dealers.

Once a list of possible names is made, they are broken down into levels. On the primary level are the prize catches—cabinet ministers, ambassadors, politicians, scientists, military leaders—anyone who is in a position to create events.

On the secondary level are intermediate functionaries who are the recipients of the information, orders, and paperwork handed down from above. On the next level down are prospective agents who simply have access to a target area—cleaning women, plumbers (non-Watergate variety), electricians. These people can get to documents, plant listening devices, photograph sensitive areas, and the like. Finally, there are the agents who have no sensitive access but can perform a variety of support functions—act as couriers, purchase vehicles and supplies, or rent houses.

Once this list is compiled, a variety of techniques (called "support operations") is used to identify the most likely candidates for recruitment. Surveillance, mail interception, scanning of local police files (this is where a plant can come in handy), and employment of listening devices are among these.

All of this, interesting as it is, is still only preliminary detective work. The real problem in agent recruitment is making contact. Usually, this is done through an intermediary—a so-called principal agent—whose job is to meet and sound out the prospective agent.

CONTINUED

"Recruiting a foreign national to spy for the CIA is like trapping an animal."

Principal agents are usually easily found among the "fringe" people who hang around the foreign community in any of the world's capitals—even Moscow. Most of them would just love to work for some well-paying foreign government—which foreign government is of no consequence to them. The principal agent is the buffer between the target agent and the CO—an American making contact with a foreign national who works in a sensitive position is just begging for trouble. It is less suspicious for a target's countryman to meet him over dinner, get close socially, develop a relationship. This personal relationship between the principal agent and the potential agent is the cutting edge in the war between the spies. It is here that every psychological trick, every subterfuge, is used to, first, assess accurately whether the target can be recruited, and then, slowly, to close the net around him. From the first innocent "favor" granted by the target, like lending a classified telephone directory or even a fire-drill floor plan, to the irrevocable act of his signing receipts for money received, agent recruitment is a carefully plotted scenario, not unlike trapping an unsuspecting animal.

If the covert-action responsibility of the CIA has all but run out of gas, its mercenary and paramilitary mechanism has been allowed to sit on the side of the road and rust. It is the CIA's job, given by the National Security Council, to conduct unconventional warfare (paramilitary operations) when needed. This is usually the case when—as in the Iran hostage situation—political events can't or won't move quickly enough, or to the benefit of American interests. Secret paramilitary operations have a built-in fascination—witness the adulation heaped on the successful Israeli Entebbe raiders—but they are always risky and require special men and special treatment. The CIA is involved in paramilitary operations because such missions are invariably highly secret and take specialized skills, information, and planning that only an intelligence and espionage agency can muster. The agency-trained mercenaries I personally knew were all ex-military, highly

intelligent, and motivated men (and one woman, to my continuing surprise). They are trained to perform such exotic missions as infiltrating weapons, communications equipment, and other matériel (such as explosives) into forbidden areas; they are also adept at picking up and delivering messages in dangerous situations, photographing sensitive installations, and performing sabotage operations, among other quasi-military black arts.

Under the recent reorganization and integration of the various intelligence organizations in the U.S. government, the Department of Defense has increasingly assumed the paramilitary functions once the exclusive territory of the CIA (with disastrous results. I might add—witness the Iranian rescue debacle). Military intelligence agencies, with the support of the clandestine service, have been training Afghan and Iranian insurgent groups at various locations in the United States—mostly abandoned airstrips in California.

It is my guess that the paramilitary initiatives being taken in those out-of-the-way California airstrips represent a paramilitary bull pen, and symbolize a fight-back mentality that should be telegraphed to the bench warmers in Washington. The U.S. intelligence community has been turned into a leaner, more responsive, better integrated force than ever before. The much-feared legislation that, for the first time, defines the limits imposed on the CIA and requires prior notification of all covert activities also establishes levels of security sensitivity and allows a fairly wide range of operations, so long as the appropriate congressional leadership is notified.

Given the present mood in Congress and the structure in place, it is certainly clear that the CIA operative is no longer "more powerful than an ambassador, more powerful than a military leader," as has been charged. Plans for covert operations will now have to be sold to a wary Congress—but it is, at least, a Congress newly aware of, and agreeable to, the need for covert operations.

The first priority is the rebuilding of our own espionage capabilities in Third World nations, using the information and agents thus obtained to destabilize key anti-American governments in Africa and the Middle East. It is vitally important that anti-Russian insurgent groups be supported to maintain pressure—both military and propaganda pressure—on the Soviets (and Cubans, where they are fighting in Africa). To this end, Congress must be made aware of the necessity of keeping a steady flow of weapons, technical aid, and matériel to the Afghan rebels, with collateral support from a cadre of foreign (not American) mercenaries. It is important that all assistance to Af-

ghanistan be camouflaged as originating in other nations.

With a wedge in Afghanistan, we should next seek a further-destabilized Iran. There is much that could be done to further disrupt the Iranian economy and to introduce fear of, and hatred for, the existing political order. Acts of sabotage could be undertaken, riots fomented, inflammatory actions taken against the police and military (provoking retaliation and shooting of demonstrators), propaganda developed from atrocities being performed in the name of the government and the Ayatollah. All of this can be accomplished quickly by cadres of paid agents and dissident Iranian religious and political groups. While there is no likelihood that the outright assassination of Khomeini would be tolerated in Congress, the pressure of revolt and the steady application of harmful propaganda should be enough to finish him off. Although this would raise him to the rank of martyr for his followers, it removes a living, binding force, and clears the way for another forceful ayatollah—one on our payroll—to take command of the situation. The slow, steady reversal of anti-U.S. policy in Iran would begin.

American initiatives should be taken on several fronts at once, while the Soviet Union has its attention diverted in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Start so many fires that they cannot possibly put them all out. Realistically, it would be a difficult, and probably losing, battle to attempt to get Congress to support CIA moves to destabilize the anti-U.S. regimes in Somalia, South Yemen, Libya, and Cuba, but public pressure should be applied. The fall of any one of these regimes would be a tremendous propaganda coup for the United States. Cuba and Libya are the conscience of the radical Third World, and the failure of either of their despotic governments would help turn the tide presently running against us. Nobody likes a loser. Libya is a relatively easy target. Because of its animosity toward neighboring Egypt—Libya's dictator, Colonel Muammar Al Qadhafi, has vowed to have Egyptian president Anwar Sadat assassinated, and probably will if he's not stopped—we could orchestrate all of our operations undercover from a "safe" nearby location. Planned border provocations, a short war, social uprisings by agents in place—and the government falls.

All of these scenarios are perfectly within the present capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency and its supporting intelligence organizations. The only thing we need is a sympathetic Congress—and an impatient citizenry who'll demand to know why we're fiddling around while the world burns. It's time to roll up our sleeves and go out there and fight. □

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 41

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 October 1980

Congress may yet probe 13-year-old sinking of US spy ship by Israel

New book rekindles interest in Liberty affair; Stevenson seeks classified documents

By Stephen Webbe
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The charge that Israel's devastating attack on the USS Liberty 13 years ago was a brutal, premeditated act of murder rather than a case of mistaken identity, and that successive administrations have concealed the truth from the American people may soon be investigated by a congressional committee.

The allegation, made in the recently published book, "Assault on the Liberty" by James M. Ennes Jr., who was wounded in the June 8, 1967, attack, has attracted the attention of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and, in particular, of its second-ranking member, Adlai Stevenson (D) of Illinois, who is attempting to gain access to classified material denied the author.

According to Sherry Towell, Senator Stevenson's staff representative on the committee, evidence cited by Mr. Ennes, along with documentation in the committee's possession and material it hopes to acquire, will be studied to determine whether a full-scale inquiry into the attack is called for.

Ennes strenuously disagrees with a Navy court of inquiry conclusion that the attack on the intelligence-gathering ship, which killed 34 and wounded 171 of its company, was the result of "mistaken identity."

"This key finding is virtually unsupported by evidence," he says. "And, in fact, is strongly contradicted by testimony concerning the carefully coordinated nature of the attack [and] the length of the attack."

He rejects the court's suggestion that the Liberty's flag was not discernible due to calm conditions and the ship's slow speed. "The court ignored deck logs, quartermaster's logs, and weather logs which all recorded sufficient wind to display the flag clearly," he says.

According to Ennes, a Navy legal officer who examined the full transcript of the court of inquiry told him that "after you read the report, review the evidence, and then the findings, your first impulse is to go back and see if you missed a couple hundred pages, because the evidence simply does not lead to the findings."

Before Israeli jets tore into it off the Mediterranean coast of Sinai, the Liberty was subjected to more than six hours of Israeli reconnaissance, claims Ennes, who was a cryptologist with the rank of lieutenant at the

time.

After Mirage warplanes rocketed and machine-gunned the ship, he says, Mysteres doused it with napalm, all the while jamming the ship's radios. Three Israeli motor torpedo boats then appeared on the scene, he relates, one firing a torpedo into the damaged ship, tearing a 40-foot hole in its side and killing 25 men. All three torpedo boats then proceeded to machine-gun the ship's lifeboats, he adds.

In Ennes's view, Israel decided to sink the Liberty because of the ship's ability to discover

its impending invasion of Syria.

If the Senate Intelligence Committee does decide to probe what Ennes calls the "deliberate attack" on the Liberty and the ensuing "cover-up by our government," it may also look into his allegations that a command and control failure left the ship in an exposed position off Gaza and that US rescue forces were unable to come to its aid for three hours.

Concerned that the Liberty was vulnerably placed, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) apparently ordered it to pull back 20 miles from the coast. But the message, which inexplicably failed to leave the JCS communication center for more than 14 hours, according to Ennes, never arrived.

"It was sent in error to the naval communication station in the Philippines," he says, adding that another message ordering the Liberty to remain at least 100 miles from the coast also was misdirected to the Philippines. "There it was correctly rerouted to the Pentagon for further relay to the naval communication station in Morocco for delivery to Liberty," he asserts, declaring that the Pentagon then misdirected it again — this time to the National Security Agency at Fort

Meade, Md., where it was filed and never delivered.

A top-secret message ordering the Liberty far out to sea likewise failed to reach its destination, he alleges, maintaining that the ship "was not a subscriber to the top-secret message delivery system." Altogether, five messages were mishandled, delayed or lost, claims Ennes, "any one of which might have saved the ship had it been received."

Although the aircraft carriers America and Saratoga, cruising to the west, had more than 150 planes between them, none came to the Liberty's aid, Ennes maintains. After four nuclear-armed Phantoms from USS America were personally recalled by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara because they had been launched without JCS approval, he says, it took more than three hours to dispatch conventionally armed aircraft. These were then recalled when Israel issued an apology.

"We had been told in advance to expect support in 10 minutes if we were to come under attack," he says. "I believe that many men died needlessly because of the Navy's failure to come to our aid. This alone is worthy of a Senate inquiry in order to identify the failures with a view toward preventing a recurrence."

Ennes had hoped that Senator Stevenson, who has long been concerned about the attack on the Liberty, would initiate an inquiry by the Senate Intelligence Committee, but the Illinois lawmaker's term is about to expire and he is not seeking re-election. Ennes now hopes that the committee vice-chairman, Sen. Barry Goldwater (R) of Arizona, will press for an investigation.

Neither the US Navy nor Israeli authorities are prepared to comment on the Liberty attack, regarding the matter as closed. But the National Association of Arab-Americans (NAAA) would welcome such an inquiry as Ennes is urging, says its treasurer, David Sadd, a former naval officer.

In the opinion of NAAA public affairs director John Richardson, subpoena power "might turn up documents confirming the political motivations for the cover-up by the Johnson administration and its successors."

ARTICLE APPEARED
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Press

Crackdown on "Disinformation"*France prosecutes two journalists for "bad acquaintances"*

"The Plan we devised three years ago was to develop our capacity to influence public opinion in the West, through disinformation fed to governments and opinion formers and, above all, through media operations."

The half-crazed Soviet spy master who spells out his Plan is pure fiction, the creation of Journalists Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss in their new novel *The Spike*. The plan itself, according to U.S. intelligence experts, is all too factual. "Disinformation" refers mostly to covert falsification tactics used by the So-

viet Union to further its propaganda aims. Examples of disinformation—a forged U.S. Army field manual, bogus vice-presidential statements critical of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat—occasionally surface in the Western press.

Soviet experts in the West have known of the KGB's disinformation activities for years; dealing with them is quite another matter. For the first time, French authorities have begun to crack down on the practice. In the past 15 months, two writers have been arrested and charged with using secret foreign contacts to jeopardize national security. Other French journalists are wondering whether the campaign against disinformation is beginning to restrict the free flow of information.

The first case involves Pierre-

Charles Pathé, 70, the son of pioneer French Film Producer Charles Pathé. An avowed admirer of the U.S.S.R., Pathé was arrested in 1979 after leaving a long trail of liaisons with Soviet diplomats and intelligence agents. He was accused of accepting money for disseminating Soviet disinformation through numerous writings dating back to 1959.

After his arrest, Pathé helped police fill in the missing KGB names and dates in the 15 years' worth of notebooks taken from his Paris apartment. He assisted in pin-

pointing some 50,000 francs in his bank account as Soviet payments. The money, he said, represented author's fees for Soviet rights to his book and many articles. His regular intelligence contacts, he claimed, were simply journalistic sources for gathering information—not spreading disinformation.

Pathé was tried last May, but for the most part his writing was not examined in court. Compared with the normal stream of invective and accusations running through France's hyperactive partisan press, Pathé's personal editorializing seemed tame indeed. As one French intelligence officer acknowledges, "If the court had only ruled on what Pathé wrote, he would not have been condemned."

Why, then, was his case pursued? One reason may be that for a pro-Soviet left-

ist, Pathé had unusually close links with business and government. His brother-in-law, Bernard Vermier-Palliez, is president of the state-owned Renault autos, which has just agreed to become the principal owner of a U.S. automaker, American Motors. Pathé himself belongs to a group called Movement for the Independence of Europe, whose members have included a number of government ministers. Thus, as the court suggested, Pathé's danger lay not only in his role as a biased small-press journalist, but as a man of important private influence. Moreover, the government may have been looking to set a harsh precedent. French Counterespionage Commissioner Raymond Nart acknowledges that Pathé was punished simply for having contributed to "an operation of orientation of the French public." The Pathé case, one bitter witness told TIME's Sandra Burton, was the state's "warning to the press that it is dangerous to accept information from foreign sources."

The French press recognized the warning—and roundly denounced it. The conservative *Le Figaro* called Pathé a "scapegoat," and Versailles's *Toutes les Nouvelles* feared that espionage would henceforth include "confidences and personal analyses of men and political events." Meanwhile, a petition signed by 100 journalists complains that the court's decision poses "a serious threat for freedom of expression and information."

Coincidentally, only days before Pathé was tried, French authorities were beginning to press another case of disinformation. Roger Delpey, a right-wing author, was arrested on the steps of the Libyan People's Bureau in Paris. He was charged with resorting to "technical disinformation" that would "compromise the external policy of France."

Delpey's troubles began shortly after Central African Emperor Jean-Bédél Bokassa was ousted with French help last September. The Paris-based satirical weekly *Le Canard Enchaîné* (The Chained Duck) printed a 1973 document signed by Bokassa authorizing a large cache of diamond gifts to his old friend, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who was Finance Minister at that time. The tale was almost forgotten when Delpey was quietly jailed. Last week *Le Canard Enchaîné* ran excerpts of a telephone interview with Bokassa, now living in exile in the Ivory Coast. He not only confirmed the diamond document, but said that he had employed Delpey to write his memoirs and to send letters pleading his case to French and African leaders. Bokassa added that he had given 187 documents to Delpey, some of which



President Giscard with Emperor Bokassa during 1975 African tour. Inset: Pierre-Charles Pathé. Claiming to catch "disinformants," authorities may be curtailing freedom of information.

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are thought to contain further embarrassments for Giscard.

Some French journalists were convinced that Delpey had been imprisoned for acting as Bokassa's personal secretary and accomplice in humiliating Giscard. His biggest crime, noted the left-wing *Le Monde*, was his "bad acquaintances." Undeterred, the French prosecutor said he would press the case against Delpey, alluding to "technical disinformation which the court has already come to know in other affairs"—namely, those of Pierre-Charles Pathé, who is now in Fresnes prison serving a five-year sentence. ■

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 24THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
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Spies in a free society

Much has been done to reform the US Central Intelligence Agency since the revelations of wrongdoing in the aftermath of Watergate. But, as the just-concluded series on "spy wars" by Monitor correspondent Daniel Southerland bears out, the United States still faces a grave national intelligence problem. The CIA alone cannot be blamed for failures of policy in such areas as Iran; indeed, the whole foreign policy establishment can be faulted. But it is clear that there still needs to be a better public perception of the role of the CIA and other intelligence services — and more national discussion of how to make intelligence an integral, valuable part of US foreign policy.

Too many Americans still think of intelligence work as a romantic world of "moles" and secret back-alley operations. Yet the basic need today is not for quick-fix solutions of a covert nature but for steady, balanced intelligence that provides a president not only with the facts of what is happening or what may happen in the short run but with an understanding of the political, social, religious, and other factors affecting the enormous long-term changes now sweeping the world. It is on such intelligence that he relies in shaping policy and ensuring national security.

The sad fact, however, is that there are too few thoughtful, knowledgeable people in the intelligence services who can analyze and interpret developments abroad. This, in turn, stems from a US educational system today attracting less interest in foreign languages and cultures than a decade ago. Until this cultural gap is remedied — and the intelligence community is accorded due prestige and importance — it will be hard to upgrade the quality of intelligence work.

Another problem is the relative isolation in which the CIA seems to operate. The agency ought to be tied more closely to the policy-makers, without of course letting it become politicized or involved itself in the formulation of policy. Too often what is done at Langley, Va., is unrelated to what is needed. The

State Department's small Bureau of Intelligence and Research, by comparison, works closely with the secretary of state and maintains a high rating of intelligence analysis.

As for covert operations, these have steadily declined in importance as the technology of intelligence gathering has been revolutionized. Yet, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the seizure of US hostages in Iran, pressures are again building for more resort to cloak-and-dagger operations. Increased "political action," as the CIA prefers to call these, is perhaps justified in such areas as limited support for the supply of arms to Afghan freedom fighters.

But the temptation to return to the CIA's secret practices of the past — manipulation of elections, assassination plots, overthrow of governments, distortion of the press — should be strongly resisted. It has never been proved that such activities have benefited the US and indeed they have more often than not damaged the nation's credibility and moral stature. This is not to deny the immense mischief attempted around the world by the Soviet Union and the vast intelligence network of the KGB. But the way to meet this challenge is not to blame everything on the Russians but to address the local conditions on which Soviet manipulation feeds. This is why local conditions need to be understood well — so that US policy does not fall into a trap, as it did in Iran.

We are not unmindful either that the KGB maintains a vast army of agents in the US, confronting the nation with a severe counterintelligence problem. Counterintelligence ought to be strengthened, and the FBI, already overburdened, needs more people. It goes without saying, however, that the crimes of the past committed in the name of counterintelligence must be guarded against and that a charter would help protect both the public and the FBI.

Nor should efforts fade to provide the CIA with a new charter allowing for effective intelligence gathering and secrecy even while preserving individual freedoms. It is true that the original charter legislation may have been unworkable and modifications are needed. But the proposed restrictions on the Freedom of Information Act, for instance, seem to go too far. Since passage of the act there has been no notable leak of national security information by the courts handling freedom of information cases. The system, in other words, is working, and the Senate should be careful not to erode the gains made for greater openness and accountability. In this connection it ought to be noted that some leaks of recent years have come from within the security system — a former CIA clerk, two aerospace employees, and so on — suggesting that the CIA must do a better job of tightening its own security.

In this connection, too, the American public ought to know that the US Congress is playing a constructive role in the intelligence field. More lawmakers have been brought into the process of information and evaluation — and, we hasten to add, with none of the "leaks" some people are so concerned about. This dispersal of power can be seen as an unusual and successful experiment contrasting markedly with that of other countries.

In sum, there remains a need to give the CIA and other intelligence agencies more coherent and purposeful direction. The nation has yet to come to grips with what it wants intelligence to do or how to do it. For the next president, the task will be not only to formulate a sound foreign policy — but to make the important intelligence community a meaningful part of it.

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(FREEDOM OF INFORMATION)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- AN APPEALS COURT SAYS A LOWER COURT MUST RECONSIDER ITS RULING THAT REJECTED A CIA EFFORT TO WITHHOLD INFORMATION FROM A CONSUMER GROUP INVESTIGATING AN AGENCY DRUG RESEARCH PROGRAM.

THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MONDAY SENT THE CASE BACK TO U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR FURTHER ACTION.

THE CASE INVOLVED A 1977 LAWSUIT BROUGHT BY JOHN C. SIMS, AN ATTORNEY EMPLOYED BY THE RALPH NADER GROUP PUBLIC CITIZEN CONSUMER GROUP, SEEKING THE NAMES OF PERSONS AND INSTITUTIONS THAT CONDUCTED SCIENTIFIC AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH UNDER CONTRACT TO THE CIA UNDER THE SO-CALLED MK-ULTRA PROGRAM.

THE APPEALS COURT REJECTED THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO USE A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT EXEMPTION THAT THE INFORMATION WAS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS.

IT AGREED WITH THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THE AGENCY COULD NOT USE ANOTHER EXEMPTION THAT SHIELDS "PERSONNEL AND MEDICAL FILES" FROM DISCLOSURE WHERE PERSONAL PRIVACY WOULD BE INVADED, ALTHOUGH IT DISAGREED WITH THE COURT'S REASONING ON THE ISSUE.

THE CIA-SPONSORED RESEARCH PROGRAM WAS CONDUCTED BETWEEN 1953 AND 1966.

THE TESTING INCLUDED BOTH VOLUNTEER AND NON-VOLUNTEER HUMAN SUBJECTS AND RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF AT LEAST TWO PERSONS, COURT DOCUMENTS SAID. IT WAS ORIGINALLY CONCEIVED AS A RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE USE BY THE SOVIET UNION OR CHINA OF CHEMICAL AGENTS IN INTERROGATION OR BRAINWASHING.

IN RESPONSE TO SIM'S REQUEST, THE CIA CONTACTED THE 80 INSTITUTIONS THAT PARTICIPATED IN THE PROGRAM, ASKING THEM IF THEY WOULD AGREE TO DISCLOSURE. FIFTY NINE AGREED AND 21 DECLINED.

BUT NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE BY THE CIA TO CONTACT THE 185 RESEARCHERS.

AT ISSUE NOW IS THE DISCLOSURE OF THE REMAINING 21 INSTITUTIONS AND ALL 185 RESEARCHERS.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
29 September 1980

SPY WARS

Can a democracy operate in secret?

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

"I don't know why the Soviets bother running around trying to steal secrets in this country," said one of America's leading intelligence officers recently.

"There's so much information available to them from open sources," he said, adding with a touch of bitterness: "I hope they drown in it."

Washington is preoccupied these days with the twin problems of getting good intelligence while keeping the secrets.

For the men and women fighting America's silent war to gather such intelligence, the shooting war between Iraq and Iran dramatizes a continuing problem: understanding rapid change in a world of widely dispersed power and assertive developing nations.

Given the past weaknesses of American intelligence gathering in the Middle East, it is not surprising that new flaws are showing: After a week of fighting between Iran and Iraq, some Washington officials are beginning to complain of inadequate intelligence reporting on the conflict.

The war has erupted against the background of yet another Washington preoccupation: keeping secrets in a society that prides itself on producing information for the widest possible consumption.

To counter leaks of highly classified information, the White House recently imposed a new system called "royal." It restricts the distribution of certain secrets to all but a few top policymakers.

The CIA is pushing for legislation that would make it a criminal offense to publish the names of undercover American intelligence operatives. It also wants to impose restrictions on the Freedom of Information Act, which currently allows private citizens access to a wide range of once-classified documents.

The civil libertarians are fighting back, and seem to have succeeded in getting action postponed on legislation dealing with undercover intelligence officers. They argue that proposed legislation would infringe on constitutional rights and fear it might provide cover for CIA abuses. Many journalists and law professors argue that the legislation might violate guarantees of free speech and a free press by punishing reporters for exposing CIA corruption or incompetence.

The CIA argues that allowing opponents of the intelligence agency to disclose the identities of its undercover officers exposes them to threats from terrorists and has a "chilling effect" on their intelligence-gathering operations. It also argues that the FOIA disclosures have caused foreign intelligence agencies to stop sharing some of the information they would normally share with the CIA.

The intelligence agencies, civil libertarians, and parliaments in a number of other countries are viewing the American debate over legislative restrictions on the CIA and other American intelligence agencies with a mixture of apprehension, awe, and, in some cases, hope.

The debate amounts to an unprecedented experiment. Never has any major nation argued out in public, to such a degree, the virtues and vices of its intelligence agencies. If the experiment works, and a reasonable balance can be found between preserving freedoms and pursuing effective intelligence gathering, other nations will no doubt learn lessons from it.

As Stephen Dedijer, a professor in the policy research program at the University of Lund in Sweden points out, since their birth in the 16th century, organized intelligence services in Europe have never been mandated by modern constitutions. In Europe, there is still scarcely any legislation dealing with intelligence.

But, contends Professor Dedijer, an examination of recent history also shows that the intelligence services in none of these countries has been exempt from failures and scandals.

Legislative reform has come only in recent years. In the United States and in Italy, independent parliamentary committees with legislated powers to exercise oversight and control have been established. The issue of legislative oversight has been intensely debated in the parliaments of West Germany and Sweden. Oversight legislation is being introduced in Canada. And parliaments in several other countries are watching the US Congress.

In some countries, of course, there is a firm conviction that too many legislative restrictions and too much openness hinder the effective operation of America's CIA. This, at least, is the view in Britain, as reported by Americans with friends in Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, known as the SIS or MI.6.

"They feel very uneasy about it in Britain," says Ray Cline, a former deputy director of the CIA. "They told me, 'We think you people are on a suicidal course.'"

But a three-month look at the problems of intelligence gathering from the perspectives of Europe, the Middle East, and the United States indicates that many of the difficulties that trouble America's intelligence agencies have nothing to do with legislative restrictions or the Freedom of Information Act.

Perhaps the most important factor in the recurrence of intelligence failures has been a lack of consensus in the United States as to what the US should be accomplishing in the world as well as a lack of clear foreign policy leadership.

As the British spy novelist John Le Carré once said, "No secret service can be more clear headed than its govern-

ment. Everything rests upon a clearcut statement of requirements by those who formulate the nation's policy."

At the end of what might be called a voyage into the spy world, one returns with the feeling that Le Carré, once a member of the British secret service, has a useful message for Americans. In an interview in the New York Times Book Review last October, the novelist argued that Americans must overcome a kind of "political romanticism that one moment espouses openness at any price, and next revels in the high alchemy of secret panaceas and swift, unconventional, totally illegal solutions."

Putting it another way, Le Carré seems to be saying that the United States needs a little less of James Bond as a model and a little more of his rumpled hero George Smiley, a spy who can often be sensitive, balanced, and reasonable.

There are no quick-fix, James Bond solutions or secret panaceas to the problems that trouble the American intelligence agencies.

One of the main problems is an educational one. Americans are not studying foreign languages or foreign cultures as much as they did a decade ago. The CIA is short of linguists, particularly in the difficult languages of Chinese, Russian, and Arabic.

In 1978 Adm. Stansfield Turner, the director of Central Intelligence, complained that the number of applicants for CIA employment with foreign-language proficiency was dwindling. CIA officials say the situation has not improved.

When a Soviet soldier sought asylum in the US Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, recently, he could find no one who could communicate with him in Russian.

There is a cultural problem as well. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, said recently, Americans tend to be "event-oriented" — interested in the sensation of the moment, but not much interested in long-range trends. (Ironically, some other officials accuse Dr. Brzezinski himself of this failing at times and often refer to him as impulsive.)

Intelligence officers who specialize in one area of the world are not rewarded as often as those generalists who can move quickly from one "hot" area to another, according to a former CIA analyst.

"Bureaucratically, a specialist is an embarrassment, because you can't move him around easily," said the former analyst.

"The problem," said a White House official with overseas experience, "is to find analysts who can write from a wealth of understanding for a foreign culture. . . . We've had a failure in the American educational system to produce classical scholars who can do that."

"There is an American habit of mind that is not particularly contemplative," he continued. "It's not how fast you know something that should count. It's what it means, and how you convey that meaning to others."

"The great intelligence failure in Iran was the inability to find out what Islam meant."

"You've got a global trend toward fundamentalist nostalgia," he said. "But it is very, very hard for representatives of a progressive civilization to get in tune with all that."

A leading US official lists relations with the Soviet Union and with the developing countries as the key areas of concern in the coming decade. Yet the US has yet to work out what it wants to do in the way of a long-range foreign aid program. If it did more, it might have fewer crises to cope with over the long run in the developing world. As the London Economist newspaper has pointed out, Americans last year spent more on potted plants and flowers (some \$5 billion) than they did on aid to developing countries.

A typical American solution to problems such as now exist in the American intelligence community would be to reorganize. But it is hard to imagine that reorganization will get at the root of the problems.

A criticism from a former high-ranking Israeli intelligence officer who has observed the American system: "You've got some good people working on the Middle East who do know the countries and the regimes. . . . But even if they do proper analysis, there seems to be a breakdown, a failure of communication between them and the people who should be making the decisions."

Another part of the American debate over secrecy and security is an incredible blossoming of literature on the CIA. In the first six months of 1980, more than 70 books and manuscripts were submitted to the CIA for security review, mostly by former agency employees.

One of those books, written by former CIA official Ralph McGehee, will charge that the intelligence agency is poorly manned and operated and has made numerous intelligence failures.

The British are constantly accusing the CIA of being overmanned. But among many knowledgeable Washington bureaucrats, one of the highest ratings for intelligence work goes to the smallest component in the so-called intelligence community. This is the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).

The INR, with a staff of about 300 persons, would almost get lost in one of the CIA's long corridors. It has no overseas collectors of intelligence. But it has one major advantage over the CIA. Being located inside the State Department, it is closer to the policymakers than the CIA and is relied upon by the secretary of state.

"We know what the secretary wants, and we can get to him," one INR man said.

"Ninety percent of the people in this building deal with problems relevant to the next 24 hours," the official said. "We're interested in the next 20 years."

The INR, now headed by Ronald I. Spiers, is credited with having been the only government intelligence agency to have consistently warned of war well before the 1973 Egyptian attack on Israel. During the Iranian crisis of 1978-79, INR is said to have challenged relatively optimistic assessments of prospects for the Shah of Iran coming from other intelligence agencies, including the CIA.

The INR has a number of analysts who study the same country or region year after year.

Despite fears that the American system is too loose — with its freedom of information and congressional oversight of intelligence agencies — the system is in some respects working remarkably well. There have been no notable leaks of classified information from the intelligence committees of FOIA cases.

There has been only one case in which a district judge ordered the CIA to make a disclosure of something the agency argued was classified.

In Washington, one of the most security-conscious and careful bodies is the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Members watch every word they say with a care that is atypical of politicians. More national security leaks appear to come from the executive branch than from Capitol Hill.

Mark Lynch, a lawyer for the liberal American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), fears that while the "oversight" system may be working well so far, the two congressional committees may be "coopted" by the intelligence agencies.

"My fear is that they may brainwash a large part of the Congress," he said.

"We may develop a little cadre of senators who want to understand the CIA's most complicated arguments. They may start believing in the whole mystique."

What has definitely not been resolved is the question of how to protect intelligence officers working in foreign nations under cover. The Washington-based Covert Action Bulletin

CONTINUED

has been publishing the names of such officers, thus giving conservatives in the Senate and House a case on which to build arguments for lifting some of the restrictions on the intelligence agencies.

Any relatively open society trying to protect its secrets from another society with a long tradition of secrecy, conspiracy, and deception has a problem. But there might be some comfort in the fact that even if the Soviets and their friends are able to get to know one segment of a democratic society, it cannot give them the key to the whole. Power is too widely dispersed for that.

Because of this relative openness, however, it seems almost inevitable that the US, and by extension its Western partners, should be losing the edge in the war to keep the secrets. But sometimes that very openness is the best weapon of self-defense — as long as openness does not amount to naiveté. One can think of a number of cases of defectors from the Soviet Union and East-bloc countries who have come over to the West in part because of its freedoms. In some cases, of course, they have also sought a higher standard of living.

It is precisely by not playing — in peacetime, at least — the deception game that some communist nations play, that the West has a chance to come out on top.

As the British diplomat and writer Harold Nicolson says, "It is advisable for the Westerner to stick always to the truth, in the expenditure of which he possesses ample reserves. His actions will in any case be misrepresented; if they be based on demonstrable truth, then the misrepresentation will be apparent even to the least educated."

There is a theory, not yet widely accepted, that the revolution in technology which the world has seen in recent decades has made cloak-and-dagger intelligence obsolete. Professor Dedijer of the University of Lund is a proponent of this theory.

Spying as a labor-intensive intelligence activity is gradually being replaced by technological and scientific methods accessible to many countries, wrote Professor Dedijer in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.

Leaning toward Professor Dedijer's theory is, of all people, a former CIA director, William E. Colby.

In an interview Mr. Colby said that "intelligence is becoming a private-sector problem. And the acquisition of intelligence is becoming a small, small part of the total problem. There was no secret about the causes of the Shah's downfall, but we didn't do a particularly good job of interpreting the information which was available."

Mr. Colby argues that many different competing centers of analysis — many of them in the private sector — will provide the nation with better judgments in foreign affairs.

Covert operations

President Carter came to office sounding skeptical about secret CIA operations aimed at influencing events abroad and indeed seems to have kept such operations to a minimum during his first 2 1/2 years in office.

But frustration over the taking of American hostages in Iran as well as over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has generated pressures in this country to return to some of the cloak-and-dagger operations of the past. According to a variety of official and unofficial sources, the United States is now running a number of such operations, most of them apparently in the news media and propaganda field.

Such activities could include financial or material support for friendly foreign newsmen and publications or attempts to insert articles in foreign publications.

It is also thought that the United States may be playing a coordinating role by shipping Soviet small arms stockpiled in Egypt to the Afghan freedom fighters. Sophisticated anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons of the type the Afghan guerrillas say they most need have yet to show up in any significant numbers on the battlefield, however.

In June of this year, the CBS television network broadcast a special report on "The Return of the CIA" in which it spoke of a "propaganda war" being run by the intelligence agency against Cubans in Africa and "secret political campaigns" being waged by the CIA in Central America. Rep. Les Aspin (D) of Wisconsin told CBS that he thought the President and some of his advisers wanted the CIA to go "back into the covert action business, in that area where they used to conduct operations, political, military, or economic; to try to achieve US foreign policy aims, destabilize..."

A senior official who is supposed to be informed of all such operations recently told this reporter, however, that while there had been a limited revival of secret political actions, they amounted to "peanuts" compared to any of the well-publicized actions of the past — the CIA's campaign against Chile's Marxist President Salvador Allende Gossens, for example.

US Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Turner, has never shown any great liking for "covert action." He once told Time magazine, "A couple of times it [a plan for covert action] has been accepted but on the whole I have not found it a very attractive option."

But supporters of Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan have indicated that Governor Reagan would like to do more in the way of covert action than the Carter administration has done. Mr. Reagan told the Wall Street Journal in an interview last May that, as president, he would favor providing weapons to the guerrilla faction in Angola known as UNITA. UNITA has been fighting the Marxist government of that southern African country.

The conventional wisdom in the US Congress at the moment seems to be that any attempt on the part of a President Reagan to revive anything like the large-scale secret operations of the past would be defeated by opposition from the Democrats.

And despite the CBS report on secret political campaigns being run by the CIA in Central America, at least one US ambassador in the region, Robert White in El Salvador, is reported to have said "no" to proposals that the CIA mount a propaganda campaign in that country.

Spying is old school and old hat for British

Report from London

The United States and Britain could not be closer when it comes to sharing intelligence information, but they could hardly be further apart when it comes to attitudes toward secrecy.

The British have been at the business of spying in an organized way for a few hundred years and thus apparently do not hesitate to give advice to their rich American "Cousins." It was supposedly Sir Francis Bacon in the 16th century who first used the term "mole" for an agent who penetrates deep into an opposing country's government or intelligence service.

Britain is said to have thousands of persons working in electronic intelligence. But the intelligence officers working directly for the Secret Intelligence Service, or MI.6, number in the hundreds rather than the thousands. Their real budget is kept secret, but according to the New Statesman magazine, it has been increasing steadily in recent years.

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Americans who have worked with British intelligence officers say the British service has concentrated increasingly on the gathering of economic intelligence in recent years. British officers are considered underpaid by American standards, but some of them are admired by the Americans for being all-round generalists. American intelligence officers tend to be more specialized.

"They know everything across the board," said one American who has worked with the British. "They know how to recruit, how to pitch, how to code — they really are all-purpose scouts."

One US official says the United States and Britain share intelligence to the point where they work from "the same information base." The official said that by sharing work in the fields of communications and signals intelligence, the two nations save as much as \$500 million to \$1 billion each year.

The British tend to believe, however, that US intelligence officers are too dependent on technology and the latest gadgetry and that they are not as knowledgeable as they should be about areas such as Middle East.

Three former MI.6 officers interviewed by this reporter maintain that the morale of the secret service is high. But reports prepared by the New Statesman magazine suggest that the intelligence services have suffered from problems of corruption, at least on the electronic side of the business. The left-wing magazine has also reported cases in which the secret services engaged in domestic phone-tapping and mail opening.

The British intelligence relationship with the United States suffered greatly when it was discovered in the 1960s that a high-ranking MI.6 officer, Kim Philby, was a Soviet "mole." But mutual trust seems to have been almost completely restored in recent years.

Little is known publicly about Arthur Temple (Dickie) Franks, the chief of MI.6. He has served in the Middle East, plays golf, and belongs to a club. But under the self-censorship system in place since 1921, British journalists are asked not to publish the names, whereabouts, or activities of present or former intelligence officers. Only the New Statesman is known to have published Mr. Franks' name.

Although the public seems to have little control over MI.6, it comes under the tight control of the prime minister and Foreign Office. In this regard, some Americans as well as Britons think the US might learn something from the British system.

Writing in the London Economist newspaper earlier this year, however, R. D. Foot, a professor of modern history at Manchester, made this criticism of the British system: "The head of each British secret service has to satisfy the controller and auditor-general, in person, that the money allocated to his service has been properly spent to the public benefit; one civil servant has to reassure another, but Parliament has no say."

Quite a contrast with the American system.

British intelligence ingenuity

According to one former MI.6 man, a classical rule of British espionage is that one must "butter up" one's agents. Even if sometimes underpaid, they must at all costs be made to feel important.

The former MI.6 man said that in the early 1950s the secret service found a potential recruit in a relatively high position in an African government. But the man refused to commit himself to work for the SIS until he had actually met the nameless chief of the service known then to all but a few persons as "C."

"We had a number of ex-MI.6 staff members — men in their 50s — who had retired on half service," the former MI.6 man said. "We chose one who was distinguished looking enough to be 'C,' and we dressed him up for the part."

"We gave him a fine suit, an umbrella, and a bowler hat. He flew out and met the man. As far as that man knew, he had been personally recruited by 'C' and he was delighted."

As an American official tells it, the British secret services managed to discover where the Soviets were testing atomic weapons in a "wonderfully nonsophisticated way." They read the provincial Soviet newspapers and saw that there were two locations that were never mentioned. They assumed that these were locations for test sites. U-2 aircraft made photographs and there were the craters from the tests.

An American official once paid the head of the British service's liaison in Washington a compliment for a British report on Soviet regional councils and economics that was one-third the length of a comparable American report but twice as clear.

"Well, when you're a minor power, you can only concentrate on that which is important," said the British official.

Conversation with a spy expert from "the Firm"



The veteran of MI.6 sat by a window in his London club, his face hidden by the shadows, not letting the light fall on his face.

On the basis of an introduction, the British spy expert had agreed to an informal talk, "a little gossip," as he put it, as long as his name was not disclosed.

Describing the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) as a "close and friendly club," the man whom we shall call "Collins" said the morale of the service was surprisingly high. The men and women of "the Firm" regarded themselves rightly or wrongly, as an elite. They came into the service at different ages, so that some of them would have practical experience in the world before taking on intelligence work.

In Collins' view, Americans did not have a natural aptitude for secret operations. The British did have, partly as a result of learning to survive, and then maneuver, under the harsh discipline of boarding schools.

The CIA, as far as Collins was concerned, was in a lamentable state. What had really done the CIA in, he said, was its intervention in Chile, its paramilitary operations — the "secret army" of Hmong tribesmen in Laos, the connection with special forces and "pacification" teams in Vietnam — and, of course, the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion against Fidel Castro. If you were determined to overthrow Castro, he suggested, it would be best to be straightforward about it, get your country behind it, and use a division of marines. But involving a secret service in such things caused endless problems and diverted the service from its real missions of intelligence gathering and counterespionage.

The veteran thought it would take the CIA some five years to "get on its feet again" and become capable of effective intelligence work.

"The first thing the Americans must do," he suggested, "is establish a new relationship based on mutual trust between the intelligence agency and the government bureaucracy." In Collins' view, the CIA had long been overstaffed, to the point where it couldn't get its priorities straight. He also felt there were times in the past when the CIA had too much money to spend for its own good.

The British veteran agreed with the moves now under way in the US Congress to reduce from eight to two the numbers of committees that have to be informed "in a timely fashion" of secret operations.

Submitting sensitive information of this kind to eight committees was "absolutely batty," he said. "It means your hands are tied."

Like so many other specialists in intelligence work, Collins rates the Israelis as the best in the field.

The Soviets, he says, are to be admired for their patience (although it is not clear how much patience they showed in Afghanistan not long ago where they were apparently responsible for the killing of a government leader).

Collins said the Soviets might take great pains to plant a "mole" inside a Western intelligence agency. The Soviets, he said, were prepared to let that agent "sleep" for 10 years or more before activating him.

"The old KGB thug is still there with Russians, but there's a new type as well, he said. "The Soviets recruit new men from the universities, and they try to get people who would be suitable for any drawing room." The best spy ever, he said, was Richard Sorge, a German journalist close to the German Embassy in Tokyo who fed secrets to the Soviets prior to and during World War II. Unfortunately for the Soviets, Stalin did not always listen to Sorge and that may have cost tens of thousands of Soviet casualties.

But when Stalin did listen, the payoff was enormous. Sorge's prediction of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor allowed Stalin to transfer troops from the eastern front to meet the Germans on the western front.

The British veteran said that while a master spy like Sorge can provide extraordinary intelligence, this is rare in the spy world. Government leaders in the West should realize there are limits to what an intelligence agency can do.

In reading about John F. Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs, Collins was most struck by the American President's naiveté in thinking the CIA could somehow achieve a miracle with limited means at the Bay of Pigs. The problem, he added, is that through spy novels, the public — and sometimes the politicians — got the false notion that intelligence services can do anything.

"James Bond and all that — it just confuses things," he said.

But the CIA, while limited in what it can do, should get used to being blamed for just about everything, everywhere, anytime, he said.

Earlier, the British secret service took the blame, he said, and got used to it. Everyone needs a villain, he continued, Greek gods once supplied it, today the intelligence services supply that need.

The most demanding of all intelligence work is counterespionage, he said.

"About 20 years of that is enough, because your judgment starts to go," he said. "First, you have to watch your tongue at all times. Second, you get so involved that developments going on in the world tend to pass you by."

Current literature on spies and intelligence gathering recommended for further reading:

1. "The Man Who Kept the Secrets; Richard Helms and the CIA," by Thomas Powers, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1979.
2. "KGB," by John Barron, Bantam Books, 1974.
3. "The Codebreakers," by David Kahn, Signet Books, 1973.
4. "High Treason; Revelations of a Double Agent," by Vladimir Sakharov with Umberto Tosi, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1980.
5. "Intelligence requirements for the 1980's: analysis and estimates," edited by Roy Godson, National Strategy Information Center, 1980.
6. "Sun Tzu, The Art of War," translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, 1977.
7. "Smiley's People," by John Le Carré, Albert A. Knopf, New York, 1980.
8. "Decent Interval," by Frank Snepp, Random House, New York, 1977.
9. "In Search of Enemies; a CIA Story," by John Stockwell, W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York.
10. "The Hit Team," by David E. Tinnin with Dag Christensen, Little, Brown & Co., Boston/Toronto, 1976.
11. "Iran: Evaluation of US Intelligence Performance Prior to November 1978," staff report of subcommittee on evaluation, permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, US House of Representatives, January, 1979, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
12. "The Role of Intelligence in the Foreign Policy Process," hearings before Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Jan. 28 to Feb. 20, 1980, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

Last of six reports. Others in the series appeared Sept. 22 - 26.

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AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
29 September 1980

Washington Roundup

Missile Disguise

White House and Pentagon officials believe that the discovery by the USAF/TRW KH-11 reconnaissance satellite of an SS-20 ballistic missile in its canister alongside an encapsulated SS-16 ICBM was an effort by the Soviet Union to disguise the two weapons. Both were positioned alongside the SS-20 mobile launcher during recent Soviet war games, and officials believe this was so that Russian reconnaissance spacecraft could compare the two and that steps could be taken to improve the similarity. The SS-20 uses the first two stages of the SS-16 and it has been deployed extensively as an intermediate-range or theater nuclear weapon. The SS-20 has three MIRVs while the SS-16 is armed with a single reentry vehicle with a nuclear warhead yield of 0.65 megaton and an accuracy of 0.26 naut. mi. at 9.150 km. range. In the SALT 2 agreement, the USSR promised not to produce the third stage for the SS-16, the reentry vehicle or the device to target the reentry vehicle of the missile.

ARTICLE
ON PAGE 2CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
29 September 1980

CAMPAIGN ROUNDUP



Ronald Reagan's intelligence briefing this coming week on the Iran-Iraq conflict marks the other side of the no man's land he straddles in making campaign statements on foreign policy.

Reagan policy has been to refuse such briefings.

On one hand, he needs reliable, inside information to make sound statements on critical issues— especially in the face of Carter criticism that he speaks out irresponsibly and from a dearth of facts.

But conversely, Reagan feels Carter could "mousetrap" him by giving him classified briefings, and thereby silencing him, on key subjects.

Reagan in this case decided to accept a briefing on the border war so he won't "inadvertantly say anything harmful." The briefing could also negate criticism from the Carter campaign that Reagan carelessness on foreign issues could precipitate disaster.

— Marshall Ingwerson

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ON PAGE A-19

NEW YORK TIMES
29 September 1980

ESSAY

Reaganaut Lineup

By William Safire

WASHINGTON — With the perception spreading among pollsters and pundits that the Carter campaign is slowly sinking; with the President publicly dangling spare parts to Iran in return for the Ayatollah's vote (a last-minute hostage release that would not necessarily fool the American public); and with the prospect of a tough Senate report late this week on Billygate, thoughts in the nation's capital have begun to turn to what kind of people a Reagan administration would bring to town.

Unburdened by any recent talks with the possible next President, here are my predictions of the names that would be making news in a Reagan administration:

Secretary of State: Democratic Senator Henry Jackson. A sensible hardliner, who scorns the bluster of what he calls "born-again hawks" and who understands energy politics, Jackson would be a reassurance to the country, a welcome choice to the Congress, and a warning to the Soviets. Another name bruited about is George Shultz, highly respected in Europe; a dark horse is Laurence Silberman, former ambassador and Deputy Attorney General.

Treasury Secretary: Texan Charles Walker, former Deputy Treasury Secretary, has a good shot at this, with competition from Alan Greenspan, former chief of the Council of Economic Advisers. Congressman Jack Kemp, of Kemp-Roth fame, is the dark horse.

Secretary of Defense: William Casey, who ran the S.E.C. and the Ex-Im Bank and is now campaign chairman, is profoundly knowledgeable about defense matters. Another possibility is William Simon, on his way to becoming Chairman of the Fed, as well as former budget chief James Lynn. If Senator Jackson declined State, Senator Sam Nunn might be offered Defense. Do not overlook Jeane Kirkpatrick, strategist and Democrat high in Reagan's regard, who could wind up in a post never before considered for a woman.

Attorney General: Casper Weinberger, longtime Reaganaut who served as head of H.E.W. and O.M.B., is talked about for this post, if he does not wind up at Treasury or as White House staff chief. Another lawyer who could be chief of the White House staff is Ed Meese. The dark horse for A.G. is California judge William Clark, who might also be an early Supreme Court choice.

Secretary of Health and Human Services: Robert Carleson, who headed California's welfare program, has the inside track, though I hear some boosting for Republican Chairman Bill Brock. The Reagan people are mightily impressed with Vernon Jordan, head of the Urban League, who might well be offered this or H.U.D.

Secretary of Commerce seems made-to-order for Ann Armstrong; another possibility is the team of William Agee and Mary Cunningham of Bendix, in which case the No. 2 job would have to be renamed "Deputy Secretary."

Secretary of Labor will be an unfamiliar name. I'll bet on Thomas Sowell, U.C.L.A. economist, a black. **Interior** will be any Westerner Paul Laxalt chooses; **Agriculture** will go to a popular governor like Robert Ray of Iowa. **Housing and Urban Development** may see the first Hispanic in the Cabinet, or a moderate governor like William Milliken of Michigan. **Energy** could go to Congressman David Stockman, who will intelligently close it down, and **Transportation** to Delaware Congressman Tom Evans.

The Office of Management and Budget, which should be more important than most Cabinet offices in a Reagan administration, might be offered to Washington-wise Don Rumsfeld, or to long-time Reagan economic aide Martin Anderson, unless either wants the domestic council job.

The Council of Economic Advisers will be a hotly contested choice: Arthur Laffer has the edge, unless Jack Kemp gets the Treasury slot, in which case Martin Feldstein has the edge. Tom Sowell or Martin Anderson might wind up as compromise.

At the National Security Council Richard Allen, who insisted to George Ball on "Issues and Answers" today that Israel is indeed a "strategic asset," is likely to succeed at lowering the profile of the Adviser's job. Names like William Van Cleave, Pedro San Juan, Richard Pipes, Robert Pfaltzgraff, Fred Ikle, Robert Neumann, Robert Ellsworth, John Lehman, Ed-

ward Luttwak and Scott Thompson will be heard in the high reaches of State, Defense and Arms Control. The C.I.A. would be for Bill Casey or Larry Silberman if they are not in the Cabinet. Eugene Rostow would take the place once occupied by Averill Harriman as roving ambassador, and Jack Javits would be impressive as Ambassador to the U.N.

The White House staff would be run by the aforementioned Shultz, Weinberger or Meese, with Lyn Nofziger imitating Jim Hagerty as lovably irascible Press Secretary and with smooth Bob Gray in the Herb Klein slot. William French Smith, Reagan's personal lawyer, would be the new Kirbo.

Many of these Reaganauts are fungible, and may wind up in slots other than those I have imperiously assigned. But as a group they are experienced, respectable, occasionally brilliant and often innovative — and they would hit the ground running.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
29 September 1980

Convicted spy asks for new trial

By Douglas Frantz

WILLIAM PETER KAMPILES, convicted of selling military secrets to the Russians, has asked for a new trial because his lawyers charge the government withheld information that the Soviets had the secrets before Kampiles sold them.

The lawyers also charge that a top official of the Central Intelligence Agency "misled" the jurors who convicted Kampiles and the judge who sentenced him.

Months before Kampiles' arrest, his attorneys contend, the United States' satellite surveillance network—one of the most secret of all espionage operations—was breached by two other young spies.

Kampiles, 25, is a former CIA clerk who was raised in Chicago. He was sentenced to 40 years in prison in 1978 for selling a manual of instructions for the KH-11 spy satellite to a Soviet secret agent in Athens for \$3,000. The satellite can reportedly photograph a one-foot detail from 100 miles in space.

THE ALLEGATIONS are in documents filed with two motions in United States District Court in Hammond by Chicago attorneys Michael D. Monico and Marvin Bloom.

The first motion seeks a new trial. It contends the government knew the spy satellite system had been compromised before Kampiles sold the manual, but withheld that evidence from defense attorneys.

The motion further charges that a government witness, Leslie Dirks, deputy CIA director for science and technology, "misled" jurors and Judge Phil McNagny about the seriousness of the harm the U.S. suffered as a result of the manual's sale.

The second motion asks for a sentence reduction. It says the new evidence shows that Kampiles' crime was not as severe as prosecutors and Dirks indicated to McNagny.

KAMPILES, whose appeals have been turned down by the U.S. Supreme Court, is in the medium-security prison in Ox-

ford, Wis. Authorities there report he has performed excellently as a clerk.

At sentencing on Dec. 22, 1978, McNagny told Kampiles that his punishment was so severe because "we have a crime of enormous magnitude where the United States has suffered a terrible setback, according to Mr. Dirks."

McNagny added, however, that the sentence could be lessened if later evidence showed the damage to be "not as serious as I believe it to be at this time."

RULES FOR FEDERAL criminal trials require prosecutors to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant in response to the proper motions.

In pretrial motions, Kampiles had specifically requested any government information about the possibility the Russians had gained their knowledge of the KH-11 satellite from other sources.

Monico and Bloom contend the government concealed information that satellite secrets were among "thousands of classified documents" sold to the Russians in 1976 by two other young spies, Christopher Boyce and Andrew Daulton.

Boyce and Daulton, two Californians, were sentenced to long prison terms in 1977 for trying to sell documents to Soviet agents in Mexico City. Those documents dealt with a proposed CIA satellite system called Pyramider, which was never built.

IT WAS NOT DISCLOSED until April,

1979, however, that the Justice Department and National Security Council knew the two men had sold the Soviets data about two functioning CIA systems, called Rhyolite and Argus, as well as other satellite systems over a period of several months.

"The Russians did in fact know about the U.S. covert reconnaissance satellite system and its features long before the defendant's alleged sale of information in March of 1978," Kampiles' attorneys argue.

At Kampiles' trial, Dirks, the CIA deputy director, said Kampiles' sale of the manual severely impaired the nation's defense and its ability to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT II; the pending arms limitation treaty.

IN THEIR MOTIONS, Kampiles' attorneys said: "As the newly discovered evidence makes plain, Dirks' assertions were illusory, exaggerated, and simply incorrect."

The lawyers note that government officials have since said the U.S. is fully capable of monitoring Soviet compliance with SALT II.

The lawyers quote Defense Secretary Harold Brown's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on tiveness of one of the elements of that capability [to monitor SALT II] does not necessarily imperil our overall ability to July 18, 1979: "The reduction of effectiveness."

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
28 September 1980

THE SPY WAR



In a dispute over whether the K.G.B. had penetrated the C.I.A., counterintelligence chief James Angleton (left) was fired by Director William Colby in 1974.

By Edward Jay Epstein

In July 1977, President Carter's secret Special Coordinating Committee—the White House unit that oversees the clandestine activities of the C.I.A.—received a piece of dismaying news: A Central Intelligence Agency spy in the Kremlin, "Trianon," had been apprehended by the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence service. In 1978, the Soviet press reported that this American spy had been tried for treason and sentenced to death.

"Trianon" was the code name for Anatoly N. Filatov, a 37-year-old aide in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The C.I.A. had caught him in a sex trap in Algiers in 1976, when he was attached to the Soviet Embassy in Algeria. After being confronted with compromising photographs, Filatov was persuaded—or blackmailed, as he is reported to have claimed at his trial—to work as a spy for the C.I.A. when he was reassigned to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow. He was supplied with all the necessary paraphernalia for espionage: a miniature camera for photographing secret documents, a "burst" transmitter for signaling his contact in the American Embassy in Moscow, and a "dead drop" on a Moscow bridge, where he could inconspicuously leave his microfilm for American intelligence agents to pick up.

How he was so quickly caught by the K.G.B. has been a mystery of immense concern to American intelligence. Was he detected through routine Soviet surveillance? Was he exposed by an accidental leak from American intelligence? Or was he betrayed by a Soviet spy in the C.I.A.? To date, this question remains unanswered. Currently, in response to a request from Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, and Senator Malcolm Wallop, Republican of Wyoming, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is conducting a preliminary investigation into the circumstances that led to Filatov's exposure. Even after a three-year hiatus, this Senate investigation threatens to open up a Pandora's box of secrets about the spy war—secrets that the C.I.A. has managed to preserve until now.

In recent years, the C.I.A. has been hamstrung by restrictions on its secret operations. It must now report to a host of Congressional committees, answer Freedom of Information Act requests and contend with frequent leaks to the press. The exposure of C.I.A. sources and methods by Congressional investigations and the press has made other Western intelligence services reluctant to share their secrets with the C.I.A., and the agency's "liaison relationships" with these services have deteriorated. In addition, the C.I.A.'s inability

to prevent leaks has made it far more difficult for the agency to recruit spies and defectors abroad.

When the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was briefed on the Filatov case shortly after his arrest in 1977, according to one staff member of the committee, it found that the case had thrown the American intelligence community into confusion. Consternation arose because Filatov was apparently the only United States agent in a position of access to secrets in the Soviet Union—he was, in the language of the intelligence world, a "mole." Moreover, incredible as it may seem, he may have been the only mole that the C.I.A. had established inside the Kremlin in more than a decade. According to one high Government official, who was in a position to be familiar with all the major C.I.A. operations between 1969 and 1977, the C.I.A. failed to establish a single productive mole in the Soviet Union between the arrest of Col. Oleg Penkovsky in Moscow in 1962 and the recruitment of Filatov in 1976. This intelligence gap was also cited by former

C.I.A. executives and a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The only exceptions mentioned by these sources were two Soviet United Nations diplomats—code-named "Top Hat" and "Fedora"—recruited by the F.B.I. in New York and a Soviet diplomat—code-named "Igor"—recruited by the C.I.A. in Washington, during the 1960's. In all three cases, however, C.I.A. counterintelligence determined that the "moles" were double agents, working for the K.G.B., and all three returned to Moscow.

It is, of course, impossible to state with certainty that the C.I.A. had no productive spies in the Soviet Union during the period between 1962 and 1976. Deception and lies are common and necessary tactics in the spy war. However, the consistent failure of the C.I.A. to resolve its most vexing intelligence problems since the early 1960's supports the contention that the C.I.A. has not established a dependable source in the Soviet Union.

The primary task of any clandestine intelligence service—whether the C.I.A. or the K.G.B.—is to establish moles within the enemy's inner sanctum who are in a position to warn of changes in its plans and intentions. "No intelligence service can function unless it has secret sources," Richard Helms, a former Director of Central Intelligence, pointed out to me. There are, to be sure, other profitable ways of gathering intelligence, such as satellite surveillance and the interception of communications by powerful antennae, but these do not require the operation of a

clandestine service. The spotting, compromising, recruiting and handing of moles on a regular basis requires a highly professional secret service. And, even in the age of satellites and electronic wizardry, moles who can report on the strategic thinking of an adversary remain a crucially important part of the continuing intelligence war.

While public debate over the C.I.A., fueled by Presidential inquiries and Congressional investigations, has narrowly focused on the charge that the agency has abused its power by spying on domestic groups outside its legal purview, the secret concern in intelligence circles, which has not surfaced in any of the many public hearings, is that the C.I.A. is not spying effectively on its principal adversary: the Soviet bloc. As one counterintelligence expert from the RAND Corporation put the question: "Why has the C.I.A. repeatedly failed to penetrate the Soviet system by recruiting agents?"

Within the C.I.A. itself, this question has been the center of a bitter and destructive debate that has persisted unresolved for some 20 years. On one side of the issue, it is argued that the K.G.B. has successfully established its own moles in American intelligence, and that these agents report to Moscow the secret plans and sources of the C.I.A., thereby making it impossible for the C.I.A. to recruit—or keep secret—its own moles. Tennant Bagley Jr., who was the deputy chief of the C.I.A.'s Soviet Bloc Division in the mid-1960's and was responsible for countering the activities of Soviet intelligence, explained in a series of interviews that "it takes a mole to catch a mole." According to his view, the two most successful moles that the C.I.A. ever recruited, Col. Peter Popov (1953-58) and Colonel Penkovsky (1961-62), were both caught by Soviet intelligence because they had been betrayed by a K.G.B. mole, or moles, working in American intelligence. Bagley claimed, moreover, to have seen during his tenure in the C.I.A. direct evidence of a mole "feeding back," as he put it, operational plans of the C.I.A. to the K.G.B. "In one case, Soviet intelligence clearly knew about an elaborate C.I.A. plan to recruit a Soviet-bloc diplomat in Switzerland," he pointed out. He knew of no productive mole that the C.I.A. had recruited in the

Soviet Union since the capture of Penkovsky in 1962. (Bagley retired from the C.I.A. in 1972.) He accounted for this failure in blunt terms: "It is impossible for the C.I.A. to maintain any secret sources if it is penetrated." And clearly, as far as he was concerned, the C.I.A. was "penetrated" by Soviet moles.

This argument was carried much farther by James Jesus Angleton, who served as the C.I.A.'s counterintelligence

chief until 1975. Angleton, theorizing on the basis of information supplied by Soviet defectors, believed that he had penetrated the K.G.B. "penetration" as he called them, in the Soviet Bloc Division of the C.I.A. In 1963, he began purging or transferring four possible suspects. When these administrative measures did not result in ferreting out the mole or plugging the apparent leak, Angleton took more drastic action. In 1968, he explained to me, he completely "cut off" the entire Soviet Bloc Division from information about highly sensitive cases. This step led, according to Angleton's critics, to the near paralysis of the Soviet Bloc Division, which was then responsible for all C.I.A. intelligence activities in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

On the other side of the debate, a large number of C.I.A. officers, such as William Colby, who became Director of Central Intelligence in 1973, believed that the mole issue was divisive, demoralizing and ultimately a dangerous distraction. They argued that Porov, Penkovsky and other moles were caught by the K.G.B. either through routine surveillance procedures or because of a blunder or mishap in American intelligence — and not through any information supplied by a mole. These intelligence officers viewed the deductive search for moles as "sick think," as Jack Maury, a former head of the C.I.A.'s Soviet Bloc Division, described it to me. Indeed, William Colby blamed the failure of the C.I.A. to recruit agents in the Soviet Union on the mistaken fear that there was a mole in the C.I.A. who would quickly betray them. When he became Director, he fired Angleton and transferred other counterintelligence officers who had worked under him. He also did away with the tight compartmentalization of information that Angleton had insisted on. Colby explains in his autobiography that he took these actions because he believed that the K.G.B.'s "ultraconspiratorial turn of mind had, at least in recent years, become more of a liability than an asset to the agency."

The dismissal of Angleton did not end the debate. When the K.G.B. uncovered Filatov, the C.I.A. again had to come to grips with the possibility that Soviet intelligence had a source in the agency. Even though C.I.A. officials told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Filatov's detection had come about because of an inadvertent statement to the press by one of national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's deputies on the National Security Council, a number of counterintelligence officers believed that Filatov had been betrayed by a mole in the C.I.A.

In fact, the C.I.A. had cogent evidence in its files testifying in no uncertain terms to the capacity of Soviet intelligence to recruit and sustain moles in highly sensitive positions in American and other Western intelligence services. In the early 1960's, the C.I.A. uncovered, through the services of its own anonymous spy, a well-organized complex of Soviet moles that included not only American but also French, German, Israeli, British, Swedish and NATO officers.

Most of these agents, according to their public admissions, were induced to work for the K.G.B. by financial rewards or sexual blackmail rather than an ideological sympathy with Communism. Some were enlisted under "false flag" arrangements in which, for example, former Nazis were recruited by a K.G.B. front that pretended to be a secret Nazi conspiracy. They all continued spying for long periods of time, and, in some instances, such as in West Germany, provided the K.G.B. not only with secrets but also with control of the intelligence apparatus itself. In the West German case, according to Tennant Bagley's analysis for the C.I.A., the moles were able to manipulate the careers of their fellow officers so as to promote and strategically place other K.G.B. moles. In this sense, the mole complex was self-perpetuating; and between 1960 and 1978 more than two dozen K.G.B. agents would be uncovered in the NATO alliance.

The unraveling of this complex did not occur through any ordinary security procedure but through an accident of history that could not reasonably be expected to reoccur in the intelligence war. This incredible story began with a letter sent on April 1, 1958, to the American Ambassador in Switzerland, Henry J. Taylor. Taylor promptly turned the letter over to the C.I.A. station chief in his embassy.

Tennant Bagley, one of the C.I.A. officers who took control of the case, recalled in a series of interviews with me that the letter was written in fluent German, and that the author, who claimed to be a high-ranking officer of a Communist intelligence service, refused to divulge his name or even nationality. The mysterious author suggested, according to Bagley's recollection of the case, that there were moles in Western intelligence who would betray him if he identified himself. He therefore proposed helping Western intelligence put "its own house in order," presumably by ferreting out the moles, before he would consider defecting to the West. He signed the letter "Heckenschütze."

In his initial reports, sent to mailing addresses supplied by the C.I.A., "Heckenschütze" rapidly identified seven Soviet spies. These included a British admiralty aide at the Portland Naval Base, named Harry Houghton, who had been supplying the K.G.B. with secret information about United States nuclear submarines; Col. Israel Beer, an Israeli military historian who, in fact, was an Austrian who had emigrated to Israel 20 years earlier, pretended to be an Orthodox Jew and gradually won the confidence of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and other Israeli leaders; and Col. Stig Wennerström, the Swedish air attaché in Washington, who was actually a general in the K.G.B.

"Heckenschütze" also provided a document that caused serious embarrassment at the British Secret Service — a purported list of 26 Polish officials compiled by British agents in Warsaw as potential targets for recruitment. This list, "Heckenschütze" explained, had come from the K.G.B.

When Bagley and other C.I.A. officers evaluated the list, the question arose: How could the K.G.B. have obtained such a sensitive document unless it had a mole inside the British Secret Service?

When the C.I.A. queried the British about the list, they reported that it was a clumsy fabrication. "Heckenschütze's" C.I.A. case officer, Howard Roman, recalls that British intelligence asserted that the names could have been taken out of the Warsaw telephone directory. The denials were so heated that even James Angleton was prepared to believe that the anonymous mole was a disinformation agent who was attempting to sow discord between the American and British services.

Then, to everyone's astonishment, a researcher in the C.I.A.'s Eastern European Division discovered that British intelligence had sent essentially the same list to the C.I.A. a year or so earlier. It now became clear to the C.I.A. officers handling the case that the list had not been lifted from the Warsaw phone book, but from the secret files of British intelligence.

Allen Dulles, then the Director of Central Intelligence, presented this evidence to his British counterpart, and, after several months of investigating those who had access to the list, British intelligence traced the probable leak to the safe of George Blake. Blake, a Dutch-born career intelligence officer, had rapidly risen in the ranks of the British Secret Service through a remarkable string of successful recruitments of Communist officers in Germany. Could such successes have been purposely provided by the K.G.B. to enhance Blake's standing?

During his interrogation, Blake admitted that he had spied for the Soviet Union since 1952 and that he had passed virtually every important document the British Secret Service had in its files to the K.G.B.

The depth of this K.G.B. penetration into British intelligence stunned the C.I.A. When the British diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean had defected to the Soviet Union in 1951, Harold (Kim) Philby, an

officer in the British Secret Service, also had come under suspicion and, in the early 1950's, he had been effectively "reopened". Then, after Philby's confession, Anthony Blunt, a former officer in the British security service (MI-5), who had retired at the end of the war, was confronted by British interrogators and, in return for a grant of immunity, admitted that he had served as a Soviet mole. (In 1963, Philby defected to Moscow, thereby clearing up any doubts about his loyalties, and,

several years later, Blake escaped from prison and also went to Moscow.)

"Heckenschütze" next turned his attention to the West German Intelligence Service (B.N.D.). Headed by Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, Hitler's former intelligence chief against the Russians, this organization worked closely with the C.I.A. "Heckenschütze" reported in 1959 that he had been told by a high-ranking K.G.B. officer that the B.N.D. had been thoroughly infiltrated by Soviet intelligence, that many of its top officials had been blackmailed by K.G.B. into cooperating with it. Specifically, he stated that of the six B.N.D. officers who had visited C.I.A. headquarters in Washington in 1956, and met personally with Allen Dulles, two were K.G.B. moles.

This lead was specific enough to identify immediately one member of the group, Heinz Felfe. Felfe, a former Nazi officer, was then the deputy chief of West German counterintelligence. Like Blake, Felfe had risen to his high position through a series of "successes." West German security police immediately placed Felfe under close surveillance, and eventually caught him transmitting secrets. The surveillance led to the arrest of a number of other moles in West German intelligence, including Hans Clemens — the man in charge, ironically enough, of the surveillance team in Bonn. Felfe, after being convicted of espionage, was eventually traded to East Germany for a group of alleged West German

spies.) A classified 1973 review of the memoirs of General Gehlen (which I received through a Freedom of Information Act request) termed the Felfe case a "crushing defeat" for the B.N.D., and concluded that "the West German Government has been and doubtless still is thoroughly penetrated."

"Heckenschütze" finally decided to defect to the United States in 1960, after more than 30 months' service as an anonymous mole. The K.G.B. had found out about certain documents that he had sent to the C.I.A. and asked his help in tracking down the leak. "Heckenschütze" now knew that there was a leak in American intelligence. On Christmas Day, he arrived with his wife at the American military mission in Berlin, and was met by a contingent of C.I.A. officers. He identified himself as Michael Goleniewski, the vice chairman of Polish military intelligence. He further in-

formed the Americans that he had hidden away a cache of documents in a tree trunk in Warsaw for the C.I.A. to retrieve after he had escaped.

When the C.I.A. recovered these documents, it found thousands of pages of Polish and Soviet military bulletins containing United States military secrets that could only have come from high-level sources in NATO and the United States Defense Department. Goleniewski was given an office in Washington, where he worked with his debriefing officers attempting to "elaborate," as he put it, the various clues. He believed, for example, that he could pinpoint the leak in the C.I.A. that had betrayed him. He revealed that Polish intelligence had known about a 1959 C.I.A. plan to recruit a Polish diplomat in Switzerland. The C.I.A. did not pursue the lead, according to Goleniewski. He later said to me that the debriefing officers had spent "only a few hours" on this subject, and never brought it up again.

Before the debriefing could be completed, Goleniewski presented the C.I.A. with still another surprise. He informed his case officers that "Goleniewski" had merely been a

cover name he had used in Polish intelligence. His real name, he explained, was Grand Duke Aleksei Nikolaevich Romanoff. He further explained to the bewildered men from the C.I.A. that his father, Czar Nicholas, had secretly escaped from Russia to Poland after the Bolsheviks had seized power. Goleniewski told his astonished audience that he was now heir to the czar's fortune.

When news of these disclosures reached Richard Helms, then Deputy Director for Plans, he realized that the C.I.A. had a potentially embarrassing problem on its hands. Goleniewski had been the most productive agent by far in the entire history of the C.I.A., revealing more than a dozen Soviet moles; the C.I.A., however, could not be put in the position of supporting his claim to the czar's fortune. In 1964, the C.I.A. severed its relations with its former spy.

Almost exactly one year after Goleniewski had defected in Berlin, a K.G.B. security officer named Anatoli Golitsin defected from the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki, Finland, and was taken by the C.I.A. to Washington, where he was turned over to Angleton for questioning.

Even though he held a relatively low rank in the K.G.B. at the time of his defection, Golitsin claimed to have attended Moscow staff meetings in which the infiltration of Western intelligence services was openly discussed. Like Goleniewski, he suggested that the K.G.B. had its moles in the C.I.A., the British Secret Service, NATO, and French intelligence. Indeed, much of the data that he furnished on this mole complex seemed to parallel that provided earlier by Goleniewski. Golitsin asserted additionally, however, that the K.G.B. had managed to place its agents in France in cabinet-level positions "close, very close, to de Gaulle." According to one member of Angleton's counterintelligence staff, the Golitsin leads focused suspicion on the French Deputy Prime Minister, but they were insufficient for French intelli-

gence to take any action. Golitsin demanded an immediate payment of \$1 million for his information, and received a substantial portion of it from the C.I.A.

According to Philippe de Vosjoli, who had been the liaison between the C.I.A. and French intelligence in Washington, and was gradually brought in on the case, Golitsin insisted that at least six French intelligence officers were Soviet moles. After Golitsin provided clues that could possibly fit two colonels in French intelligence, both were allowed to resign from the service.

Golitsin further described a plan that French intelligence had devised to spy on American nuclear-missile sites. The information that French spies collected in the United States in this operation would, according to Golitsin, be channeled to the K.G.B. through its moles in French intelligence. De Vosjoli had never been informed of such a plan. Then, in 1963, he received orders from his superiors in Paris to organize the spy networks in the United States that Golitsin had outlined. As far as de Vosjoli was concerned, this order demonstrated that French intelligence was being controlled by K.G.B. moles and used to collect information for the Soviet Union, not France. He protested the scheme, pointing out that France had no conceivable interest in spying on American missile sites. When his orders were not changed, he resigned from French intelligence, and, after being informed that he would be assassinated if he returned to France, he went into hiding in the United States.

A large number of documents that Goleniewski had left for the C.I.A. in the tree trunk in Warsaw contained information stolen from the NATO command. There was, for example, a top-secret June 1960, report on "intelligence objectives elaborated by the commanding staff of NATO." Goleniewski claimed that some of these documents had come from a French source, married to a Communist, who had once been associated with the French war college.

In August 1963, French intelligence photographed a NATO official passing an attaché case full of NATO documents to a Soviet Embassy official. It was Georges Paques, a former director of studies at the College who had been an aide to nine French ministers. During his interrogation, he confessed that he had been spying for the Soviet Union for some 20 years.

Then, in 1968, Hermann Lüdke, a rear admiral in the West German Navy and the deputy chief of logistics for the NATO command, was identified by West German security police as a K.G.B. spy. Two weeks after his interrogation began, Admiral Lüdke was found dead; he had been shot with a rifle. German officials declared his death an apparent suicide. The same day that Lüdke was killed, Gen. Horst Wendland, the deputy director of West German intelligence, was found shot to death in his headquarters, another alleged suicide. Goleniewski claimed that he had pointed to Wendland as a key Soviet mole in West German intelligence under the code name "Organizer" as early as 1961. Gen. Wendland had been the target of a West German security investigation, and had undergone interrogation prior to his death. He now was presumed to have been a Soviet mole for some 22 years, according to a C.I.A. officer who had been privy to the investigation. Within two weeks, four other German officials, who were reported to be suspects in the Lüdke-Wendland cases, died violently, all alleged suicides.

Behind a ring of three barbed-wire electrified fences at Fort Meade, Md., is the headquarters of America's most secretive intelligence service — the National Security Agency (N.S.A.). Even though it has more employees and a larger budget than any other American intelligence agency, including the C.I.A., its existence was classified a secret through most of the '50s. This extraordinary reticence is considered necessary because the N.S.A.

is responsible for protecting the security of the channels through which the leaders of the United States Government, military forces and intelligence services communicate with one another. In most cases, the N.S.A. designs the ciphers, encoding machines and protected lines through which the nation's most closely guarded secrets are transmitted. Any breach of this system can have disastrous consequences. Aside from protecting the nation's secret communications, the N.S.A. intercepts and deciphers the secrets of foreign governments. Such "signal intelligence" includes intercepts of telephone and radio signals, telemetry from missiles and electrical impulses from radar and sonar. Vast quantities of information about the testing, capabilities and deployment of Soviet weaponry are derived from the N.S.A.'s sustained "electrical intelligence." Information about Soviet intentions comes from its code-breaking operations or "communications intelligence."

On July 22, 1963, Victor Norris Hamilton, a Syrian-born research analyst at N.S.A. headquarters, turned up in Moscow and announced that he was defecting. Presumably, he was an agent of the K.G.B. In Moscow, he joined two other former N.S.A. employees, Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin, who had defected to the Soviet Union three years earlier. While working as K.G.B. moles at N.S.A. headquarters, they had provided the Soviet Union with information about the technical capabilities and locations of the supersecret sensors that the N.S.A. had employed against it, and also with data about the N.S.A.'s codes and code-breaking techniques.

One day after Hamilton defected from the N.S.A., Jack E. Dunlap, an employee of the N.S.A. since 1958, was found dead of carbon monoxide poisoning — an apparent suicide. One month later, when Dunlap's wife found sealed packets of Government documents in the attic of their house, it was reported that he was a Soviet agent.

Col. Thomas Fox, the chief of counterintelligence of the Defense Intelligence Agency at the time of the investigation, explained to me that Dunlap, a native of Bogalusa, La., had been recruited by the K.G.B. while employed at the N.S.A. communications-interception base at Sinop, Turkey. He met Maj. Gen. Garrison B. Coverdale, the chief of staff of

the N.S.A., who selected him to be his personal driver at N.S.A. headquarters at Fort Meade. General Coverdale further arranged for Dunlap to receive top-secret clearance and a position in the N.S.A.'s traffic-analysis division. Since the general's car had "no inspection" status, Dunlap could drive off the base with documents hidden in the car and then return without anyone knowing that the material had been removed from the base.

Moreover, Dunlap appears to have had high-level connections in the N.S.A. The Carroll Report, a secret Defense Department document (part of which I received through a Freedom of Information Act request) named after Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, who was asked to investigate the case, noted that Dunlap had helped a colonel at the N.S.A. base pilfer some "expendable items of Government property" from his office. From this incident, the report deduced, "Dunlap had already had experience in circumventing N.S.A. procedures under relatively high-level tutelage." The implication was that he had expanded his access to secret files by offering to help officers appropriate furniture and other articles from their offices.

When General Coverdale left Fort Meade in August 1959, Dunlap was reassigned as a driver to the new N.S.A. chief of staff, General Watlington. The means by which he received this reassignment is not clarified in the Carroll Report, but, by continuing his chauffeur, Dunlap retained access to the "no inspection" vehicle necessary for smuggling documents on and off the base.

The Carroll Report makes it clear that Dunlap was interrogated by N.S.A. investigators just before he died. According

to Colonel Fox, the Defense Department investigating team did not establish any connection between Dunlap and the three N.S.A. employees who fled to Moscow. Since four K.G.B. moles had been uncovered in the N.S.A., the agency found it necessary to change its secret codes, encoding machinery, security procedures and entire *modus operandi*.

While Dunlap was chauffeur around the N.S.A. chief of staff at Fort Meade, the K.G.B. developed another mole at the pinnacle of American military intelligence — Lieut. Col. William Henry Whalen. Colonel Whalen, who had also served in the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, was recruited by the K.G.B. in 1959 when he worked in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as intelligence adviser to the Army Chief of Staff. Since Colonel Whalen, as intelligence adviser, could demonstrate a "need to know," he had access to virtually all military planning and national intelligence estimates. In return for money, he regularly supplied secrets to his Soviet case officer over a three-year period — even after he had retired from the Army because of a physical disability. According to his indictment, the highly classified data sold to the K.G.B. included "information pertaining to atomic weaponry, missiles, military plans for the defense of Europe, estimates of comparative military capabilities, military intelligence reports and analyses, information concerning the retaliation plans by the United States Strategic Air Command and information pertaining to troop movements." He gave away, in short, a wide range of national secrets available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Pleading guilty in 1966 to charges of conspiring with a Soviet agent to divulge national defense documents, Colonel Whalen was sentenced to 15 years in prison, and paroled after six years.)

Through the services of Dunlap and Whalen, the K.G.B. succeeded, as one counterintelligence officer puts it, in "opening the window" on virtually all American intelli-

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gence-gathering activities in the Soviet bloc. Just as the C.I.A. was able to ferret out K.G.B. moles by tracing the documents that Goleniewski provided from Moscow to their [redacted], the K.G.B. could [redacted] trace the military intelligence reports and analyses that Whalen provided to whatever traitors existed in the Soviet intelligence apparatus. During this period, 1958 to 1963, the K.G.B. did in fact succeed in catching the C.I.A.'s two prize moles in Moscow, Peter Popov and Oleg Penkovsky. Both were executed.

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Even in the light of these past Soviet successes in penetrating the N.S.A. and Defense Department, there is considerable resistance in the intelligence community to confronting the possibility that the K.G.B. has used the same techniques and resources to establish new and undetected moles in American intelligence. In the past year, I attended a series of conferences on "Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's," sponsored by a group of Harvard, [redacted] and Georgetown academics called the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. The participants included, among others, current and former officers of the C.I.A., F.B.I., Defense Intelligence Agency, British Secret Service, French Intelligence and Israeli Military Intelligence, as well as a defector from the Czech Intelligence Service.

During one of these sessions, Dr. William Harris, a consultant to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence with access to top-secret documents, said that the C.I.A. had to operate on the assumption that it was a "partially penetrated" intelligence service. He added, "I assume we will never be rid of penetrations." Dr. Harris's matter-of-fact statement caused considerable unease among some of the intelligence officers present. Was Dr. Harris actually suggesting that there were currently [redacted] moles high up in American intelligence, asked one former A. executive. Dr. Harris tactfully responded that the "penetrations" he had re-

ferred to could include nonhuman sources such as microphones.

Later, in private, Dr. Harris explained to me that he had no doubt that the K.G.B. had succeeded in placing moles inside the C.I.A. He said that even if the C.I.A. had the best conceivable "quality control" procedures to screen its officers — which might be "99.8" percent successful in detecting potentially disloyal individuals — there would still be a small number — "2 percent" — that would slip through. Since the C.I.A. has processed tens of thousands of officers in the past 10 years, there might be several hundred potential recruits. Dr. Harris then suggested that the C.I.A. did not in fact have a good record at quality control. In 1978, for example, a 23-year-old watch officer in the C.I.A. named William Kampiles sold to the K.G.B. a top-secret manual explaining the technical operations of the KH-11 satellite system that is used over the Soviet Union. When the C.I.A. investigated, it discovered that there were at least 13 other missing KH-11 manuals. The fact that Kampiles passed through all the security procedures and could steal a manual — which was never missed — indicated faulty "quality control."

Moreover, it is clear from the cases of moles in the N.S.A. and the Defense Department that the administration of polygraph (lie-detector) examinations, which is called "fluttering" in the C.I.A., is not an effective means of detecting disloyalty. In all the N.S.A. cases, for example, the Soviet moles had undergone periodic lie-detector tests without their clandestine activities for Soviet intelligence being discovered.

Finally, just as the British Secret Service resisted the idea that it had been infiltrated by K.G.B. moles even after it had received the incriminating documents from Goleniewski, American intelligence services are understandably reluctant to pursue evidence of a mole. For example, William C. Sullivan, Assistant Director of the F.B.I. for Domestic Intelli-

gence until 1971, claims that J. Edgar Hoover, the F.B.I. Director, refused to allow him to move against what he was convinced was a Soviet mole in the F.B.I.'s New York office. In his autobiography, Sullivan describes how he discovered the leak and, unable to identify the mole, proposed transferring, one by one, all personnel out of the suspected section. Hoover replied, "Some smart newspaperman is bound to find out that we are transferring people out of the New York office," and flatly rejected the request. The source of the leak had not been removed from the office, or further identified, when Sullivan retired. There is little bureaucratic incentive for searching for moles: If the search is a failure, it will be viewed as a demoralizing witch hunt; if it is successful, it will completely undercut trust in the past work of the intelligence service.

The C.I.A. must eventually come to terms with the possibility that it has a mole problem, if it is to regain confidence in its effectiveness as a clandestine intelligence service. As long as its officers remain vulnerable to being seduced, bribed or compromised — which is, after all, part of the human condition — the K.G.B. can recruit them either directly or under some "false flag." The C.I.A. must assume that the K.G.B., which has proved itself a first-class intelligence service, will develop moles with access to secrets. Once such an assumption is made, an active counterespionage strategy, involving compartmentalization of secrets and "marked-card" tests for locating leaks, can be evolved. If, however, the agency continues to evade the issue, as its critics claim it does, there is little likelihood that American intelligence will be able to do what it is paid to do. ■

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JACK ANDERSON

Ryan Kin: How Much Did U.S. Know?

The five children of the late representative Leo Ryan (D-Calif.) have filed a \$3 million lawsuit charging that the State Department withheld information that could have prevented his murder in Jonestown, Guyana, two years ago.

The House Intelligence Committee, meanwhile, has begun an investigation of the same disturbing allegations.

Both the lawsuit and the House investigation are based on persistent rumors about Central Intelligence Agency activities in Guyana and the agency's links to the Rev. Jim Jones, the People's Temple cult leader. According to some reports, a CIA agent may have witnessed Ryan's assassination, as well as the ritual murder-suicides of more than 900 men, women and children at Jonestown a few hours later.

The Ryan children's lawyer, Marvin E. Lewis, said he plans to prove that the State Department and the CIA possessed vital information about the Jonestown situation, and were aware of the extreme danger involved in Ryan's ill-fated fact-finding mission. Yet the agencies did not tell Ryan what they knew, and he was killed by cultists at the airport near Jonestown on Nov. 18, 1978.

The lawsuit also charged that the State Department failed to provide the congressman with adequate security.

As for the House probe, a Capitol Hill source said of the long-circulating rumors about the CIA: "These allegations are coming from some very responsible people, and they cannot be dismissed out of hand." Details of the investigation are still under wraps, but my associate Indy Badhwar has learned that it will focus on the following evidence:

- Joe Holsinger, Ryan's top aide who helped arrange the trip but remained in California, got a phone call from the White House on the day of Ryan's murder. The caller, Les Francis, of the congressional liaison office, reported accurately the number of persons killed, and according to Holsinger said his information was based on "a CIA report from the scene." Francis, now executive director of the Democratic National Committee and a Carter-Mondale campaign official, recalled the conversation, but said, "I think I said 'intelligence report' rather than 'CIA report.'"

- A tape-recording in the FBI's possession covers the last horror-filled minutes of the Jonestown mass murder-suicide ritual. On the tape, Jones can be heard barking the instruction: "Get Dwyer out of here before anything happens to him . . . I'm not talking about you, Darrell, I said Dwyer."

Investigators say the reference was to Richard Dwyer, deputy chief of the U.S. mission in Guyana, who accompanied the Ryan party to Jonestown. "Who's Who in the CIA," a sometimes reliable East German publication, lists Dwyer as an agent since 1959. Dwyer, who knew Jones, says that he left Jonestown before the massacre, and also says Jones must have been "mistaken" when he referred to him as present. Dwyer had "no comment" when asked if he worked for the CIA.

- Discovery at the Jonestown commune of a huge cache of arms and drugs like Quaaludes, Valium, Demerol and Thorazine. The discovery raises the question of links between Jones and drug traffickers and organized crime, as well as law-enforcement agencies.

- House probers particularly want to

find out if Ryan's requests to the State Department for accurate information on conditions at Jonestown were turned down to protect CIA cover operations in Guyana. When he failed to get answers from the State Department, Ryan flew to Guyana to get his own.

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"Trigon"

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NEWSWEEK
6 October 1980

PERISCOPE

A Deal With Moscow on a U.S. Spy

When the Soviets revealed last week that they had spared the life of 40-year-old Anatoly Filatov, who was sentenced to death in 1978 for being a U.S. spy, NEWSWEEK learned that the commutation was the secret part of an elaborate bargain already announced. In a package deal negotiated by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national-security adviser, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviets agreed not to execute Filatov at the time they arranged the public, 1979 release and deportation of five well-known Soviet dissidents, including poet Aleksandr Ginzburg. In exchange, the Soviets got back two countrymen who had been convicted as spies by a U.S. court in New Jersey.

■ Washington is trying to keep track of Aleksandr Kruglov, the Russian private who gave himself up to Soviet officials after briefly taking refuge in the American Embassy in Kabul (NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29). Noting that the Soviets promised the soldier that if he returned home he would suffer no penalty and could quit the army to study, the Carter Administration has told the Kremlin it will be watching the Kruglov affair. U.S. officials do not know exactly where Kruglov has gone, but they gave him an unlisted phone number of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow—just in case he cares to call for future American help.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

4 October 1980

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 17

The dirty tricks department.

The Trigon Caper

"The Brotherhood" is a fraternity of the political right and outcasts from the intelligence-defense establishment, seeking to save the US government from a Soviet network of "moles," agents, and dupes they perceive as sapping the fiber of American security and threatening to hand the world to the Kremlin on the silver platter of detente. As this episode will reveal, it can organize a cabal blending fact and fiction to depict a high American official as a traitor in a spy thriller, plant the same idea in a newspaper article, then manipulate its allies on Capitol Hill to make the plot come alive in real life.

The Brotherhood uses the covert weapons of its craft—information and disinformation, whispered secrets and published sensations. One of its psychological missiles was recently MIRVed to strike successively at two priority targets: Henry Kissinger, once described by ex-CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton as "objectively a Soviet agent"; and David L. Aaron, once Kissinger's arms control expert, now the Mondale-sponsored deputy to Zbigniew Brzezinski in the National Security Council.

The "missile" was a piece of microfilm (now missing) that was furnished to the CIA in April 1977 by one of its prize agents, a cable clerk in the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow, code-named "Trigon." It purported to be the copy of a cable from Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin reporting on a conversation with recently retired ex-secretary of state Henry Kissinger on the morning of April 11.

Kissinger was represented as ridiculing Carter administration proposals for a new approach to the SALT II negotiations aimed at concrete reductions in existing levels of nuclear weapons. According to the "Dobrynin Telegram," Kissinger called President Carter a prisoner of his own "human rights illusions" and Brzezinski "an ideological dogmatist." He said that he had not been consulted on the new proposals and would have opposed them, knowing better than anyone else what the Russians could accept.

What most surprised Carter aides was that Kissinger was represented as advising that the new administration would not hold out for "equal aggregates" of strategic weapons, which he himself had helped to negotiate. The authenticity of the dispatch was a subject of hot dispute among the few officials privy to it. It was, in any event, the last contribution of "Trigon," believed to have been spotted as an American spy in the summer of 1977 and eliminated. (Some reports have confused him with another agent, Anatoli N. Filatov, who was tried in Moscow in 1978, and is now serving a 15-year prison sentence in the Soviet Union.)

"Trigon" and the "Dobrynin Telegram" were closely guarded secrets, unknown even in the State Department, until leaked by the CIA in 1978 as part of a subterranean struggle over SALT and detente. Its contents were shared with Richard Perle, staff assistant to anti-SALT senator Henry M. Jackson, by a CIA arms control analyst, David S. Sullivan. The brilliant but impulsive Sullivan, unable to persuade his agency to support his view that the Russians were cheating on the SALT I treaty limits, also gave Perle a copy of his secret report based on the monitoring of Soviet weapons tests.

To authenticate the "Dobrynin Telegram," Sullivan—so he told Perle—asked the National Security Agency whether it was consistent with monitored traffic from the Soviet Embassy, and was told that a coded message of approximately that length had been sent on that date. Sullivan was going dangerously far in his dissent.

Dismissed in mid-1978 by CIA director Stansfield Turner, Sullivan joined the fraternity of embittered outsiders—along with Angleton, ex-director Richard Helms, and young ideologues like Sven Kraemer, a former NSC staffer who is the son of Fritz Kraemer, Kissinger's postwar mentor. United in viewing the "insiders" as oblivious to the national interest and the Soviet menace, they gravitated toward the Reagan camp, making contact with advisers like Richard V. Allen and John Lehman. Sullivan joined the staff of the right-wing New Hampshire senator, Gordon Humphrey.

This set the stage for the launching of the Trigon missile, which I first heard about in Detroit early in July, a few days before the opening of the Republican convention. Senator Jesse Helms was leading a campaign to bar Kissinger from addressing the convention, branding him as a symbol of all things perniciously un-Reaganesque—detente with the Russians, friendship with Peking, and a self-crippling SALT treaty. The senator's aide, John Carbaugh, told reporters that Kissinger was about to be exposed as having served Soviet interests.

Sure enough, the following Monday morning, July 14, as the convention opened, *Newsweek* broke the sensational story of the CIA's "top-grade spy" who had given the CIA long-suppressed dope on Kissinger's meeting with Dobrynin. *Newsweek* correspondent David L. Martin was frank to say it had come from enemies of Kissinger. Jack Anderson followed with a column on the same subject. Some reporters were told they could get more details from David Sullivan, who was circulating a memo on the subject.

CONTINUED

Kissinger reacted as if he had been stabbed in the back. "How can anyone serve the government if subjected to such character assassination?" he asked me. Kissinger confirmed that he had met with Dobrynin on the date mentioned, but denied saying any of the things quoted in the purported telegram. He was vague about what he did discuss with Dobrynin. He described it as a "not very important conversation." "What would have been the point of going over Secretary Vance's proposals in Moscow, which had already been rejected a month before?" asked Kissinger. "In any event, it would have been crazy for me to talk in such terms in the Soviet Embassy, of all places" (presumably because the embassy is bugged).

The attack on Aaron was more richly and subtly textured. Aaron was not only a former Kissinger adviser on SALT and Senator Walter Mondale's staff assistant in the Church Committee's investigation of the CIA and FBI. He was perceived by Reagan supporters as a key figure in a series of politically inspired Carter administration leaks of national security secrets: the nuclear targeting plan, the Stealth bomber, and an arrangement with Peking for cooperation in monitoring Soviet communications. A cloud of suspicion cast over him would spread over the whole Carter administration.

Under Senator Humphrey's signature, David Sullivan drafted a letter to his own former boss, Admiral Turner, asking for an investigation of how a valuable intelligence asset like Trigon had been lost. (Humphrey told me he had signed the letter, unaware of Sullivan's own involvement in the affair, and summarily fired his aide when he belatedly learned of it.) The letter called attention to an article in the *London Daily Telegraph* which had gone generally unnoticed in this country.

The same article was cited in another letter asking an investigation by the Senate Intelligence Committee, signed by two of its members, Republican Malcolm Wallop and Democrat Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a national security pillar. This letter originated in Wallop's office. Wallop's staff aide on the Intelligence Committee, Angelo Codevilla, had been in contact with Sullivan in drafting the letter. The obscure *Telegraph* article was 15 months old. Bemoaning the low state of security, it reported:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation recently interviewed a senior official of the National Security Council over the leakage to Soviet bloc intelligence agents of a top-secret document classified 'Blue Line,' one of the highest security categories, relating to intercepts of coded Soviet communications. American intelligence sources maintain that, as a result of this leakage, an American agent abroad lost his life.

Other details of the long-overlooked sensation were made available by Senate staffers. The NSC official in question had reportedly said something to a Rumanian at a diplomatic reception that pointed to the identity of Trigon, possibly compromising him.

Who was the official who, in the words of the Wallop-Moynihan letter, may have contributed to "a major intelligence failure"? The FBI said it had not interviewed any NSC official in any such connection. The CIA reported to the Senate Intelligence Committee that it had no reason to believe any American official had been involved in the loss of Trigon.

Yet Senators Wallop and Moynihan demanded closed hearings. "If an agent was betrayed," said Moynihan, "it is despicable and very possibly criminal." But neither he nor Wallop nor their staffers would say whom they had in mind—not on the record.

But the Brotherhood had provided a trail for anyone interested. The author of the *Daily Telegraph* article was Robert Moss, a British right-wing journalist who once worked for a CIA-sponsored London news syndicate, Forum World Features. He is also the author of a book, *Chile's Marxist Experiment*. The CIA has refused to confirm or deny that the book is part of the covert operation against the Allende regime. More recently, Moss was co-author, with Arnaud de Borchgrave (lately resigned from *Newsweek*) of a best-selling spy thriller, *The Spike*, which represents the manifesto of the security Brotherhood, certified on its jacket by Richard Helms as presenting "the challenge posed to America and the Free World: Can the Soviets destroy the West without firing a shot?"

The villain of the novel, a KGB "principal agent" who has conspired to blind America to the Soviet challenge, is revealed as Perry Cummings, deputy director of the NSC and protégé of the vice president, himself an "unconscious" agent. Cummings dies—at his own or the KGB's hand—and the vice president resigns. A former CIA officer fired for leaking secret material on Soviet violations of SALT agreements is installed as the new director of the CIA.

Get it?

The novel, soon to become a "major motion picture," served the cause well, and vice versa. The hapless David Aaron, who said he had never done anything to compromise an agent, was left to contend with phantoms. He appealed to one news organization after another to withhold his name, until the *New York Times*, despite Aaron's appeal through James N. Reston, which served to delay publication for two days, finally identified him as the target of the operation.

Aaron then commented publicly for the first time, calling the rumors "unfounded" and "malicious." It was a classic piece of covert action, and it left the desired taint of suspicion. David Aaron did nothing. In fact, he was never accused of doing anything.

Daniel Schorr

Daniel Schorr is senior correspondent of the Cable News Network. He covered the Watergate and CIA investigations as a CBS correspondent.

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Rep. Beard Leak

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THE WASHINGTON POST
2 October 1980

Rep. Beard Wins A Decision on Leaking Charge

Associated Press

Rep. Robin L. Beard (R-Tenn.) won a preliminary decision yesterday against a charge that he leaked classified information about Soviet missile operations, but he may face further investigation.

Rep. Samuel S. Stratton (D-N.Y.), chairman of the House Armed Services investigations subcommittee, said a staff inquiry determined that the information that Beard, a subcommittee member, had disclosed had not been given to the House Armed Services Committee.

Stratton said his only concern was whether classified information had been leaked from the committee, and the investigation showed that it had not.

However, Stratton said the House Intelligence Committee has been notified in case it wants to investigate whether the information Beard disclosed was, even so, classified.

Rep. Bob Carr (D-Mich.) had filed a charge that Beard, one of the harshest congressional critics of leaks about the Pentagon's Stealth technology, had issued a news release Sept. 18 based on classified information "furnished him with a clear understanding of its classified nature."

"He's a liar," Beard said Tuesday of Carr.

Beard said he did not know the information was classified. He said he got it from a congressional employee.

he will not identify who told him the information would be in an Aviation Week magazine article then being written.

"It did not occur to me that it would be classified," he said.

Beard said his purpose in airing the information was to criticize what he thought were Soviet violations of arms limitation treaties and to ask the Armed Services Committee to investigate them.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A18THE WASHINGTON POST
27 September 1980

U.S., Soviets Exchange Data on Missile Forces

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. and Soviet officials meeting in Geneva yesterday swapped information about each side's missile forces, an exchange that U.S. officials believe indicates Moscow means to continue respecting at least the initial arms limitation pact signed by the two superpowers.

Sources said the Soviets provided information about the dismantling of some older Yankee-class, missile-firing submarines as newer vessels enter their fleet.

The United States reported on initial steps toward retiring some older Polaris missile subs to make room for the Navy's new Trident submarine that will go on sea trials next year.

The first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) was signed by the superpowers in 1972 and was the first step toward applying ceilings on the atomic arsenals of both countries.

Under terms of that agreement, each side is required to account for older missiles replaced with more modern ones.

The SALT I pact, however, expired in 1977. And, while President Carter and Soviet chief Leonid Brezhnev signed a SALT II pact in June 1979, it has not been ratified by Congress. The question of whether the Soviets would continue to abide by the restraints of these treaties has become an important one in arms control circles.

U.S. officials said that while the exchange of data yesterday is no guarantee of future Soviet compliance, it could be seen as at least a reassuring sign that the Kremlin has not given up on the SALT process.

Informants said there was no discussion of alleged Soviet violations of the SALT agreement because the administration apparently does not consider various press and congressional reports of violations to have been, in fact, violations.

Officials said that many of these published reports either were in error, were old charges that had previously been looked into, or were not actual violations.

Recent charges of Soviet SALT violations by Rep. Robin Beard Jr. (R-Tenn.), however, have caused the administration considerable concern and have touched off an investigation of Beard by the House Armed Services Committee.

Beard charged that the Soviets, in July, "conducted an exercise over a five-day period in which they simulated the reloading of 25 to 40 SS13 missile silos."

The SS13 is Moscow's biggest missile and a rapid reload on missile silos is prohibited under SALT II.

Administration officials contend that Beard's charges are inaccurate. Privately, however, the real fuss is over a possible compromise of intelligence sources because the United States apparently did detect signs that the Soviets were simulating such activity.

Some officials argue that it is no violation because it was truly a simulation in that no missiles were moved and it was not rapid, in the sense that it apparently took more than five days.

The U.S.-Soviet discussions in Geneva involve the Standing Consultative Committee, which was set up under the initial agreement and which meets periodically to discuss SALT issues.

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David Aaron in the Limelight

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THE WASHINGTON POST
2 October 1980

JACK ANDERSON

White House Denies Espionage Blunder

President Carter has rushed to clear his deputy national security adviser, David L. Aaron, of the charge that he inadvertently compromised a top U.S. spy in the Soviet Union.

The White House has called the accusation "completely unfounded" and an "unsubstantiated rumor." The FBI and the CIA have dutifully confirmed that there's no substance to the allegation.

Certainly Aaron is a sterling fellow, high on the White House totem pole, who would never intentionally unmask an American agent. Indeed, he may be as innocent as the White House insists he is. But my own investigation indicates otherwise.

In the subterranean world of half-light where espionage is practiced, the truth is always difficult to discern. Yet my associate Dale Van Atta has questioned four intelligence sources who are familiar with the case. They have been scrupulously accurate in the past.

They claim that Aaron let slip some ultra-secret information at a party, that an intercepted diplomatic dispatch proved he had talked out of turn and that the White House is more anxious to cover up the embarrassment than to uncover the truth.

Aaron's slip allegedly exposed the identity of Anatoly N. Filatov, a Soviet intelligence officer, who worked undercover as an American agent known to the CIA by the code name Trigon. The unfortunate spy disappeared into the Soviet prison system after a secret military trial in 1978.

The Soviet press reported he had been executed. Some CIA officials believe he committed suicide. His Moscow lawyer claims he is still alive, serving out a 15-year sentence.

The information that Aaron spilled at the party, sources say, came from "blue line" documents so secret that only a trusted few insiders are allowed to see them. There are several levels of secrecy above top-secret. Some papers are stamped with code words, which themselves are classified. Even more guarded than these are documents with blue lines running down the pages.

Only the most sensitive information appears in blue-line documents. Aaron allegedly mentioned to an East European diplomat some facts that had come from a blue-line document dealing with Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons.

Apparently, a third-world diplomat happened to overhear Aaron's careless conversation with the East European. The eavesdropper reported the conversation in a cable to his own foreign office.

The cable was intercepted and decoded by America's ultra-secret National Security Agency. The message was such an embarrassment to the White House that, under an executive order for the protection of private individuals, it was supposed to be destroyed. Yet I understand a copy was kept and might be ferreted out if the FBI looked hard enough.

Shortly thereafter, the CIA canceled all blue-line clearances. This was done, sources say, because Aaron had compromised the documents and had "rolled up one of our agents."

The nuclear weapons information that Aaron revealed, so the story goes, pointed a finger at Trigon. But other sources, who confirm Aaron's blue-line slip, believe Trigon was really compro-

mised because he "lived too high" on the money the CIA paid him.

Footnote: Shortly after I first wrote about the Trigon case, two members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) and Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.), asked the staff to investigate. This could be awkward, since Aaron was a staff colleague before he moved to the White House.

Secret Warning — Long before the Iraqi-Iranian outbreak, the Joint Chiefs laid before the president a top-secret warning that a crisis in the Persian Gulf could erupt "at any time" and that it "could curtail access to the oil required by the United States and its allies."

The military chiefs warned that the "dramatic worsening of the military balance in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region" exposed the "oil-producing states in that area to much greater potential security threats."

They foresaw the danger of Soviet intervention — not "a bolt from the blue nuclear attack on the United States" but limited military action "Afghanistan-style" — in the early 1980s.

"The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the first major Soviet-American incident of the 1980s, may well be a harbinger of the greater risks of military confrontation which can be foreseen in the decade to come," wrote the Joint Chiefs.

They warned that Soviet forces "could intervene in regional political conflicts and become a threat to U.S. and Allied access to oil supplies." And the United States doesn't have the military power to stop them, short of nuclear retaliation.

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ON PAGE A1-S

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
2 October 1980

Carter Claims Privilege in Probe of Leak

By David Wood
Washington Star Staff Writer

President Carter, invoking a claim of executive privilege, has ordered Deputy National Security Adviser David Aaron not to testify before a House subcommittee investigating the aide's alleged role in intelligence leaks.

The panel's chairman, Rep. Samuel Stratton, said yesterday the subcommittee would subpoena the White House aide.

During a brief public session yesterday of the Armed Services investigations subcommittee, Stratton announced that Aaron had been forbidden by Carter to testify.

Aaron sent a sworn, written statement denying allegations that he had been the source of leaks about the "Stealth" aircraft system. But the aide, yesterday's expected witness in the House hearings, did not appear.

Stratton, D-N.Y., asserted that the claim of executive privilege in this case was "unacceptable" because the privilege covers only communications between the chief executive and his advisers, not those between the advisers and outsiders.

Chiding the White House, Stratton observed that "Congress probably has a little more experience in judging exactly what is involved in invoking executive privilege than does the present occupant of the White House or his staff."

Stratton said that White House

Counsel Lloyd Cutler had advised him in a letter late Tuesday night that Carter had invoked executive privilege, and that Cutler had called him again yesterday morning to say that the Justice Department agreed with the decision.

"Here again," noted Stratton, an 11-term Democrat, "We are dealing with people who haven't been in Washington very long."

Following the subcommittee session Republican members were full of praise for Stratton for "standing up to the White House." But because of the imminent congressional recess, there is not expected to be any confrontation soon between Aaron and the panel.

The issue involves allegations brought before the investigations subcommittee two weeks ago by retired Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, in which the former chief of naval operations identified Aaron as the source of mid-August disclosures about the secret Stealth program.

Zumwalt, an informal adviser to Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, cited as sources high officials in the White House and the Pentagon, but declined to reveal their identities.

In a sworn affidavit accompanying the Cutler letter, Aaron denied having any part in intelligence leaks or knowing anyone on the White House or National Security Council staff who did.

In Cutler's letter to Stratton, the White House lawyers called Zumwalt's allegations "the most suspect kind of hearsay" and said Aaron would testify only "if and when

your subcommittee has more credible evidence" of Aaron's involvement in intelligence leaks.

Cutler also offered to make Aaron available for a deposition, an offer Stratton rejected as being "not the same as testifying and being cross-examined."

Stratton said he would insist on a claim of executive privilege directly from Carter, rather than one relayed through Cutler. If Carter makes such an assertion, Stratton said, he would challenge it with a subpoena.

Subcommittee aides said no action probably will be taken until the House reconvenes Nov. 12 from its election recess. Even then, one predicted, there is "no way Aaron will ever come up here to talk."

Zumwalt's allegations were part of an increasingly bitter series of skirmishes on national security on the presidential campaign trail and across Capitol Hill — amid accusations and wild rumors about who is leaking what and for whose benefit.

The administration has angrily denied Republican charges that it has seriously weakened American defense capabilities, as well as accusations that Carter aides disclosed details of the Stealth program to counter such charges.

Carter and Reagan have accused each other of jeopardizing the nation's security by attempting to build political capital on intelligence leaks. Republicans and Democrats on the Armed Services committee and elsewhere have likewise accused each other of leaking defense secrets for political ends.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
2 October 1980

White House Aide Declines To Testify on Stealth Leaks

Associated Press

Acting on President Carter's orders, a White House national security aide refused yesterday to appear at a congressional hearing on news leaks about Stealth technology, for making warplanes relatively invisible to enemy radar.

David Aaron, deputy White House assistant for national security affairs, had been called by the House Armed Services investigations subcommittee to testify on an allegation that he leaked the Stealth information.

Aaron sent a sworn statement denying he was the leaker but did not show up to testify. Rep. Samuel S. Stratton (D-N.Y.) said the subcommittee probably will subpoena Aaron.

White House counsel Lloyd Cutler told the panel in a letter, "The president has directed Mr. Aaron not to appear before your subcommittee in a public hearing at this time."

"When, and if your subcommittee has some credible evidence before it to support the charge against Mr. Aaron, the president will review the situation as it may then exist."

Retired Adm. Elmo Zumwalt told the subcommittee Sept. 16 that two White House officials, whom he would not identify, had told him Aaron leaked the information published by The Washington Post Aug. 14.

Zumwalt also testified the sources told him Carter directed that Stealth

information be leaked as part of his reelection campaign, to counter criticisms of a failure in defense policy.

Stratton, the subcommittee chairman, said only the president, not his counsel, can invoke executive privilege, and that it can be invoked only against disclosure of the president's consultations with his advisers.

"If this involves a conversation in which the president told Mr. Aaron this Stealth information should be made available to the press, then this would be covered by executive privilege," Stratton said.

Stratton's subcommittee is investigating news leaks of the technology and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's announcement Aug. 22 that the technology existed.

Brown said he was forced by the news leaks to confirm the program's existence but is keeping technical details secret.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-21NEW YORK TIMES
2 OCTOBER 1980

A SECURITY OFFICIAL DECLINES TO TESTIFY

Tells a House Panel He Disclosed
No Secrets About a Bomber
Now Under Development

By JUDITH MILLER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 1 — A member of the National Security Council staff declined to appear today before a Congressional panel investigating disclosures about the Stealth bomber project after President Carter directed him not to testify.

The House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee, headed by Representative Samuel S. Stratton, Democrat of upstate New York, had asked David L. Aaron, deputy assistant for national security affairs, to testify on how information had been disclosed to news organizations about the secret technology now under development that would permit aircraft to avoid radar detection.

Mr. Stratton said he received a letter last night from Lloyd Cutler, White House counsel, informing the panel that Mr. Aaron would appear only "when and if your subcommittee has some credible evidence before it to support the charge" that Mr. Aaron had disclosed the information. In addition, the subcommittee received a sworn statement from Mr. Aaron denying that he disclosed the information as well as assurances that the panel could privately question Mr. Aaron under oath.

Mr. Stratton said, however, that Mr. Carter could not properly refuse to permit Mr. Aaron to testify by invoking claims of executive privilege, asserting that the doctrine exempted Presidential advisers from testifying only about their consultations with the President. Mr. Stratton added that the subcommittee would probably subpoena Mr. Aaron to testify when the House reconvenes after the election.

Jurisdiction Problem Cited

In other action, Mr. Stratton referred to the House Select Committee on Intelligence allegations that Representative Robin L. Beard, Republican of Tennessee, had improperly disclosed classified information about possible Soviet violations of the strategic arms limitation treaty. Mr. Stratton said his subcommittee lacked jurisdiction to investigate the charges since Mr. Beard had not obtained his information about the alleged violations from committee sources.

Representative Bob Carr, Democrat of Michigan, the committee member who requested the investigation, accused the subcommittee of hypocrisy, saying it was "willing to investigate the Administration on allegations of leaks regarding Stealth" but was "unwilling to discipline its own members."

Today Mr. Beard renewed his charges that the Soviet Union was violating the provisions of the arms limitation treaty and other arms control agreements with the United States. He stated that he had received new information from intelligence sources supporting his charges.

According to Congressional aides, the Defense Intelligence Agency has completed a report concluding that the Soviet Union has for years been practicing the possibility of re-using missile silos. Mr. Beard has alleged that Moscow conducted an exercise over a five-day period in July in which they simulated the reloading of 25 to 40 SS-18 missiles. Rapid reloading of missile silos is prohibited by the 1979 arms treaty. Although that treaty has not been ratified, both sides had indicated they were prepared to observe the treaty's terms.

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"Billygate"

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-23**NEW YORK TIMES
2 OCTOBER 1980ESSAY

Senate 'Condemnation'

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, Oct. 1 — A bipartisan committee of the U.S. Senate, with the counsel of a former Federal judge, this week issues its "condemnation" of influence-peddling and hostage-profiteering by the President's brother.

More important, President Carter himself is criticized for contributing to his brother's salability because the President knew "the enhancement of Billy Carter's importance in the eyes of the Libyans might be exploited by him for his own economic advantage." Jimmy Carter's protestations of ignorance are dismissed by the Senate with "this possibility was made more serious by the financial difficulties that, as the President knew, Billy Carter was experiencing."

The nine senators and the judge also sharply criticize the Attorney General for hiding an intelligence report from his own investigators while the same top-secret report was being shared with Billy Carter — and most likely, the Libyans — by the President's National Security Adviser.

Lying under oath is also implicitly charged: the aide whose office is closest to Jimmy Carter's is said by the Senate to have "professed not to remember events relevant to the investigation which he could reasonably have been expected to remember."

Most startling of all, neither the President's personal word nor Adviser Brzezinski's sworn testimony are accepted as truth on the subject of telling Billy in April that his secret oil deal was known. Boxed in by conflicting evidence, and determined to protect the President, Brzezinski contradicted himself on the date of the call, leading the Senate to suspect in writing "whether the President participated in the decision to communicate at least some of the information to Billy Carter."

Here we have the President, adjudged guilty of condoning his brother's illegal activities; the National Security Adviser officially criticized for "significantly risking" intelligence sources by acting "outside of his normal functions" to avoid political embarrassment; the Attorney General chastised publicly for impeding an investigation and improperly telling the President that he could assure his brother of no prosecution; and the Carter appointments secretary suspected of falsely forgetting under oath.

That's not "much ado about nothing." That is an emphatic condemnation of White House venality. How do the Carterites react? "The subcommittee staff has found no significant impropriety," goes the White House statement (shifting significantly from

previous claims of "no impropriety"), "but has raised certain issues involving questions of judgment." Four years and \$220,000 too late, Mr. Carter is now issuing "guidelines" to forbid his Administration from continuing to do what he refuses to admit is wrong-doing.

That morally sleazy defense — that no crimes were discovered, and only poor judgment was shown — will be snapped up by apologists who have derided as "mediagate" the exposure of Libyan penetration of the White House and its ensuing cover-up.

Lest we forget, the ethical standards promised by the holier-than-thou Carter gang were slightly higher than "we won't commit any felonies and get caught."

However, this devastating Senate report is only the second step down a long road. The report quietly mentions that all testimony is being forwarded to the Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility for use in its own internal investigation.

Next comes the Shaheen Report, which the director of the O.P.R. at Justice assures the Senate will not be postponed past the election. Michael Shaheen is known to have blessed the present Attorney General's previous transgressions; Ben Civiletti says he is confident that his loyal subordinate's report will reveal "no improprieties." At least none significant enough to be prosecuted.

As with the Lance prosecution, close examination of Senate and O.P.R. testimony may start a chain reaction. Unreasonable forgetfulness under oath is a crime. Direct conflicts in testimony, which permeate these hearings, call for perjury probes. The prospect of a perjury rap does much to refresh recollections.

Following that, no matter who is elected, will come the special prosecutor. He will investigate the probe of the Vesco-Charter "Sandbox plot" suspiciously compartmentalized by the will closely review the Shaheen probe for misfeasance; he will find out if any other Carter family members received payments from the Libyans; he will seek indictments for any perjurious "I don't recall" that now protect the Georgians.

He will find out if evidence was destroyed or concealed about informal, high-level "assurances" of a post-election pro-Arab tilt that Dictator Qaddafi reported had been made to him.

Farfetched? Nearly two years ago, when a few of us demanded to know why Billy Carter's lobbying for Libya was not being investigated, who would have thought a committee of the Senate would one day issue an unprecedented "condemnation"? More to come.

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ON PAGE A-16

NEW YORK TIMES
1 OCTOBER 1980

Draft Study Says President Showed Poor Judgment Over Brother's Acts

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 30 — The staff of the special Senate subcommittee investigating Billy Carter's dealings with Libya has concluded that President Carter showed poor judgment in not explicitly disassociating himself and his Administration from his brother's activities.

The conclusion was contained in a preliminary draft of the subcommittee's report to the Senate, which is to be submitted Thursday.

The draft, prepared by staff lawyers, has not been approved by the nine Senators on the subcommittee. Several of the Senators said today that, while the wording in the draft would probably be changed, the gist of it would probably not change.

"The President should have either issued a public statement or sent a private message to the Libyan Government, or both, that Billy Carter did not represent the United States and that the Libyans should not expect to gain any influence in the United States by cultivating their relationship with him," the draft report states. Portions of the preliminary report were made available to The New York Times by a Senate staff member.

Complaint About Disclosure

The White House issued a statement today complaining that the press had obtained copies of the draft report. The statement said that no one in the White House had seen the report and, therefore, there could be no specific comment. However, it did say that "after-the-fact opinions may differ on judgmental issues."

The White House also released a letter from the President's special counsel, Alfred H. Moses, to Philip W. Tone, the subcommittee counsel, in which Mr. Moses responded to nine questions about the Billy Carter matter. The panel decided last week to have the President's staff answer the questions, rather than to interrogate the President directly.

Mr. Moses's letter added no significant new information to the material in a statement on the Billy Carter affair that the President made to the Senate last month.

Mr. Moses wrote that the President had not made a private statement or a public announcement disassociating himself from his brother's activities because he

"considered Billy Carter's trips to Libya to be strictly private visits involving no governmental function or purpose." The letter also asserted, as the President has said many times, that "we had no control over what Billy Carter said or did."

Among the other conclusions in the draft report are these:

¶ Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser, and Benjamin R. Civiletti, the Attorney General, seemed more interested in protecting Mr. Carter from political embarrassment than in serving the best interests of the nation's foreign policy or law enforcement.

¶ The career officials in the Justice Department who investigated Billy Carter under the Foreign Agents Registration Act performed their task "honestly and conscientiously."

¶ Billy Carter's conduct was "contrary to the interests of the President and the United States and merits condemnation."

Action Called Unreasonable

The staff document states that it was unreasonable for the President to have used his brother as an intermediary to set up a meeting last November at which Mr. Brzezinski asked Ali A. el-Houderi, the Libyan representative here, for help in obtaining the release of the American hostages in Iran.

The sharpest criticism in the draft report is leveled at Mr. Brzezinski and Mr. Civiletti.

Mr. Brzezinski, it says, risked compromising important intelligence sources when he telephoned Billy Carter last spring to urge him to break off his financial ties with Libya. The call was based on highly classified information.

The Attorney General, according to the draft report, made a mistake by withholding from investigators with top-secret security clearance similar intelligence information he had obtained. Mr. Civiletti's action, the report states, delayed the investigation unnecessarily.

The staff found no fault with Mr. Civiletti's informing the President about the case, but he should not, the lawyers declared, have told the President that his brother would not be prosecuted if he registered as a foreign agent.

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ON PAGE 411

THE WASHINGTON POST
1 October 1980

Criticism on Billy Draws Response by White House

By Edward Walsh

Washington Post Staff Writer

The White House made public yesterday a document answering a series of questions on the Billy Carter affair posed by a special Senate subcommittee and defended President Carter's handling of the situation involving his brother's ties to Libya.

In a display of annoyance, White House officials said they made the document public because of the leak to the press Monday of a draft version of the subcommittee's final report on its investigation of Billy Carter.

The same document was provided to Senate investigators Monday and "we would expect that the final report will reflect the information" contained in it, the White House said.

There were no important revelations in the White House document, which contained responses to questions posed by the subcommittee last week.

The draft of the subcommittee report, which is to be made public later this week, said the investigation of Billy Carter's ties to Libya was conducted "honestly and conscientiously" by the Justice Department. But the same draft report said the president and some of his closest aides deserve to be publicly chastised for poor judgment in their handling of the matter.

Many of the questions posed by the subcommittee dealt with the president's precise state of knowledge of his brother's activities in connection with Libya and whether the president attempted to intervene in Billy Carter's relationship with the foreign government.

In response, the president, in the document released yesterday, reiterated

his earlier statements on his knowledge of his brother's activities and defended his judgments in dealing with the affair. For example:

- The president said he was not informed in advance of a second trip to Libya in 1979 by his brother.

- The president did not discuss with his advisers the advisability of making a private or public statement on Billy Carter's second trip to Libya. "The president considered Billy Carter's trips to Libya to be strictly private visits involving no governmental function or purpose," according to the document. Moreover, after publicly disassociating himself from some of his brother's remarks in connection with the Libyan ventures, the president "did not feel that any further announcement by him or private statement to the government of Libya was called for," the document said.

- The president did not discuss with his brother Billy Carter's effort to win an increase in Libya's oil allotment for an American oil company. Billy Carter had already been advised against the venture by White House national security affairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and "the president believed a further call from him was likely to be counterproductive," the document said.

The president also was quoted in the document as defending the decision of intelligence agency officials not to inform him of reports in April 1980 that Libya was about to make a payment to his brother. Intelligence officials are in the best position to judge how such information should be used, and in this case did the correct thing by turning it over to the Justice Department for its investigation of Billy Carter, according to the document.

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ON PAGE A-1

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
1 OCTOBER 1980

Carter Backs Aides' Actions In Billy Case

By Phil Gailey

Washington Star Staff Writer

President Carter has told Senate investigators he believes that administration officials made the correct decision in withholding from him early intelligence reports on his brother's financial dealings with Libya.

In written response to nine questions submitted to him on Sept. 24 by the Senate subcommittee investigating Billy Carter, the president also said he never saw any reason to publicly condemn his brother's association with the radical Arab nation prior to July 14, when he said he first learned that Billy Carter had received \$220,000 from the Libyan government.

The White House, stung by a draft of the subcommittee's report, which is critical of the administration's handling of the Billy Carter affair, yesterday released the president's response to the panel's questions. In the process, it took a swipe at the subcommittee for leaking its conclusions to the news media before the latest White House information "could be reviewed and reflected" in the Senate report.

In a draft of a report that is to be made public later this week, Senate investigators concluded that President Carter and several members of his administration, including Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, showed poor judgment in their handling of Billy Carter's Libyan connection.

In particular, the report said the president and other White House officials had acted in a way that not only encouraged Billy Carter's relationship with Libya, but enhanced his importance in the eyes of his Arab friends at a time when his financial troubles made him vulnerable to exploitation.

"The news articles which we have seen describing the draft report indicate that the subcommittee staff has found no significant impropriety but has raised certain issues involving questions of judgment," the White House said in a statement released late yesterday.

"As is to be expected, after-the-fact opinions may differ on judgmental issues. We look forward to a final report which will present in an impartial and balanced manner the facts learned by the subcommittee and the conclusions it has reached."

The president's response, prepared by White House Special Counsel Alfred H. Moses, added little to his previous statements on the matter and, according to one Senate source, contained nothing that is likely to alter the subcommittee's initial findings.

Moses said the until July 14, when Billy Carter registered as a foreign agent, the president never discussed with his advisers "the advisability of making a private statement or public announcement" dissociating himself and his administration from Billy Carter's second trip to Libya in the fall of 1979.

He added, "The president considered Billy Carter's trips to Libya to be strictly private visits involving no governmental function or purpose . . . and did not feel that any further announcement by him or private statement to the government of Libya was called for."

The Senate subcommittee, however, concluded that the president "should have either issued a public statement or sent a private message to the Libyan government, or both, that Billy Carter did not represent the United States and that the Libyans should not expect to gain any influence in the United States by cultivating their relationship with him."

Carter has said Brzezinski informed him sometime around March 31 of Billy Carter's attempt to broker an oil deal between Libya and an American oil company. Brzezinski, who received the information in an intelligence report from CIA Director Stansfield Turner, has said he took it upon himself to call Billy Carter and warn him that his financial dealings with Libya could embarrass the president.

In response to one of the subcommittee questions, Moses said the president did not personally take up the matter with his brother because he believed such an effort would be "counterproductive."

President Carter has said he did not know about Libyan payments to his brother until July 14 — several days after some of his top aides learned of the development.

The Senate report discloses that as early as last November the FBI had "information from intelligence channels" that Billy Carter was attempting to get a loan from the Libyans and to negotiate an oil deal that would have paid him huge commissions.

It faults Civiletti for not contacting the FBI to see if it had any information to supplement an intelligence report he received in early April alerting him that Billy Carter was about to receive payments from the Libyans.

Civiletti has testified that he withheld the intelligence report from Justice Department investigators until early June rather than risk compromising sensitive intelligence sources. He also said he made the decision not to go to the president with the information.

"The subcommittee believes it is likely that the Billy Carter case would have come to an earlier conclusion if the attorney general had shared the information with a subordinate having knowledge of the case," the Senate report said.

Moses said the president believes that "public confidence in impartial law enforcement was best served by the decision reached not to bring this particular intelligence report to his attention."

He added, "The president believes that the correct policy with regard to the dissemination of intelligence information relating to possible law violations by persons close to president is to leave this decision in the first instance to the heads of the intelligence agencies."

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ON PAGE A1-6

THE WASHINGTON POST
30 September 1980

Draft Report Also Scolds Aides

Carter Criticized on Billy

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

Senate investigators have concluded that President Carter and some of his closest aides deserve to be publicly chastised for poor judgment and unwise handling of Billy Carter's dealings with the Libyan government.

The subcommittee apparently found no violations of law in the course of its inquiry. It also said the Justice Department's investigation of Billy Carter's failure to register as a foreign agent "was honestly and conscientiously conducted" by the department's Criminal Division.

But in the draft of a report to be made public later this week, lawyers in charge of the inquiry suggested that the president should have known that using his brother as a middleman with the Libyans would have the "predictable effect" of both condoning the relationship and enhancing Billy Carter's stature and prestige with the radical Arab government.

The White House should also have realized, the draft report states, that "the enhancement of Billy Carter's importance in the eyes of the Libyans might be exploited by him for his own economic advantage."

"This possibility," the report adds, "was made more serious by the financial difficulties that, as the president knew, Billy Carter was experiencing."

In fact, the report discloses, Billy's telephone calls in pursuit of money and oil from the Libyans "increased dramatically" following the Nov. 27, 1979, meeting he arranged at the White House between White House national security affairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Libya's chief diplomat here, Ali Houderi.

The report, listing conclusions for the hurried inquiry that began in late July, is now being circulated among members of the special Senate subcommittee that conducted the investi-

gation. A copy was obtained by The Washington Post.

Composed by staff lawyers Phillip Tone, Michael Davidson and Robert Kelley, it has been revised once and is said to be in near-final form.

Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti, White House appointments secretary Phillip J. Wise, CIA Director Stansfield Turner and Brzezinski all come in for their share of criticism.

In the course of it, the report discloses that the FBI had "information from intelligence channels" as early as last November and December that Billy Carter was trying to get a loan from the Libyans and to arrange for an increased allocation of Libyan oil for the Charter Oil Co. of Jacksonville, Fla.

The subcommittee said Civiletti might well have discovered that fact had he made any effort last April to determine whether his department had any information that could supplement other intelligence reports that he had just been told of and that he chose to keep to himself.

Coupled with what the FBI had heard last year, the various items of intelligence "could have been used in the investigation" earlier than they were "without compromising sources," the report states. But instead, the Senate lawyers noted, "the attorney general failed to share the classified information that came to him in April 1980 with any trustworthy subordinate who had the necessary security clearance."

White House appointments secretary Wise is accused in the report of being responsible for "some delay in the progress of the investigation." The Senate lawyers said he "was less cooperative than he should have been in returning calls by an FBI agent seeking to reinterview him."

The draft report also expresses disappointment over the fact that Wise "professed not to remember events relevant to the investigation which he could reasonably have been expected to remember."

In a footnote, for example, the Senate investigators say they are convinced that Wise arranged a State Department briefing for one of Billy Carter's associates about the status of some C130 military air transports the Libyans were trying to obtain. Wise, in his testimony before the subcommittee, said he had no recollection of playing any role in the January 1979 briefing for Henry (Randy) Coleman.

The subcommittee noted that one witness who accompanied Billy Carter on his first trip to Libya in 1978 recalled the president's brother telling his Libyan hosts "that he would try to do something to obtain the release of the C130 aircraft Libya had ordered." But beyond the 1979 briefing, the panel said it "found no evidence of further activity of Billy Carter with respect to C130s."

The report criticizes "White House aides close to the president" for failing to warn him of Billy's 1978 trip despite its potential for embarrassment. The Senate investigators also faulted the president for not disassociating himself and his administration from his brother's second trip to Libya in the fall of 1979.

[H]aving failed to dissuade him [Billy Carter] from returning to Libya," the report states, "the president should have either issued a public statement or sent a private message to the Libyan government, or both; that Billy Carter did not represent the United States and that the Libyans should not expect to gain any influence in the United States by cultivating their relationship with him."

The fact-finding segment of the report, which presumably will supply more detail, is to be distributed to subcommittee members in draft form today. The section devoted to conclusions, however, notes that "Libyan officials went to considerable trouble and expense in establishing and maintaining a relationship with Billy Carter."

"The initial contact," the report adds, "was the result of persistent efforts and a devious series of personal contacts aided by the participation of an important Libyan official."

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The report said Billy's potential as a public-relations man for the Libyans did not last long and "surely did not extend beyond early 1979" when he hosted some Libyans on a controversial U.S. tour. But the subcommittee lawyers said, "other purposes must have remained because the remarkable relationship between important Libyan officials and the brother of the president of the United States continued."

In fact, according to the draft, Billy's telephone calls about money and oil "continued at a relatively high level" after the Nov. 27 Brzezinski-Houderi meeting concerning the U.S. hostages in Iran. The Libyans paid the president's brother \$20,000 on Dec 27 and \$200,000 on April 7.

In addition, the report states, "the Libyan government appears to have held out the promise of an increased oil allotment well beyond that [April 7 date]."

By then, CIA Director Turner had already received a top-secret intelligence report concerning the projected Charter Oil deal, but furnished it only to Brzezinski with the request that it be shown to the president.

In doing this, the report states, Turner "denied another intelligence element missing portions of the information, which were unknown to it and which it had requested . . . he thus preempted the professional judgment of the other element" that might have felt the information should be sent to the FBI.

The "missing portions" of the report, according to informed sources, were the explicit identification of Billy Carter and Charter Oil; whose names had been deleted. The "other intelligence element" that asked for those details was not identified, but it is known that a copy of the report, without the names, was submitted to the State Department as well as the CIA and the FBI.

The subcommittee said it could not resolve the question of whether Brzezinski spoke with the president before or after Brzezinski warned Billy Carter against the Charter Oil transaction last April 1 or 2. Thus, it remains unclear "whether the president participated in the decision to communicate at least some of the information [in the intelligence report] to Billy Carter."

The president and Brzezinski have both said Brzezinski called Billy first, before consulting the president. But if that sequence is correct, the report says:

" . . . then Dr. Brzezinski (a) took it upon himself, without consulting the president, to do an act outside of his normal functions as National Security Adviser, [an act] that should have been done, if at all, only with the authority of the president and (b) kept to himself significant information about the president's brother for nearly two days, during which time he met alone with the president at least once."

Despite Brzezinski's disclaimers, the subcommittee concluded that his communicating a portion of the intelligence information to Billy "carried with it the risk that sources would be compromised" and that Billy might take steps to make his activities more difficult for Justice Department investigators to uncover.

"It is to be noted," the report states, "that within two weeks after receiving Dr. Brzezinski's admonition, Billy Carter accepted \$200,000 from the Libyan government."

Civiletti draws sharp criticism at the same time for his judgment in withholding the Charter Oil intelligence report, and another foreshadowing the \$200,000 payment, from his own subordinates.

The subcommittee believes it is likely that the Billy Carter case would have come to an earlier conclusion if the attorney general had shared the information with a subordinate having knowledge of the case," the report states.

The Senate investigators also said they regarded as "persuasive" the evidence that Civiletti told his subordinates on June 11—the day Billy admitted getting \$220,000 from the Libyans—to take no action for 10 days.

The report says it would not have been improper for Civiletti to have informed the president of what the Justice Department knew of Billy's activities at that point. But it said the attorney general "should not have made what amounted to a prediction that criminal proceedings would not be instituted if Billy Carter registered" as a foreign agent. The Justice Department lawyers in charge of the investigation testified that they had not yet made that determination.

As a consequence, the report says, if the president had told his brother of Civiletti's assurance, "the president's assurance would have made the later prosecution of a criminal case difficult or impossible."

Drawing several harsh parallels between Civiletti's and Brzezinski's performances, the report pointed out that both men "made decisions about the use of intelligence information without calling for the facts available to the organizations they head or to the government generally." In addition, "neither saw it to be his responsibility to present to the president for decision the issues arising from the intelligence information each had received" and, in effect, "acted to protect the president from taking personal responsibility."

The report says the subcommittee was unable to make a thorough study of the legislative problem it came across, such as the possible need for administrative subpoenas in enforcing the Foreign Agents Registration Act. But it called Libya's increasing efforts to gain political influence in this country "particularly troublesome and dangerous" and recommended intensive Justice Department investigation of those activities.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
30 September 1980

Draft Report On Billy Hits Carter, Aides

Administration Cited For Poor Judgment

By Roberta Hornig
Washington Star Staff Writer

President Carter and several key members of his administration used poor judgment in their handling of Billy Carter's Libyan connection, according to a preliminary draft report prepared by the staff of the Senate subcommittee investigating the president's brother.

The report, circulated to the nine Senate investigators yesterday, reserves its severest condemnation for the conduct of the president's brother himself during the six-month Justice Department probe that led to his registration as a foreign agent for Libya last July.

The draft report says that only after being confronted with the facts by Justice did Billy Carter acknowledge his Libyan links, his receipt of \$220,000 in payments from the anti-U.S. Tripoli government as well as a multimillion-dollar oil agreement with that government.

"His conduct was contrary to the interests of the president and the United States and merits condemnation," the draft says.

But the report also chastises the president, national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti, CIA Director Stansfield Turner and the president's appointments secretary, Phillip Wise, for bungling in the Billy Carter affair.

Speaking of the president, the report states, "the subcommittee concludes (he) should have either issued a public statement or sent a private message to Libya that Billy Carter did not represent the United States and that Libya would not gain any influence through Billy."

The report says Carter should have publicly disclaimed his brother's activities before Billy Carter went on his second trip to Libya, in the summer of 1979.

The report severely criticizes Brzezinski and Civiletti for their roles.

Brzezinski had two encounters with Billy Carter. The first was in November 1979, when — at the suggestion of Rosalynn Carter — the national security adviser asked Billy Carter to broker a meeting at the White House between him and the chief Libyan diplomat in Washington, Ali Houderi. The purpose was to discuss the plight of U.S. hostages held in Iran and try to gain Libyan support for their release.

The second was late last March when Brzezinski, after receiving intelligence information from Turner that Billy Carter was negotiating an oil deal with Libya, telephoned Billy Carter and warned that he could embarrass his brother, the president.

About the White House meeting between Brzezinski and the Libyan diplomat, the subcommittee report states that it "believes that full and careful reflection leads to the conclusion that the decision to use Billy Carter in the hostage crisis was ill advised."

About the telephone warning to Billy Carter, the report states: "the subcommittee concludes that communicating a portion of the intelligence information to Billy Carter, the subject of the information, carried with it the risk that sources would be compromised."

Civiletti was chastised for his failure to share "classified information (about the case) that came to him in April 1980 with any trustworthy subordinate who had the necessary security clearance."

Pointing out that Civiletti believed the intelligence information he received was so sensitive that he would not pass it on even to subordinates to whom it would have proven helpful, the report says that "communicating to Billy also made it more difficult for FARA (foreign agents registration act) investigators to make their case against the president's brother."

This was a second intelligence report about Billy Carter that came to the attention of a major Carter administration figure. While Brzezinski was given information on the oil deal by the CIA, the defense intelligence establishment alerted Civiletti that Billy Carter was on the verge of receiving money from Libya.

In criticizing Civiletti's withholding of this pertinent information from his own investigators — information it took the investigators three more months to come up with — "he did so without attempting to learn whether the department had available to it other information which might have permitted it to make investigative use of the April 1980 intelligence," the report states.

While condemning Civiletti's behavior, the report praises the Justice investigators on the case with "honestly and conscientiously" pursuing Billy Carter's Libyan links.

The report also concludes that Civiletti did nothing "improper" by sharing with President Carter the knowledge that Billy Carter needed to register as a foreign agent.

But, the report continues, "he (Civiletti) should not have made what amounted to a prediction that criminal proceedings would not be instituted if Billy registered because that had yet to be determined by the Department of Justice."

Civiletti gave President Carter the information at an Oval Office meeting last July, only days before Billy Carter finally registered — partially because of the prodding by his brother.

The report is critical of Turner for his decision "not to refer the information on the oil deal to Civiletti, as he had to Brzezinski."

The report states that Turner made the decision "without calling for any information that might have been available within the intelligence community and in fact was available."

The report also accuses the president's appointments secretary, Wise, of causing "some delay in the progress of the investigation" into Billy Carter by failing to cooperate with the Justice Department.

It says Wise was "less cooperative than he should have been in returning calls by an FBI agent seeking to interview him and professed not to remember events relevant to the investigation."

Wise was Billy Carter's chief contact at the white House and, according to testimony heard by the subcommittee, cooperated with FBI investigators only after several attempts.

The preliminary report, drafted on the basis of 10 public and about a half-dozen executive sessions, was circulated to the five Democrats and four Republicans on the investigating subcommittee for comment.

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REPORT FINDS INVESTIGATION HONEST BUT FAULTS CARTER; CBS SAYS
NEW YORK (AP) - THE FIRST DRAFT OF A REPORT BY THE SENATE
SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATING BILLY CARTER CONCLUDES THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATED THE LIBYAN AFFAIR HONESTLY AND
CONSCIENTIOUSLY; BUT FAULTS PRESIDENT CARTER'S HANDLING OF THE CASE;
CBS NEWS SAID MONDAY.

"THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT EITHER THE INVESTIGATION OR DISPOSITION OF THE CASE WAS SKEWED IN FAVOR OF BILLY CARTER BECAUSE HE IS THE BROTHER OF THE PRESIDENT," THE NETWORK QUOTED THE SPECIAL SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT AS SAYING.

BUT THE AS-YET-UNRELEASED REPORT SAYS THE PRESIDENT FAILED TO FOLLOW UP ON EFFORTS TO "DISSUADE BILLY CARTER FROM MAKING HIS SECOND TRIP TO LIBYA," THE NETWORK SAID.

CBS SAID THE PANEL FOUND THE PRESIDENT "DID NOT DISASSOCIATE HIMSELF AND THE ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TRIP."

"THE SUBCOMMITTEE CONCLUDES THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD HAVE ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT OR SENT A PRIVATE MESSAGE TO THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT THAT BILLY CARTER DID NOT REPRESENT THE UNITED STATES," CBS QUOTED THE REPORT AS SAYING.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE CRITICIZES THE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI FOR USING BILLY CARTER AS A DIPLOMATIC INTERMEDIARY WITH THE LIBYANS AND CRITICIZES BRZEZINSKI AND CIA DIRECTOR STANFIELD TURNER FOR THEIR HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ABOUT BILLY CARTER'S DEALINGS; THE NETWORK SAID.

THE NETWORK QUOTED THE REPORT AS SAYING ATTORNEY GENERAL BENJAMIN CIVILETTI SHOULD NOT HAVE TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT "CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS WOULD NOT BE INSTITUTED IF BILLY CARTER REGISTERED" AS AN AGENT FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

COMING IN FOR THE SHARPEST CRITICISM IS BILLY CARTER. CBS SAID THE REPORT FINDS: "HIS CONDUCT WAS CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE UNITED STATES AND MERITS CONDEMNATION."

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE I/6CHICAGO TRIBUNE
28 September 1980CIA says millions spent*Libyan favor-buying outlined*

By James Coates

Chicago Tribune Press Service

WASHINGTON—The CIA has outlined to the Justice Department a multimillion dollar Libyan effort to influence United States policy and public opinion by targeting hundreds of Americans—such as Billy Carter into associating with the pro-terrorist state.

The organizer of one effort told The Tribune he spent more than \$225,000 on air fare alone to bring 125 Americans to Libya right after the President's brother made his first trip there in late 1978.

Richard Shadyac, a major Arab lobbyist here, acknowledged that while his group ostensibly was part of an "Arab-American dialog" seminar, some of the Americans were taken under wing by Libyan hosts and offered business deals.

Among those on the trip were former Democratic Senate Foreign Relations Chairman William Fulbright, Rep. Nick Joe Rahal [D., W. Va.] former Federal Aviation Administrator Najeeb Halaby; and Bill Edwards, a Wyoming state senator. Shadyac said. Only one guest, Steve Bell of ABC's "Good Morning America," paid his own way he recalled.

ONE DOCUMENT obtained by the CIA and described by CIA Director Stansfield Turner indicates that Libya worked in three general areas trying to win favor among Americans:

- The Libyans made some Americans lucrative offers as brokers for oil

deals—such as Billy Carter and unnamed members of the American Farm Bureau Federation. Chicago's Rev. Jesse Jackson apparently was also targeted for an oil deal which he says never came off.

- They offered others brokers' commissions for such items as peanuts, soybeans, and wheat. Several prominent Idaho leaders apparently received such offers as did some Carter Georgia associates, including former White House Budget Director Bert Lance.

- They provided other Americans with trips to the North African nation, where they were given the opportunity to make their own business deals with the oil-rich Arabs or simply enjoy touring the extensive Roman ruins along the Mediterranean shoreline.

A SPOKESMAN for Sen. Birch Bayh [D., Ind.], chairman of the subcommittee investigating the Billy Carter affair, said the panel's nine senators will decide after Oct. 4 whether to pursue a wider examination of Libyan influence-buying efforts.

The Libyans discussed agricultural deals, with leaders in Idaho, Georgia, and Wyoming, according to documents compiled by various intelligence agencies, it was learned.

For example, U.S. Sen. James McClure and Rep. Steven Symms, both conservative Idaho Republicans traveled to Libya, CIA documents sent to the Justice Department show.

Bayh associates acknowledged that the senator is considering a possible investigation of whether a number of powerful state figures invested part of the money they received from Libya in efforts to defeat Sen. Frank Church [D., Idaho]. Church is an outspoken foe of Libya and the liberal chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

SHADYAC confirmed in a phone interview that he arranged an expen-junket of Libya in October, 1978, just days after Billy Carter left the North African country.

The Americans on that trip included Rep. Rahal, the owner of radio and television stations who is of Lebanese extraction; Halaby, an ethnic Arab who served as FAA chief and president of Pan American World Airways in the 1960s; and Dean Brown, former U.S. ambassador to Jordan.

Also on that trip, said Shadyac, was Allan Grant, president of the American Farm Bureau Federation.

Grant has acknowledged recently that he tried to arrange an oil deal with Libya which would have allowed an oil cooperative owned by the federation to obtain Libyan crude. He has confirmed the CIA files which show that he visited there frequently.

Last week the Justice Department announced it was sending a "letter of inquiry" to the Rev. Mr. Jackson who has acknowledged that he tried to arrange an oil deal. The Rev. Mr. Jackson has denied ever visiting Libya.

Approved For Release 2009/06/15 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501430001-1

Identities Legislation

Approved For Release 2009/06/15 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501430001-1

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 14

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
3 October 1980

PEN Protests Proposed Bill On Agent Disclosure

PEN American Center, in two separate actions, has protested proposed legislation that it fears would expand the CIA's power to control information. PEN objected in particular to Section 501 (c) of proposed Senate bill 2216, Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which "goes beyond the control of publication by employees and former employees (as in the Snepp ruling) to include the writing of non-employees using unclassified information."

Testifying for PEN before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 5, Sol Yurick, author of four novels including "The Warriors," said, "While there is no provision in the Constitution for freedom of the imagination, surely this law would force prior restraint not only on my speech, but on my imagination."

He could easily foresee instances, Yurick said, in which he could learn the names of agents merely by reading newspapers and books or by listening to gossip. If he inserted the names into

a work of fiction, he would be subject to prosecution under the law as proposed by the Senate Intelligence Committee, he said.

"To put it another way, the [proposed] law allows for what is, in effect, an invasion of the mind itself, for one is enjoined to forget what one has learned," Yurick said. Noting that he may not have known that the information he was publishing was proscribed, he asked rhetorically, "Have I committed a crime? In short, am I stopped from practicing my livelihood?"

In a letter of September 12 to each member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, writer Bernard Malamud, PEN's president, urged deletion of the section banning publication of agent names. Malamud called the section "potentially an enormously grave threat to the First Amendment."

"I am sure you will agree that the possibility of a writer being prosecuted for using information already in the public domain runs counter to the very tenets of free expression," he told the Senators.

The legislation was intended to curb

specific publications. But, Malamud said, "Efforts to curb activities of a few individuals through sweeping legislations of this sort endanger the well-being of American literature and of this nation as a whole."

On September 17 the Senate Judiciary Committee attempted a compromise of sorts by voting, 8-6, to send to the Senate floor a bill that would exempt from the ban writers and publications that disclose agents' names if the disclosure occurred as an "integral part" of constitutionally protected activities.

Representatives of the American Civil Liberties Union told reporters the change, offered by Chairman Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.), was aimed at convincing the Carter administration to work with Congress to try to resolve the constitutional problems posed.

Differing versions of the proposed legislation have now reached the floor of each house, giving the bills the stamp of controversy at a time when Congress was trying to avoid difficult measures in order to adjourn for a month of campaigning. The House version, scheduled for floor action the week of September 15, was set aside for other legislation.

H.F.

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ON PAGE A-20

NEW YORK TIMES
2 OCTOBER 1980

Congress Shelves Bills That Impose Penalties On Listing U.S. Agents

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 1 — Legislation to prevent the publication of the names of United States intelligence agents by dissidents who oppose covert operations abroad seemed to have been pushed aside today as Congress prepared to recess for the fall election campaign.

The proposed legislation, informally called the "agents identities protection bills," was shelved yesterday in the Senate when the majority and the minority leaders of that body agreed that passage was not feasible.

The Democratic leadership of the House of Representatives then agreed to put the proposal aside to concentrate on bills that have a chance of being passed by both the House and Senate.

Advocates of the bills argued that a new law was needed to protect agents of the Central Intelligence Agency who were serving under "diplomatic cover" in American embassies.

Criticized By Liberals

Critics of the legislation, which included several professors at leading law schools and the American Civil Liberties Union, contended that a major provision of the proposed bills was probably unconstitutional or unworkable.

That provision would have made it a crime for persons who were not present or former Government officials to publish the identities of United States agents or sources of "operational assistance," even if the identities were deduced from nonclassified biographical information.

The Senate and House versions of the legislation had also contained controversial clauses that seemed to encourage the President to insist, if he thought it necessary, that agencies such as the Peace Corps furnish "cover" for intelligence agents.

The Senate Judiciary Committee had passed proposed amendments to the bill that were primarily designed to force the Justice Department and the White House to bargain further on the more controversial clauses. Well-informed sources say the Justice Department, failed to act in time to save the bills.

The leaders in both houses had made no promise to try to pass the controversial law in a lame-duck session of Congress to be called after the Nov. 4 elections.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 11

THE WASHINGTON POST
1 October 1980

On Capitol Hill

The House gave final congressional approval, 385 to 18, and sent to the president the intelligence authorization bill for next year, which provides some measure of congressional oversight. It calls for stricter reporting to the House and Senate intelligence committees and requires advance notice of all significant intelligence operations but recognizes the undefined constitutional authority of the president to withhold some advance reporting of sensitive operations.

—Richard L. Lyons

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A12

THE WASHINGTON POST
1 October 1980

Blind Is Drawn Until November On CIA Measure

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

The CIA's controversial "names of agents" bill was sidetracked yesterday, at least until Congress comes back for a lame-duck session.

Advocates of the measure, which would make it a crime to disclose the names of U.S. intelligence operatives abroad, had been hoping to send it to the White House before the early campaign-year recess. But disputes over the bill's constitutionality have yet to be resolved.

Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) said that he favors "legislation in this field," but indicated that it was impossible to bring it to the floor now. The Senate Intelligence and Senate Judiciary committees have reported out sharply differing versions.

Some fireworks may yet take place on the House floor, where the measure is scheduled for debate this afternoon.

Opponents who contend the bill is unconstitutional plan a concerted attack on provisions that would make it a felony to disclose any information, even from public documents, that serves to identify a covert agent.

Some House members want to make the bill even tougher. Rep. Jerome Amodeo (D-N.Y.) said he intends to propose that offenses by government officials with direct access to the names of agents be made the equivalent of treason, punishable by death.

House Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D-N.J.), a leading opponent of the bill, asked Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.) yesterday morning to take the House version off the schedule on the grounds that its passage would be pointless.

In a letter to the speaker, Rodino pointed out that negotiations were under way between the Senate and the administration over a bill that all sides could accept. Rodino also said the administration does not want the House bill because it would require proof of an "intent to impair or impede" U.S. intelligence activities before journalists or other "outsiders" could be successfully prosecuted.

The Justice Department has contended that requirement of intent would make enforcement too difficult.

Aides to the speaker said last evening that the bill was still on the House schedule for today, but pointed out that the press of other legislation may keep it from coming up in any case.

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ON PAGE 10 (PART 1)

LOS ANGELES TIMES
1 October 1980

House OKs Bill Tightening Congressional Rein on CIA

WASHINGTON (AP)—A bill aimed at helping Congress keep a closer eye on the Central Intelligence Agency won overwhelming final approval from the House Tuesday despite objections that it is too vague to be effective.

Rep. Edward P. Boland (D-Mass.), chairman of the Intelligence Committee, said the bill states "a clear policy" that intelligence committees of both houses are to be told about major undercover operations before they are started.

But Rep. Ted Weiss (D-N.Y.), complained that "what we're doing in the guise of tightening control of the CIA is really opening up more loopholes and making it more difficult to get an accounting from them."

The bill, passed earlier by the Senate, now goes to President Carter, who is expected to sign it.

Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), praised the legislation, passed 385 to 18, for asserting that "it is the norm" for the President to inform congressional intelligence committees before letting the CIA embark on

covert operations—such as those intended to influence events in other nations.

But he complained that the bill raises "the statutory possibility that the Administration can just, in effect, waive the whole thing" by contending that undefined extraordinary circumstances makes prior notice unwise.

Viewed as Improvement

Backers of the bill—worked out by a group of representatives, senators and White House officials—said it was a big improvement over current prior-notification law, which the Administration has interpreted as no requirement at all.

Boland said Carter "has made clear his belief" that some information can be held back on constitutional grounds, and Boland said the bill "neither asserts nor denies" such a right.

The CIA has wanted some version of the bill because it cuts the number of agencies to which it must report—from as many as seven or eight committees to just the two intelligence panels.

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ON PAGE A7

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
30 September 1980

Abortion Funds May Ensnarl Spending Bill

The Senate, pressing to approve emergency funding to keep the government from running out of money at midnight tonight, yesterday approved compromise language on federal funding for abortions that could stymie the special money bill.

The stopgap legislation, which conflicts with a House measure, received final Senate approval on a 58-27 vote.

The bill went quickly to a joint House-Senate conference whose members faced major problems in reconciling it with widely divergent provisions of the House spending bill before the deadline.

After a morning-long debate, the Senate voted 47-37 to continue current guidelines for federal payment for abortions in cases where the mother's life or health was endangered or in cases of rape and incest, except when the state involved objects.

The abortion language is substantially more lenient than a House-passed version that would restrict abortion funding for poor women to cases where the mother's life is at stake.

The compromise, offered by Sen. James Exon, D-Neb., was attached to a continuing resolution to allow federal agencies to keep spending at current levels until Congress approves formal appropriations bills.

In other action this week, the House is planning to act on a recommendation to expel Rep. Michael Myers, the Pennsylvania Democrat who was convicted in a federal court on charges of taking funds from undercover FBI agents posing as representatives of a phony Arab sheik. The charges stemmed from the Abscam investigation.

The 25 bills scheduled for House floor action today range from the refugee education assistance act and amendments to the trading with the enemy act to a bill to enhance competition in gasoline production and a resolution concerning U.S.-Japanese trade.

Tomorrow, the House will take up legislation that would make it a federal crime to publish the identification of American CIA officials as well as bills concerning coal slurry pipelines, juvenile justice and delinquency, farm credits and water pollution controls.

Before leaving Thursday, the House hopes to act on regulatory reform legislation and authorizations concerning the Department of Energy's defense programs, and the International Development Association and the African Development Bank.

United Press International

UPI

30 SEPT. 1980

-CIA-CONGRESS

BY ROBERT FURLOW

WASHINGTON (AP) -- A BILL AIMED AT HELPING CONGRESS KEEP A CLOSER EYE ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WON OVERWHELMING FINAL APPROVAL FROM THE HOUSE TUESDAY DESPITE OBJECTIONS THAT IT IS TOO VAGUE TO BE EFFECTIVE.

REP. EDWARD BOLAND, D-MASS., CHAIRMAN OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, SAID THE BILL STATES "A CLEAR POLICY" THAT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES OF BOTH HOUSES ARE TO BE TOLD ABOUT BIG UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS BEFORE THEY ARE LAUNCHED.

BUT REP. TED WEISS, D-N.Y., COMPLAINED THAT "WHAT WE'RE DOING IN THE GUISE OF TIGHTENING CONTROL OF THE CIA IS REALLY OPENING UP MORE LOOPHOLES AND MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT TO GET AN ACCOUNTING FROM THEM."

"WE'VE TOTALLY FORGOTTEN THE TERRIBLE ABUSES" THAT INSPIRED EFFORTS TO INCREASE CONGRESSIONAL SUPERVISION OF THE SPY AGENCY, HE SAID.

THE BILL, PASSED EARLIER BY THE SENATE, NOW GOES TO PRESIDENT CARTER WHO IS EXPECTED TO SIGN IT.

REP. LES ASPIN, D-WIS., PRAISED THE LEGISLATION, PASSED 385-18 ON TUESDAY, FOR ASSERTING THAT "IT IS THE NORM" FOR THE PRESIDENT TO TELL CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES BEFORE LETTING THE CIA EMBARK ON COVERT OPERATIONS -- SUCH AS THOSE INTENDED TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN OTHER NATIONS.

BUT HE COMPLAINED THAT THE BILL RAISES "THE STATUTORY POSSIBILITY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION CAN JUST, IN EFFECT, WAIVE THE WHOLE THING" BY CLAIMING THAT UNDEFINED EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES MAKE PRIOR NOTICE UNWISE."

"WE'VE STILL LEFT IT VAGUE, AND I THINK THAT'S UNFORTUNATE," SAID ASPIN. BUT HE VOTED FOR THE COMPROMISE MEASURE, HE SAID, BECAUSE IT CLEARLY STATES CONGRESS' DEMANDS FOR ACCESS TO SECRETS, IT INCLUDES INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING OPERATIONS RATHER THAN ONLY COVERT OPERATIONS AND IT INCLUDES ALL INTELLIGENCE AGENTS RATHER THAN JUST THE CIA.

REJECTED WERE EARLIER VERSIONS THAT WERE MORE INSISTENT IN DEMANDING PRIOR NOTICE AND ACCESS. BUT A NUMBER OF SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CONCEDED THAT EVEN THOSE MEASURES WOULD HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO WHITE HOUSE CLAIMS THAT INFORMATION SHOULD BE WITHHELD ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS THAT THE DEMANDS WOULD INFRINGE ON EXECUTIVE BRANCH POWERS.

AP-WX-0930 2008EDT

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE E5NEW YORK TIMES
28 September 1980*Most Proposals Die in Favor of One to Formalize a 'Gentlemen's Agreement'*

Congress Settles for a Draw In New Intelligence Charter

By CHARLES MOHR

WASHINGTON — After months of emotional and often hyperbolic debate, Congress this year smothered most of a large body of proposed intelligence bills. But, with almost no fanfare, it is close to completing action on what may be a significant piece of legislation, the brief Accountability for Intelligence Activities Act. The measure was approved by Senate and House conferees earlier this month and now requires only a routine House vote and President Carter's signature to become law.

One intention of the act was negative: to "repeal" a 1974 measure, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, that permitted as many as eight Congressional committees to be informed of covert actions by the Central Intelligence Agency. The 1980 "accountability" act gives responsibility for Congressional oversight of the intelligence agencies exclusively to the Senate and House intelligence committees.

The bill does not provide iron-clad guarantees that the executive branch must give the two committees "prior notice" in cases of covert intelligence acts. And it gives Congress no "veto power" to stop a covert action, a power that the Congress has never sought. Moreover, it only ratifies a so-called gentleman's agreement that has been in effect for four years under which the intelligence community has voluntarily submitted to such oversight by the two intelligence committees and has apparently been diligent in furnishing the information those committees requested.

The difference between a gentleman's agreement and statutory law, however, is a very great difference. It was a clear recognition, in fact, of the importance of translating informal agreements into written law that in large part accounted for the months of wrangling and for the death of many other pieces of intelligence legislation this year.

When President Carter signs the act, as he is thought certain to do, he will be committing himself, and future Presidents, to a novel attempt to bring the shadowy work of clandestine intelligence at least partly under the constitutional control of a legislative body. One member of the Senate staff who has been at the center of the long negotiations called it a "crucial step in the constitutional control of national security policy." A former official of the C.I.A. described it as "an unprecedented attempt, never tried by any other country, to submit intelligence to parliamentary control." A civil libertarian who had hoped for a more sweeping charter calls it a good bill that "makes absolutely clear that Congress intends to assert oversight."

Providing Tolerable Restraints

The bill says that the Director of Central Intelligence shall keep the two intelligence committees "fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities." The legislation has loopholes. Without

them, in fact, it almost certainly could not have become law and might have been an intolerable straitjacket for the President. One loophole permits the President in "extraordinary circumstances" to limit

notice to the chairmen and two ranking minority members of the intelligence committees and the two top party leaders in each house of Congress.

An even larger loophole is contained in a preamble to the act which says that information will be shared with the committees "to the extent consistent with all applicable authorities and duties, including those conferred by the Constitution upon the executive and legislative branches . . ." The Congressional conference report interprets this, probably correctly, as little more than affirmation of "an executive branch assertion of constitutional authority to take actions to defend the nation." The possibility that an unscrupulous White House might try to stretch it much farther has also been apparent to many.

However, even with this preamble, the passage of a law asserting a congressional "right" to information about "all intelligence activities" seems much more likely to restrain than to encourage adventurism in the White House. The law also requires the President to submit an explanation in cases when he does delay giving Congress prior notice of an operation. While no one can be sure that willful Presidents and Presidential assistants might not try to conceal improper behavior, the existence of the act would seem to increase the legal hazards of such behavior.

The present membership of the two intelligence committees appears to be, on the whole, more friendly to than suspicious of the intelligence agencies. But the panels seem to be representative of the ideological groupings in the Congress and include some members likely to keep a critical eye on the C.I.A. The membership rotates and, supposedly, cannot become "entrenched."

This could be important because the philosophy of the measure is to establish legal oversight but to leave unwritten a detailed code of intelligence behavior. For instance, liberals dropped a proposal that would have specifically forbidden the use of journalists, clergymen or professors as covert agents. By the same token, conservatives dropped proposals that would have exempted the Central Intelligence Agency from the Freedom of Information Act and legalized more intrusive spying on Americans.

Less certain of final passage is a bill that critics think is of doubtful constitutionality and even more doubtful utility. The bill would make it a crime to use classified and even unclassified information in an effort to disclose the identities of covert intelligence agents with the aim of impeding intelligence work. Aimed primarily at stopping the activities of the former C.I.A. agent Philip Agee and the staff of a small Washington newsletter that identifies agents, the bill might have some chilling effect on reporting of intelligence abuses, critics feel. Although such critics are apparently outnumbered on Capitol Hill, they may be able to sidetrack the bill.

It is, in any case, all that remains of a list of so-called "C.I.A. relief bills" proposed earlier in the year to unleash the intelligence agency. It was argued then by some that the C.I.A. had become a fettered, helpless giant. In fact, several highly informed sources agreed last week, the agency has been functioning and scarcely seems to need to be unleashed or given legislative vitamin shots.

The danger of naming names

Under the leadership of Sen. Kennedy, the Senate Judiciary Committee has made a laudable effort to reduce the violence to the First Amendment that could result from the so-called "names of agents" bill now pending in Congress. The House, when it considers the measure this week, could do a lot worse than to embrace the language of the Senate bill. Rep. Edward Boland of Springfield, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, could and should provide the catalyst for such improvement.

The "names of agents" legislation was originally designed to punish former government employees who use their past access to classified information to reveal the names of Central Intelligence Agency operatives, thereby endangering the agents' safety.

However, in recent months substantial momentum has gathered behind proposals to broaden the bill to include prosecution of people who publish names of agents, even if publication is based only on informed analysis of public information. Such a bill is scheduled to come before the full House Thursday.

The broadened measure is aimed at a publication known as the Covert Action Information Bulletin, which makes it its business to publish the names of CIA agents. The house of an American official in Jamaica recently was fired upon after the Bulletin printed his name. Whatever one thinks of the Bulletin — and we find its endeavor here deplorable — it

surely has the same First Amendment protections as any other publication.

Further, in seeking to make the Bulletin liable for prosecution, the Congress could open all journalistic investigations of the CIA to similar prosecution. To seek to distinguish the Covert Action Information Bulletin from, say, The Boston Globe comes close to putting the government in the business of licensing publications. And by raising the possibility that any publication seeking to uncover abuses in the CIA may be subject to prosecution, Congress could well exempt the CIA from legitimate scrutiny.

The majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee, fully aware of the political support for a sweeping names of agents bill, has attempted to grapple with this. It has added language to the bill that would foreclose prosecution of individuals or periodicals that print the names of agents as "an integral part" of news-gathering or scholarly activity. That is a long step in the right direction.

In a better world all reference to the publication of agents' names obtained without violation of the classification system would be excised from the bill. And the best result this year would be for the bill simply to die in the Congress. But if broad legislation is to be enacted, the inclusion of language along the lines of that embraced by the Senate Judiciary Committee is imperative. Only with it can the public be assured that the CIA will receive the scrutiny that it deserves.

TOLEDO BLADE (OHIO)
22 SEPTEMBER 1980

Protecting Agents

INTELLIGENCE agents whose jobs entail protecting this nation's security in a troubled age need and deserve the kind of personal protection which fortunately is gaining congressional support.

The House Judiciary Committee recently approved, by a 21-to-8 vote, a measure making it a crime to disclose the identity of a covert agent of a U.S. intelligence agency or an informer for the FBI.

A series of malicious attacks which jeopardize the safety of U.S. agents has made passage of such legislation an urgent matter. For-

mer CIA agent Philip Agee, for one, has in recent years revealed the names of intelligence agents, and a Washington-based newsletter regularly publishes the names and movements of purported CIA agents. As a result of disclosures of this sort, attacks have been made on several security officials.

The committee rejected an amendment that would have weakened the measure by excluding private citizens from the bill's penalties. A somewhat similar — though looser — bill is pending in the Senate; the two measures could be merged into a single bill, but the protections should not be watered down in the process.

In a world populated by countries that display outright contempt for the lives of Americans, protection for U.S. intelligence agents and their families is a necessity. Unless a measure of this sort becomes law, it will become more and more difficult to attract qualified men and women to staff the CIA and other similar agencies.

Such a law should not, of course, run roughshod over traditional rights of free speech. But that is not the intent of the measure now before Congress. It simply attempts to defend the nation's interests.

MOBILE REGISTER (AL)
19 SEPTEMBER 1980

Protecting protectors

We are pleased that Rep. Jack Edwards of Mobile is supporting legislation designed to protect U.S. intelligence agents from being exposed. It is high time we backed away from the open door policies hysterically adopted a few years ago in knee-jerk reactions to Watergate and some other excesses.

These present policies have left our intelligence apparatus in a shambles.

Although congressmen, Edwards included, contend that the close congressional oversight of the FBI and CIA has not resulted in leaks of secret information, we suspect that there has been little secret information

to be leaked.

Intelligence agencies in other nations which in the past cooperated with us have no doubt cut off the flow of information to the CIA and FBI, realizing that these secrets would likely wind up in the hands of eight congressional oversight committees and staff members — many of whom feel we could do without any intelligence operations at all.

The shackling of the CIA and FBI has represented a major victory for civil libertarians — but a big blow to the security of our nation.

We therefore hope Congress will expedite this remedial legislation.

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BOSTON HERALD-AMERICAN
15 September 1980

Forum

A free exchange of ideas on the issues of the day

CIA bill: the need is now...

By EDWARD P. BOLAND

In the past several years the intelligence activities of the U.S. government have been exposed to the light of public scrutiny to a degree never before witnessed in this or any other country.

Presidential commissions, congressional committees, judicial decisions, investigative reporters have all, at one time or another, given us a detailed glimpse of the day-to-day practices of our intelligence agencies.

To an unfortunate degree, some of these practices were found wanting — wanting in terms of their compatibility with American values, morals, laws, and constitutional precepts.

We have now, I believe, taken the painful but necessary steps to bring a halt to such practices and to insure that they do not occur again.

All of this has not taken place without rancor, divisiveness, and heated debate among our people and within the government.

Significantly, however, both sides of the debate have always proceeded on the unquestioned assumption that it is both necessary and proper for this country to possess a clandestine intelligence service.

An effective clandestine service is especially important to American interests in these troubled times. As recent events demonstrate, it is as vital to our security to possess some insight into the thought processes of seemingly obscure religious figures as it is to know the location of Soviet missile launchers. Technical systems which are purchased, quite properly, at significant cost to determine the latter are of little use in gleaned the former. In such areas, the nation must rely on our clandestine service.

The operating heart of any such service is the use of undercover agents and officers overseas to collect intelligence information. Obviously, if the names of these people are spread upon the public record, their usefulness is ended and the effectiveness of the clandestine service is diminished.

In the past few years, that is precisely what has been occurring. A small number of Americans, including some former intelligence agency employees, have been engaged in a systematic effort to destroy the ability of our intelligence agencies to collect information secretly by disclosing the names of overseas undercover intelligence agents. Not only are legitimate intelligence activities thwarted, but the careers of dedicated intelligence officers are disrupted, service morale is lowered, the taxpayer's money is wasted, and — perhaps most important — lives are directly placed in danger.

In my opinion and, I think, in the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the American people, unauthorized disclosure of the names of undercover intelligence agents is a pernicious act that serves no useful informing function whatsoever. It does not alert us to abuses; it does not further civil liberties; it does not bring clarity to issues of national policy; it does not enlighten public debate; and it does not contribute one iota to the goal of an educated and informed electorate.

Whatever the motives of those engaged in such activity, the only result is the complete disruption of our legitimate intelligence collection programs — programs that bear the unprimature of the Congress, the President, and the American people. Such a result benefits no one but our adversaries.

Later this month legislation to combat such disclosures will be debated on the floor of the House of Representatives. Under consideration will be H.R. 5615. The Intelligence Identities Protection Act, a bill which has been reported favorably, after several days of hearings, by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which I chair, and the House Judiciary Committee.

This bill would make it a crime to disclose any information that identifies covert United States intelligence agents. Different penalties and elements of proof are established depending on whether the defendant was a present or former government employee who acquired his information from authorized access to classified information, or whether the defendant derived the information disclosed from non-classified sources.

The publishers of the "COVER ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN" and similar groups, contend that they fall into the latter category. They claim they can discover the identities of our undercover agents by diligently studying previously published diplomatic lists and biographical registers and comparing and collating the information contained therein with other publicly available information. Having had no access to classified information, they claim it is unconstitutional to prohibit their disclosures.

In recent days, many newspapers, while denouncing such articles, have also stated that the proposed legislation violates the First Amendment. I respectfully disagree. H.R. 5615 is a carefully crafted limited solution to an urgent or grave problem. It responds to an evil the government clearly has a right to prevent; it is narrow and precise in its scope so as to give notice of its proscriptions, and it

CONTINUED

does not sweep within its purview any activities protected by the First Amendment.

The Intelligence Committee has been very sensitive to constitutional claims. We recognize the First Amendment implications. We have spent many hours crafting a bill that responds to the disclosure problem without sacrificing constitutional rights.

Contrary to recent suggestions, we have not acted in an hysteric response to the early July attacks on U.S. Embassy personnel in Jamaica. Rather, we, as well as the Senate Intelligence Committee, have spent over a year-and-a-half dealing with the issue. The initial version of H.R. 5615, which also authorized prosecution of those with no access to classified information, was introduced almost a year ago, in October of 1979.

What we have done since then is to limit the sweep of the provision in order to meet First Amendment objections. It does not inadvertently cover normal reporting; it does not cover those investigating and disclosing intelligence agency wrongdoing; nor does it cover a group's efforts to determine if any of its members are informants. Those who suggest the contrary have not read the bill. To successfully prosecute an individual who discloses the identities of undercover intelligence agents but who has had no access to classified information, H.R. 5615 requires the government to prove each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

- That the disclosure was intentional;

- That the covert relationship of the agent to the United States was properly classified information and that the defendant knew it was classified;

- That the defendant knew that the government was taking affirmative measures to conceal the agent's relationship to the United States;

- That the disclosure was made as part of an overall effort to identify and expose covert agents for the purpose of impairing or impeding the foreign intelligence activities of the United States;

- That the particular disclosure was intended to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States.

A bill so narrowly focuses threatens no one's First Amendment rights; at the same time it is the minimum necessary response to the obnoxious activities of those who make it a practice to ferret out and then expose our undercover officers and agents for the purpose of destroying our intelligence collection capabilities.

Edward P. Boland represents the 2nd Congressional District in Massachusetts and chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

CONTINUED

...It's too much, too soon

By FLOYD ABRAMS

As Congress moves speedily towards adjournment, one piece of legislation appears on more and more congressional "must" lists of bills to be passed before adjournment. That it is also legislation of the most unlikely constitutionality and that it carries with it high risks of depriving the public of critical information about governmental wrong-doing, has slowed but not stopped the push towards passage.

On its face, the legislation is inoffensive and, in part, even attractive. Designed to protect CIA agents from exposure by revelations of their names by faithless — and disgraceful — former colleagues such as Philip Agee, one part of the bill would make illegal such revelations. That part of the legislation is both constitutional and desirable: the naming of names of our agents by their present or former colleagues is probably illegal already. If it isn't, it should be and there is surely no constitutional bar to making it so.

But the legislation Congress is considering and seems likely to pass goes further. Much further. In the course of also making illegal the disclosure of agents' names by people outside the government, and who have no connection with it, it might allow the prosecution of the officials of an American university with an overseas branch which, upon learning that the CIA had secretly placed agents within its faculty, sought to determine who the agents were and to expose them.

It could allow the prosecution of a newspaper and its reporters who, upon learning of CIA participation in some Watergate of the 1980s, published a series of articles naming the agents who wrongfully — and illegally — participated in those activities.

And it would allow prosecution of individuals (whether or not they were journalists) who exposed, over a period of time, illegal CIA conduct by named individuals within the United States, despite the fact that the information set forth was not even classified.

It is difficult to believe that this was the intended result of the legislative efforts of the CIA. I, for one, do not believe it. But it is the result that the current bills under consideration by both the Senate and House would permit.

The role of the Department of Justice in the development of the legislation is hardly reassuring. As recently as this June, an associate deputy attorney general urged upon the House Select Committee on Intelligence that only the disclosure of classified information should be made illegal since otherwise "a speaker's statement about covert activities could be punished, even though they are not based on access to classified information, do not use inside methodology acquired by the speaker in government service and one unimbued with any special authority from former government service."

Yet in August, the Department of Justice — with barely a word of explanation, not to say apology — supported legislation which would make it illegal for persons with no connection to the government to disclose unclassified information.

As for the CIA itself, while its efforts have been good faith ones to protect its — and our — agents abroad, it has demonstrated a marked insensitivity to the values embodied in the First Amendment. What defense, for example, can possibly be offered for the outrageous position of CIA Deputy Director Frank C. Carlucci before the Senate Judiciary Committee?

According to Carlucci before the Senate Judiciary Committee?

According to Carlucci, "nothing could be more subversive of our constitutional system than to permit a disgruntled minority of citizens freely to thwart the will of the majority." Read that line again. It comes closer to describing the "constitutional system" in, say, Czechoslovakia or Chile than here. In fact, it comes about as close to describing our system accurately as it would be to say that our system is one of majority rule and no minority rights.

Nothing, in fact, could be more subversive of our constitutional system of government than to permit a disgruntled majority of citizens freely to thwart the rights of expression of a minority. Even a most disagreeable one. The CIA really ought to polish its vocabulary. Or to change its thinking.

At bottom, the breadth of the legislation Congress now has before it is so sweeping as to imperil much that no one — including, I suppose, the CIA itself — intended to cover. But so compelling and so seductive is the call of national security that common sense is too often left behind.

Perhaps we could all ponder again the words of Judge Murray Gurfein in the Pentagon Papers case. "The security of the Nation," he wrote, "is not at the ramparts alone. Security also lies in the value of our free institutions."

Floyd Abrams is a practicing lawyer in New York and adjunct professor at Columbia Journalism School. He has frequently represented journalists, newspapers and broadcasters in his practice and is best known for his defense of the New York Times in the Pentagon Papers case.

LEXINGTON HERALD (KY)
14 SEPTEMBER 1980

Protecting Undercover CIA Agents: 'Hysteria' or a Necessary Action?

The House Judiciary Committee recently approved a bill that would make it a crime to expose undercover U.S. intelligence agents. This was done despite a subcommittee suggestion that the bill's jurisdiction be limited to persons with access to government secrets.

The proposal is largely in reaction to the activities of publications like Covert Action Information Bulletin, a Washington-based newsletter which has made a career of identifying supposed CIA agents stationed abroad. In 1975 it named Richard Welch as CIA station chief in Athens, and Welch was murdered the next day. Recently, it claimed 15 Americans resident in Jamaica were agents, and they have been the victims of violent attacks on several occasions since.

Philip Agee, a onetime CIA operative in Latin America, has also been active in the identification of intelligence agents. Both Agee, who lives in Europe, and the editors of Covert Action have been quite candid about their motive in these matters: They seek to strengthen their own opposition to American foreign policy by undermining its operation wherever possible.

They have declared themselves indifferent if this has meant that their targets should lose their lives; if it should advance the cause of this nation's enemies abroad, so much the better.

The bill before the House is believed by some members to be potentially unconstitutional. Some, such as

Rep. Robert Drinan, D-Mass., claim that it is impossible to prevent private citizens from exposing agents' identities, and a probable infringement of the First Amendment. He believes "hysteria" is to blame for the measure, and a wiser effort would be for the government "to provide these people with better cover."

What he is saying, in essence, is that carrying legal interpretation to its logical extremes should supersede national security. It is, of course, difficult to prove intent, but it seems as though wisdom has been turned on its head when a legislator's principal concern is the legal insulation of people whose activities could possibly be described as treasonous.

This sort of law does not inevitably presage a witch-hunt, nor is it designed to gag journalists who may disapprove of the CIA, or beg to differ with American foreign policy. On the contrary, it establishes the simple principle — common to many other Western democracies — that the government, in the operation of its foreign relations, is entitled to certain secrets, without which those foreign relations cannot be properly conducted.

The government, it is to be hoped, would not abuse this privilege. Some might argue that it has in the past, and would again. Perhaps it might; if it does, it should certainly be called to order. In the meantime, however, it deserves some protection from those who would have its overseas agents killed to satisfy their sense of justice.

SPOKANE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (WA)
13 SEPTEMBER 1980

Secrecy essential to CIA activities

For most of this year, Congress has been trying to draft legislation relating to congressional oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency. Because of concern over some of the CIA's free-wheeling actions in the past, Congress began tying the agency's hands with a series of restrictive bills. For instance the Hughes-Ryan bill, passed in 1974, required the CIA to report to eight different congressional committees with a total of over 200 members. Secrecy was impossible.

The legislation under consideration would cut the reporting requirement down to two, the House and Senate Intelligence committees.

The Intelligence Oversight Act covers many aspects. One important one is the provision of stiff penalties for the public disclosure of the identities of U.S. secret agents.

Opponents of the CIA contend that this constitutes an infringement on freedom of speech and an individual's First Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court looked into that claim and came out with a resounding defense of the government's right to demand and enforce restrictions on the First Amendment rights of its employees. In *United States v. Snepp*, the court fully backed the government's suit for breach of contract against Frank Snepp, a former employee of the CIA, who wrote a book about CIA activities in Vietnam without obtaining prior approval from the agency. The court rejected the argument that this represented a constitutional infringement of free speech rights.

The House Judiciary Committee has just passed a bill providing stiff jail terms for anyone who discloses the identities of agents. It established penalties of up to 10 years in prison for an insider who leaks identities, and up to three years for a private citizen. Some civil libertarians have voiced objections, but from the point of view of those who risk their lives carrying out missions designed to safeguard their country, it doesn't seem that objectionable.

Everyone concedes that the CIA must operate secretly. But under currently prevailing law a Soviet agent of the KGB can request intelligence information from the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act. It doesn't take much intelligence to figure out that something is wrong here and needs attention.

Summary: Even a democracy needs a secret intelligence agency.

LOWELL SUN (MASS.)
6 SEPTEMBER 1980

Protection

The House Judiciary Committee has taken a step toward reason and responsibility in protecting the lives of our secret agents in the Central Intelligence Agency. It passed, 21 to 8, a bill to make publication of nonsecret information a crime if it disclosed the identity of a "covert agent" of any U.S. intelligence body or the FBI.

This is overdue response to the wave of CIA baiting that took much of the secret functioning ability away from our overseas intelligence arm. For too long the politicians have tried to make political hay by defaming the CIA, often by digging up past activities to embarrass and condemn the agency in the present.

One cost has been the drying up of many intelligence sources vital to our continued understanding of what other nations are doing and planning.

The least the country can do is guarantee the secrecy of those who undertake the hazardous activities of spying, activities necessary to any nation's security and practiced by all the nations of the world. Members of the FBI deserve the same kind of protection.

The bill should be passed by the House as the committee recommends, then the Senate, and made into law.

PROVIDENCE BULLETIN (R.I.)
5 SEPTEMBER 1980

On the need for keeping secret agents secret

There are, in this country, a few individuals who thrive on exposing the identity of American intelligence operatives abroad. These people strike an idealist's pose with their aim of curbing hidden U.S. involvement in foreign countries, but they are reckless in their disregard of the risks when they publish names of secret agents.

Almost five years ago, the Central Intelligence Agency chief in Athens was murdered shortly after *Counterspy* magazine published information that led to disclosure of his identity. Last July, when an anti-CIA newsletter purported to name 15 agents in Jamaica, terrorists shot up the home of one of those named. Other disclosures have forced the agency to move its operatives out of other countries.

Such deliberate publicity, whatever its motivation, indeed is "vicious and irresponsible," as Sen. John H. Chafee asserted in a Senate speech last July 24. The gains proclaimed for these disclosures pale beside the peril they bring to hundreds of American intelligence officers serving in sensitive posts overseas. It is clear that intelligence activities demand continuing scrutiny, and that covert operations abroad should be minimized and kept under the tightest presidential controls. But this watchfulness does not — cannot — extend to the condoning of those who wantonly endanger the lives of agents and their families.

Congress is seeking to discourage such conduct. The House Judiciary Committee approved a bill on Wednesday making it a crime for anyone to publish information disclosing the identity of a U.S. "covert agent" or an informer for the FBI. This provision is none too strong. We usually are among the first to criticize legislative attempts to curtail free expression, but where the safety of intelligence agents is involved, other compelling considerations come forward. This measure, like a similar bill in the Senate, does not seek to restrict responsible journalists who shrink from deliberately endangering U.S. intelligence agents. It aims only at halting the heedless behavior of those who freely put U.S. lives in danger, and that aim is worth the doing.

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Iraq - Iran - Saudi Arabia

Approved For Release 2009/06/15 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501430001-1

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ON PAGE E11

THE WASHINGTON POST
1 October 1980

JACK ANDERSON

Iraq's Secret Support — U.S. intelligence agencies have detected more Saudis than Soviets in the Iraqi woodpile. This contradicts press reports that the Iraqis are relying on Soviet support for their war effort. It's true that an Iraqi envoy, Tareq Aziz, flew to Moscow to seek more military supplies. But the Iraqis have been quietly shaking loose from the Soviet grip. One secret analysis claims that "Iraq's self-interest" is leading it "to take a position somewhere between Russia and America." Another topsecret report asserts that the Iraqis have moved "very close" to Saudi Arabia. The report calls the silent relationship "an evolving alliance, combining Iraq's political stability and military potential with the almost unlimited financial resources" of Saudi Arabia.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 19NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
1 October 1980

Secret history of a U.S. failure in Iran

By MICHAEL LEDEEN
and WILLIAM LEWIS

SECRET AND TOP-SECRET State Department cables between Washington and Tehran during the summer and autumn of 1979 show that the U.S. was pushing hard for military agreements with the government of Iran until just a few days before the seizure of the hostages in Tehran.

These agreements would have provided the Iranians with American spare parts for weapon systems—including Cobra helicopter gunships—that were to be used to fight the Iranian Kurds. Some U.S. officials believed the agreements would make it possible to achieve a policy breakthrough and establish good working relations with the Khomeini regime. Yet, in practice, the American policies probably encouraged the seizure of the embassy.

There had been special Pentagon missions to Iran since the spring, working out various arrangements to provide the Iranian military with badly needed equipment (especially spare parts) to keep the armed forces operational. By mid-July, Lt. Gen. Phillip Gast—the head of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Tehran—cabled Washington to suggest a visit by a special Pentagon team. And, in a distinctly upbeat cable dated July 30, Charge d'Affaires Bruce Laingen announced that Gast had just received a call from Col. Kamkar, the deputy minister of national defense, on behalf of his minister, Gen. Riahi. The Iranians asked that the United States attempt to speed up the flow of equipment to Iran.

As Laingen put it: "We can only speculate that Riahi's sense of urgency is associated with mounting problems in the West and Northwest. In any event, it is an indicator of their growing need for assistance and represents a direct request for U.S. favorable response. Mission supports strongly a favorable response.—Laingen."

There was a lot of evidence to support the "speculation": that the Iranians needed the spare parts to smash the Kurds, for during the same period Gast had cabled Washington with the news that the commander of the Ground Forces Logistics Command had also asked for rapid shipments of spare parts.

The reaction at top levels of the administration was highly enthusiastic, and both military and civilian officials were instructed to do everything possible to speed up the flow.

There was thus little ambiguity about what was going on: The Iranians wanted to wage war more effectively against the Kurds, and the Americans were willing to provide the wherewithal.

By August, the U.S. government was supplying some spare parts to the Iranian armed forces and was discussing the possibility of brand-new contracts in the amount of \$5 million or \$6 million. Indeed, we were pushing for these new contracts even though

we knew the purpose for which the weapons were being used, and even though we knew that Khomeini was using the war against the Kurds (and other ethnic separatists) to consolidate his own regime.

There was no American security interest at stake in the campaign against the Kurds. Indeed, it may even be argued that American interests favored support of the Kurds (a point made by several of our allies). But President Carter and his top advisers were anxious to demonstrate that "we could work with" the new Iranian regime. The President thus approved the military supply program, evidently hoping that this would be the opening wedge in an expanded government-to-government relationship.

The American enthusiasm can be judged from secret reports of a series of Iranian officials in October, 1979. The first took place in New York City

*Two analysts conclude
that American efforts to
placate Khomeini actually
emboldened him to seize
our embassy*

on Oct. 4 between Iranian Foreign Minister Yazdi and his aides on the one hand and Iran Country Director Henry Precht, Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Lucy Benson, David McGiffert (head of the Pentagon's International Security Agency) and Gen. Graves (head of the Defense Security Assistance Agency).

Precht's account of the meeting, in a cable sent on Oct. 6—two days after the meeting—reflects the atmosphere: "Meeting was characterized by frank, sometimes bluntly stated Iranian questions. . . . While the air was thick with suspicion there was little acrimony. U.S. side was extraordinarily patient and understanding, repeatedly indicating willingness to review issues on their merits and to provide additional information where feasible. . . ."

"Undersecretary Benson opened by indicating our willingness to cooperate with and assist Iran on defense matters where that was desired by both sides and feasible. She reaffirmed U. S. interest in Iran's independence, territorial integrity and security. . . ."

In other words, the Americans were pushing for cooperation on military matters, and the Iranians were suspicious. This suggested what would later turn out to be of considerable significance. While Iranian military personnel were eager to buy American weapons, the Islamic chieftains were suspicious of anything that looked like a U.S. effort to resume the previous level of relations.

The next meeting took place Oct. 6, this time at a

higher level. Secretary Vance, accompanied by Newsom, Saunders and UN Ambassador McHenry met with Yazdi. The meeting did not go as well as had been hoped. Yazdi said the United States had not yet accepted "the revolution" and asked for concrete steps to demonstrate American acceptance. Vance replied that the U.S. government had revealed its acceptance through a number of public statements. This was not enough, Yazdi said, and demanded the extradition of Iranian "criminals" who had fled to the United States after the revolution.

This was not what Vance had expected, and the meeting was a distinct setback to the campaign for hurried normalization of relations. Yet the American courtship of Iran continued unabated. In fact, at the very time these meetings were taking place in New York, Laingen was briefing leading American journalists in Washington. At a breakfast meeting at Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, Laingen told a small group of correspondents that things were going very nicely in Iran, that relations with the Khomeini regime were good, and he asked that American journalists be less hostile to the new government. He also suggested that the time had come to normalize relations and appoint an ambassador to Tehran.

This upbeat mood infected even the normally cautious Newsom, who left the meeting with Yazdi in New York convinced that "after a transition period common interests could provide a basis for future cooperation—not on the scale as before but sufficient to demonstrate that Iran has not been 'lost' to us and to the West."

Less than a week later—just three weeks prior to the seizure of the hostages—Gast met with the deputy minister of National Defense once again. Col. Kamkar had spoken with the new defense minister, Ali Chamran, and wanted to push the matter of spare parts. In return—and despite the somewhat discouraging meeting in New York—Gast suggested a new departure: Why didn't the Iranians set up a full-scale purchasing mission in Washington? This would permit them to make up an extensive shopping list and negotiate their purchases on the spot. Kamkar was interested and told Gast—in the words of the cable reporting the meeting—he would be pleased to have "any ideas based on similar missions now operated by Israel, the Federal Republic of Germany, and others in the United States."

On Nov. 1—three days before the seizure of the embassy—National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski went to Algiers for the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Algerian independence struggle. He took the opportunity—probably scheduled in advance—to meet with Yazdi and Prime Minister Bazargan. Brzezinski reiterated the points that had been made so often in the recent past: The United States recognized the revolution, had no

intention of helping the shah recover his throne, hoped that Bazargan and his colleagues would successfully create a stable political structure for Iran and encouraged full government-to-government relations. Brzezinski reported the meeting was highly successful. Three days later the hostages were seized.

Thus U.S. efforts to re-establish full relations with Iran failed. Ironically, the Carter administration—which had so often criticized the human rights performance of the shah—was eager to cooperate with the new regime, even though it was evident that the Islamic revolution was quite violent. Further, the administration was more than willing to be an accomplice in the war against the Kurds.

This was not the first time that an Iranian government had asked for U.S. cooperation in a campaign against the Kurds, for in 1975 the shah had decided to terminate his covert support to anti-Iraqi Kurdish groups, the government had acquiesced. In 1979 the situation was somewhat different: In this case, American active support was required if the Iranian campaign were to succeed. We were willing to support this war, hoping that it would open the door to good relations with the Iranian government.

Like so many desperate attempts, this one backfired. The effect of the American pursuit of good relations, stressing as it did the provision of American military material and the continued activity of U.S. military personnel in Iran, heightened the fear of the Iranian revolutionaries that the United States still wished to pursue an "imperialist" policy.

Thus, the ironical outcome: The American President, who had so resolutely abstained from taking any serious action to defend the shah—citing human rights violations and a policy of "non-interference" as justification—strained to provide the ayatollah's regime with the weapons it desperately needed to wage war against its own people. Yet despite this departure from the moralistic principles that had been supposed to underlie Carter's foreign policy, that policy failed to win over the ayatollah. Indeed, it appears that the courtship itself helped produce the reaction that led to the capture of the American diplomats in Tehran.

(Ledeer is executive editor of The Washington Quarterly. Lewis is a professor of political science at George Washington University. The Debacle, America's Failure in Iran, their book on the U.S. and the Iranian revolution, will be published in the spring.)

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **D-15**

NEW YORK TIMES
1 OCTOBER 1980

Few Signs Seen of Rush to Buy Oil

By ROBERT D. HERSHEY Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 30 — Prices of both refined products and crude oil moved up again in overseas spot markets today, with France and Brazil among the buyers, according to industry sources.

But while activity increased somewhat, specialists said demand remained erratic and there were few signs of a rush to buy oil at a time of record world inventories and slack demand.

In fact, "It would not appear to me that there are any distinct trends," said Brice A. Sachs, executive vice president of the Exxon International Company, before a House Energy subcommittee this morning.

Unlike the experience during the Ira-

nian revolution, Mr. Sachs added, the price effects of the Iraq-Iran conflict are "considerably more mixed and considerably more dampened."

Much attention at today's hearing and elsewhere was directed at trying to assess the damage to Middle East oil facilities, but reports were still sketchy. "Unfortunately we do not have any information on the extent or nature of the damage to either country's oil facilities," Mr. Sachs declared. "This will probably remain a major uncertainty at least until hostilities cease."

Another witness, Charles L. Campbell, senior vice president of the Gulf Trading and Transportation Company, said there appeared to be a "significant" amount of damage that might even force Iran and Iraq to import refined products, probably from other Persian Gulf producers.

But the company maintained there were some grounds for optimism. In the case of Iraq at least, exports could be expected to "come back fairly soon" after the fighting ends, the company said, a view that differed from the gloomy projections that prevail in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the Senate Energy Committee was briefed on the situation behind closed doors by officials of the State Department, the Energy Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator Henry M. Jackson, the Washington Democrat who is committee chairman, declined to comment on specific contingency plans discussed, including what might be done to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, but he said there had been "encouraging indications" that Iraqi oil exports could be resumed sooner than expected.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-6WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
1 OCTOBER 1980

Iraq Oil Safe, Analysts Tell Legislators

By Roberta Hornig

Washington Star Staff Writer

The United States believes that Iraqi oil facilities, although frequently bombed by Iran, have suffered minimal damage and that Iraqi oil exports can resume shortly after the war ends.

"This is a very important development," said Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., chairman of the Senate Energy committee, as he emerged from an hour-long briefing yesterday with the CIA and the state and energy departments.

Jackson said the intelligence experts reported that while some oil refineries suffered great damage from the bombings, oil supply systems did not.

"If the conflict comes to an end, damage to this state is not such that we can not get oil moving again within a relatively short time."

Jackson said the intelligence analysts said the most severe damage has been suffered by Iraqi refineries that process petroleum for internal consumption. Ports and pipelines that help move oil overseas have been less seriously damaged, he said.

But the analysts did indicate that the war could last longer than initially thought.

"I left (the briefing) with the impression that the hostilities can be prolonged," reported Sen. Ted Stevens, R-Alaska.

Jackson said that U.S. officials believe the world can weather the absence of 3 million barrels daily from Iraq until the end of the year.

Jackson said he believed that the only danger from losing Iraqi oil is to the price of oil. "And that is directly related to the length and duration of the cutoff of oil," Jackson said.

Iraq is the second-largest oil exporter of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

About 2 million barrels daily were cut off shortly after the war broke out last week. Roughly 1 million barrels more daily was cut off this weekend after one of Iraq's pipelines, running through Turkey, was sabotaged. The government then shut down a second pipeline that traverses Syria.

A State Department spokesman said last night that because of the current world oil glut, there are enough stockpiles of oil to preclude any severe shortage, such as occurred when Iran's exports were cut off two years ago.

The spokesman said that two of the major buyers of Iraqi oil — Italy and France — shortly will begin using their stockpiles.

The third big Iraqi customer, Brazil, may have a more difficult time and would likely have to begin buying oil on the spot market if the Iraqi cutoff lasts much longer.

Meanwhile, a Department of Energy report shows that spot crude oil market remains calm and is showing no signs of panic buying.

U.S. officials generally discount the oil lost from Iran on grounds that Iran — the second-largest supplier before its revolution — is no longer a major producer.

The U.S. buys no oil from Iran and only about 50,000 barrels daily from Iraq.

1 Oct 80

SMITHSONIAN NEWS SERVICE

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DATE 08-11-2010 BY 60322 UCBAW/SJS

THE PHOTOGRAPHS - WHICH ONE OFFICIAL DESCRIBED AS "REMARKABLE" IN CLARITY - PROBABLY ARE COMING FROM THE SUPER-SECRET KH-11 SATELLITES.

BUT THE HARDWARE SHOULD NOT CONFUSE THE OVERALL COVERAGE OF AN AREA MANY MILES WIDE OR ZOOM IN ON A SINGLE VEHICLE ON A BATTLEFIELD. THE PICTURES ARE TRANSMITTED INSTANTLY TO GROUND RECEIVING STATIONS.

NO DAMAGE TO REFINERIES, PIPELINES OR SHIPPING TERMINALS.

IRANIAN AIR RAIDS HAVE BEEN SPORADIC AT BEST, WITH LITTLE OR NO PRECISION BOMBING, ACCORDING TO PENTAGON OFFICIALS.

"FROM WHAT WE'VE SEEN SO FAR," SAID ONE SOURCE, "IT SHOULDN'T TAKE THE IRAQIS LONG TO GET BACK INTO PRODUCTION ONCE THERE IS A CEASE-FIRE."

NEWHOUSE NEWS

UNLESS THERE IS MORE EXTENSIVE DAMAGE FROM FURTHER RAIDS, IRAQI OIL COULD BE FLOWING AGAIN "IN A MATTER OF WEEKS RATHER THAN MONTHS," SAID THIS SOURCE, WHO WOULD DISCUSS THE INTELLIGENCE DATA ONLY GENERALLY AND ANONYMOUSLY.

THE HEAVIEST DAMAGE HAS BEEN TO IRAN'S ABADAN REFINERY NEAR WHERE THE SHATT-AL-ARAB WATERWAY FLOWS INTO THE PERSIAN GULF. IRAQI TROOPS HAVE HAD ABADAN UNDER SIEGE FOR A WEEK AND HAVE BEEN SHELLING BOTH THE CITY AND THE REFINERY.

ABADAN IS IRAN'S LARGEST REFINERY, BUT ITS PRODUCTION HAS CONSISTED ENTIRELY OF HEATING OIL FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION SINCE IRAN'S PETROLEUM OUTPUT PLUMMETED AFTER THE REVOLUTION THERE IN EARLY 1979.

PRIOR TO THE CURRENT FULL-SCALE BORDER WAR ACROSS THE SHATT-AL-ARAB, WHICH DIVIDES THE TWO COUNTRIES, IRAQ WAS EXPORTING 2.5 MILLION BARRELS OF OIL A DAY AND IRAN WAS SHIPPING 300,000 BARRELS A DAY, ACCORDING TO U.S. OIL INDUSTRY FIGURES.

IRAQ WAS THE SECOND-LARGEST EXPORTER IN THE WORLD (SAUDI ARABIA IS THE LARGEST), BUT ALL EXPORTS FROM BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN HAVE BEEN HALTED BY THE WAR.

OFFICIALS HERE SAID THEY BELIEVE IRAQ WILL HAVE AN EASIER TIME GETTING ITS OIL PRODUCTION GOING AGAIN AFTER THE WAR - NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT APPARENTLY HAS SUSTAINED LESS DAMAGE, BUT BECAUSE IT WILL HAVE LITTLE DIFFICULTY GETTING OUTSIDE HELP. IRAQ HAS THE CAPITAL IT WILL NEED TO MAKE THE NECESSARY REPAIRS, AND CAN COUNT ON HELP FROM EUROPEAN TECHNICIANS AND ENGINEERS, ESPECIALLY THE FRENCH, WHO ALREADY HAVE A HEAVY INVESTMENT THERE..

IRAN, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS MORE THAN HALF ITS OVERSEAS CAPITAL FROZEN IN U.S. BANKS BECAUSE MILITANT SUPPORTERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT CONTINUE TO HOLD 52 AMERICANS HOSTAGE. OF ITS ESTIMATED \$15 BILLION IN ASSETS OUTSIDE OF THE COUNTRY, ABOUT \$8 BILLION IS FROZEN IN U.S. BANKS. SOME OFFICIALS HERE ALSO BELIEVE IRAN WILL HAVE A TOUGHER TIME GETTING HELP FROM WESTERN OIL EXPERTS BECAUSE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY TURMOIL THERE.

THE UNITED STATES HAD GOTTEN VIRTUALLY NO OIL FROM IRAN SINCE THE SEIZURE OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN TEHRAN LAST NOVEMBER, AND BUYS VERY LITTLE OIL FROM IRAQ.

RB END SMITH

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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
6 October 1980

Letters to the Editor

Brzezinski's Actions

Contrary to your September 22 Whisper, no decision has been taken on any request for new equipment for Saudi Arabia's F-15 fighters. And no decision would be taken without consultation with Congress. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, accordingly, has not communicated advance word of such a decision to "friends," as you report.

I would also appreciate your correcting two other statements relating to Dr. Brzezinski in your September 29 issue. Although both stories have moved from the status of myth to that of gospel in Washington gossip, it is not true that Dr. Brzezinski even jokingly invited his Chinese hosts on the Great Wall to fight the Soviets in Ethiopia. His much-quoted and distorted aside on the subject was made to a staff aide. Further, in the Khyber Pass when he was presented a Chinese-made rifle for inspection, he inspected it muzzle down and did not aim it in any direction.

ALFRED FRIENDLY, JR.
Associate Press Secretary
National Security Council

Editor's Note: We stand by the Whisper on Saudi Arabia as it appeared. We take note of Brzezinski's version of the China Wall and Khyber Pass incidents as put forward by his press spokesman.

ARTICLE APPEARED
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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
22 September 1980

Washington Whispers

Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national-security adviser, is telling friends that Carter intends in 1981 to back Saudi Arabia's request for refitting its American-made F-15 fighter planes to give them offensive capability. Presumed reason for the delay: Fear of angering Jewish voters.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A1-12**

THE WASHINGTON POST
30 September 1980

U.S. May Deploy Radar Aircraft To Defend Saudis

President Confers With Hill Leaders

By Michael Getler and Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Carter summoned congressional leaders to the White House late yesterday amid indications he will soon dispatch U.S. Air Force airborne warning and control aircraft to Saudi Arabia to aid the air defense of the Persian Gulf.

Lawmakers who took part in the special 1½-hour briefing by the president and his senior advisers forecast an announcement of new U.S. efforts in the Iraq-Iran crisis within a few hours.

Defense officials said the deployment of the U.S. air defense aircraft to Saudi Arabia is highly likely, but that a final decision awaits the approval of an announcement acceptable to both countries. It was unclear last night whether the Saudis requested the deployment, or whether it was a U.S. initiative.

Yesterday afternoon's White House meeting, involving Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, CIA Director Stansfield Turner, presidential assistant Zbigniew Brzezinski and other top officials in addition to Carter, was the latest of a series of top-level conclaves over the past two days regarding the continuing war in the Persian Gulf.

U.S. consideration of the military deployment followed increasingly explicit threats by Iran to take action against any Persian Gulf countries cooperating with the military forces of its enemy, Iraq. These statements have generated concern in several small Persian Gulf oil sheikdoms, as well as in Saudi Arabia, that Iran might bomb their oil fields, refineries or other facilities in a new extension of the Iraq-Iran war.

The Air Force planes, called AWACs, are modified versions of the Boeing 707 jetliner and carry sophisticated radars that can see electronically about 250 miles in all directions. Thus, stationed over Saudi territory, they could detect any warplanes approaching the west side of the Persian Gulf and could assist in directing their interception by defensive forces.

The Carter administration dispatched two AWACs planes and about 250 U.S. Air Force personnel to Saudi Arabia in March 1970 when the war between North Yemen and South Yemen, on the Saudi border, created concern that the fighting might spill over to the oil kingdom. When the fighting subsided, the planes and U.S. personnel returned home.

After a private briefing by Muskie in New York earlier yesterday, Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a statement approving of the supply of "defensive assistance" to Saudi Arabia in present circumstances.

Church also said, "We should hold our Navy ready if needed to participate in keeping open the Strait of Hormuz, should a naval presence become necessary either for the purpose of keeping the strait open or to protect oil tankers." Church said such a naval presence might involve the participation of British, French and Australian vessels as well as those of the United States.

Muskie conferred in New York early yesterday with representatives of Bahrain and Oman, two Persian Gulf states that could be threatened by a widening of the Iraq-Iran war. There was no report on whether Muskie discussed with them the possible dispatch of the U.S. air defense aircraft.

The secretary of state also saw Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, whose chief of state, President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, has traveled to Iran and Iraq on behalf of the Islamic conference of states in an effort to encourage mediation efforts that would end the fighting. Zia is expected to arrive in New York today to visit the United Nations, with a side trip to Washington later this week.

Zia's mission to the two combatant states failed to bring any indication of a halt to the fighting in the near future, and there was doubt in diplomatic circles that a cease-fire could soon be arranged.

As seen by State Department officials monitoring reports from the war zone, the prospect is for a relatively lengthy war. Both Iran and Iraq now seem to be seeking the overthrow of the ruling powers in the regime of the other as a central objective, these sources said. While the downfall of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein or Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini cannot be ruled out in time, these are unnegotiable objectives.

The damage to oil refineries and other oil installations in both Iraq and Iran during a week of fighting is believed to be extensive. And as Iraqi troops move in measured but deliberate pace further into the Iranian oil province of Khuzestan, there is no lessening of the danger of additional damage to the petroleum assets on both sides.

Two principal flashpoints could bring a dramatic widening of the war to outside powers, in the view of Washington officials.

One is the possibility of Iranian air strikes against states in the area which, in Tehran's view, are aiding Iraq. In an interview broadcast yesterday on Tehran Radio, Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Rajai said his country has warned the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Jordan and other similar states that Iran will consider that it is at war with them if they continue alleged aid to Iraq.

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The other possibility is Iranian action to shut off the flow of oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, thus striking at the vital petroleum life-line of many western nations. Iran has permitted tankers to proceed through the strait so far, so long as they do not put in at Iraqi ports. The commander of the Iranian navy, Admiral Afdal, was quoted on Tehran Radio yesterday as saying that his forces are now "in complete control" of the strategic strait.

Staff writer John M. Goshko contributed to this article.

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ON PAGE **B15**

THE WASHINGTON POST
30 September 1980

JACK ANDERSON

Iraq Is Developing a Nuclear Arsenal

Behind the battle smoke along the Iraqi-Iranian border, Iraq is secretly developing nuclear weapons, which could add a frightening incendiary in the midst of all those oil barrels and powder kegs.

The Defense Intelligence Agency has concluded that Iraq will become the first Arab nation to build a nuclear arsenal. The Iraqis don't have nuclear weapons that could be turned against the Iranians today, but they are expected to produce "a number" of nuclear warheads by 1985.

It's more likely these warheads would be used against Israel. An Iraqi nuclear arsenal, according to one top-secret Pentagon analysis, would have "a potential for threatening Israel," which already is "stockpiling nuclear warheads."

This could create "a classic unstable nuclear balance" in the turbulent Middle East, which could lead to a nuclear exchange, warns a related document from the Pentagon's secret files.

But at least one top analyst believes Israel won't wait around for the Iraqis to produce nuclear weapons. "This most pressing problem for the United States," he writes, "is not the prospect of a nuclear conflict involving Israel and Iraq... but rather the prospect of a preemptive Israeli strike, with conventional weapons, against the [Iraqi] reactor."

The world can thank the French for introducing this terrifying incendiary into the Persian Gulf oil region. In order to ingratiate themselves with their oil suppliers, the French are shipping enriched, weapons-grade uranium to Iraq. All it takes to build a nuclear bomb is 20 kilos; the French have agreed to deliver 70 to 80 kilos as a beginning. They have

also offered to train Iraqi personnel in nuclear technology.

Iraq already has an ugly array of Soviet-made missiles, which can be armed with nuclear warheads. A nuclear missile bombardment, of course, would devastate tiny Israel. This threat reportedly has spurred the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad, to sabotage nuclear reactors that France was building for Iraq.

Adds a top-secret DIA report: "Prudently, we must assume that Israel is considering some sort of action to forestall Iraqi acquisition of a nuclear capability, and we must consider the implications of such actions."

Footnote: The French have also agreed to supply Iraq with 100 Mirage F1 and Delta2000 warplanes, as well as warships, tanks and antitank weaponry. Intelligence reports claim the Iraqis wish to be less dependent upon the Soviet Union for their military supplies.

ARTICLE APPROVED
ON PAGE 27AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
29 September 1980**Surveillance Capabilities in Mideast Conflict**

Washington—Soviet Union had at least two film-return military reconnaissance spacecraft in a position to conduct surveillance over the conflict between Iran and Iraq last week.

Soviet Cosmos 1,210 reconnaissance spacecraft launched Sept. 19 was passing over the combat area at noon each day. The spacecraft was launched from Plesetsk into a 268 x 195-km. (166 x 121-mi.) initial orbit inclined 82.3 deg.

Cosmos 1,210 is a type of reconnaissance spacecraft that normally remains in orbit for two weeks before the entire spacecraft is returned to earth for recovery of its intelligence data. It was possible the spacecraft would be returned earlier to enhance the value of the images. During the Arab/Israeli war, similar Soviet spacecraft were returned to earth after only six-day missions.

Cosmos 1,208, another Soviet reconnaissance spacecraft that could have provided the Soviets more timely data on the war, was returned to earth Sept. 24 when the Iranian/Iraqi fighting was intense. Cosmos 1,208 was launched Aug. 26 and unlike Cosmos 1,210 was believed to have a film pod return capability allowing sequential return of data before the entire spacecraft was deorbited also carrying a film payload. The 30-day mission flown by this spacecraft is standard for its configuration, but could have been especially helpful to Soviet monitoring of the Mideast fighting.

A third Russian imaging reconnaissance spacecraft, Cosmos 1,211, launched from Plesetsk Sept. 23, could also be involved in observing the warfare, although its radio frequency characteristics are more like Soviet military mapping missions. The spacecraft was, however, on a nearly identical ground track with Cosmos 1,210 late last week and following 1,210 by about 45 min. Cosmos 1,211 was launched from Plesetsk into a 261 x 215-km. (162 x 133-mi.) orbit inclined 82.4 deg.

Another new Soviet spacecraft that does not have a relation to the war is an advanced Meteor-2 weather spacecraft launched from Plesetsk Sept. 9 into a 906 x 868-km. (562 x 539-mi.) orbit inclined 82.3 deg.

U. S. Air Force Lockheed Big Bird film-return reconnaissance spacecraft launched June 18 and a KH-11 digital image transmission spacecraft launched Feb. 7 (AW&ST July 7, p. 25) were capable of providing the U. S. with satellite reconnaissance of the Iranian and Iraqi force movements last week.

THE PITTSBURGH PRESS
22 September 1980

Iran Hostage Crisis Called Result Of Weak CIA

By WILLIAM ALLAN Sr.
Press Roving Editor

The Iranian hostage situation is a direct result of the crippling of the CIA, says Dr. Ray S. Cline, who has lived James Bond movies for more than 30 years.

"A first-class intelligence operation would have had the revolutionary movement penetrated, detected the hostage thing and forestalled it," he says. "The present hostage situation is a direct result of the United States not having intelligence capability."

Cline cut his intelligence teeth breaking Japanese codes for the Navy in World War II, moved on to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and then to the CIA and State Department. He is now an executive director at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

In the 1970s, after Congress clamped down on some CIA activities, the U.S. intelligence effort switched heavily to monitoring from above — satellites, photography, etc.

"But the hostage situation is the exact thing you need people for," Cline emphasized. "We had all the photographs of Iran we could use but they didn't tell us what was in peoples' minds."

"I firmly believe that the CIA of the 1950s and early '60s would have prevented the hostage situation. It would have known the political and social situation in Iran and would not have allowed our people there to become sitting ducks."

After the hostages were trapped in the U.S. embassy in Tehran "there was not much we could do," Cline allows, but his study of the aborted rescue attempt convinces him it was "as bad as it seemed."

"A slightly more sophisticated, better coordinated operation could have handled the rescue," he says. "What we tried was more of a commando operation, with no real intelligence involved. It was poorly planned, poorly coordinated."

Cline argues that intelligence operations, while complicated and bureaucratic, are more important to a free society than to a closed one.

In addition to the CIA, he says, the United States employs, for intelligence-gathering purposes, the Army, Navy and Air Force, the FBI, the State and Treasury departments, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

The Central Intelligence Agency is just that — the agency that puts all of these inputs together.

Pearl Harbor, he argues, probably would have been detected if a CIA had been around to put together all the pieces of information other agencies already had.

Covert operations — which are what got the CIA into trouble — weren't all that hidden, he maintains.

One — Radio Free Europe — has been very popular, and in fact, is being jammed again by the Russians, particularly in the area of Poland.

Another, to which Cline points as a good covert operation, was "sponsoring the defeat of the communists in the 1948 Italian elections."

He says Italy was unorganized in the wake of World War II and the communists, aided by the Soviet Union, were very strong. So the United States financed the opposition (which already was there) and showed the anti-communists some election techniques that enabled them to win.

Some covert operations are not so easy to defend: Assassinations, or attempted assassinations, of the opposition in foreign countries.

Cline, looking back, says:

"The things which Americans sort of culturally disagree with are relative few — mainly attempted assassinations."

"But I suspect that if somebody today said they could assassinate (Libyan dictator Moammar) Khadafy, the public outcry wouldn't be very negative."

"And I'm sure that when Eisenhower and Kennedy clearly signaled they'd like

somebody to get rid of Castro, that would have been presentable to 90 percent of the people of the United States if put to them in a referendum.

"So we tend to be a little hypocritical and pious in retrospect."

There's legislation before Congress to restructure the intelligence community, and in all of it assassination is out — even when ordered by the president.

"The other way to stop assassinations is for the presidents of the United States not to order them," Cline suggests.

He thinks a workable agency can be set up for covert operations limited to "modest assistance to good elements in a society," elements which lean our way.

Cline also is for legislation that would make it a crime to identify our spies in other countries.

He says former agents, now authoring books, are dropping the names of people who helped the United States in the past. And that, of course, works against getting an organization together again, whatever the Congressional guidelines.

(Second in a series of articles based on news briefings by Mideast experts at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies.)

ONLY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA.

BY JOHN BULLOCH

DAILY TELEGRAPH; LONDON (FIELD NEWS SERVICE)

THE MAIN REASON FOR THE UNFLUSTERED AND LOW-KEY WESTERN RESPONSE TO THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR EMERGED WHEN DETAILS OF THE LATEST INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS BECAME KNOWN.

RIGHT FROM THE START, AMERICAN SATELLITES HAVE BEEN BEAMING BACK HOURLY PICTURES OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND, WHILE RADIO SURVEILLANCE STATIONS HAVE BEEN MONITORING ALL THE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED.

AND, UNLIKE THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF IRAQ AND IRAN BROADCAST FROM BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN, THESE CLANDESTINE WAYS OF MEASURING THE WAR PUT THIS GULF CONFLICT FAIRLY LOW DOWN ON THE INTERNATIONAL RICHTER SCALE OF MAYHEM.

NO MORE THAN THREE IRAQI DIVISIONS HAVE BEEN ENGAGED SO FAR, ACCORDING TO THE INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS RELEASED FRIDAY, WHILE THE BAGHDAD GOVERNMENT HAS AT ITS DISPOSAL A TOTAL OF 13 DIVISIONS. ON THE IRANIAN SIDE, THE NUMBER OF TROOPS INVOLVED IS EVEN SMALLER.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE FIGHTING HAS NOT BEEN SEVERE AND NASTY IN MANY PLACES, ANALYSTS POINT OUT.

WHAT IT DOES MEAN IS THAT IRAQ HAS NOT COMMITTED ALL ITS FORCES, AND THEREFORE APPEARS TO BE INTENT ON FIGHTING A VERY LIMITED WAR.

OTHER SURPRISES HAVE SURFACED TOO. IT WAS WIDELY ACCEPTED IN THE WEST THAT, BECAUSE OF THE CHAOS IN IRAN AND THE TOTAL CUT-OFF OF AMERICAN SUPPLIES, THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE COULD EXIST ONLY BY CANNIBALIZING AIRCRAFT. VERY FEW PHANTOMS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TAKE TO THE AIR.

IN FACT, THE IRANIANS SEEM TO HAVE HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN KEEPING THEIR PLANES AIRBORNE, AND HAVE CARRIED THE WAR TO THE HEART OF BAGHDAD, TO THE OBVIOUS SURPRISE AND DISCOMFORT OF THE IRAQIS.

IN ADDITION, THERE IS EVIDENCE OF SOUND STRATEGIC THINKING IN THE TARGETS WHICH HAVE BEEN CHOSEN FOR THE IRANIAN PLANES, SOMETHING IRAQ AND THE WEST ALIKE THOUGHT IMPOSSIBLE WITH THE REMOVAL OF SO MANY SENIOR IRANIAN OFFICERS. THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAS BEEN STRIKING REPEATEDLY AT TARGETS IN SUCH PLACES AS KIRKUK AND IRBIL, MAIN KURDISH TOWNS INSIDE IRAQ.

THESE RAIDS, COUPLED WITH THE STEADY FLOW OF PROPAGANDA FROM TEHRAN, MIGHT BE CALCULATED TO CAUSE THE KURDS TO ASK WHY THEY SHOULD BE PUNISHED FOR A WAR LAUNCHED BY THE REGIME IN BAGHDAD. FOLLOWING THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN, UNREST AMONG THE IRAQI KURDS HAS INCREASED, SO THAT AN INCREASING NUMBER OF IRAQI TROOPS HAVE HAD TO BE STATIONED THERE TO CONTAIN THE SITUATION.

WHILE SATELLITE PICTURES AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYSES SHOW THAT THE IRAQI ARMY IS DICTATING THE SHAPE OF AFFAIRS ON THE GROUND, IT IS EQUALLY PLAIN THAT THE IRANIAN NAVY HAS BEEN LITTLE TOUCHED SO FAR, DESPITE LARGE IRAQI CLAIMS.

IN SOME QUARTERS, IT IS BELIEVED THAT IT WAS THESE FACTORS WHICH INDUCED IRAQ TO OFFER TENTATIVE PEACE TERMS AT A STAGE WHEN IT APPEARED TO BE WINNING.

ANOTHER ASSESSMENT WAS THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN OF IRAQ WAS LED TO EMBARK ON THIS ADVENTURE AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME BY IRANIAN EXILES. THEY HAD PROMISED AN UPRISING OR ARMY COUP IN TEHRAN TO COINCIDE WITH THE IRAQI ATTACK, BUT BY THE TIME IT WAS CLEAR THAT WAS NOT GOING TO TAKE PLACE, PRESIDENT HUSSEIN HAD ALREADY COMMITTED HIS TROOPS.

IF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ARE CORRECT-AND THE BASIC ISSUE IS THE INTERPRETATION OF SATELLITE PICTURES-THEN THIS WOULD AID THE EFFORTS OF THE VARIOUS FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK TO FIND A FORMULA UNDER WHICH PEACE COULD BREAK OUT. IRAQ, AS WELL AS IRAN, SHOULD NOW BE READY FOR A CEASEFIRE, THE ARGUMENT GOES, SO ALL THAT REMAINS IS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO FIND A SUITABLE FORM OF WORDS.

ENDIT BULLOCH
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ARTICLE REPRODUCED
ON PAGE A-5NEW YORK TIMES
27 September 1980

Gulf War Said to Reveal U.S. Intelligence Lapses

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 26 — The war between Iran and Iraq has exposed serious deficiencies in United States intelligence-gathering abilities in the strategically vital Persian Gulf region, according to senior aides in the Carter Administration and intelligence officials.

The Administration aides said that despite two years of political turmoil in Iran, the recent fighting and the overall importance of the area's oil production to the West, American intelligence operations remained heavily focused on the Soviet Union and China rather than on the Persian Gulf.

This emphasis, which some officials believe is a mistaken holdover from the cold-war era, has been coupled with a general effort to consolidate and limit intelligence expenditures, leaving the United States poorly informed about specific events unfolding in the Persian Gulf area as well as about political, cultural and economic trends in the region, the officials said.

Data From News Accounts

In some instances in the Iraq-Iran conflict, they said, the Administration learned about battles and bombing raids from news accounts hours before receiving confirmation from intelligence sources.

An even greater problem has been a lack of accurate background intelligence data about the strengths and weaknesses of the Iranian and Iraqi military forces. Senior intelligence officials, for example, were surprised by the performance of the Iranian Air Force.

Intelligence reports from Iran led officials to believe that its air force was practically useless because of a lack of spare parts, trained personnel and jet fuel. In response to the seizure of American hostages, Washington last year halted the export of spare parts to Iran. But in the current conflict the Iranian Air Force has been able to use its American-built F-4 and F-5 jet fighters.

Logistics Data Is Scarce

Officials here also said the Government did not have the kind of intelligence information necessary to make accurate predictions about the future course of the war. They said there was a shortage of information about the logistical abilities of the two armies as well as about troop morale. But intelligence on military matters has tended to be of a higher quality than the information about cultural, political and economic affairs of the Persian Gulf nations, officials said.

"We are weak in the bazaars, on the campuses, in the streets where the life of a nation takes place," an official said.

Another said, "Frankly, we're in the Dark Ages when it comes to knowing what makes these nations tick."

The problem, according to officials, stems from several distinct elements.

Budget Problems Are Described

One source of difficulty is the traditional concentration of resources, both human and electronic, on the Soviet Union and China. While officials stressed that the Soviet Union and China require extensive surveillance, they said that the United States had been slow to develop resources in other strategically important areas, including the Persian Gulf.

The need to focus attention on other areas has also been slowed by an effort in recent years to limit expenditures on intelligence and a drive by the Carter Administration to consolidate resources and manpower.

The budget for United States intelligence agencies is classified, so public analysis of expenditure levels is not possible.

In the case of the Persian Gulf these factors boil down to several practical problems. The United States lacks the requisite number of agents on the ground to piece together a comprehensive intelligence picture of either Iran or Iraq, as well as of other nations in the area, officials said.

Some Administration officials noted, for example, that they had been surprised by the lack of intelligence information available on merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf. Such information, they said, would become critically important if the current fighting interferes with the flow of oil from the area.

Problem of Retraining Agents

Some officials said that it often takes years to train agents to work in the Persian Gulf area because of language and cultural factors, and it takes still more time to deploy them and provide them with cover.

It is also costly and time-consuming to adjust electronic surveillance from one area to another, officials said. The United States depends heavily on intelligence gathered by satellites and other electronic means. Retargeting a surveillance satellite from the Soviet Union to the Persian Gulf, for example, might require changing its orbit. Such maneuvers reduce the life expectancy of satellites.

During the controversy over the presence of a brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba last year, the Administration acknowledged that regular photographic surveillance of Cuba by satellite and aircraft had been suspended for more than a year. One reason for the suspension was to remove a possible irritant in Cuban-American relations; another was the higher priority of alternative tasks for satellites.